Is the Covid-19 pandemic about to tear Solomon Islands apart? The sensible answer is, probably not. But the consequences of the pandemic, including jostling among China, Taiwan and even the US, certainly have the potential to destabilise the country.

Ethnic-based strife led to nearly five years of civil war from 1998 to 2003 that set people from Guadalcanal, the largest island, against Malaita, the most populous island. In a conflict more about national unity than secession, Guadalcanal forces sought to expel Malaitans living in and around Honiara. They were met with a Malaita militia protecting the right of its kinfolk to live securely in a single united country.

The pandemic is now entangling two significant sources of domestic tension: relations with the People’s Republic of China and micro-nationalism. The 2019 decision by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare to reassess Solomon Islands’ relationships with Beijing and Taipei has been controversial among those concerned about the geopolitical consequences while stirring up significant domestic push-back.

Malaita’s provincial premier, Daniel Suidani, with the support of the provincial assembly, has railed against the PRC as a threat to his province, the country and global order for many reasons, including China’s communist system, atheism and ‘ambition to dominate the world’, as well as a real fear for the Solomons of debt-trap diplomacy.

Suidani’s stance enjoyed popular support and attracted the backing of the micro-nationalist Malaita for Democracy (M4D) movement, which has linked its support for the premier to a demand for Malaitan independence.

Suidani turned his preference for Taiwan into a local hot-button issue by a carefully orchestrated request for Covid assistance from Taipei, leading to a gift of soap, masks and rice to the province. Taipei argued that it responded legitimately under its global Covid people-to-people program of making aid available to those in need, even in countries without formal ties to Taiwan.

Suidani publicly thanked Taipei for the donation, referring to Taiwan as a state and the disease as the ‘Wuhan virus’, but the PRC embassy characterised the donation as ‘illegitimate, inappropriate and entirely wrong’ and criticised the display of a Taiwan flag. (Displays of the Taiwan flag contributed to fisticuffs between PRC and Taiwanese diplomats at a Taiwanese National Day event in Suva last month.)

Tensions were further heightened when a second Taiwanese donation was seized by the police, who argued that it may have breached the Sedition Act because it was included in a diplomatic pouch sent to a private citizen, Richard Olita. Olita is an adviser to Suidani who has significant ties to the M4D movement and reportedly was one of the anti-Chinese rioters who helped to burn down Honiara’s Chinatown in 2006.

The Malaita government brought legal action to force the national government to give up the donations, arguing that Taiwan hadn’t requested any special immunity for the bag or its contents.

The decision of the national government in September to allow a Chinese charter flight to land in the Solomons has further raised tensions. Unlike previous repatriation flights, this one, paid for by China, included only a few Solomon Islanders and was mostly for Chinese officials and workers.

That led an angry Suidani to renew a call for a referendum on Malaitan independence. The M4D movement protested the flight by posting demands that all Chinese citizens in Auki, the provincial capital, leave for Honiara in 24 hours.

Although quickly defused, the threat was ominously reminiscent of the ethnic riots in 2006, when hundreds of ethnic Chinese were airlifted out of Honiara by the PRC, notwithstanding the absence of diplomatic relations. Beijing has since argued for improved military capacity to effect such evacuations.

Washington has now also entered into the tense situation by presenting a US$25 million aid package to Malaita. This sum is so large (more than 50 times the total assistance to the province from all sources in 2018) that some claimed the US was using Malaita as a surrogate for opposing PRC influence in the Solomons.

The act of throwing an economic lifeline to those in Malaita pursuing a micro-nationalist agenda has worried the Solomon Islands government sufficiently that it has warned that all foreign aid must go through official channels, including approval by cabinet.

Whatever the motivation (and some saw some very sinister linkages), the aid package will help promote economic development, trade and improved natural resource management and thereby boost the sustainability of the long-neglected province.

Concerns for provincial development extend well beyond Malaita. The Western Province has threatened legal action to protect its autonomy as well as lodged complaints elsewhere regarding fairness in aid distribution. The Sogavare government has become so sensitive to such public criticism that it has now proposed banning Facebook, an act Suidani has labelled an attack on free speech.

A quarter of a century of grievances has helped to nurture the idea of Malaitan separatism, but it remained in the background of provincial politics until the switch in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Suidani, it appears, would have preferred a united Solomons Islands still aligned with Taipei but has been persuaded to link his cause to separatism by the M4D movement.

Nevertheless, the chances of success for the separatist movement seem low. Peter Kenilorea Jr, a Malaitan politician and son of the country’s first prime minister, argues that Suidani’s demand for a Bougainville-style independence referendum could be justified under international law as a right to self-determination but acknowledges that, politically, it would involve a long and complex process.

The experience of neighbouring Bougainville also demonstrates that even a successful independence referendum might not bring full international endorsement and support, especially from regional neighbours.

Neither Taipei nor Washington genuinely wants, or intends, to foment destabilisation in the Solomons. Canberra and Wellington are scarcely in the mood for a repeat of the 13-year intervention under the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands that ended the civil war and sought to rebuild the country.

But, should the tensions escalate further, the RAMSI experience could point to a way to reduce the risk of conflict. The 2000 Biketawa Declaration, which legitimated the armed RAMSI regional intervention, also provides for conciliatory, good-faith mechanisms to defuse tensions before they reach breaking point.

The Covid crisis has raised domestic tensions by inflicting significant economic hardship on Solomon Islands. It’s been a convenient tool rather than a motivator for Malaitan separatists, who have used it to underscore their rejection of the country’s links with the PRC and to break with Honiara.

This post is part of an ASPI research project on the vulnerability of Indo-Pacific island states in the age of Covid-19 being undertaken with the support of the Embassy of Japan in Australia.

The United States is in the midst of a major shift in focus to the Indo-Pacific as it competes with China for global influence. This contest will affect key US priorities and require comprehensive policy engagement with Pacific island nations and other partners in the region.

The driver for this change is the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) established under the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. When approved, the initiative will require the US Department of Defense to invest in stronger military capabilities across all domains. The PDI is intended to reassure allies and partners across the region of the depth of the US’s commitment. Most importantly, the congressional legislation underpinning a shift in resources compels action by future US administrations.

At the same time, a smaller bipartisan bill called the BLUE Pacific Act, introduced in the House Foreign Affairs Committee with support from the Pacific Islands Congressional Caucus, would appropriate supplementary funding for diplomatic and civilian agencies that would augment the PDI. This funding would help close gaps to address areas not specifically referenced in the larger legislation.

US interests in Asia and the Pacific are secured by US Indo-Pacific Command headquartered in Hawaii. To meet the PDI’s objectives, the US will provide additional resources to help countries overcome vulnerabilities to climate change and global pandemics and enhance economic development and capacity-building. Additional focus should be placed on protection of vulnerable populations consistent with the 2017 Women, Peace and Security Act.

The US must strengthen its relationship with the freely associated states (Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau), which are critical to regional stability and security. The compacts of free association now being negotiated will accomplish that task. At the same time, ties with Kiribati need to be strengthened using its separate treaties of friendship and marine conservation as a foundation.

The US also should align its policies in the North Pacific with its approach in the South Pacific. It needs to examine how it will refocus is engagement with Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Timor-Leste, along with its allies.

The 2020 AUSMIN statement underscores cooperation between the US and Australia that will help implement the legislative authorisations and appropriations of the PDI. Although the PDI has not yet been passed by Congress, the imperative for increased collaboration between Washington and Canberra has already been prescribed, especially on health security in the Pacific nations. The efforts by the US to staunch HIV and Australia’s ongoing efforts to stem non-communicable diseases would be an effective starting point for regional collaboration on health security.

The Covid-19 pandemic has brought immense challenges to Pacific nations. It has undermined key economic sectors, including labour, tourism and commercial growth, and risks fraying their social fabric. This in turn has made these states susceptible to China’s entanglements in their attempts to address these new vulnerabilities.

The PDI includes a broad definition of civil–military assistance, particularly when such efforts complement the significant requirements for establishing a stronger defence capability. However, Pacific nations need sustainability and continuity in their relationships with the US.

Washington must be mindful that they were disappointed by its response during climate change negotiations as it became clear that there was no inclination to compensate them for sea-level rise attributed to increased carbon emissions.

The US should review the different approaches of its allies and regional partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand and Japan, to determine where any additional funding for civilian agencies would complement acutely needed development assistance and capacity-building. The island nations would benefit from parallel funding of existing bilateral projects. This approach would not duplicate programs funded by the United Nations and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. However, it would mobilise resources to address conditions and situations exacerbated by the economic dislocations and privations spurred by the pandemic.

Focusing on regional health security as a priority area for coordination and collaboration with the island nations allows them and those providing help to review how existing resources can fund projects without the need to build new programs. It also could create a vehicle for other donor countries as well as Taipei to create sustainable healthcare funding mechanisms for the region. Within the US there would be strong bipartisan support for an initiative that would support Taipei’s inclusion in a regional health security program.

That would complement INDOPACOM’s efforts to strengthen humanitarian assistance and disaster planning with Australia and New Zealand. Strengthening island states’ capacity to prepare for natural disasters and to withstand their impacts should be linked to existing development assistance projects. Helping them build new infrastructure beyond that required under the PDI would be essential to these efforts.

This focus would create strong consideration for full US membership in the Pacific Islands Forum based on the substantial resources to be provided to the region that will be mandated by Congress.

There’s a longstanding record of Congress using legislation to direct foreign policy initiatives that unify the efforts of American civilian agencies and the military. The competition with China and others challenging the US in the Pacific requires a resources-based strategy that underpins US regional commitments. For US allies and partner nations, a coordinated, comprehensive and cohesive approach would become a useful planning tool to meet common objectives.

This post is part of an ASPI research project on the vulnerability of Indo-Pacific island states in the age of Covid-19 being undertaken with the support of the Embassy of Japan in Australia.

Australia’s political leaders have spoken strongly about assisting our Pacific ‘family’ through the Covid-19 crisis. But the needs of the island nations go far beyond medical supplies and expertise. The Royal Australian Navy could play an important role in supporting critical infrastructure if the crisis hits the islands hard.

Covid-19 infections in the Pacific are starting to ramp up. Australia is already helping with laboratories, medical equipment, health expertise and public information campaigns. But, in addition to the health impact, the crisis has the potential to overwhelm critical infrastructure in the islands.

The Australian Defence Force, including the navy’s two giant landing ships, could be an important, and highly visible, element of Australia’s response. HMAS Adelaide and its sister ship, HMAS Canberra, are the biggest ships in the Royal Australian Navy and have extraordinary capabilities for disaster response—helicopters, landing craft, medical facilities, engineering workshops, supplies and accommodation for large numbers of people.

Over the past few weeks, attention has been given to the use hospital ships for medical assistance, including by Australia. But using ships for this purpose requires careful consideration and preparation.

For years, the US Navy has been deploying its hospital ships in the Pacific and Indian oceans to provide health services to island communities as part of the Pacific Partnership program. USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort are each the size of a large aircraft carrier, with 12 operating theatres, 1,000 beds and large medical teams comprising US military personnel and volunteers. On 30 March, the Comfort arrived in New York Harbor to provide assistance during the Covid-19 crisis; the Mercy has been moored at the Port of Los Angeles since 27 March.

China, too, understands the importance of using hospital ships to project soft power. In response to criticism over its failure to provide significant assistance to the region after the 2004 tsunami, China  built its own hospital ship, the Daishan Dao, which has sailed throughout the Indian Ocean, and in Pacific, Caribbean and African waters, providing medical services through its eight operating theatres and 300 beds. Beijing says that, over the past decade, the Daishan Dao has visited some 40 countries and provided healthcare services to more than 180,000 people. The ship’s 2018 tour included visits to Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga.

In theory, Australia’s landing ships could provide medical assistance through their two operating theatres, eight-bed critical care units, and pathology, radiology, dental and pharmacy services. While these impressive facilities have been used to support military personnel on board, and sometimes Australian personnel ashore, they’ve never been used for regional health outreach.

There are sound reasons for exercising caution in deploying large warships for community health, particularly during a pandemic. Covid-19 outbreaks on two aircraft carriers, France’s Charles de Gaulle and America’s Theodore Roosevelt, have effectively disabled those vessels. The Comfort and Mercy are also now both battling onboard outbreaks of their own.

But while medical assistance is an initial focus of Australia’s regional response to the Covid-19 crisis, it’s highly likely that we will soon move to helping the islands maintain their critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, fuel and electricity.

All of these pieces of critical infrastructure will come under increasing strain because of the absence of workers or the breakdown of the long and tenuous supply lines that the islands depend on. An interruption of fuel or diesel supplies, for example, whether due to local or international factors, would impede the transport of people, food and essential good and the supply of electricity, which is generally powered by diesel generators. Such an event would cause significant disruptions and threaten the social order.

These effects would be greatly magnified by a concurrent natural disaster, as when Cyclone Harold  recently hit Vanuatu.

In coming weeks, we could well see ADF engineering teams, based afloat or ashore, helping to maintain critical infrastructure in the region. The Adelaide and the Canberra would be of great value as floating warehouses and bases for engineering services, although their deployment could come with real risks.

Assistance with maintaining infrastructure might be far more significant for vulnerable island nations than medical assistance. Indeed, the French navy recently deployed its landing ship Mistral to the island of Réunion in the Indian Ocean for this purpose.

Australia has been an adept practitioner of defence diplomacy through military training, disaster relief and defence capability programs. We need to help (and, importantly, to be seen to be helping) our Pacific family in this crisis, while also having regard to our own needs. Some of the ADF’s capabilities could be a highly visible component of our response in the region.