Under the banner of a new special relationship, we are currently witnessing a second evolution of Japan–Australia strategic relations. Looking back, the relationship’s evolution has had two distinct phases; the first phase of evolution started in 2007 which was marked by a deeper institutionalisation of bilateral cooperation focusing on non-traditional security, culminating in the historic Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in Tokyo. The non-traditional security cooperation between Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) is best represented by the past record of the frequent humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) cooperation between ADF and JSDF units, to name a few, in responding to the 2010 flood disaster in Pakistan, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and the 2013 mega-typhoon disaster in the Philippines.

Building on those initial efforts, we are witnessing the second evolution of the bilateral partnership which is characterised by new cooperation in the sphere traditional security. This second evolution is ongoing, and is driven by the following three new areas of cooperation. First, discussions about security legislation in the ruling coalition in the Japanese Diet suggest the real possibility of legally allowing the JSDF to cooperate operationally with ADF in more traditional security situations by offering logistics support for ADF units and/or assisting with the ADF’s force protection. Such unprecedented operational collaboration might happen when Japan, Australia and the US conduct joint training or missile defence operations in the waters around Japan, or where ADF vessels operating in support of US military activities in South China Sea are at risk of attacks in Japan’s neighbourhood.

Second, as debated on The Strategist (here, here and here, for instance), both countries are discussing the possibility of defence equipment cooperation—most notably in Australia’s Future Submarine project. It’s difficult to describe that kind of cooperation as ‘non-traditional’. Given that Australia’s submarine fleet regularly operates in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, the implication is that Japan’s supporting the modernisation and expansion of Australia’s undersea warfare capability in waters of increasing strategic importance.

Third, Japan and Australia—together with the US—are focussing on maritime security in Southeast Asia by assisting states in building up their maritime capacities. In the recent report by the Stimson Center, Ken Jimbo argues that trilateral cooperation in such areas can be designed to enhance maritime domain awareness and common operational pictures. This would be good news for Japan and Australia for many reasons. For one, it would reduce some of the burden on the US if states like the Philippines and Vietnam could manage some of the challenges they face in the South China Sea and didn’t demand US intervention every time.

As the second evolution of Japan–Australia strategic relations unfolds, both countries may face a wide range of challenges, particularly in managing mutual expectations. As bilateral relations move towards more traditional security, prominent scholars like Brendan Taylor and Nick Bisley, Des Ball and Rob Ayson, and Hugh White have expressed their concern about the risk of entrapment: Australia being drawn into a Sino-Japanese conflict should the relationship continue to develop as it is currently. Likewise, fears that getting too close to Japan might damage Australia–China relations are much more widely expressed down under (this concern can be termed as the ‘China Gap’ issue as I argued elsewhere). Those assertions, particularly ‘fear-of-entrapment’ arguments, are worrying signs because both parties harbour no desire to transform the bilateral relationship into a formal alliance, complete with the obligatory commitment of mutual defence.

Having said all that, some Japanese scholars and practitioners see the current strategic relations as a quasi Japan–Australia alliance, or see Australia as a de facto ally for Japan. This is not only misleading because these voices don’t in any way reflect Japanese government policy, but it’s also potentially dangerous because they risk fuelling fear of entrapment within Australia’s strategic community.

Indeed, managing such potential dynamics of mutual perceptions and expectations could become more critical and more difficult as the second evolution of our bilateral relationship continues to deepen and the regional security order becomes more competitive. For this reason, in future both governments may need to consider creating guidelines for Japan–Australia defence cooperation. For those who aren’t familiar with such guidelines, the Japan–US and South Korea–US alliances uses them for the purpose of articulating situations under which allies are expected to cooperate operationally, while also listing the required preparations for such operational collaborations.

Given the current status and future trajectory of the bilateral partnership, the purpose of guidelines for the Japan–Australia defence cooperation would be twofold: first, to articulate the nature of operational collaboration and what peacetime preparations are required. Second, to clearly state what this relationship isn’t about. The first point is important not just because ADF and JSDF would likely aim to cooperate in traditional situations which is unprecedented in the history of bilateral cooperation but, more importantly, because the legal limits of Japanese security would remain complex and obscure (regardless of the results of the security legislation), especially to outsiders. The second point sends an unequivocal message to various audiences, including China and the domestic constituencies of both countries, that this partnership isn’t involved with the obligatory commitment of mutual defence—it isn’t an alliance. In order for Australia and Japan to embrace the opportunities and effectively deal with challenges of the ongoing second evolution, it’s better to get it right before the time comes.

The new US–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (PDF) and the accompanying joint statement by the two countries’ foreign and defence ministers commit both sides to do more with each other in relation to third countries than did the much shorter 1997 guidelines when the East Asian security situation was less fraught.

The first reading of the guidelines from a Southeast Asian perspective suggest that one of the East Asian goals of the US rebalance is well on the way to being realised, while another one may not be so. On the positive side, as successive US Quadrennial Defense Reviews have repeated, the US has long sought greater support from allies and security partners in East Asia. The rebalance isn’t only a commitment by the US to update its forward defence commitments in East Asia (and ring-fence them from sequestration) but also a reciprocal opportunity for its treaty allies and growing number of security partners to provide greater support to the US.

In Northeast Asia, Japan, as shown by these new guidelines (and earlier unilateral defence reforms), has grasped this opportunity both for the defence of Japan and for supporting regional security through the guidelines’ new foci on third country contingencies, ballistic missile defence and cooperation on regional capacity building. South Korea, as shown by its continuing hesitancy over the deployment of a THAAD battery, less so.

In Southeast Asia, broadly defined, Australia has also grasped the opportunity to support the US role in regional security, as shown by the US marines in Darwin, greater US access to Stirling naval facilities, among other moves. Singapore’s decision to home port US littoral combat ships likewise, while the Aquino administration’s politically painful commitment to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States shows greater Philippine support for a larger US role in Philippine defence. Thailand, as shown by its hesitancy for US forces to use Thai air facilities, less so.

Three factors—two from the guidelines themselves and one external to them—suggest that the rebalance’s greater emphasis on Southeast Asia is harder going.

• the accompanying joint statement to the new US–Japan guidelines state that ‘the Ministers also reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.’ No such commitment exists for Philippine claims in the South China Sea for islands administered by the Philippines. The US commitment in Northeast Asia is deeper than in Southeast Asia when it comes to territorial disputes involving China.

• The guidelines commit Japan and the US to significantly deepen and broaden the alliance. That’s evidenced in the establishment of a whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, joint surveys of Japanese civilian airports and seaports for the use of US and Japanese forces, and by the new capabilities the US and Japan are bringing to the alliance particularly in relation to ballistic missile defence as listed in the joint statement. In contrast, the 2014 AUSMIN meeting led the US and Australia to commit to ‘establishing a bilateral working group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to ballistic missile defence in the region.’ These points reflect how much deeper and more central the US–Japan alliance is to US forward defence in East Asia than is ANZUS. That’s due to the much larger size of the Japanese military, the presence of so many US assets in and around Japan and Japan’s geographical location as a maritime neighbour of both China and North Korea. US forces and capabilities in East Asia have always been heavily unbalanced in favour of Northeast Asia, as have regional forces supporting the US presence. This will continue.

• American certainty over Japan’s reciprocal commitment to the rebalance is—or should be—stronger than the certainty granted to key allies and partners in Southeast Asia, Australia excluded. The 2016 Philippine election could lead to a significant change in the Philippine policy on its territorial disputes with China. Many fear (or hope) that the Philippine Supreme Court will strike down the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the access it provides the US to Philippine military facilities. The Philippine rebalance to the US could be undone.

The new US–Japan guidelines make specific mention of enhancing trilateral and multilateral cooperation. To take full advantage of these new, more robust guidelines, Australia should continue to strengthen its security partnership with Japan and the well-functioning trilateral relationship, and make a clearer commitment on regional ballistic missile defence. This would help ensure that the rebalance’s greater emphasis on Southeast Asia is supported not sidelined.

Since the 1946 ‘Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy’ and the closely associated Baruch Plan formulated by the United States, ‘nuclear latency’—put simply, the potential for countries to obtain nuclear weapons capability—has been a factor threatening to undermine strategic equilibrium on the world stage. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and resulting nonproliferation regime may have allayed mid-20th century concerns about the rate of spread of nuclear weapons, but the notion of nuclear latency has by no means become obsolete. At the same time, due to the complexity of underlying issues, the term continues to be widely misinterpreted and misjudged.

From a technology standpoint, the question of nuclear latency is complicated by the inherent duality of nuclear expertise—suitable both for nuclear weapons and for use in civil nuclear power programs. Accumulating a high level of nuclear capability under the guise of legitimate civilian programs may enable countries to maintain significant weaponisable knowledge without attracting a harsh backlash from the international community for having actually crossed the line. Therefore, from a political and analytical standpoint understanding a country’s motivations is critical. Arms control negotiators, the global analytical community and international nuclear watchdog agencies need a meaningful definition of nuclear latency that takes account of both capability and intent in order to develop a common understanding of the issue and deal with it effectively. Read more

The government doesn’t seem to understand the words it has been saying on submarines. It has committed to a ‘competitive evaluation process’ for the future submarine project—a term not used in defence circles—and some seem unable to explain the difference between that and a tender. Those seeking to build submarines in Adelaide sure know the difference though, because for them a big benefit of a formal tender process is that it’ll probably sink the Japanese Soryu option before it starts.

For some, the future submarine project is as much about money and jobs for South Australia as it is about defence requirements. Make-work programs for industry are exactly the wrong way to think about defence procurement: it should be about the best capabilities at the best price—but South Australians in particular don’t see it that way. Read more

Late last year Benjamin Schreer speculated on what 2015 might hold for the Australia–Japan security relationship. One of the issues he identified as being important in its development was that of potential cooperation on Australia’s future submarine program, observing in passing that any negotiations at the working level were likely to be ‘cumbersome and frustrating for both sides’.

It should be neither surprising nor exceptional if he’s proved right. Acquisition of defence materiel is nearly always challenging and complex. The degree of complexity tends to increase with acquisition from foreign countries with which Australian government instrumentalities have had little ongoing interaction.

Acquiring a major defence platform from Japan would be unique in the experience of Australia as a purchaser and Japan as a supplier. If adopted, this option would mirror the selection of the Swedish-designed Collins class as the RAN’s submarine choice as, at the time, Sweden was considered an unlikely source of major ADF materiel. Read more