Welcome back.

Last week it was Ivanka as seat warmer, and this week it was Donald Jr’s time to shine. (Sasha and Malia never got this much attention …) We now know that there was direct and unalloyed collusion between Trump’s inner circle and the Russian government. Oy vey. So here are a couple of reads. First, a piece in The National Review explores the ‘misconduct of public men’, raising some tough questions about the president’s truthfulness and his fitness for office. Ross Douthat, resident conservative over at The New York Times, is walking back from his earlier position of giving Trump the benefit of the doubt. The fantastic CSIS-TCU podcast series continued this week with Vox founder Ezra Klein. And over at his site, Klein is running with Elizabeth Drew’s characterisation of the Watergate years: ‘a time of low comedy and high fear’.

Last week I highlighted some career opportunities for the young(er) guns; this week it’s all about self-improvement for the young scholar. This effort over at War on the Rocks reckons the key is to devour the world beyond your discipline: hoist it all in together and try to make sense of what’s going on. And from the kind folks over at The Strategy Bridge, here are some thoughts and tools to train the strategic-thinking muscle.

As the dust settles on North Korea’s ICBM launch last week, don’t miss this stand-out interview with Jeffrey Lewis (he of Arms Control Wonk fame). And in case you missed it last week, the latest edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—the bunch with the clock—dropped with phenomenal timing.

Astrophotography is pretty sweet any day of the week, so things naturally just get better when you add some kit and platforms into the mix, right? Yup, exactly. US soldier Joshua Simmons has made use of things laying around at his Fort Hood base to bring the military together with the Milky Way. Nicely done. For more on the photography front, don’t miss this recent account of the work of Aussie talent Andrew Quilty, who has been based in Afghanistan since 2013. His photojournal, 28 days in Afghanistan, is also worth the time.

And to add some levity to the week’s end, how’s this for a yarn: Jim Mattis’ mobile phone number is revealed online and a high-school student calls and texts in an effort to score an interview. A week later, Mattis calls back for what turned into a 45-minute chat about US foreign policy. The episode sparked two pieces: one feature and one reflection. You can also take a squiz at the transcript.

Podcasts

If you resisted my earlier calls to dive into Malcolm Gladwell’s 2016 postcast Revisionist History then I’m back to wear you down some more … Gladwell has been back on the beat to work up a second season, with five episodes out so far. One that’s likely to be of particular interest to Strategist readers tells the tale of a CIA asset, an Islamic militant who had a change of heart only to end up as a casualty of Bill Clinton’s efforts to reform the agency. But they’re all solid, so take a look here (39 mins). Much of the series hinges on behavioural science, so Gladwell’s interview with Dave Nussbaum, a behavioural scientist, is rather revealing.

A few weeks back the ANU hosted an event for the launch of Nick Bisley’s Center of Gravity paper, Integrated Asia: Australia’s Dangerous New Strategic Geography. If you couldn’t get along, never fear, as La Trobe Asia thought to record Nick’s chat with the SDSC’s Andrew Carr. Catch up here.

Video

If you find the whole concept of cryptocurrency to be entirely foreign and bewildering—Bitcoin, Ethereum, how–what–why—here’s your chance to get up to speed. It’s a technical topic, so there’s a limit to how close to the ground any explanation will stay, but absorbing this video will stand you in good stead (26 mins).

Events

Perth: Those on the west coast should get along to the PerthUSAsia Centre’s event on 20 July, Indonesia to 2050: A New Era for Australia–Indonesia Relations. Marty Natalegawa, Mari Pangestu and John Blaxland will all be there. Details here.

Canberra: No plans on Monday night? Just as well, because the Asia Bookroom—a Canberra gem—will host the launch of a significant new tome on Japanese war criminals written by four academics from Australian universities. The gang of four will be in conversation, with their effort to be launched by Michael Wesley. Register over at the Asia Bookroom website.

Say I knock on your door and tell you that I’m going to burn your house down. And let’s say you believe I have the capability to do so, making my threat credible. Your first response would be to prioritise what you might try to save from your house before it’s burned down. By making such a threat I put myself in an excellent position to negotiate by pushing you into crisis mode and forcing you to establish priorities quickly. From here, I could back down and say, ‘Well, I won’t burn your house down, but I’ll take all your belongings in your living room.’ You might decide it’s better to surrender your living-room belongings, all of which are replaceable, than to lose your whole house. After that ordeal, I don’t follow through on the threat of arson, but I still make off with the contents of your living room. You might feel like you’ve avoided complete disaster, but you still lost some possessions. This might be a simple illustration, but it reflects President Trump’s basic zero-sum negotiating strategy.

Trump’s strategy was observable in his campaign rhetoric on proposals like the Muslim ban, in his claims that NATO is ‘obsolete’, and in his attacks against trade architecture like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and NAFTA. Now that he’s seated at the Resolute desk, we’re seeing it all over again with things like his short, tense phone call with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in which the President considered reneging on an agreement made with the previous Obama administration to resettle detained refugees in the United States, calling it ‘the worst deal ever’.

Trump’s brash style of brinkmanship may have served him well as a businessman in the cut-throat world of New York real estate development, but it won’t work as well in the international arena. Instead of pushing a policy to the limits of safety, Trump rushes himself and his opponents straight to the cliff’s edge. Taking them there without allowing them any time to think might get them to panic and reveal their bottom line. Trump could then walk them back from the brink on his own terms. Such moves could keep his opponents and negotiating partners off-balance.

It’s an effective strategy for Trump, and luckily for him, it’s a game that can be played without finesse. But it’s also risky. If I keep threatening to burn homes down I’ll eventually need to follow through at some point to solve the problem of credibility, a problem which Trump faces in the domestic and international arenas. And doing so could put me at risk. Depending on how well I understand external factors, I could actually be stuck in the house with you when I deliver my threat. I could very well bring myself down with you. That’s one way to resist Trump’s blustering strategy: understanding what he’s actually capable of, trying to contain his threats based on his own limitations, and identifying where he’s politically exposed.

Trump’s negotiating strategy was on display with the TPP. On his first day in office, President Trump followed through on his threat and withdrew the US from the TPP. Since the trade agreement can’t go into effect without both the US and Japan ratifying it, President Trump effectively “burned down the house”. He hasn’t walked away from trade with Japan altogether since the White House has put the offer of a bilateral US–Japan trade deal back on the table. But this outcome is unfortunate for Japan, since it would have to renegotiate a trade deal with a Presidential administration which has championed protecting American jobs and manufacturing and scepticism of international trade. That places political limitations on what Trump could achieve with a bilateral deal which makes progress on difficult issues like agriculture and car manufacturing, which are politically sensitive areas for Japan when it comes to trade.

If Trump is indeed applying that strategy to promote his preference for bilateral trade deals in Asia, then it might be best for Japan to deny the new president this early victory and resist his transactional approach to diplomacy. Japan and any other US partners in Asia should shun bilateral proposals. If there’s little point in the TPP without US involvement and leadership, a long-term strategy will be to wait for a change in the presidential administration in Washington, which could see the US re-join the partnership. As Asia remains the driver of global economic growth, it has time on its side and perhaps the TPP might still prevail in a post-Trump world.

Policymakers in Asia should be wary of Donald Trump’s “burn down the house” strategy as he’s proving time and time again that he doesn’t view negotiating as a win-win game. His pathology and approach to negotiations demand a loser, making it hard to see bilateral negotiations with the Trump administration delivering a satisfying outcome. Rather than a mark of a brilliant deal maker, Trump’s negotiating tactics are the hallmark of an entertainer and a blusterer. It’s a destructive strategy and in the long term, it will hurt America’s credibility in the Asia–Pacific region.

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe faces several pressing issues over the next few years, many of which are linked to his commitment to revising Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Under what’s known as the ‘peace clause’, Japan not only renounces war, but declares that never again will Japan have ‘land, sea, and air force as well as other war potential’.

Following the July 2016 election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) assumed a majority of 122 seats in the 242-seat Upper House (House of Councilors), giving Prime Minister Abe effective control over both Houses of Parliament. As such, Abe need only persuade the public to revise the constitution—a tough ask, as more than 50% are opposed to a revision.

The Self-Defense Force (SDF) is formidable. It has 250,000 men and women in uniform, over 500 combat aircraft, 32 destroyers, two aircraft carriers and a substantial submarine force. The purchasing of such equipment has led some to argue that of Article 9 has been made redundant. Nevertheless, proponents argue that the SDF construct limits Japan’s ability to support its allies or fulfill its role as a major global and regional power, hence the call for the formation of a National Defense Force.

Advocates for constitutional reform also argue that a revision would provide better protection for Japan, as the country and its people face new security threats. Those include a nuclear-armed North Korea and persistent territorial disputes with China, Japan’s largest trading partner. These have become more worrisome in the post-Crimea era, where President Putin has shown that de facto possession trumps international law and President Trump declaring his dissatisfaction with the US–Japan treaty.

Beyond the general public’s opposition to a revision, Abe must take two further issues into consideration. The first is the state of the Japanese economy, which has remained largely stagnant since the 1980s (the country’s 2015 GDP was roughly what it was in the 1980s). In 2016, Japan technically avoided a recession, suggesting that Abenomics—monetary stimulus, fiscal “flexibility” and structural reform including corporate reform aimed at encouraging firms to invest more—is working, pushing Japan’s faltering economy towards sustainable growth. However, the Bank of Japan’s hope of 2% inflation remains a distant dream, probably because the non-financial sector holds more than ¥1 quadrillion (US$9.5 trillion) of financial assets, including cash, which it refuses to spend.

The second major challenge that Abe must address is that Japan has the world’s oldest population and one of the lowest birth rates. In 2010, Japan’s population stood at 128 million and by 2015 had shrunk to 127 million. Japan’s birth rate stands at around 1.4 children per woman, well below the necessary 2.1 required to maintain a steady population. The 2015 census also indicated that over 30% of Japanese are over 65, leading the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to estimate that Japan’s population would fall below 100 million by the close of the 21st century.

There are a number of reasons for the decline. A non-existent child care system, which often means that women are required to leave the workforce to raise children which leads a two-income family to become a single-income one; low wages and long working hours; and a high cost of living discourage young Japanese from not only having children but from even forging relationships (a 2013 study by the Meji Yasuda Life Insurance Company found that 30% of Japanese men in their 20s have never dated a woman, while slightly less than 30% of women in the same age bracket have never dated a man).

Successive Japanese governments have ensured that the defense budget never exceeds 1% of Japan’s GDP. Such fiscal conservatism stems in part from the fragility of Japan’s economy and its stagnant GDP. The current defense budget stands at ¥5.17 trillion (US$50.2 billion), and includes money allocated for the acquisition of six new submarines to deal with what the Defense Ministry describes as ‘attacks against the islets’ and a 12% increase to the Coast Guard budget. Japan has also purchased six F-35 stealth fighters and allocated money to build a radar station in the East China Sea.

There are clear reasons for Abe to push for a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, but to do so would involve substantial domestic reform, including measures to stimulate Japanese corporate innovation which has stagnated. Ensuring that such moves don’t heighten tensions with China, as was the case in 2012, following Prime Minister Noda’s announcement of Japan’s intention to purchase three of the five Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, is vital. But more pressing is the demographic time bomb, which places enormous pressure on the economy, social welfare and Japan’s ability to support a security force. So even if a revision is to occur, it may not accomplish what Abe hopes.

When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe arrives in Australia today, the second stop on a four-nation regional tour, he and his team will have thought deeply about the state of the Australia­–Japan relationship, what it represents and where it is heading.

Our strategic ties have cooled considerably since the days of the Abbott government and, subsequently, Japan’s needlessly bruising experience in its failed bid to build our next-generation submarines. Since then, the ball has been in Canberra’s court when it comes to fleshing out the special strategic partnership signed by Abe and Tony Abbott—ideological blood brothers—in July 2014.

Tokyo understandably was disappointed by the submarine decision but remains optimistic about fulfilling the relationship’s potential with Malcolm Turnbull at the helm, given our broadly aligned interests, values and concerns. Evolving the strategic partnership has become more pressing, and the bilateral relationship even more significant, since Donald Trump’s election.

Both Canberra and Tokyo are keen to discern the Trump administration’s strategic intent in Asia. Donald Trump has made patently clear that he expects America’s allies to do more for their own security. As the northern and southern anchors of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, Japan and Australia must prepare to show the US president-elect that they are valuable partners working to support shared interests. They should consider how to encourage Trump to maintain America’s commitment to the region, together and separately.

Candidate Trump annoyed Tokyo with his hostile characterisation of Japan as a security free-rider that should pay more, and do more, and that would be “better off” with its own nuclear arsenal. His obstinate rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was stoically ratified in the Japanese parliament last month, was another hefty blow. Intemperate Twitter broadsides and protectionist, isolationist “America First” rhetoric didn’t go down well in Tokyo.

But since Trump’s election, Abe has sought to deal with the world as it is. He swung by Midtown Manhattan to become the first world leader to meet the US president-elect the week after he claimed victory. Reports of an Abe-Trump summit later this month further indicate that the Japanese Prime Minister is intent on quickly building a warm rapport with his new American colleague. The alliance between Washington and Tokyo is often described as the “cornerstone of peace, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific”. Abe wants to keep it that way by showing Trump that Japan is reliable and ready to muck in.

Tokyo is trying to figure out how best to wheel-and-deal with Trump and his coterie, with Abe out to win friends, grow influence and keep Washington engaged in the Asia-Pacific. By spelling out just how Japan underwrites Washington’s presence and interests in Asia, the statesman is pitching the businessman.

The value proposition on offer is compelling. Since returning to power in 2012, Abe has brought remarkable stability to the prime minister’s office after the revolving-door leadership of the preceding six years. He has been an indefatigable diplomat, travelling widely to extend Japan’s strategic horizons and forge new security relationships in the region. And he has made significant moves to modernise his country’s foreign and defence policy based on the idea that Japan should “proactively contribute” to global peace.

The Washington Post reported last weekend that ‘the Trump transition team is preparing its own pivot to Asia’— a reference to President Barack Obama’s politically underpowered rebalance to Asia. Transition officials noted that the new administration would ‘take a hawkish view of China, focus on bolstering regional alliances, have a renewed interest in Taiwan, be sceptical of engagement with North Korea and bolster the US Navy’s fleet presence in the Pacific’.

The news would have assuaged some fears among America’s Pacific allies and partners that the 45th president was set to retreat from Washington’s commitment to the region. While we can’t know the degree to which the Trump administration can deliver on boosting the US presence in the region, it’s clear that now is a good time for Australia to have a friend such as Japan.

With Abe’s arrival today there’s no doubt the Australian government also has been reflecting on its relationship with Japan. Hopefully it has grasped the significance and opportunity of Abe’s visit and corralled some weighty policy proposals to give a fillip to our strategic partnership.

In the coming months, our defence and foreign ministers are set meet with their Japanese counterparts for their annual 2+2 consultation, and Richard Court will get to work as our new ambassador to Tokyo. Canberra must harness the opportunity of Abe by encouraging an active, responsible and “normal” Japan to take on a greater security role in the region and looking for novel opportunities to further institutionalise our security relationship.

Sizeable shifts in the regional environment and the arrival of a new US president compel Canberra and Tokyo to contemplate how to strengthen their respective positions and sustain a stable, open and prosperous order in Asia. Hillary Clinton couldn’t have known that her campaign slogan, Stronger Together, would take on a different life half a world away once her opponent moved into the White House.

On Monday I spoke at a conference sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre and the JMSDF Command and Staff College on 21st Century Trilateral Maritime Cooperation.

The conference was designed to formulate trilateral cooperative approaches to enhancing the maritime security of Japan, the United States and Australia, and I spoke on the scientific aspects of civilian maritime activities.

Last August the Australian government launched the National Marine Science Plan 2015–2025: Driving the Development of Australia’s Blue Economy. The Plan sets out eight high-level recommendations, of which I’d like to highlight two. First, creating a National Oceanographic Modelling System to supply defence, industry and government with accurate, detailed knowledge and predictions of ocean state to support decision-making by policy-makers and marine industry. And second, sustaining and expanding the Integrated Marine Observing System to support critical climate change and coastal systems research.

Since 2006, Australia’s Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS) has supported a step-change increase in availability of physical, biogeochemical and biological observations and data across oceanic and coastal waters. (The following figure, designed to be read from inside to out, illustrates how IMOS is ‘operated by selected institutions but available for use by the entire community through open data access, generating a wide range of outputs that are relevant across portfolios and sectors.’)

Japan, the US and Australia should cooperate to improve the efficacy of Asia–Pacific ocean governance by creating and supporting structures to formally assess the state of regional oceans to inform sustainable ocean development. Such an assessment would drive innovation in observation, modelling and data sharing.

Four issues underwrite the need to rapidly improve our knowledge of regional oceans and seas. First, improving projections of regional, long-term change and variability (including extreme events and sea level change).The second is sustaining the productive capacity of the ocean’s ecosystems as they come under increasing pressure from human activities. Third, sustainably using marine ecosystem services, such as food security and coastal protection. And fourth, increasing resilience of communities and economic infrastructure to growing risk exposure from marine related disasters caused by extreme events, such as hurricanes, storm surges, and tsunamis.

Part 1X of the UN’s Law of the Sea Convention mandates that kind of ocean cooperation. Countries bordering enclosed and semi enclosed seas have an obligation to cooperate in their management, and this specifically applies to marine scientific research. In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted Sustainable Development Goal 14. Its purpose is ‘to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development’.

Australia, Japan and the US should be working together to reduce the time-lag between observations being made and the conclusions based on them being placed systematically and in coherent form into the regional policy arena.

We shouldn’t forget that in our region there’s lots of high seas beyond national jurisdiction. There are particular knowledge gaps in those areas, both spatially, as well as in the deep ocean below two kilometer depth. Australia’s already doing a lot with the US here, (calibration and validation of ocean data) and there’s scope to include Japan.

It’s really about gathering environmental intelligence for the oceans: understanding the ocean’s role in climate change and the resultant weather pattern changes, sea-level rise, acidification, biodiversity and evolution of marine ecosystems functioning.

There’s also the driver of the blue economy for our region, such as coastal aquaculture and hydrocarbon exploration in increasingly deep environments.

Our three countries should work together to support the capacity building of developing countries to monitor the oceans by, for example, installing tide gauges to quantify sea-level rise and predicting coastal flooding, delivering training in the use of freely available satellite information and assisting in the operation and usage of low cost (relative to ships) technology such as ocean gliders.

The three countries should engage more the merchant shipping industry on their collaboration in ocean observation. Commercial vessels spend far more time at sea than research vessels.

Last month the G7 Science and Technology Ministers met in Tsukuba City, Japan. The communique (PDF) states that the group believes that it’s crucial to develop far stronger scientific knowledge necessary to assess the ongoing ocean changes and develop appropriate policies to ensure the sustainable use of the seas and oceans.

They supported the development of an initiative for enhanced global sea and ocean observation required to monitor climate change and marine biodiversity, an enhanced system of ocean assessment through the UN Regular Process for Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment to develop a consensus view on the state of the oceans, promote open science and improve the global data sharing infrastructure to ensure the discoverability, accessibility and interoperability of a wide range of ocean and marine data.

They agreed to strengthen collaborative approaches to encourage the development of regional observing capabilities and knowledge networks in a coordinated and coherent way. Japan and the US signed off on this G7 commitment.

Australia can play key role in advancing that ocean observation agenda through IMOS. Organisations like AIMS and GBRMPA can enhance future regional ocean observations. We’re uniquely placed in the southern hemisphere to help countries test new technologies, like ocean gliders and autonomous systems.

The best way to advance that agenda is for the three countries to jointly support a strong ocean observation statement at APEC in Port Moresby in 2018. That would raise awareness of the value of earth and marine observation and data systems to support regional priorities and assist to prioritise regional marine observation needs.

One real issue for Australia, however, is that the RV Investigator, our only blue water research vessel, is tied up for half the year due to weak government funding. CSIRO own and operate the vessel, but it’s a national facility and there’s ample demand to keep it at sea year-round. That’s constraining research in the Southern Ocean and other regions and limits international collaboration, including with the US and Japan. It’s also hard to frame the recent CSIRO ocean program cuts as anything but a negative for trilateral cooperation.

Overall, however, the US, Japan and Australia are in an excellent position to bring their combined influence to bear in providing a strong impetus to strengthen ocean observation systems across the Asia–Pacific.