Unfortunately last year’s mess that was the hack of Sony Pictures Entertainments has followed us into 2015 and tensions continue to rise between the United States and North Korea. Despite a growing chorus of voices that suggest the hermit kingdom may not have been responsible for the hack, the United States continues to pull what few, essentially symbolic, levers it can to put further pressure on the regime. With the back and forth likely to drag on with little meaningful resolution, it might be worth considering how the White House could make some kimchi out of all this cabbage.
And if North Korea isn’t a satisfying culprit, head over to sony.attributed.to for some alternative cyber vandals (just click refresh til you’ve found your offender of choice!). Read more
‘The warrior ethos is at risk!’ Headlining today’s round-up is a speech by the US Army’s Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster at a Veterans Day ceremony. Specifically, it’s worth reading the second half, which discusses the importance of the warrior ethos while ‘remaining connected to those in whose name we fight’.
Also on regional order, Farish Ahmad-Noor has a new RSIS Commentary on how China sees itself and its role in Asia. Looking at Xi Jinping’s speeches, Ahmad-Noor’s piece is a useful insight into what the Communist Party of China thinks about Asia (spoiler alert: better without the West). Read more
Recently, the US and Japan released the Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation (PDF). The revision’s the first since 1997 and occurs in the context of Asia-Pacific power shifts. So countries in the region are watching closely just how much the US–Japan alliance is changing, both practically and conceptually. That includes the Australian government, which has long been supportive of a more ‘active’ Japanese security and defence policy at both the regional and global level. It’s a line Japan’s current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also been pushing.
Indeed, the five-page interim report points to the prospect of a US–Japan alliance moving beyond a narrow focus on the territorial defence of Japan against major aggression (from China or North Korea, for example). Instead, it’s based on a ‘strategic vision for a more expansive partnership’ and the need to build the alliance as a ‘platform for international cooperation that would continue to make positive contributions to the region and beyond’. It stresses that among other things future bilateral defence cooperation would focus on: Read more
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It now seems a real possibility that the replacement for the Collins-class submarines might come from Japan, rather than being built in Australia as previously promised by the government. The principal argument for that proposal is the supposed cost for the capability acquired—with a figure of $25 billion being considered better value for money than the somewhat woolly $50–80 billion for the local alternative. In the Australian Financial Review on 8 September (‘Japanese subs on the way’), Prime Minister Abbott is quoted as saying that ‘The most important thing is to get the best and most capable submarines at a reasonable price for the Australian taxpayer’.
While a simple comparison of potential costs is sobering (and obviously intended to be so) the arguments presented to date have been somewhat simplistic and don’t take into account the full range of factors upon which such a decision should be based. They also show a spectacularly naïve view on what comprises capability. Read more
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This week news broke that New Zealand has become the latest five-eyes country to be involved in submarine cable tapping. The communications cables that lie on the sea floor, carrying global internet and phone traffic, have proven to be attractive targets to signals intelligence organisations. Edward Snowden has claimed in a recent blog post that NZ’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) was involved in tapping the Southern Cross cable network, one of the largest cables connecting Australia to the United States via New Zealand, in 2012 and 2013. He also links New Zealand to the mass surveillance tool X-KEYSCORE, created by the NSA.
Prime Minister John Key has denied that GCSB conducts mass surveillance of its own citizens and has refused to comment on the X-KEYSCORE program, stating ‘we don’t discuss the specific programmes the GCSB may, or may not use’.
The other big story this week is Gmail’s supposed ‘hack’ of ‘millions of passwords’. A file containing 4.93 million account logins was published on a Russian Bitcoin board early last week, but the source and validity of the data has been called into question. The Department of Communications Stay Smart Online notification service reports that the data ‘is believed to be made up of old information captured from a number of other sources rather than a breach of Google services’. But if you’ve reused your Gmail password online in other locations, they also suggest changing it as a precaution. For those interested, you can subscribe to the excellent Stay Smart Online Service that outlines the latest online threats and vulnerabilities here. Read more
Earlier this week, Japan released its annual defence white paper. It comes amidst a number of initiatives by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to adjust Japan’s defence policy, including most recently a reinterpretation of the constitution to allow the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to exercise the right of collective self-defence. In light of Abe’s visit to Australia last month and the agreement to enhance bilateral defence cooperation, it’s worth analysing this document.
Overall, the white paper reaffirms both the Abe government’s increased concern about China’s strategic trajectory and changes to the JSDF’s force posture already announced in other documents after Abe’s re-election in December 2012. The 2013 defence white paper was already noteworthy for its harsher tone against China. The new version argues that ‘security issues and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious.’ It directly criticises China’s establishment of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013 as a ‘profoundly dangerous’ act designed to ‘unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea’. For the first time it also mentions the problem of ‘gray-zone’ situations which are ‘neither purely peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests’—another reference to China’s low-level maritime coercion activities in the East and South China Sea. Read more
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The good news is that Australia is doing just fine in shaping its relations with both China and the United States. The bad news is that things could still go wrong for Australia at any time, notwithstanding how skilled it might be in orchestrating its ties between Beijing and Washington.
There’s never any guarantee that the ‘right road’ to regional stability or economic growth will be free of unexpected traps and complications. As Hedley Bull once observed, conducting international relations remains an art, not a science. The best Australia can do is to apply the most reasonable policy assessments it can. Those involve assessing what we have learned from history and then applying diplomacy as judiciously as possible without excessive fear of risk.
In that context, fundamental aspects of Australia’s relations with China, the United States and other regional security actors can be assessed without excessive drama. Read more
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In 1972, Nixon and Mao met in Beijing to begin the Great Asia Bargain. Nixon called it the week that changed the world. The Republican and the Revolutionary ushered in a glorious period.
Almost as an aside—a prelude to the geopolitical plotting—they launched an economic engagement that turned China into the phenomenon of the modern age. As the man who took the US dollar off the gold standard, Nixon started a process that will see the yuan become a global currency to equal the greenback. Talk about unintended consequences. And that was just an aside.
Look back at what Mao and Nixon wrought because of what Shinzo Abe’s is now doing. Making Japan a security power—even claiming Japan’s right to be a ‘super power’—marks the demise of an important residual element of the Bargain. Read more
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Headlining today’s wrap-up is a new International Crisis Group report on evolving tensions between China and Japan. The report looks at mutual perceptions and canvasses opportunities for building better ties. No surprise, its first recommendation to both China and Japan is to refrain from escalatory actions near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which includes giving clear instructions to their respective coast guards to avoid collisions and conflict.
Sticking with China and Japan, Evelyn Goh weighs into the China Choice debate, arguing that the Abbott government has swung to the extreme in its embrace of Japan. In her view, ‘There is a world of difference between being forthright with China and creating the basis for a counter-veiling [sic] coalition with Japan to contain China.’ Keep reading here.
Indonesia has elected the ‘everyday man’, Joko Widodo, to be its next president. But opponent Prabowo Subianto is ready to launch a Constitutional Court challenge, demanding a revote in areas where massive fraud is alleged to have happened. New Mandala’s Liam Gammon has a useful rundown of why this is happening and how this might unfold for the retired military general. Read more
The recent dialogue between Hugh White and Peter Jennings on The Strategist makes us all ask where we stand on the Sino-Japanese relationship. Statements by President Obama emphasise that the United States takes its security partnership with Japan seriously, while Prime Minister Abbott was reassuring towards Prime Minister Abe during the latter’s recent visit to Australia. In many ways, those statements are wise and reflect the gravity with which both the United States and Australia view their treaty obligations.
There is, however, another side to this question—what do the Chinese think about the issue and are we handling them in the best possible way? Before we make up our minds simply to defend the status quo in the western Pacific right down to the last detail, it might be prudent to examine the diplomatic basis on which security rests. We know about the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security concluded in 1960, and we certainly know about ANZUS, concluded in 1951. But we may be less familiar with the principal agreement between Japan and China in the western Pacific: the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japanese version pictured), concluded in 1895 and still partly in effect. 1895 was a good time for Japan to insist on a treaty that expanded the area under its control, and a poor time for the Chinese to negotiate on behalf their interests. Read more
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