Washington’s management of its wobbly and contested Middle East policy has just become whole lot more difficult and complicated with the worsening of tensions between Riyadh and Tehran following the recent Saudi execution of an elderly Shiite cleric on dubious terrorism charges.

On the one hand, there’s Saudi Arabia, the uncontested leader of the Arab world and a long-lasting ally of the US; and on the other hand, Iran, the leader of the Shiite community and a country with which the US wants to develop a more constructive relationship. But more importantly, Washington needs both countries to be on board with the Vienna process if the Obama administration is to make any progress in finding a political solution to the never-ending Syrian crisis. And although Saudi Arabia and Iran were both at the initial meeting endorsing the process, their continued participation down the road looks increasingly like a pipe dream.

The Obama administration is indeed worried that this sudden rise in tension between the two key countries in the region will undermine its efforts to stop the horrendous bloodshed in Syria and the consequent human displacement and misery that it generates. Accordingly, Secretary of State John Kerry has been busy working the phones talking to the Saudi and Iranian leaders and officials in an attempt to de-escalate the situation. However, his efforts don’t seem to have had much impact.

Not only has Saudi Arabia broken all diplomatic relations with Iran and stopped all commercial flights between the two countries following the storming of its embassy in Tehran, but most of Riyadh’s Sunni allies in the region have joined it, in various degrees, in severing their ties with Iran. That will further harden the Sunni-Shiite sectarian divide and may well have far-reaching implications for the long-term stability of Saudi Arabia, where 10% of the population is Shiite. Importantly, most of the minority Saudi Shiite population lives in the eastern part of the kingdom where the oil fields and refineries are located. Reportedly, the Obama administration was privately critical of the Saudi Government’s decision to execute the Shiite cleric, fearing that it would create a vigorous Iranian reaction—which, in the end, happened regardless.

The tensions between the two big actors in the region are nothing new. However, the last time diplomatic relations were severed was in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, when Saudi Arabia and its Arab Gulf allies actively financially supported Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his conflict with Iran. But what’s worrisome today is how quickly tension has risen between the two sectarian rivals, with Iran accusing Saudi Arabia of conducting airstrikes on its embassy in Yemen. (A Saudi-led coalition has been battling Iranian-backed rebels since March 2015 in an attempt to restore the legitimate national government of Yemen.) And although Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (son of King Salman) has stated that Saudi Arabia doesn’t want war with Iran, this latest development doesn’t augur well for the future of bilateral relations.

But as everyone knows, a proxy war has already been taking place between the two rivals for the better part of four years, with Tehran supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, head of a minority Shiite sect, and Saudi Arabia backing the anti-Syrian government armed groups. However, the present scrap between Iran and Saudi Arabia underscores the more troubling differences: those between Riyadh and Washington.

During most of Obama’s tenure, there have been deep differences between Riyadh and Washington on how to deal with Middle Eastern issues. The Saudi monarchy has been particularly critical of the US’ willingness to cut Egyptian President Mubarak loose during the Arab Spring; its early refusal to support the moderate opposition against President al-Assad and its failure to act on the famous ‘red line’ in Syria; and, most importantly, its nuclear deal with Iran last year. As seen from Riyadh, this American approach deeply worries the House of Saud, sensing that Washington is gradually loosening its ties with the Kingdom and beginning to lean towards Iran.

In light of the underlying US–Saudi tension, it isn’t too surprising to read (although generally only stated privately) that the Saudi Deputy Crown Prince reportedly said ’the US must realise that they’re ‘the number one’ in the world and they have to act like it’. Such public statements won’t help move matters forward.

In reaction to the perceived lack of US leadership in the Middle East or in response to Washington’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s failure to pull its weight in fighting the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia unexpectedly launched an ‘Islamic military alliance’ in mid-December 2015. And although it was welcomed by the US administration, it’s unclear how this motley group of 35 Muslim countries—many of which hadn’t even been consulted prior to their inclusion—is supposed to achieve its stated aim of ‘coordinating mutual anti-terrorism assistance all over the Islamic world’. What is clear, however, is that, though that alliance is more symbolic than anything else, as seen from Tehran, this grouping very much looks like an anti-Shiite alliance. Only three Muslim countries—Iran, Iraq and Syria, all majority Shiite or Shiite-dominated states—aren’t included. No wonder then that Iran reacted to the Saudi execution of the Shiite cleric as it did.

It’ll be critical for the Obama administration to diffuse this ever-growing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran as quickly as possible. And although it’s unlikely that tensions will eventually lead to direct armed conflict between the two Gulf countries, it’ll probably lead to an increase in military support for each other’s regional, non-state proxies. So let’s hope Washington is up to the task of hosing down this latest Iranian–Saudi scrap because it’s those living in this already unstable and war-torn region who would suffer as a result of increased tensions.

Washington is abuzz with the Iran deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed upon last month between the P5, Germany and the EU on the one side, and Iran on the other. The intense debate about the merits of the deal will continue until 17 September, when Congress returns from recess and votes on whether to accept or reject the deal. Regardless which way the vote goes—and the odds are that the deal will narrowly survive this vote—this issue will be the defining foreign policy moment of the Obama presidency. The political fall-out of this deal will continue until well beyond September, and will undoubtedly impact on the 2016 presidential race.

The ongoing debate about the JCPOA is really about two things: the first is Iran’s nuclear program and the second is Iran’s behaviour in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the JCPOA only deals with the nuclear side of the equation and doesn’t address the non-nuclear issues. Put differently, Congress is effectively being asked to vote on the merits of the nuclear deal in a geostrategic vacuum.

According to the nuclear experts, this is a good deal and probably the best that one could hope for given the number of participants involved in the negotiations. And while even the supporters of the deal recognise there are weaknesses in the agreement—it delays but doesn’t end Iran’s nuclear program—Iran isn’t required to close any of its nuclear facilities. It also doesn’t include ‘anywhere, anytime’ inspections—but supporters feel it should be accepted by Congress nevertheless.

However, President Obama has had few, if any, wins on the foreign policy front and with less than two years left in his presidency, he’s decided to take no prisoners on this issue. On the contrary, having negotiated what he believes to be one of the most comprehensive nuclear inspection regimes ever agreed to, this is a unique opportunity to leave the Oval Office on a grand note. However, it’s in the selling of the deal to Congress that things have turned nasty.

In his speech at the American University on 5 August, President Obama accused the Republican opponents to the deal of ‘making common cause’ with the Iranian hardliners. This wasn’t only getting personal but it was hitting a raw nerve indeed.

It’s also important to remember history. Some 35 years ago, when a Democratic president was in the White House, Iranian students sympathetic to Ayatollah Khomenei overran the American embassy in Tehran and held over 50 diplomats hostage for well over a year (444 days to be precise). They were eventually released on the day Ronald Reagan—the Republicans’ ideological hero—was inaugurated president in January 1981. This whole episode was seared in the psyche of the American public and, needless to say, bred deep distrust of the Iranian regime and the mullahs who run it today. Cutting a deal with Iran is something anathema to Republicans. This brings us to the second part of the equation: Iran’s behaviour in the Middle East.

The battlelines have been drawn: all Republican members of Congress as well as a significant number of Democrats, including some prominent ones, have rejected the deal. They’ve done so not only because of its nuclear aspects but because they feel that this deal will still allow Iran to behave in ways that are against American and Israeli interests.

Although not specifically spelled out, there’s a built-in assumption in the Obama administration that this deal will somehow convince the Iranian regime to modify its behaviour in the region. This is wishful thinking. There’s absolutely no reason why Iran should stop supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, President al-Assad in Syria, Hamas in Gaza, the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen—they’ve managed to cut a nuclear deal with the international community while doing just that. On the contrary, Iran may well intensify its activities in those areas. And this is what worries the agreement’s opponents.

At this stage, the opponents of the deal don’t have the numbers in both houses to override a presidential veto, but they’ll fight this to the very end. A recent survey suggests that 41% of Americans feel that the Iranians got the upper hand in the agreement.

Accordingly, while the Republicans will most likely lose this battle and the Iran deal will survive a determined Congressional opposition, all Republican candidates for the 2016 presidential race have promised that, were they to be elected president, one of their first executive orders would be to rip up the Iran deal. Let’s watch that space.

It is probable that after 60 days of intense debate in Washington, DC, and conceivably Tehran, the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” signed on July 14 by Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany (the P5+1), will enter into force. But no one should confuse this outcome with a solution to the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions or its contributions to the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East. On the contrary, depending on how it is implemented and enforced, the agreement could make matters worse.

This is not to suggest the JCPOA makes no contribution. It places a ceiling for the next decade on the quantity and quality of centrifuges Iran is allowed to operate and allows the country to possess only a small amount of low-enriched uranium for the next 15 years. The agreement also establishes, in US President Barack Obama’s words, a “where necessary, when necessary” inspections mechanism that has the potential to verify whether Iran is meeting these and other commitments.

The net result is that the accord should lengthen the period it would take Iran to produce one or more nuclear weapons from several months to as much as a year, making it more likely that such an effort would be discovered in time. The prospect that the JCPOA could keep Iran without nuclear weapons for 15 years is its main attraction. Sanctions alone could not have accomplished this, and using military force would have entailed considerable risk with uncertain results.

On the other hand (there always is another hand in diplomacy), the agreement permits Iran to keep far more nuclear-related capacity than it would need if it were interested only in civil research and in demonstrating a symbolic ability to enrich uranium. The agreement also provides Iran with extensive relief from economic sanctions, which will fuel the regime’s ability to support dangerous proxies throughout the Middle East, back a sectarian government in Baghdad, and prop up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Moreover, the accord does not rule out all nuclear-related research and does not constrain work on missiles. Sales of ballistic missiles and missile parts to Iran are banned for no more than eight years. Sales of conventional arms to Iran are prohibited for no more than five years.

There is also the danger that Iran will fail to comply with parts of the agreement and undertake prohibited work. Given Iran’s record, this has understandably been the focus of much concern and criticism regarding the pact. What matters is that non-compliance be met with renewed sanctions and, if needed, military force.

A bigger problem has received much less attention: the risk of what will happen if Iran does comply with the agreement. Even without violating the accord, Iran can position itself to break out of nuclear constraints when the agreement’s critical provisions expire. At that point, there will be little to hold it back except the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a voluntary agreement that does not include penalties for non-compliance.

It is important that the United States (ideally, joined by other countries) let Iran know that any action to put itself in a position to field nuclear weapons after 15 years, though not explicitly precluded by the accord, will not be tolerated. Harsh sanctions should be reintroduced at the first sign that Iran is preparing a post-JCPOA breakout; this, too, is not precluded by the accord.
Iran should likewise be informed that the US and its allies would undertake a preventive military strike if it appeared to be attempting to present the world with a fait accompli. The world erred in allowing North Korea to pass the nuclear-weapons threshold; it should not make the same mistake again.

In the meantime, a major effort must be launched to assuage the concerns of Iran’s neighbors, several of which will be tempted to hedge their bets against Iran’s potential breakout in 15 years by pursuing nuclear programs of their own. The Middle East is already nightmarish enough without the added risks posed by a number of would-be nuclear powers. Obama’s claim that the agreement has “stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region” is premature, at best.

It will also be essential to rebuild strategic trust between the US and Israel; indeed, this will need to be a high priority for Obama’s successor. And the US should push back as warranted against Iran’s foreign policy or treatment of its own people.

None of this rules out selective cooperation with Iran, be it in Afghanistan, Syria, or Iraq, if interests overlap. But here, too, realism should prevail. The notion that the nuclear agreement will lead Iran to moderate its radicalism and rein in its strategic ambitions should not be anyone’s baseline scenario. In fact, the emergence of an ever more capable Iran, not a transformed one, is likely to be one of the main challenges confronting the Middle East, if not the world, in the coming years.

Ahron Shapiro’s critique eloquently expresses the strongest arguments against the P5+1 interim deal. In many ways this debate is ‘the principle versus the technical’. It’s regrettable that in 2015 the discussion is about how many thousands of centrifuges Iran may continue spinning. The mere fact that we have arrived here reflects a condemnable failure of policy over many years.

Ahron is also absolutely correct in saying that Iran’s nuclear programme serves no legitimate civilian purpose. Iran does not require its existing nuclear infrastructure to service its fuel needs. Demanding that Iran dismantle its entire nuclear programme on these grounds is therefore a defensible position—just not an effective one.

To say the deal will ‘legitimise Iran as a nuclear weapons threshold state’ is a major overstatement. Once the deal is implemented Iran will have significantly less capacity to build a nuclear bomb than it does now. Although Iran’s nuclear facilities will remain in place, what makes this deal surprisingly effective is the degree to which Iran is surrendering those elements that could lead to a bomb. As Joe Cirincione puts it ‘Iran gets to keep its buildings. And we get to move out most of the furniture.’

Admittedly, this deal does legitimise Iran’s enrichment activities. This is plainly undesirable and undermines those seeking to limit the kinds of nuclear activities that individual states can legitimately engage in elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the interim deal with regard to enrichment is still quite strong. One risk was that the P5+1 would negotiate a ceiling on the number of centrifuges, while allowing Iran to upgrade its existing cascades with more advanced models. This did not occur. Iran is only permitted to use IR-1s in its enrichment activities, and strict limitations are being placed on Iran’s LEU stockpiles. Ahron’s speculation that Iran may utilise IR-8 centrifuges in its enrichment programme is therefore incorrect. Moreover, Foreign Minister Zarif’s claim that Iran may ‘operate its high-speed centrifuges from the first day’ does not contradict this. Iran will be able to undertake ‘limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges’. Iran will not, however, be permitted to use those centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

Ahron also understandably raises Iran’s refusal to discuss its ballistic missile programme, Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and the continued outrages from Tehran denying Israel’s right to exist. These are all serious matters that must be addressed—but the fact is sanctions imposed on Iran’s nuclear programme are not in place for this purpose. The interim deal expressly states that ‘U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal’.

Finally, Ahron asks two key questions: 1) what happens after the agreement ends?, and 2) what happens if Iran doesn’t keep to the deal?

When the agreement ends, we will be in another world. The good news is that the interim deal is not one that just allows Iran to bide its time. Another risk in the negotiations was that Iran would get relief from sanctions and achieve acceptance of its nuclear programme, only to be in a position to race for bomb on the deal’s expiry date. However the interim deal sufficiently winds back Iran’s existing programme in a manner that makes this a difficult proposition. As part of the deal, Iran will be expected to join the IAEA Additional Protocol and comply with an intrusive inspections regime. Once the deal expires those inspections will continue to be in place.

What happens if Iran cheats is perhaps the most important question. I share Ahron’s scepticism regarding the effectiveness of ‘snap back’ provisions for sanctions, especially those sanctions imposed by the UN. For a substantive violation my recommendation would be for a limited military response. For instance, if Iran was found to be secretly enriching uranium then the offending sites should be targeted. Leaving the remaining facilities unscathed (at least at first) would provide Iran with a clear incentive for returning swiftly to compliance. Moreover, a targeted military strike against Iran under those conditions would likely be seen as legitimate by the international community, far more so than any such action would be today.

This is where Israel should have focused its attention. Obtaining from the US clear and specific commitments as to what consequences Iran would face for cheating would have been an achievable and useful Israeli objective.

Beyond acknowledging the existence of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Rodger Shanahan’s views on Iran and my own differ greatly. At the core of our disagreement is how Iran might employ its nascent nuclear capability. I’m clearly more pessimistic than Dr Shanahan, who sees the Iranians developing nuclear arms essentially as a defensive shield. On the other hand, I’m far more concerned about the offensive utility of such weapons in the hands of an unstable and irrational polity.

The source of my pessimism arises from Iran’s record within the international system, remembering that this is the same polity which: Read more