When Joe Biden made his first speech as president-elect of the United States, he declared that a revived America would ‘lead not by the example of our power, but by the power of our example’. For Americans who believed Donald Trump’s antics debased the office of the president, Biden’s pledge to restore Washington’s moral leadership would have offered much relief by evoking comfortable images of American exceptionalism. But those very images of a moralistic and restrained United States, while welcome domestically and perhaps in Europe, won’t help an Indo-Pacific grappling with the challenges posed by an increasingly aggressive People’s Republic of China.

The Indo-Pacific is a politically diverse, multipolar region whose constituent governments, by and large, want to retain their sovereignty and avoid falling under Beijing’s orbit. That requires an interested, engaged America that can act as a backstop against China’s military expansionism.

Though Trump’s personal bombast and antipathy for alliances rubbed some world leaders up the wrong way, his administration’s willingness to use American power sent an important message. Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of the Singaporean ministry of foreign affairs, outlined the case in a recent article for Nikkei Asia. ‘Trump understood power, albeit instinctively’, Kausikan observed. Whereas Barack Obama failed to enforce his ‘red line’ over Bashar al-Assad’s grotesque use of chemical weapons against his own people, Trump ‘bombed Syria … while at dinner with Xi Jinping’. The episode ‘did much to restore the credibility of American power’, Kausikan argued, for the simple reason that Trump had shown Beijing, rather conspicuously, that Washington’s red lines again meant something. That message likely offered some reassurance to a region facing China’s grey-zone coercion in the South China Sea.

To be fair, Biden hasn’t yet been given an opportunity to back up his rhetoric with demonstrations of American power. And the Biden campaign’s rhetoric has been appropriately tough. Jeffrey Prescott and Ely Ratner, two key advisers on the Biden campaign, argue that he ‘will rally the free world and mobilize half the world’s economy to hold Beijing to account for its trade abuses’.

Michèle Flournoy, who’s likely to be Biden’s defence secretary, believes that the US military will need reinvigoration so that it can ‘sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours’. Biden himself has even called Xi a ‘thug’. These are promising rhetorical signs that a Biden administration won’t be as reluctant as Obama’s to counter Chinese aggression.

That said, the actions of the Biden team since the election suggest that the new administration may not walk the talk. The first sign was Biden’s apparent unwillingness to follow the Trump administration’s precedent by accepting a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen. Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, explained that Taipei had been working with Biden’s team on ways to ensure that Tsai’s congratulations were formally passed on to the president-elect. The result was a phone call between Taipei’s Washington envoy Bi-khim Hsiao and Biden foreign policy adviser (and the man who’ll reportedly be secretary of state) Antony Blinken, effectively downgrading US–Taiwan ties.

Rhetoric and phone calls aside, more insight into how Biden might approach China is likely to come from his picks for senior foreign policy roles. As Thomas Wright argued in an article for the Lowy Institute, the foreign policy advisers who will likely take key positions in a Biden administration can be divided into two camps: the ‘restorationists’ and the ‘reformers’.

‘Restorationists’ admire the judiciousness with which Obama deployed military force, assign similar weight to transnational threats and geopolitical competition in the conduct of American statecraft, and believe in America’s resilience as a great power. ‘Reformers’ believe that America needs to play a more active role in protecting its economic interests and cooperating with other countries, particularly democracies, to out-compete rising powers like China.

The most notable restorationist is Susan Rice, who was in the running to be Biden’s secretary of state but did not get the nod. This will be welcome news to Asia hands. Numerous commentators have argued that Rice’s appointment to any senior role would be poorly received across the Indo-Pacific, especially in Japan, due to her reportedly weak grasp of regional issues.

Another restorationist is John Kerry, who has just been selected as Biden’s presidential envoy for climate change. Given China’s status as the world’s largest polluter, Kerry’s job will be to find ways of working with Beijing in order to secure a meaningful multilateral deal on climate change. Whether Kerry’s bid to cooperate with Beijing will come at the cost of some of Biden’s more competitive policies will depend on how effective other members of Biden’s team are at getting the president’s ear.

That’s where the reformers come in. Kurt Campbell is probably the best-known reformist in the Biden camp, having been the architect of Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. Campbell has long argued that the US needs to develop a coherent strategy to out-compete China militarily, diplomatically and economically. Campbell’s views, along with his considerable expertise and connections in the region, would make him welcome in most Indo-Pacific capitals. However, his name, hasn’t arisen much in press speculation about Biden’s possible senior appointments. Even if other reformers, like Ely Ratner and Jeffrey Prescott, take reasonably important roles in the national security bureaucracy, it seems unclear just how much influence the group will have with the president.

Sitting between the restorationists and reformers is Antony Blinken, who has been announced as Biden’s pick for secretary of state. Blinken seems to have developed a stronger appetite for competition than other Obama-era figures, but wants to work with Beijing to ensure that these competitive dynamics don’t escalate into confrontation. The task for Blinken will be to strike the right balance and ensure that the Biden administration doesn’t revert to the old norm of US diplomacy that privileges cooperation with China over competition.

Important though foreign policy cliques may be, domestic challenges are likely to take up considerable bandwidth in the Biden White House. In this respect, the writings and ambitions of Jake Sullivan, Biden’s pick for national security adviser, are particularly revealing. A former foreign policy hand in the Obama administration, Sullivan has been vocal in arguing that American foreign policy needs to better address the country’s internal needs, and he was reportedly more interested in a domestic policy role during the campaign. Given the weight of America’s problems at home, ranging from the coronavirus to a burgeoning national debt, it seems likely that Sullivan will ensure Biden’s key foreign policy decisions are better aligned with America’s domestic priorities.

Joe Biden may prove to be a president who takes a tough-minded approach to China that is supported by a well-executed and competitive strategy. Yet, what emerges from a preliminary look at the Biden transition is an administration that looks similar to Barack Obama’s—risk-averse and preoccupied by domestic concerns. For Americans who want to see a divided (and sick) nation heal, that may be just what the doctor ordered. But for countries in the Indo-Pacific that are living under the shadow of an increasingly aggressive Beijing, reviving the Obama administration’s overly cautious approach would be a bad outcome.

America can’t just lead by the power of its example. It also needs to lead by the example of its power.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has lost no time pivoting to the incoming US administration, declaring he hopes US President-elect Joe Biden and his wife Jill will visit Australia for next year’s 70th anniversary of ANZUS.

‘This is a profound time, not just for the United States, but for our partnership and the world more broadly’, Morrison told a news conference on Sunday.

‘And I look forward to forging a great partnership in the spirit of the relationships that has always existed between prime ministers of Australia and presidents of the United States.’

Those around Morrison say the government is already familiar with many figures in the Biden firmament, who were players in the Barack Obama presidency.

Morrison also thanked Donald Trump and his cabinet ‘with whom we have had a very, very good working relationship over the years of the Trump administration’, adding, ‘of course, that will continue through the transition period.’

Meanwhile, Labor leader Anthony Albanese retrospectively sought to put a less controversial gloss on his Friday comment, when he said Morrison should contact Trump and convey ‘Australia’s strong view that democratic processes must be respected’.

On Sunday Albanese said: ‘What I suggested was that Scott Morrison needed to stand up for democracy. He’s done that in acknowledging the election of President-elect Biden.’

Within Australia political attention is quickly turning to what a Biden administration will mean for the Morrison government’s climate change policies, and how Biden will handle China.

With an activist climate policy a central feature of Biden’s agenda, including a commitment to net zero emissions by 2050 (which Australia has refused to embrace), Australia faces an increased risk of becoming isolated internationally on the issue.

That could have trade and investment implications, something of concern to the business community.

Morrison sought to highlight a common Australia–US commitment to technology.

He said he particularly welcomed campaign comments Biden made ‘when he showed a lot of similarity to Australia’s views on how technology can be used to address the lower emissions challenge.

‘We want to see global emissions fall and it’s not enough for us to meet our commitments,’ Morrison said.

‘We need to have the transformational technologies that are scalable and affordable for the developing world as well, because that is where all the emissions increases are coming from … in the next 20 years’, he said.

‘I believe we will have a very positive discussion about partnerships we can have with the United States about furthering those technological developments that will see a lower emissions future for the world but a stronger economy as well where we don’t say goodbye to jobs’, Morrison said.

Labor will use the Biden win as a springboard to ramp up its attack on the government over climate policy, including in parliament this week.

Albanese said Biden would reject ‘accounting tricks’ like the government’s argument that it should be allowed to use carryover credits to reach emission reduction targets.

Former Liberal prime minister Malcolm Turnbull told the ABC the US result gave Morrison the opportunity to pivot on climate policy. Now was the time for him to say, ‘I don’t have to go on with all of the BS about a gas-led recovery, which is political piffle’, Turnbull said.

Chief of the Australian Industry Group Innes Willox said the Biden administration would place much more emphasis on climate change and energy policy.

‘The commitment to net zero emissions by 2050 will encourage other economies to move down this path. We are already seeing significant steps in recent times from other major trading partners such as Japan, South Korea, the UK and the European Union.

‘Australia, led by industry and investor action, is already headed this way without making a formal target commitment’, Willox said.

Willox said independent MP Zali Steggall’s climate change bill—with a pathway to a 2050 target—provided an immediate opportunity to move the debate forward. The bill will be introduced on Monday.

‘The bill is non-partisan. 2050 is many changes of government away, but for some industries it’s just a couple of investment cycles’, Willox said. The Steggall bill is receiving considerable business support.

Willox said the other shift of importance for Australian industry from a Biden administration would be ‘the opportunity for the US to re-engage with China on trade and broader economic issues.

‘Efforts to take the heat out of differences on global trade through a change in tone will be welcomed but there should be no illusion that a Biden administration would seek to markedly soften the US’s stance on key issues’, Willox said.

‘The risk for Australia until now has been that we have been caught up as collateral damage in the US–China trade dispute.

‘The future risk is that China may seek to substitute Australian exports in key sectors with goods from the US in an effort to reset their economic relationship’, Willox said.

Asked about the prospect of the US rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Morrison said, ‘I think it would be very early days to speculate on those matters. I would simply say to the United States, the door has always remained open on the TPP. It is open now. It will be open in the future and you are welcome any time.’

With the presidential election only 10 days away, what US nuclear strategy might be under a Joe Biden administration and what that might imply for US extended nuclear deterrence should be key issues of concern for the region, and for Australia.

The US is facing a more adverse strategic environment than it has for a long time. It is confronted by two nuclear-capable peer adversaries: China, which is seen as the main threat, and Russia, whose nuclear force is being upgraded rapidly. The modernisation of China’s nuclear forces could cause Beijing to shift away from its traditional no-first-use policy.

The combination of Russian and Chinese nuclear capability development—not to mention an unpredictable and nuclear-armed North Korea, and the prospect of an Iranian nuclear breakout as a consequence of President Donald Trump’s scrapping of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—means that Biden would have to think carefully before succumbing to calls to adhere to a ‘no first use’ doctrine or to make a ‘sole purpose’ declaration. Both of these options will be advocated by proponents in the US arms-control and disarmament community.

As President Barack Obama’s deputy, Biden supported the idea of a no-first-use posture for nuclear weapons, stating in 2017 that, ‘Given our non-nuclear capacities and the nature of today’s threats, it’s hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or would make sense.’ The Democratic Party’s 2020 platform suggests that ‘the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal should be to deter—and, if necessary, retaliate against—a nuclear attack, and we will work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with our allies and military’.

The platform also commits to ‘work to maintain a strong, credible deterrent while reducing our overreliance and excessive expenditure on nuclear weapons’, but would apparently cancel both the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile and low-yield warhead for the Trident—both initiatives of the Trump administration’s 2018 nuclear posture review.

So it seems probable that a Biden administration would seek to move back to nuclear policy that is similar to, if perhaps a bit more ambitious than, that suggested in Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, which emphasised nuclear disarmament that was consistent with maintaining a ‘safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies’.

The risk is that Biden may still view nuclear weapons through the lens of Prague 2009, rather than the strategic reality of 2020. In 2009, the main threat to the US came from international terrorism and nuclear weapons were largely seen as peripheral. But that was then and this is now, and the primary threat is from peer adversaries such as China and Russia.

Of course, Biden isn’t blind to the challenges from China and Russia, but the military capabilities—including nuclear ones—of America’s peer adversaries have improved considerably during the past 11 years.

Today, the US and its allies face a far more potent military challenge in technological terms and traditional advantages are being eroded in key areas. For example, the US Navy is being openly challenged by a rapidly expanding and modernising People’s Liberation Army Navy, and the PLA Air Force has undertaken a broad modernisation of its air combat capabilities that involves replacing obsolete third-generation platforms with advanced ‘ fourth-plus’ and fifth-generation systems, including for strategic strike.

The establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force and the growth of advanced Chinese counter-space, cyber and electronic ‘network warfare’ capabilities is placing the US lead in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) at risk, and with it the US ability to rapidly gain and sustain a knowledge edge in warfare. The PLA Rocket Force has grown dramatically and now has far more potent anti-access/area-denial capabilities that are increasingly putting the US ability to project power into the western Pacific at risk.

Russia’s military continues to engage in large-scale modernisation. Moscow faces greater challenges in economic terms to sustain such an effort, but investment in long-range hypersonic missiles, the blurring of boundaries between strategic non-nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons, and new counter-space and cyber systems are making Russia a more dangerous foe in 2020 than it was in 2009.

With these developments in mind, now is not the time for well-intentioned efforts towards denuclearisation or adoption of a no-first-use posture. Any decision by Biden to embrace a ‘sole purpose’ declaration would end US strategic ambiguity. With the military balance much less skewed in the US’s favour, China and Russia could use conventional military force to impose their will, without having to worry about a nuclear riposte from the US, so long as they themselves remained below the nuclear threshold. With enhanced conventional capabilities, they now have a much greater ability to inflict heavy losses on US forces. If they sink an aircraft carrier or two or use overwhelming force against US allies, for example, what would a Biden administration committed to a no-first-use policy do?

Such a state of affairs would not engender confidence in US extended nuclear deterrence among America’s allies. For Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra, or Warsaw for that matter, knowing that the US would no longer deter major conventional attacks by maintaining the possibility of a nuclear response would increase the prospects of military coercion or threats from China and Russia.

That prospect is certain to have some decision-makers—notably in Tokyo and Seoul—re-examining their options for acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, simply because they could no longer count on the US.

It would also leave Australia in a difficult position. The 2009 defence white paper’s comment on the importance of extended nuclear deterrence still resonates today:

Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance. That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.

Winning Wisconsin is key to Donald Trump’s re-election. In 2016, he secured an upset win in the state by a margin of less than 1%, which was critical in helping him cobble together an electoral college majority. In 2020, both the Democrats and Republicans view winning Wisconsin as vital to victory and the state is being hit with a blizzard of political messaging, in the form of conventional advertising and social media campaigning.

To understand how political campaigning works in Wisconsin, it helps to have a sense of the state’s deeply segregated political geography. The two largest counties—inner-city Milwaukee county, and Dane county containing the capital Madison—vote Democratic in overwhelming numbers.

Outside urban areas, formerly blue rural and regional areas are now solidly red. Trump signs are ubiquitous, and economic issues are much less salient than the cultural touchstones of guns, abortion and immigration. Slogans like ‘No More Bullshit’ are a common sight on flags and garden signs. While the Joe Biden camp has tried to make inroads by emphasising the disastrous consequences of the trade war with China for Wisconsin farmers, its efforts have had little impact.

That means the suburban vote is the key battleground for both parties. The ‘WOW’ counties (Waukesha, Ozaukee and Washington) that surround the city of Milwaukee used to be the beating heart of the Republican party. Local right-wing talk-radio hosts like Charlie Sykes had national influence comparable to that of Alan Jones in Australia.

But the political trajectory of Sykes from Republican firebrand to never-Trumper following the 2016 election has been mirrored in the suburban belt he once held sway over. The narrow electoral loss of three-time Governor Scott Walker in 2018 showed that this once reliable red wall was cracking, and the suburbs were up for grabs.

The various messages that are blanketing Wisconsin are all about winning the suburbs and getting out or suppressing the vote, through both ‘surface’ and ‘subterranean’ efforts.

The surface campaign consists of the ads that you see on TV or highly trafficked websites, and it is designed with suburban voters in mind.

An enormous fundraising advantage has allowed Biden to plaster Wisconsin with positive messages. His ads tend to focus on his plans for office, with only glancing critiques of Trump’s pandemic performance.

There has also been a strong effort to push Biden’s working-class roots. In one ad, pictures of his childhood in Scranton, Pennsylvania, are juxtaposed with images of him visiting factory workers as vice president. More recently, there’s been an emphasis on reassuring voters that Biden condemns violence and looting. This frequently manifests as clips of Biden’s speeches cut into TV ads or YouTube commercials.

Trump’s ads enthusiastically embrace the negative. The ad ‘You won’t be safe in Joe Biden’s America’ has got a lot of airplay recently. It’s notable for the focus on ‘the radical left-wing mob’, using Antifa militants as its bête noire since Biden himself doesn’t fit that description.

But focusing on these surface messages tells only part of the story. Much of the campaign is being played out below the surface, in digital messaging that uses data-profiling to target specific groups of potentially movable voters. With the potential for more precise targeting, this subterranean campaign is being waged all over the state.

Most of this subterranean messaging takes place on open platforms like Twitter and public Facebook groups, with a smaller amount in closed spaces such as private Facebook groups and messaging apps like WhatsApp. Campaigns and issues groups target voters with paid ads, hitting key issues in different states. In Wisconsin, this has often meant healthcare on the left and economic growth on the right.

But there’s also an extensive effort to generate and spread content organically, without explicitly paying platforms for ad space. The majority of this content doesn’t originate with campaigns themselves, but with digital surrogates.

On the left, the most effective organic, unpaid content comes from groups like Occupy Democrats. It consists of anti-Trump memes, rather than actual misinformation or disinformation, and there’s little targeted expressly at Wisconsin.

There’s far more Wisconsin-focused material from the political right, some of which is at least partially organic. Groups like pro-gun advocates calling for armed protests against Covid-related mask mandates, or others opposing business restrictions during the pandemic, include real Wisconsinites with right-leaning beliefs.

But much of the subterranean digital content in Wisconsin is deliberate misinformation or disinformation. Young Mie Kim of the University of Wisconsin—Madison observes that most of the disinformation is focused on boosting right-wing messages.

The dominant themes are purported rioting, Antifa activists and the left’s desire to defund the police. Content often draws on pro-gun messaging, and there’s an extensive pro-police ‘Blue Lives Matter’ subculture—one it appears 17-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse was immersed in before driving to Kenosha in southeastern Wisconsin and shooting two innocent protestors in August.

Since then, the law-and-order theme has morphed into active pro-Rittenhouse messaging, which has now been taken up by both local Republicans and the Trump administration.

On the Covid-19 front, groups such as Turning Point Action are working around the safeguards Facebook has put in place to inhibit content farms, pushing messages like ‘Don’t trust Dr Fauci’. These groups also help amplify Trump’s attempts to discredit the voting process, falsely asserting mail-in balloting ‘will lead to fraud’.

The digital cult of QAnon, now designated by the FBI as domestic terrorist threat, is another example of a Trump-boosting subculture that thrives on Facebook in Wisconsin, so much so that two Republican candidates in the state are openly running QAnon-supportive campaigns.

The most potent electoral effects of these messages come via the recommendation algorithms of Facebook and YouTube, which make it very easy for those who don’t already hold these views to be drawn into a vortex of right-wing content. This messaging therefore serves the dual purposes of mobilising existing right-leaning voters and reaching audiences that may be otherwise disinclined to vote.

And what about those infamous Russian disinformation operations? Using data from earlier in the election campaign, Professor Kim estimated that at least 20% of all suspicious activity (activity that doesn’t appear to come from a real individual) could be directly traced to Russian groups that US intelligence agencies have confirmed are engaged in misinformation. It’s impossible to be certain exactly how active they are in Wisconsin, but Kim observes that Wisconsin is one of the most targeted states for this type of content.

Russian content is distinguished from other types of disinformation in its efforts to sow division generally rather than to simply boost right-wing messages. Kim notes that the primary target of division is racial tension, citing two Russian-run Instagram accounts focused on Wisconsin—one targeting police with a law-and-order message, and the other focused on African Americans and critiquing police violence.

That said, Russian activity in America broadly has also served to smear Biden and denigrate postal voting. Spreading misinformation can be as simple as just amplifying the president’s tweets. Chinese efforts to interfere in the US information arena have also been uncovered, though most such campaigns are focused not on the election but on issues like the South China Sea.

It’s too early to tell how the chaotic events of the past week—the race to replace of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the widely panned first presidential debate, and the White House becoming a Covid-19 hotspot—will affect surface or subterranean messaging campaigns.

Biden currently leads Trump by 7% in Wisconsin, which will encourage desperate Republican efforts to narrow that margin in coming weeks. The broad contours of this race for the state appear set: a TV-driven fight for the suburbs where Biden outspends Trump, ringed by a furious storm of conspiracy and misinformation that seeks to rouse and radicalise any latent right-leaning voters through fear.