Tag Archive for: Japan

ASPI suggests

With Donald Trump holding a few too many cards for comfort, The Washington Post is playing its ‘Obama nostalgia’ hand with a ‘virtual museum’ of the 44th Presidency. The masthead has released two ‘rooms’ so far, all filled with a rich array of reflections, opinion, videos, stats, images and graphics. Room One, ‘The First Black President’, ranges from race relations and black incarceration through to Selma and giving dap. Room Two, ‘The Commander in Chief’, surveys Obama’s military moments: the oratory, the philosophy, the generals, the enemies, the drones.

Newsweek carries a fascinating dive into Vladimir Putin’s personal habits, which have been compiled as a piece of fact-based fiction after the author concluded three years of interviews with former PMs, current Russian cabinet ministers, bureaucrats, aides and everyday citizens:

‘The President behaves as though he is made of bronze, as if he shines. He seems to know that they will flinch when meeting his eye. There is a silence around him. The voices of grown men change when they speak to him. They make their voices as low as possible. Their faces become solemn, almost stiffened. They look down: worried, ­nervous, alert.’

It’s always heartening  to see established media outfits jump into new forms of storytelling, and more so when it’s coming from Australia’s public broadcasters. One eye-catching exemplar was illustrated by Eleri Mai Harris and published by the ABC this week: a quick telling of the Islamic State story, looking at the group’s roots and rise, it’s aspirations and authenticity. It reminded me of another standout effort from SBS last year, The Boat—an interactive adaptation of Nam Le’s acclaimed story of escaping war-torn Vietnam. With a film noir-esque opening and bleak black watercolour throughout, New York-based Aussie artist Matt Huynh tabled the emotive graphic novel for the 40th anniversary of the fall of Saigon.

Local research alert: the Perth USAsia Centre and the US Studies Centre have teamed up to survey public opinions across the Asia–Pacific in order to understand the power and influence of the US and China (PDF). And it’s been a busy time here at ASPI, with recent releases on Islamic State recruitment, the rationale for offensive cyber capabilities, the Aus-Africa Dialogue, and America’s rebalance to Southeast Asia, along with our Agenda for Change paper laying out the strategic choices facing the next Australian government.

Two pieces tied to the Second World War bubbled up this week. The first was a glowing obituary for Jane Fawcett, who spent her early career holed up at Bletchley Park breaking German codes. According to the The Economist, Fawcett was ‘the deb who sank the Bismarck.’ The second is some cracking July 1944 war reportage from The New Yorker’s archives—hello, Generation Kill…

Podcasts

A few weeks back we mentioned the recently-landed longform essay, The Citizen-Soldier. Its author Phil Klay sat down with Brookings’ Cafeteria podcast for a chat about the piece (43 mins).

Strategist readers will be interested to hear that Andrew Zammit, of The Murphy Raid and formerly of Monash University’s Global Terrorism Research Centre, recently unveiled the first episode (33 mins) of a new podcast brought together with Kate Grealy. The effort is set to cover issues as diverse as ‘LGBTI refugees, terrorism in Indonesia, media portrayals of Muslim women, gender politics in Indonesia, signals intelligence and counter-terrorism, conflict resolution in Papua, asylum seeker flows through Southeast Asia’, and plenty more. Bookmark it.

Video

The brains at Alphabet’s tech incubator, Jigsaw—formerly the ‘think/do tank’, Google Ideas—build some truly fascinating products. They’ve released the conflict zone data tool Montage, to join their existing tools like the anti-DDoS service Shield, the phishing protection Password Alert, and the web-sharing extension uProxy.

For their next trick Jigsaw have partnered with VICE to produce BLACKOUT, a five-part documentary exploring technology’s role in the struggle for free expression around the world. A new episode will be released each fortnight: Pakistan is out now (16 mins), to be followed by travels to Venezuela, Thailand, Belarus, and Eritrea.

Events

Canberra: Hip hip, hooray, and happy 10th birthday to New Mandala, the stellar site focused on the dynamic political and cultural affairs of Southeast Asia. The ANU will host a half-day block party/symposium in honour of NM and its region of focus. Make tracks for the Hedley Bull Centre next Thursday, 16 June.

The ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre along with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA and the JMSDF Command and Staff College will deliver a whole-day [#allmalepanel galore] conference on trilateral maritime cooperation between US–Australia–Japan. Get along on 27 June—should be a good show.

Hiroshima with or without remorse?

Image courtesy of Flickr user Antonia Hayes

The announcement that US President Barack Obama’s visit to Japan later this month will include a stop in Hiroshima is welcome news. Of course, Obama will not apologize for America’s 1945 nuclear attack, which annihilated the city and instantly killed about 90,000 people (with many more dying later from the effects of radiation). Nonetheless, the visit will inevitably spur reflection and debate about what happened there and why.

The main argument in favor of dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and a second bomb on Nagasaki three days later, has always been that it would hasten an end to World War II. The attacks actually saved many more Japanese and American lives, the argument goes, than they claimed. Implicitly, this argument recognizes that Hiroshima was not a military target. The main tactical purpose of the attack was to kill large numbers of civilians, thereby demonstrating to the Japanese the high cost of continuing the war.

One might ask why the awesome power of the atomic bomb was not demonstrated to the Japanese with an attack on, say, a military site away from a city. That option was considered at the time, but American officials decided that the effect on Japanese policymakers would not be as great.

In fact, US officials had another reason for choosing to target Hiroshima and Nagasaki, instead of remote sites: they wanted a firsthand look at the impact of an atomic bomb on a city. They didn’t choose, say, Tokyo, because it had previously been firebombed, the devastation from which could not easily be differentiated from the effects of the atomic bomb. Kyoto was also considered, but a top American official, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, had visited that city during his honeymoon and objected to the destruction of the city’s cultural treasures. So Hiroshima and Nagasaki it was.

The problems with this approach should be apparent. Most obvious, if it were acceptable to kill civilians en masse whenever it could be expected to abbreviate a conflict, no atrocity would be beyond the pale. Yet Obama remains unwilling to apologize for Hiroshima—a decision with which most Americans probably agree. A number of factors shape this approach.

First, there is Japan’s conduct during the Pacific War. Not only was Japan extremely brutal toward the populations of Asian countries it occupied—a reality that undermined sympathy for Japanese civilians who became victims of allied attacks—but it also brought the US into that war by perfidiously attacking Pearl Harbor. As a result, many Americans believe that it deserved whatever happened after that.

Moreover, Japan’s record in expressing regret for its own crimes is poor, as exemplified by its half-hearted apologies for forcing Korean ‘comfort women’ to provide sexual services to its army during the war. Add to that the widespread view that the bombs accelerated the end of the war, thereby saving lives, and few Americans would make the case that Japan is owed any apology.

But there is even more to the story. Given America’s unique role in the world, its actions tend to be viewed as somehow justifiable, even when many Americans recognize them as technically wrong. That is the case with the Vietnam War and, more recently, the invasion of Iraq on the fallacious grounds that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. The right to make mistakes without apologizing for them is a cherished principle of American ‘exceptionalism.’

But the US was not always so reluctant to issue apologies. In 1988, the US Congress adopted, and President Ronald Reagan signed, legislation granting reparations to Japanese-Americans who had been placed in internment camps during WWII. Reagan’s successor, President George H.W. Bush, wrote a letter of apology to internees on December 7, 1991, the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The leaders of many other countries, including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have issued apologies for past misdeeds. By far the best-known apology was issued by German Chancellor Willy Brandt in December 1970. On a visit to a memorial where the Warsaw Ghetto once stood, Brandt—who had actually fought the Nazis—dropped to his knees, his head bowed, in a silent but profound apology on Germany’s behalf. It was electrifying. If one had to pick the moment when Germany restored its global standing in the aftermath of the horrors it committed during WWII, this was it.

Brandt’s apology was in no way degrading. On the contrary, it was uplifting. And, though no one imagines that Obama would repeat Brandt’s gesture, his words and his demeanor in Hiroshima will be scrutinized worldwide. Let us hope that they include some sign that he recognizes America’s responsibility for the destruction of so many civilian lives.

Mr Obama goes to Hiroshima

The White House announced last week that President Obama would visit Hiroshima later this month, making him the first US president to do so. He won’t be apologising for the US’s dropping of the atomic bomb, and some reports suggest he doesn’t even plan on making a major address there. It’s a case where Obama’s damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t, of course. If he doesn’t make a major speech, commentators will see it as symptomatic of his continuing drift away from the anti-nuclear position he outlined in Prague in 2009. If he does, commentators will see the two speeches as the rhetorical bookends of an otherwise unremarkable legacy.

Actually, Obama’s legacy isn’t that underwhelming. He can point to a successful 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, a New START agreement with Russia, a nuclear deal with Iran, and a series of nuclear security summits. Yes, he has supported a modernisation program for US nuclear forces, but the US is virtually the last nuclear power out of the blocks on modernisation, not the first. As Robert Scher recently noted, the US now faces a situation where non-modernisation would leave it with ‘a slow and unacceptable degradation in [its] ability to deter’, facing off against other great powers which have already bitten the modernisation bullet.

Arms control champions have been pushing Obama to use the Hiroshima visit to commit the US to something substantial. Michael Krepon, for example, has argued in favour of Obama’s going to Hiroshima, but only if he seizes the opportunity to advance his anti-nuclear agenda. Specifically, Krepon wants words and deeds that push for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. That’s probably a bridge too far for Obama, who knows the groundwork hasn’t yet been properly laid in the US Senate for ratification and who’s conscious of just what a large—and difficult—nuclear agenda the incoming president will already confront.

To get a feel for that agenda, have a look at the videos of the panels at the recent CSIS conference on US nuclear policy post-2016. Issues of deterrence, assurance, arms control, modernisation, money, and sustaining a bipartisan consensus on nuclear weapons policy, already seem likely to make the next president’s job especially challenging in the nuclear field.

Still, a visit to Hiroshima can’t help but be politically significant. It’s not the same as visiting other cities destroyed by allied airpower in World War 2—cities like Berlin, Dresden and Tokyo. As Krepon argues, ‘Tokyo is remembered for the horror of a world war that was waged against cities and civilians as well as on battlefields. Hiroshima is remembered for the weapon used to destroy the city and the people living in it.’

John Kerry clearly found his visit profoundly disturbing. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only two places on earth that provide first-hand evidence of the devastating effects that nuclear weapons have on cities, even using first-generation, primitive weapons. It’s one thing for a policy-maker to know that they have such effects; another thing again to see them up close. The technical descriptions offered by reputable texts such as Samuel Glasstone and Philip Dolan’s The effects of nuclear weapons are scientifically accurate but determinedly impersonal; Hiroshima colours those descriptions with names, familial and social ties, injuries and death.

Japanese public opinion is split over the issue of whether the US president should be expected to apologise for the dropping of the bomb, but no more so than public opinion in most other countries. Indeed, a recent poll conducted by The Japan Times found that almost 65% of Japanese respondents thought Obama should not apologise, but that he should commit to nuclear non-proliferation. Even that might be difficult to do in a way that would satisfy sceptical listeners. The president could, of course, reaffirm the US’s commitment to the NPT, and to a vigorous counter-proliferation agenda, but he can’t promise to forsake modernisation of the US arsenal.

It’s going to be a neat trick for Obama to ensure that his visit reflects the strange duality of nuclear weapons: that they are both massively destructive and—for now—strategically irreplaceable. Since he’s the bloke with the nuclear codes, his statements and reactions will be monitored more closely than Kerry’s were. But Obama can be thankful for one of life’s small mercies—unlike Harry Truman, US presidents today aren’t invited to cross the nuclear threshold by dropping nuclear weapons on cities. True, it’s uncertain if escalation control will work in a nuclear conflict, but planners are smart enough to know it probably won’t if the first round of warheads kill large numbers of civilians.

ASPI suggests

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERAWe’ve not heard a great deal from senior figures in Tokyo’s political establishment about Australia’s decision to partner with France for the SEA 1000 project. That all changed this week when CSIS’s Japan Chair Michael Green hosted a high-level, cross-party coterie from the Japanese Diet. The group, which included two of Japan’s former Defence Ministers and one former Foreign Minister, convened for a chat on the next steps for US–Japan security cooperation—an engaging presentation on its own (1 hour 24 minutes). But what’s more compelling for Australian viewers is a Q&A exchange near the end of the event. See here for the question on our submarine decision, and hang tight for the (translated) smackdown answer that follows.

Dan Drezner’s latest includes a tasty morsel on the unseen 2011 tussle between Hillary Clinton and Tom Donilon as they sought to claim parentage of America’s new-and-improved Asia policy—the policy formally known as the pivot. Drezner then introduces a game that everyone can play at home: coining your own foreign policy doctrine. All you need is an adjective and a noun, with a ‘neo’ added to taste. Et voilà.

Donald J. Trump’s emergence as presumptive victor in the Republican Party’s primary battle marked the denouement of a brutal and bruising period for the GOP. In response, a stunned commentariat has swiftly shifted gears to more urgently consider what Trump would mean for republicanism, conservatism, democracy, executive government, and America at home and abroad.

The Atlantic ran David Frum asking ‘where to next for the GOP?’, and Molly Ball on the day the Party was changed forever. In The New York Times, Ross Douthat pondered the trumping of true conservatism, and Evan Thomas called on the foreign policy elite to step up. This piece in New York magazine couches President Trump as an ‘extinction-level event’(!) for democracy, begetting tyranny. Some argue that the demographics aren’t on Trump’s side; others are pulling back the curtain on what President Trump’s first 100 days at 1400 Pennsylvania Avenue might look like. FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver has a useful reflection on how The Donald racked up the votes to wrap up the nomination. Keeping one eye trained on Politifact’s Trump file probably isn’t a bad idea as we move to and through July’s GOP convention in Cleveland. Hold onto your hats.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become a darling of the West since his elevation to the top job in May 2014. Barack Obama even profiled Modi for Time’s Influential People issue last year, which could be seen as an incredible about-face—Modi had been banned from the US for the preceding decade for ‘severe violations of religious freedom’. A long-read feature from The New Republic takes a different tone to much of the commentary we’ve consumed on Modi, drawing on darkness to paint Modi as India’s ‘silent, lonely, aloof, admired, and unloved leader’—the ‘anti-Gandhi’.

Lifelong learning is something we can get behind here at The Strategist, so we were keen to see the launch of Brookings 101, a series of educational courses out from the famed DC think tank. There are four offerings so far, covering off US government debt, the Islamic State, Primaries and Politics 101 and Vladimir Putin 101. Get swotting—there’ll be a test later.

Two foreign policy caffeine hits for your weekend: first, a dive into the uninspired, risk-and-narrative-adverse world of NATO speechwriting; second, fresh from The New York Times Magazine comes an engrossing profile on Obama’s foreign policy point man, Ben Rhodes.

Finally, the Stimson Centre is running an international student essay competition to encourage new thinking on non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, in support of UNSC1540. Up for grabs is a trip to Cambridge, Massachusetts, some cash and the chance to be published by Stimson.

Podcasts

In Episode Two of the US State Department’s podcast, the Historian of the State Department, Stephen Randolf, talks through the history of US ambassadors (23 mins). This related podcast on diplomatic immunity is an older effort from the always-entertaining How Stuff Works team (41 mins).

Special Relationship is a shiny new podcast jointly-presented by British title The Economist and American ‘new media’ outfit Mic, focusing on issues and themes of the US presidential race. The first episode covers off terrorism and national security. We suspect that it’ll fast become a must-listen.

Video

The 2001 documentary First Kill is a sobering journey through the horrors of the Vietnam War and the challenges faced by vets upon their return to the US as they scrambled to process what they’d seen and done. War correspondents are also called on for their testimony, one of whom is Michael Herr, the author of Dispatches and a screenwriter for Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket. The full doco is up on YouTube (1 hour 13 minutes).

Events

Canberra: Don’t miss the ANU’s Amin Saikal and Georgetown’s Cynthia P. Schneider in conversation with Mark Kenny on US Middle East policy under President Obama and the avenues that remain open to his successor. Here’s what you need to know about the 10 May event.

The AIIA’s ACT Branch has teamed up with the ANU’s Coral Bell School to pull together a strong panel to explore Myanmar’s political transition following the country’s historic November 2015 elections. Mark your calendar for 11 May, and register online for this free event.

Sydney: Head to the University of Sydney Law School on 17 May to hear a discussion about how climate change and renewable energy policy is developing in China.

SEA 1000: no veto for Beijing on Australia’s defence policy

With the outcome of the long-awaited SEA 1000 Competitive Evaluation Process seeing France’s DCNS announced as the international design partner for the future submarines, Australia must now manage the diplomatic fallout with the two failed bidders: Germany and, especially, Japan. As David Lang notes, ‘we should expect the CEP outcome to dampen the energy and enthusiasm that’s driven the bilateral relationship for much of the past two and a half years.’ There may also be disappointment in key defence circles within the US, given the very real strategic benefits that would’ve flowed to the Australia–Japan–US trilateral. But Japan’s lost bid isn’t simply a bilateral challenge for Australia–Japan defence and foreign relations. Australia has to manage China’s reaction.

The outcome is likely to have pleased Beijing, (and here) given that ‘Option J’ would have opened the doors to a greatly expanded strategic partnership between Tokyo and Canberra—both allied to the US. Paul Dibb summed up the situation:

‘Beijing must be rubbing its hands with glee that we are not buying submarines from its adversary, Japan…there is every possibility that the harsh authoritarian leadership under President Xi Jinping considers it has successfully bullied Australia to kowtow to its demands.’

It’s ironic that despite China’s probable happiness at Japan’s loss, Australia’s ability to operate alongside the US and Japan to counter Chinese naval forces will increase with this decision—albeit far too slowly in a rapidly changing security environment.  

However, in managing strategic policy, perceptions really matter. It’s unconvincing to suggest that the Turnbull government has chosen ‘Shortfin Barracudas’ over ‘enhanced Soryus’ in part because of a fear of angering Beijing, but Australia can’t allow the perception that Beijing has a veto over Australian defence and foreign policy gather strength. The best way to burst Beijing’s prospective bubble in this issue is to move decisively to repair any damage with Tokyo through visible and concrete policy measures that strengthen the ‘special strategic partnership’. That’s vital, given increasing uncertainty over the US role in Asia (let alone under a possible future Trump Administration), and China’s more assertive posture in the South China Sea.

In this worsening strategic environment, the old motto ‘united we stand, divided we fall’ is more relevant than ever. Failing to follow up the CEP outcome with new approaches to Japan for fear of entrapment would incentivise greater Chinese assertiveness at the expense of its neighbours—America as well as Australia. A policy of deterrence and dissuasion, matched by constructive engagement, is the best approach to take with regards to China, and closer defence relations between Japan and Australia should be a cornerstone to that.

To do this, Australia must develop closer cooperation with Japan (alongside the US) on ensuring Freedom of Navigation through joint Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. It can pursue cooperation alongside Japan in capacity building for security partners in the South China Sea that are facing a challenge from China—such as the Philippines and potentially Vietnam—through strengthening maritime domain awareness and ensuring sea lane security. The development of a Theatre ASW capability between Japan, Australia and the US would strengthen our ASW advantage over China’s submarine fleet. Dialogue on Ballistic Missile Defence could contribute to countering China’s increasing anti-ship ballistic missile and land-strike capability.

Australia should also seek defence cooperation with Japan in operations and sustainment of the F-35, and in particular through provision of access to the Woomera Test Range in South Australia for combined training with the Japanese Air Self Defense Force. Beyond the F-35, Japan is developing its X-2 stealth demonstrator for the future F-3 stealth fighter program that could support a future bid to replace the RAAF F/A-18Fs in the 2030s.

In space, networked commercial satellites owned by Japan and Australia can contribute towards information sharing across common C4ISR networks. In the face of growing PLA information warfare capabilities, Japan, Australia and the US should seek to work collaboratively to build resilience in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Trilateral cooperation in pursuing technologies related to the ‘Third Offset’ strategy led by the US could bring in many of these capability areas in a way that would more than address any gaps in the Australia-Japan relationship left by the submarine decision.

China will clearly react negatively to such cooperation, or indeed to other opportunities that Canberra and Tokyo choose to pursue. Australia must resist the temptation of submitting to such threats, particularly as competition between China and the US intensifies. Instead, Australia should move decisively to reinforce defence ties with Tokyo in a manner that emphasises a strong and enduring strategic partnership for the future.

Trump’s dangerous America First campaign

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Donald Trump’s loutish campaign for the US presidency has left most of the world – excluding, perhaps, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his European populist allies, like France’s Marine Le Pen—confused and aghast. Indeed, it is difficult for anyone to assess not only what Trump would do as President, but also which racial or religious minority, or foreign country, he holds in greatest contempt.

Name virtually any group or country, and you can bet Trump has insulted it. He has called Mexican immigrants to the US ‘criminals’ and ‘rapists.’ He has proposed banning all Muslims from entering the US. He has flung sexist invective at professional women, such as the political pundit Megyn Kelly, who have the temerity to stand up to him, and has called others ‘dogs’ and ‘fat slobs.’ He has sneered at America’s European and Asian allies, and blamed China for many of America’s economic woes.

But it seems that the people whom Trump holds in the greatest contempt are his own supporters. Instead of giving anything like a straight answer about the policies he would pursue were he actually elected, he has stoked and manipulated their inchoate rage, rooted in frustration with stagnant wages and fear of the unknown.

Japan has particular reason to be unsettled by ‘The Donald’s’ incendiary rhetoric, which has the potential to do lasting damage. At one moment, he treats Japan as a freeloader, unnerving Japan’s citizens about the state of our core security alliance with the US. At the next, he says that he would not think twice about Japan (and South Korea) becoming a nuclear-weapon state, feeding fears that today’s arms race in Asia might escalate beyond conventional weapons. Then he backpedals, claiming the words were fabricated by the media.

Under ordinary circumstances, the world could dismiss the ignorant rabble-rousing of a populist like Trump, whose campaign would remain a fringe affair. Yet Trump has so far captured the largest share of Republican Party primary voters. And, at this late date in the campaign, it seems highly improbable that the party will find its way back to sanity and produce a reasonable candidate for the election in November. In other words, Japan and the rest of the world ignore Trump at their own peril.

Republicans—indeed, all Americans—must understand the risks to global stability, and even peace, that could accompany a presidential campaign that becomes a Trump-produced spectacle of incendiary demagogy. And that could happen. Trump’s campaign is now managed by one of the most cynical—and most effective—operatives in the business: Paul Manafort, whose repackaging efforts in 2010 duped Ukrainians into thinking that Viktor Yanukovych, whom they eventually overthrew in a bloody revolution, was a democrat.

The impact in Japan, and across Asia, of Trump’s vision of a nuclear-armed Japan is a striking example of how his muddled jingoism can unsettle political discourse. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has lately been undertaking modest reforms to Japan’s defence posture, aimed at ensuring that in the event of some regional crisis, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could come to the aid of our allies—in particular, the US. Some Japanese, however, view the reforms with concern, fearing that the peaceful Japan of the last seven decades will suddenly revert to the militaristic Japan of the 1930s.

Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric has helped to take these fears to the next level, with some opponents of Abe’s defence reforms detecting, they believe, the germ of some secret conspiracy with the US to turn Japan into a nuclear-weapon state. Of course, such fear mongering will attract only the most gullible. But given the need to reassure the Japanese public that Abe’s reforms are truly what he says they are—that is, modest changes that will allow Japan to deepen its alliance ties—Trump’s intervention is the height of irresponsibility.

Beyond undermining core political alliances, Trump seems prepared to undo much of the progress that has been made in deepening America’s economic relationships, not only with Japan, but also with the rest of the world. Abe has taken enormous political risks at home in embracing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, aimed at building a rules-based order for trade and investment among a dozen countries on both sides of the Pacific. Other leaders, including US President Barack Obama, have done the same. Yet Trump seems willing to oppose that stance, in order to stoke voters’ anger and maintain their support.

Of course, the real question is how deeply held Trump’s ideas are among ordinary Americans. Is it possible that a substantial bloc of Americans today really wants to pull up the drawbridges and embrace isolationism?

For Japan and other US allies, an isolationist America remains a distant prospect. But as we watch the United Kingdom prepare for its referendum on European Union membership, doubts begin to creep in. In Britain, a small-minded sector of the Conservative Party has played on almost the same sentiments as Trump to stoke political rage and turn ‘Brexit’ into a real possibility. And, just as Trump has done to the Republicans, they have torn apart their own party—the party of Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher—in the process. With this in mind, it may be time to admit that America really could return to isolationism.

America’s friends and allies around the world need to declare clearly, as Obama has done to the British people, that isolationist policy characterised by contempt for others will only make peace and prosperity harder to achieve. In the US, Republicans like Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who care deeply about America’s standing in the world, will have to put aside party loyalty in favour of love of country and refuse to back Trump (and perhaps the equally incendiary Ted Cruz) in a presidential race. If a Trump presidency does emerge, it will be a loss for the Republican Party, the US as a whole, and its allies.

Whaling and Japan’s security cooperation with Australia

Image courtesy of Flickr user Jose Miguel

Australia and Japan are key actors in the Indo–Pacific, integral to the region’s future security architecture and the prevalence of international law at sea. Australia’s location, democratic system, economy and military capabilities make the country important to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

The Japanese leader’s narrative is based on the following legs: peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law (including arbitration under UNCLOS); interim agreements on resource management (embodied in the Japan–Taiwan fisheries agreement); tighter links among ‘Maritime Democracies’ (chief among them Asia’s ‘democratic security diamond’, made up of Japan, the US, India and Australia); regional capacity building assistance (both Japan and Australia are helping the Philippines rearm); and the 1982 Falklands War as a reminder to revisionist powers that appeals to international law don’t exclude an armed response to aggression.

Despite strengthening ties, cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra is threatened by a long-standing dispute over whaling. Both countries therefore need to make an effort to reach a decision on that issue which lays the foundation for closer defence and security relations between the two countries in an increasingly challenging strategic environment.

In 2014 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Tokyo’s special permits under her whaling program ‘JARPA II, were not “for purposes of scientific research” pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention’. Tokyo reacted by announcing in October 2015 that it was excluding the International Court of Justice from future whaling disputes, stating that its jurisdiction ‘does not apply to … any dispute arising out of, concerning, or relating to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of the sea’.

Tokyo’s decision is of particular concern to Australia and other maritime democracies, plus Vietnam, because it contradicts Japan’s support for the Philippines’ international arbitration suit against China. It runs directly counter to the view that international law, and more specifically international tribunals, provide a way forward when negotiations have failed to produce a solution to maritime disputes.

It also contradicts the emphasis on the rule of law in Japan’s 2015 White Paper on the Arctic. After all, the notion that endless negotiations are better, and that a decision by an international court is incompatible with a country’s sovereignty, sounds perilously close to Beijing’s assertions in rejecting compulsory arbitration under UNCLOS in the South China Sea.

The context and scope may be different than the Philippines–China arbitration case, but too much is at stake for Tokyo to leave this flank open. Looking at the wider strategic picture in the maritime Asia–Pacific, it’s clear that Tokyo should be careful to act in accordance with international law and tribunals given its stance on other maritime disputes. Any actions contrary to this have the potential to damage relations with a key partners like Australia.

The same determination, pragmatism, and eagerness to invest political capital—as displayed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in securing a successful end to long years of fisheries negotiations with Taiwan—is now needed.  

That doesn’t mean, however, that Australia should simply continue to push Japan to terminate whaling. Scientific evidence-based conservation concerns are legitimate, but ideally should go hand-in-hand with a pragmatic examination of the other side’s cultural determinants plus shared strategic interests..  

Australia and Japan must understand that they’re condemned to finding a solution, unless they’re prepared to leave in place an obstruction to enjoying deeper relations and to give ammunition to other parties that seek to subvert the international legal order. Any solution to the issue will involve not only both countries’ governments, but also their civil societies, including relevant private industry and environmental organisations.

Both Japan and Australia share an interest in the South China Sea, as clear from their support for the Philippines’ military modernisation program. A pragmatic approach to whaling, with concessions by both sides, would remove an irritant and pave the way to greater cooperation at all levels, including more frequent joint naval and military drills and exchanges. Proposals for an ‘Asian NATO’ remain far-fetched, but as long as Canberra and Tokyo keep moving forward they will stay alive.

The regional implications of ‘Peak Japan’

Image courtesy of Flickr user spaztacular

Recent changes in Japanese security policy have been applauded as ‘the biggest revisions in the country’s defense policy since adoption of the 1947 constitution’. There is a new National Security Council, a National Security Strategy, a National Secrecy Law, new National Defense Program Guidelines, reinterpretation of the Constitution to permit Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, new US-Japan bilateral defense guidelines, and security legislation that turns those documents into deliverables. That legislation took effect this week.

Alarmists worry about a resuscitation of Japanese militarism. More sensible and discerning assessments point out that these changes are evolutionary and adaptations to changing circumstances, ‘a small, yet essential, step for Japan as it travels the path of a normal security policy’. Amidst the handwringing and back slapping, little attention is being paid to structural factors that conspire to limit Japan’s capacity to sustain a higher and more expansive hard-security profile. Japan’s demographic trajectory and the inability of Abenomics to gain traction mean that Tokyo’s international influence is likely to be at its apogee, and will level off and eventually decline. Tokyo won’t be irrelevant, but we may well be witnessing ‘Peak Japan’.

When he returned to the Prime Minister’s Office in 2013, Shinzo Abe made clear that he understood that the future of his administration and his Liberal Democratic Party, along with Japan’s international status and standing, rested on economic recovery. He developed a radical program, dubbed ‘Abenomics’ that would provide the foundation for assertive diplomacy and forward-leaning security policy. Three years on, the verdict is mixed: Abenomics’ targets haven’t been hit and economists fear they remain well beyond reach. Growth is stagnant or slow, productivity gains limited and debt continues to expand.

More worrisome is Japan’s demographics: the ‘greyest’ country in the world will continue to age and its population is set to shrink from the current 127 million to 100 million just before 2050; by 2060 population it’ll have shrunk to 86.74 million and nearly 40 percent will be age 65 or older. More ominous still, the workforce, which was 65.77 million in 2013, will plummet 42% by 2060, to 37.95 million. The economic implications of that trajectory are profound: Japanese productivity and economic dynamism will fall, budget choices will become tougher and the resources and energy for security and foreign policy activism will be harder to find.

This future isn’t guaranteed—Japan could open its doors to foreigners, or it could finally unleash the productive power of women (a largely underutilized resource)—but if the past is prologue, it’s a near certainty. If so, then Japan and its friends and allies should act now to mitigate the negative consequences.

First, Japan should maximize the leverage it has now to deal with longstanding issues that impede constructive relations with partners and neighbors. Deals should be struck, relationships consolidated and institutional infrastructure strengthened so that Japan’s position within the region is supported and sustained by a variety of sources. It can’t depend solely on Tokyo’s initiative and energy. (Even the Abe era must end and there’s no guarantee—and little likelihood—that his successor will continue his policies or possess his outlook.)

Second, partners and allies must work with Tokyo to ensure that Japan stays engaged despite the many forces—more than just economic; social and legal pressures are equally powerful—that push it away from regional affairs and turn its focus inward. Tokyo must be drawn out, given a stake in regional outcomes and pushed to play as prominent a security role as possible. One way to do this is to conceptualise security broadly and to identify ways for Japan to contribute that don’t focus on purely military means. Japan has championed comprehensive security for over three decades; this should provide a framework for efforts that are congenial to Japanese resources, capabilities and thinking. Calibrating this tension is essential. Japan must be pushed to do more, even while its partners remain conscious of the domestic circumstances that create resistance to such initiatives.

Australia will be central in this effort. Canberra has emerged as Tokyo’s preferred security partner (after the US). The two governments have overcome a bitter and difficult history to forge a ‘special strategic partnership’ that reflects shared values and interests. It includes an expanding institutional infrastructure with regular leadership meetings, an array of security instruments and coordination with their mutual alliance partner, the US. Australia should continue to press Japan to work with it across a spectrum of security and foreign policy issues. There should be diplomatic coordination bilaterally and in regional and international forums. Of special importance is outreach to third parties throughout East Asia to press for respect for the rule of law, human dignity and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Australia and Japan should be planning, along with the US, for regional contingencies, as well as expanding cooperation, including joint exercises.    

While its alliance with the US will remain the cornerstone of Japanese security policy, the real focus of its diplomacy and foreign policy in years to come should be Asia. Forging a new, forward-looking and constructive partnership with all its Asian partners, and fending off the urge to reduce those relations to zero-sum calculations, will consume Japanese diplomats and politicians. Commitment and creativity will be a premium. It is a lot to ask, but Japan should be up to the challenge.

Cyber wrap

Malcolm Turnbull and Barack Obama

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is in Washington DC this week, and cyber issues have featured prominently on his agenda. During a poignant address on regional and international security at CSIS, Turnbull pushed several international cyber issues, including the of promotion of norms for responsible behaviour in cyberspace and the need for an open and free multistakeholder internet. Watch the PM’s remarks at CSIS here.

Turnbull and President Obama met at the White House earlier today and discussed a series of mutual issues. A fact sheet released by the White House on the meeting contains a section on cyber cooperation. It contains a nod to the aforementioned norms and open internet, but also a list of practical bilateral initiatives, including plans to map incident response structures and expand cybercrime cooperation, exchanges and regional capacity building.

Also coming out of discussions at the White House was an agreement to hold an annual 1.5 track cyber dialogue. PM Turnbull announced that this dialogue will be convened by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre and our colleagues at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Justice Minister Michael Keenan has shared some interesting stats gathered by the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN). ACORN was set up by the government in late 2014 to gather reports of online crime from members of the public and organisations with the aim of better understanding emerging types of online crime, and to share details on how to remain secure in cyberspace. In 2015 ACORN received 39,000 reports. Taking the top spot for the highest type of reported crime was online fraud and scams, which accounted for 49% of total reports. Coming in at number two were online trading issues, with 8,363 reports received from Australians affected by crime when buying or selling goods online. Unsurprisingly, email, social networking and website advertising were the top three means used to carry out online crimes.

After just recovering from the high profile infiltration of three Ukrainian power companies in late December, Kiev is in trouble again. It was discovered earlier this week that malware similar to that used during the electricity grid compromise was uncovered on a network at the country’s largest international airport. The network was home to the airport’s air traffic control system. Finger-pointing at the official level is yet to begin, but a Ukrainian defence spokesman did share that the Malware had been linked to a Russian server. Ukraine’s national Computer Emergency Response Team, CERT-UA, is expecting further attacks and has called on system administrators to remain vigilant.

For the first time, the Nuclear Threat Initiative has included in its annual threat index (PDF) a set of indicators designed to measure ‘how well states are prepared to handle cyber threats and potential acts of sabotage to nuclear facilities’. According to the report, 20 countries possessing either civilian or military nuclear programs ‘do not even have basic requirements to protect nuclear facilities from cyber attacks’. The indicators used in the cyber assessment covered regulatory, legal and policy mechanisms that were present (or not) in each country.

The Nihon Keizai Shimbun has reported 40 large-scale Japanese businesses, including Toyota and Sony, are joining together to share threat-intelligence and develop cyber countermeasures. In support of that goal, the group will also combine forces to develop a deeper pool of information security professionals who are able to tackle those threats.

In case you missed it, make sure you check out Simon Hansen’s new ASPI Special Report on Australia–China cyber relationships in the next internet era. The report is a product of Simon’s placement at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), and is a great study on why we need a closer cyber dialogue with China, and how we might go about achieving it.

Australia and the South China Sea dispute

HMAS Arunta and Sirius departed Subic Bay, Philippines after completing a port visit during the ships North East Asian Deployment. During this deployment the Task Group will operate with various HMA Ships and foreign military units from India, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, China and Indonesia.

Mark Thomson and I were in Tokyo earlier this month as part of an annual exchange ASPI has with the National Institute for Defense Studies. The two organisations have been doing exchanges for over a decade, and it’s been interesting to see how the topics of discussion have evolved in parallel to the security relationship between our two countries. There’s always a lot to cover, but this time around the three main topics were submarines, the South China Sea (SCS) and Australia’s leadership change (specifically, what it might mean for security policy).

No surprises there. Subs were always going to be near the top of the list with the Competitive Evaluation Process closing this month. The SCS has pretty much every security analyst in the hemisphere engaged. And the change of PM here in Australia could conceivably have a bearing on how we as a country handle both of those issues. With Mark having posted on the submarines I thought it was worth summarising what I had to say on the other issues. (My complete presentation is here.)

My assessment—which I don’t think is controversial—is that so far there’s more continuity than difference in Australia’s public position on regional security in general, and the SCS in particular since Mr Turnbull replaced Mr Abbott. There was some speculation in Australia that his thinking on China is more positive than Abbott’s and that those views might carry over to national security. However, in his first substantial interview as Prime Minister, Mr Turnbull said this about China’s SCS activities:

‘…we need to ensure is that the rise of China [is] conducted in a manner that does not disturb the security and the relative harmony of the region upon which China’s prosperity depends. Now – now, that requires careful diplomacy, it requires balancing. China would be better advised in its own interests, frankly, to – not to be pushing the envelope, and that is why there’s been resistance against that activity. I think their foreign policy in the South China Sea has been quite counterproductive.’

Since then, those sentiments have been echoed by the Foreign Minister, and in speeches by the new Defence Minister. As well, Australia has been a vocal supporter of ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises by the US, and has agreed to increase naval cooperation with the USN, including additional exercises. The communiqué from this year’s AUSMIN consultations included this:

‘[The parties] expressed strong concerns over recent Chinese land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea. They called on all claimant states to halt land reclamation, construction, and militarization. They urged claimants to exercise restraint, take steps to ease tensions and refrain from provocative actions that could escalate tensions.’

It remains to be seen what steps beyond rhetoric Australia is prepared to take in support of US activities to assert ‘freedom of navigation’. There have been suggestions that Australia should conduct a similar operation. One such came from former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Representing the opposing school of thought is another former Foreign Minister in Bob Carr. On the Liberal side, I think it’s fair to say that former Prime Minister Abbott might have found a freedom of navigation exercise appealing. Mr Turnbull might take a different view, but we can’t yet be sure.

Some worry that Australia faces a potentially damaging backlash from China if we push on the SCS issue. I’m not so sure. When China declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea, Australia was a vocal critic, and the Foreign Minister had the Chinese ambassador to Australia summoned for a formal communication of Australia’s disapproval. Australia also warned that it would also object to any future ADIZ declaration in the SCS. Australia’s position drew a strident response from China, which described it as ‘irresponsible and mistaken’ and added that Australia should ‘immediately correct its mistake, so as to avoid damaging China–Australia relations’.

Australia didn’t withdraw its criticism, and there were no visible consequences as a result. In fact, since then, the Australian and Chinese navies have just conducted their second live fire exercise and the two countries have negotiated a free trade agreement. That suggests that assertions of our strategic interests don’t carry the downside risk that’s sometimes argued—Mark was probably right when he observed that China has less leverage over Australia than is often thought. But following Australia’s support of recent USN activity, China is following its usual script of telling Australia following the US example will ‘only bring trouble’.

Australia will need to decide what it’s prepared to do, so Mr Turnbull and his National Security Committee have to form a position on this issue that attempts to preserve our strategic interests against encroachment. They’ll also need contingency plans in case of a crisis—another EP-3 like incident (PDF) could warm things up quickly.