Tag Archive for: Japan

Peaceful rise, anyone? China’s East China Sea air defence identification zone

B-52 and B-2 of the US Air ForceOn 23 November, Beijing declared an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), which not only overlaps significantly with Japan’s but also with Taiwan’s and South Korea’s ADIZs. While the Chinese Ministry of Defense insists that the ADIZ is in ‘accordance with current international practice’, many countries have a very different view, including Australia and its ally the United States. Foreign Minister Julia Bishop called the establishment of the zone ‘unhelpful in light of current regional tensions’ and summoned the Chinese ambassador to express her concerns. US State Secretary John Kerry warned that such ‘escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks of an incident’. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel declared the ADIZ a ‘destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region’.

The ADIZ is problematic indeed. The rules demand that all aircraft flying in the ADIZ are required to notify flight plans to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respond to orders by Chinese authorities during the flight, and face military action in case of non-compliance. Rule number three specifically states that ‘China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in identification or refuse to follow the instructions’. China provided a very assertive understanding of an ADIZ, defining it as ‘an area of air space established by a coastal state beyond its territorial airspace to timely identify, monitor, control and react to aircraft entering this zone with potential air threats’. In contrast, the Pentagon sees it as an ‘airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required’. As Secretary Kerry stressed, the US also ‘does not apply its ADIZ procedures on foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. national airspace’.

In sum, China’s ADIZ undermines the freedom of overflight in East Asia. But there are at least four even broader strategic implications. Read more

Abbott and Abe: allied Liberals

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan

Just as the thumping victory by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party under Shinzo Abe in December 2011 over the ‘progressive’ Democratic Party of Japan is good for Japan–Australia relations, the thumping victory by the Liberal–National Coalition under Tony Abbott last Saturday against the Australian Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd is good for Australia–Japan relations.

Even before the new Coalition government is sworn in, there are three main reasons why such a categorical judgment is possible.

First, as stated clearly in the Coalition’s foreign policy platform (PDF), the new government will return to the successful policy settings of the Howard years that places Japan as Australia’s closest and most important partner in Asia and focusses on strengthening both the economic and strategic elements of the relationship. The attenuated Labor government under Prime Minister Rudd from 2007–10 didn’t share such a view, in word or action. Read more

Abe’s ASEAN tour

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan

Abe’s recent trips to Southeast Asia show that Japan is turning once again to the region. Abe travelled to Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in January — his first foreign tour since his re-election as prime minister.

He visited Myanmar in May, and then Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in July. Abe is also set to visit Brunei, Cambodia and Laos in October. While many observers interpret such visits primarily as a strategy to counter China, it can be argued that Japan’s major motive for this diplomacy is a mix of both commercial and strategic interests.

Abe’s Southeast Asia visits are not unprecedented. Japan has turned to Southeast Asia numerous times in the past, evident in foreign policy changes orchestrated by Prime Ministers Sato, Tanaka and Fukuda. Each time Japanese leaders have approached Southeast Asia the main issues have usually involved China, concerns over Japan’s economy, or both. While it was not accompanied by a tour, Japan’s first turn to the region in the post-war period happened in the 1950s under Prime Minister Yoshida. The motive for the turn was mainly commercial, as the Southeast Asian region was seen then as a substitute for the ‘loss’ of the Chinese market after it shifted to a socialist system. Since then, Japanese leaders have consistently attached great importance to its relationship with countries in Southeast Asia. This observation is reinforced by Japan’s huge economic presence in the region in the form of aid, trade and investment, which have grown progressively over the years. Read more

However it’s described, Japan’s Izumo will be its naval centrepiece

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) (left), steams alongside the British Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious (R 06) in the Persian Gulf on April 9, 1998. The two ships were operating in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Southern Watch, which is the U.S. and coalition enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Southern Iraq. DoD photo by Airman Robert Baker, U.S. Navy.Benjamin Schreer offers some important qualifications to Radford’s initial remarks about the relevance of Japan’s new carrier, Izumo, both for the JMSDF and in relation to naval developments and ramifications for naval politics in Northeast Asia in general.

I think Radford overemphasised, and to some extent misrepresented, the importance of Izumo in the context of Japanese efforts to enhance naval capabilities over the last decade. But I don’t think Schreer is quite right either in his characterisation of Izumo and aircraft carriers, and by extension and the role of a variety of warships in naval operations. Izumo, by design, meets all the established criteria for being called an ‘aircraft carrier’. It doesn’t feature a well deck or other integrated weapons capabilities aimed at providing either amphibious, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare or anti-air warfare functions, except for short-ranged self-defence purposes. Just as Hyuga and Ise before it, Izumo is wholly focused on supporting naval aviation. The Japanese designation as ‘destroyer’ can be dismissed as a political choice, as should be done with the Hyuga class. It’s safe to say that in no other naval force worldwide would this term be warranted or used for such a ship.

For the time being, the Izumo only carries helicopters in support of what are primarily ASW operations in peer-to-peer warfare scenarios. But this doesn’t by any means negate the capabilities of the design. Neither, for that matter, do Japanese comments to the same effect. The ship before our eyes needs to be judged primarily on its own merits, not by what someone would like to make it out to be for the rest of the world. Read more

The ship that dare not speak its name

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Oct. 3, 2011) An F-35B Lightning II makes the first vertical landing on a flight deck at sea aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). The F-35B is the Marine Corps Joint Strike Force variant of the Joint Strike Fighter and is designed for short takeoff and vertical landing on Navy amphibious ships. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Seaman Natasha R. Chalk/Released)

Aircraft carriers have a habit of denying what they really are. In the 1970s, Britain’s new Invincible class carriers were officially christened ‘Through Deck Cruisers’, to reassure the nation’s bookkeepers that its Navy really had surrendered grandiose pretentions. America’s 40,000 ton Wasp-class flat tops are ‘Amphibious Assault Ships’, despite being instantly recognisable as aircraft carriers, and operating squadrons of US Marine AV-8B Harrier fast jets.

Now Japan has joined the international warship-euphemism stakes with the impressively misleading construction: ‘Flat Top Destroyer.’ Launched last Wednesday, this 27,000 ton (full load) capital ship, Izumo sports a full-length, 248 metre flight deck, an all-round visibility flight control island, and a hull that has been subtly sponsoned out to a 38m beam at flight-deck level.

To put this non-carrier into perspective, the new Izumo is almost exactly the same size, shape and displacement as the Royal Navy’s old HMS Hermes: the flag ship of the task force that recaptured the Falklands. At the height of that conflict, Hermes operated 26 Harrier jump jets and 10 Sea King helicopters. By contrast, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force asserts that Izumo–the largest addition to the post-war Japanese fleet–will accommodate just 16 helicopters. Read more

ASPI suggests

Reunification Highway, south of Pyongyang in North KoreaThe normalisation of tension on the Korean Peninsula is settling onto its foundations, with South Korea pledging US$7.3 million of humanitarian aid to North Korea over the weekend. The move came one day before South Korea offered a ‘final’ round of talks with the DPRK to re-open the Kaesong industrial complex on the north-south border. Meanwhile, Pyongyang celebrated the (July 27) 60th anniversary of the Korean Armistice agreement, predictably, with a military parade.

Across the water, the Japanese returned Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to office. At a speech in Singapore he confidently declared:

…the will to change has returned to Japan, and so has strength. The “revolving door” politics with its high turnover for which Japan is now known has disappeared and is now a thing of the past. Read more

Reader response: control and diplomacy

Brendan Taylor provides an eloquent critique of Ben Scheer’s recent post, but I don’t think I can agree with him.

In his desire to ‘soften’ his former colleague’s line on China’s recent actions in the territorial dispute with Japan, he misses the most worrying element of his alternative anti-monolithic view of China in line with Linda Jakobson’s recent Lowy paper. This very element might well rule out the creative diplomatic options Brendan teases us with but does not elaborate on.

Following that logic, China’s most senior political leaders might not know what armed agents of the Chinese state are doing and are unable or unwilling to reign them in once they find out. This is a more worrying scenario for us all than the ‘monolithic complex strategy following China’ that Brendan claims Ben presents. Even more worrying is Linda’s final point that this lack of control is inherent to the present Chinese political system.

The upsurge in China–Japan tensions over the last decade is consistent with the uncontrolled thesis, as it is Chinese armed state agents that have come the closest to triggering an incident at sea (a ‘Tuchman miscalculation’), with Chinese helicopters and fighter jets ‘buzzing’ Japanese forces, PLAN radars locking onto Japanese platforms in disputed waters and PLAN flotillas sailing through the Miyako strait with no prior warning. Seemingly none of the perpetrators of these unprecedented and dangerous acts have faced sanctions from their political seniors. This wouldn’t and couldn’t happen in Japan, Australia or the United States and it shows how far the situation may be from creative diplomatic solutions. Read more

Reader response: China and Japan – let’s take a step back from the brink

Let's take a step back from the brink

Ben Schreer takes a hard-nosed approach to his analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in his recent post, but I don’t think I can agree with him.

First and foremost, despite his criticism of China I think Ben’s assessment actually gives too much credit to Beijing. He portrays a China that’s methodically ‘probing’ its way towards ruling the waves of the Western Pacific. He sees China implementing a coherent and sophisticated strategy involving the coordinated use of maritime surveillance, coast guard vessels and more conventional naval assets.

Ben might well be right. But for an alternative perspective, readers might also be interested in an excellent new report just released by Linda Jakobsen at the Lowy Institute. A seasoned China watcher, Linda characterises the new Xi Jinping leadership as one plagued by domestic pressures and internally focused as a consequence. This interpretation stands in marked contrast to Ben’s assessment, which—while acknowledging in passing the possibility of internal fissures—sees China as an externally focused, largely unitary actor that is pursuing a coherent grand strategic vision.

Linda’s analysis resonates with an oft-cited International Crisis Group report, published in 2012, that exposes conflicting mandates and a lack of coordination amongst Chinese government agencies—the so-called ‘nine dragons’—involved in the South China Sea. Yet Ben anticipates that the current, coherent pattern of Chinese maritime behaviour in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute will play out similarly in the South China Sea. What’s interesting, however, is just how different China’s approach to these two friction points has been. Where in the East China Sea exchanges between Beijing and Tokyo have quickly escalated to involve the use of military ships and aircraft, Chinese tactics in the South China Sea have by and large remained confined to the use of maritime patrol vessels. Read more

ASPI suggests

President Barack Obama gives his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress in the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol, Jan. 27, 2010. (Photo was shot with a tilt-shift lens) (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)

Welcome back for our pick of the defence and security world’s articles over the past week and listing of interesting events.

Navy and fleet sizes

The US Navy has reduced its fleet requirement from 313 to 306 ships. If you’ve been following Andrew Davies’ graphs of the week on the US Navy and fleet size, you won’t be surprised.

Nuclear security

With President Obama set to deliver his State of the Union address later today, the team over at Arms Control Wonk have distilled the best quotes about nuclear weapons and disarmament from all past SOTU addresses, going back to President Harry Truman.

There’s a little inter-blog discussion going on about nuclear superiority, sparked off by Erik Voeten’s post on The Monkey Cage which questions conventional wisdom on the subject, followed by a response by Daniel Nexon over at Duck of Minerva.

Japan and China

The Diplomat’s Trefor Moss argues that, despite a hawkish PM, it’s unlikely Japan will go to war with China and gives seven reasons to back that up.

Over at CIMSEC’s blog, Felix Seidler has a piece that asks, will China’s Navy be operating soon in the Atlantic? Read more

Getting Japan right

Getting Japan right

At first glance, it appears that the recent election results in Japan and the early policy pronouncements of the Abe government indicate that Japan has shifted significantly to the right and that this will increase strategic tensions in Northeast Asia. The evidence seems clear and plentiful:

  • The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan’s return to office after only one term in opposition via a thumping electoral victory (LDP 294 seats out of 480 up from 119 in 2009)
  • The electoral humbling of the nominally left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ 57 seats, down from 308 in 2009)
  • The rise from nowhere of the Japan Restoration Party co-led by arch-nationalist Shintaro Ishihara (JRP 54 seats in its inaugural election)
  • The return of the nationalist Shinzo Abe as prime minister
  • The prevalence of nationalist revisionists in his cabinet
  • Abe’s commitment to reverse Japan’s decade-long decline in defence spending
  • Abe’s call to amend the Japanese ‘peace’ constitution
  • The escalation of the Japan-China territorial dispute over the Japanese administered Senkaku islands from simmering to bubbling

The South Korean and Chinese media have certainly read the evidence this way, while authoritative voices in Australia have jumped in early to chastise the new Abe government along these lines. Reading the evidence this way is useful for China and Korea as it puts the onus of blame on the new Japanese government for any further increase in regional tensions and revives the spectre of Japanese ‘militarism’ in the minds of their own people. Read more