US President Donald Trump has announced what was long anticipated: that he will not certify that Iran is complying with the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by the United States, China, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Iran. Nor will he certify that the suspension of sanctions undertaken by the US as part of the agreement is justified and in the vital national interest of the US.

To be clear, such certifications are not required by the JCPOA. Rather, they are required every 90 days by a law enacted by the US Congress soon after the accord was signed. It is also essential to underscore that Trump did not withdraw from the JCPOA itself. What he chose was a compromise: to make clear his disdain for the agreement without leaving it or reintroducing sanctions that were removed as part of it (a step that would be tantamount to US withdrawal).

What happens next is unclear. Congress has 60 days to reintroduce some or all of the suspended sanctions but is unlikely to do so. It might, however, introduce new sanctions tied to Iran’s behavior in Syria or elsewhere in the region. Consistent with this, Trump announced his intention to place extra sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

If the US were to impose new sanctions for any purpose at any time, it would likely find itself alone. The Europeans, China and Russia are highly unlikely to join, not only because of financial self-interest, but also because Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA. This is a point made by international inspectors operating under United Nations auspices, as well as by senior US officials, including Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.

To argue, as some in America do, that Iran is not complying with the spirit of the JCPOA is meaningless: ‘spirit’ is a term without legal standing. And while it is fair to argue that much of what Iran is doing in the region is a legitimate cause for concern, it is not grounds for reintroducing sanctions under the accord.

Renegotiating the JCPOA to extend the duration of several of its constraints, make inspections more intrusive, and expand its coverage to missiles is attractive in the abstract. But it is totally unworkable in practice, as Iran and most (or all) of the other signatories of the JCPOA would reject these demands. The threat to terminate US participation in the JCPOA if such changes are not made will thus prove either empty or self-defeating if carried out.

None of this is meant to argue that the JCPOA is a good agreement. Still, Trump’s decision not to certify was unwarranted and ill-advised. The agreement was the result of a collective effort. American unilateralism now could make forging a common front against Iran much more difficult in the future.

Trump’s move is also bad for US foreign policy. There must be a presumption of continuity if a great power is to be great. Unpredictability can provide a tactical advantage, but it is also a strategic liability.

Here there is an obvious link with North Korea. At some point, the US may determine that diplomacy has a role in managing the North Korean nuclear and missile challenges. But America’s ability to offer a credible diplomatic path will be seriously undermined if others judge that it cannot be trusted to stand by agreements.

There is also a more immediate problem: if the US sets in motion a dynamic that causes the JCPOA to unravel, and Iran resumes nuclear activities currently precluded by the accord, a crisis will erupt at a time when the US already has its hands full with North Korea.

Despite these considerations, it would also be a mistake to focus just on the US announcement and not also on Iranian behavior. In the short run, the world needs to contend with an Iran that is an imperial power, one that seeks to remake large swaths of the Middle East in its image. What is needed is a policy of containment of Iran across the region—including support for the Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria, as well as of other groups and countries that are pushing back against Iran.

In the longer run, the challenge is to deal with the JCPOA’s flaws, above all with its sunset provisions. The agreement ‘parked’ the nuclear problem, rather than resolving it. Important provisions of the accord will expire in either eight or 13 years. At that time, inspections will not prevent Iran from putting in place many of the prerequisites of a nuclear weapons program that could be made operational with little warning.

It cannot be assumed, as some do, that Iran’s intentions and behaviour will moderate over the next decade or 15 years. On the contrary, Iran is more likely to remain a hybrid regime in which a government coexists with a permanent religious authority and with powerful military forces and intelligence units that exercise considerable political influence and largely operate outside the government’s control.

Dealing with an ambitious and powerful Iran thus entails a broad range of other open-ended challenges that define the ever-turbulent Middle East. Without the JCPOA, however, those challenges would become even more daunting.

With the Trump administration stepping up its efforts to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear activities over recent weeks, Iran may soon face some difficult choices on how to respond to increasing US belligerence. Non-certification by Trump in October is likely despite the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has again found Iran to be in compliance with its obligations under the agreement. It’s clear from Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly on 19 September that the White House is not only determined to wind back the clock on engagement with Iran on its nuclear activities, but also to portray Iran as a ‘rogue state’ comparable to North Korea.

Iran has been relatively constrained in its responses to Trump and appears determined to promote the narrative that it won’t be responsible if the JCPOA collapses. In August, President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran could restart its nuclear program in a matter of ‘hours’ should the US impose further sanctions, and Iran has claimed that the US is already in breach of the agreement. And in mid-September, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Iran wouldn’t be bullied by the US and would react strongly to any ‘wrong move’ by Washington on the JCPOA.

Increasing US hostility towards the JCPOA and Iran will likely undermine the broad support the agreement has had within Iran. Khamenei’s original endorsement of the JCPOA was conditional on sanctions relief, and recent statements by both Khamenei and Rouhani indicate that new sanctions remain a red line. Rouhani responded to Trump’s UN speech by stating that the JCPOA can’t be renegotiated and won’t continue without the US. That’s a much harder line than that taken by Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi, a key negotiator on the JCPOA, who had previously noted that Iran may remain committed to the JCPOA in the event of a US withdrawal, if the other JCPOA parties remain committed. But hardliners within Iran are already targeting Rouhani—who was re-elected with a comfortable margin despite predictions that the JCPOA would affect his prospects—for not dealing with the issue of sanctions firmly enough.

Trump’s belligerence also diminishes the prospect for IAEA access to military sites such as Parchin, which has been flagged as something that the IAEA needs to incorporate in future verification activities. Iran has so far ruled out IAEA access to military facilities, a position that IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano has challenged, but US threats will harden Iran’s resolve on the issue.

Iran likely relishes the fact that the US’s posture on the JCPOA is out of sync with other parties’ views on it, and Iran will exploit that to its own advantage. But it must also be alarmed by the White House’s increasingly strident rhetoric, which confirms Iran’s belief that the administration’s policy is based on deep-seated anti-Iran sentiment and a desire for regime change.

Worryingly for Iran, Trump’s animosity is unlikely to be tempered by key advisers, and the likely non-certification of the JCPOA appears to be the first step in a tougher approach to Iran. Trump’s appointment of Mike Pompeo—who as a congressman opposed any type of agreement with Iran—as CIA director means that Trump may succeed in constructing a politicised intelligence case for action against Iran. While Defense Secretary James Mattis has been more moderate in his views on the JCPOA, he has also long been hawkish on Iran.

But the portrayal of Iran by the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others as an aggressive state seeking hegemony in the Middle East is misleading and ignores a key element in Iran’s foreign policy—a deep-seated sense of strategic isolation. The Iranian leadership sees itself as acting defensively rather than offensively, and its strategic posture is informed by a number of factors—a lack of meaningful alliances, a sense of vulnerability and isolation in a tumultuous region, and increasing encirclement by US troops and bases.

Iran’s actions have typically focused on providing support to co-religionists in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen to disrupt perceived threats to Iran’s interests, and are best characterised as focused on survival in a hostile world. Nevertheless, Iran has shown itself to be capable of constructive engagement with neighbours. Oman, for example, enjoys a largely positive relationship with Iran after recognising what others have not: that engaging with Iran can be mutually beneficial. Iran was also amenable to a recent approach from Qatar, long vehemently opposed to Iran, on the restoration of diplomatic relations following the boycott of Qatar by other Gulf states in June.

Iran has clearly managed to leverage the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to advance its strategic interests across the Middle East. But the contentious question of whether those gains presage the establishment of an ‘Iran order’ in the Middle East—as claimed by Iran’s opponents—doesn’t diminish the importance of the JCPOA to security in the Middle East.

Trump’s white-anting of the agreement and hostile posture towards Iran does little more than feed and justify Iran’s deep-seated paranoid world view, and risks more than just the success of the JCPOA. President Rouhani and others have spent considerable political capital—and risked the ire of hardliners —with their commitment to the JCPOA. The failure of the JCPOA would likely weaken the position of relatively moderate factions within Iran.

In this context, Trump’s conflation of Iran and North Korea is troubling and unjustifiable. North Korea represents a dramatic failure by the international non-proliferation regime, whereas Iran and the JCPOA have the potential to be one of its greatest successes. Should the JCPOA fail at a time when Iran is facing broad threats from an increasingly ill-disposed US (and an increasingly aggressive Saudi Arabia intent on escalating its strategic competition with Iran), then Iran may start debating some difficult questions regarding how best to guarantee its security.

US President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia offered a rare glimpse into his emerging foreign-policy agenda. It is now all but certain that the Trump administration will abstain from lecturing foreign leaders about their countries’ democratic shortcomings, and that promoting human rights will take a backseat to other priorities.

Efforts to encourage democracy and respect for human rights have rarely, if ever, prevailed against $110 billion arms sales, and this will be especially true during Trump’s presidency. Whether a potential business partner adheres to international human-rights norms seems to be irrelevant to this administration.

But the real news from Trump’s trip is that he has now fully embraced the Sunni Arab world, not least for its opposition to Iran. In his speech at a gathering of Sunni Muslim leaders in Riyadh, Trump delivered a sharp and visceral rebuke of all things Iranian—including, it seems, that country’s recent elections. His remarks were music to the ears of Sunni Arab leaders, who regard Iran as the root of all evil, and the source of the Shia resurgence in Iraq.

In Israel, Trump continued to warn of an Iranian menace, and he revealed why Iran is so central to his thinking. Trump believes that Israel and Sunni Arab countries are actually allies in a mortal struggle with Iran, and that they should unite around that cause, rather than allow such issues as the Palestinian territories to keep them apart. Trump seems to think that this one supposed insight into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be parlayed into a settlement that finally achieves peace in the Middle East—or at least realigns the region to confront Iran.

While Trump was en route to Saudi Arabia, Iranian voters elected their moderate incumbent president, Hassan Rouhani, to a second term, and gave him a mandate to introduce urgently needed reforms. To be sure, Iran’s electoral process is often questioned, and for good reason. The Guardian Council, an unelected body of Islamic jurists, vets every candidate; and the Revolutionary Guard oversees all elections. Still, the spirited campaign between Rouhani and his main opponent, Ebrahim Raisi, suggests that this election was not a sham.

In Rouhani and Raisi, Iranian voters faced a stark choice. Raisi has a well-deserved reputation as a hardline cleric and former prosecutor with anti-Western views. Had he been elected, the future of the Iranian nuclear deal with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany) might have been called into question.

The high voter turnout in the election—more than 75%—suggests that Iranians do not want to turn away from the deal. While most households have not benefited from the slow lifting of international sanctions, and unemployment remains high, they remain willing to trust Rouhani to deliver on his promise to improve ordinary Iranians’ livelihoods.

But it will be up to Iranians themselves to push for the reforms they need. It is clear that neither the Sunni Arab world nor the current US government is betting on—or even rooting for—Rouhani’s success.

In recent history, the US-Iran relationship has been particularly fraught. In 1979, after an uprising against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his dreaded SAVAK secret police, Iranian mobs seized the American embassy. They accused American diplomats of espionage, and held them for 444 days. After a long, delicate negotiating process, the hostages were finally set free, on the day of President Ronald Reagan’s inauguration. Since then, Iran has never apologised for the hostage episode; and the United States has never forgiven Iran.

When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, many observers, especially in the Arab world, believed that the removal of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-minority regime would enhance Iran’s position in the region. In the aftermath of the invasion, Shia Iraqi militias, which Iran had financed and armed with sophisticated explosive devices, regularly attacked US troops. These militias were aided by the Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guard’s special forces unit, which took its direction from Iran’s religious leadership.

Iran never acknowledged its complicity in the attacks on US forces in Iraq. Not surprisingly, many senior US military leaders’ views toward Iran have been influenced by that brutal period. That is certainly true of Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a retired Marine Corps general.

Making matters worse, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s president from 2005 to 2013, not only challenged Israel’s right to exist—a position to which Sunni Arab leaders had long paid lip service; he also declared the Holocaust a hoax, pushing his country even further into international isolation. More recently, Iran has continued to prop up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and it has maintained its longstanding support for Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia.

As the Trump administration has debated its approach to Iran, it has had to come to grips with the fact that the nuclear deal cannot easily be changed. Still, while Trump was in the Middle East, the US Congress began considering a new round of sanctions to punish Iran for its continued meddling in Syria, and for its support for groups deemed to be terrorist, such as Hezbollah.

Iran’s bitter internal politics suggest that it may be on the brink of change. But the country’s dark legacy, from the hostage crisis in 1979 to its involvement in Syria today, is not one that many US policymakers will readily forgive or forget.

In the end, it is up to Iranians to decide their future. They have taken an important first step by re-electing Rouhani, and they will now have to support him as he pursues difficult domestic and foreign-policy reforms.

Iran has much to make up for in its relations with the rest of the world. But if reforms can be implemented and sustained, and if the nuclear deal can be protected from hardliners, Iran will be able to break free of its past and become a normal member of the international community.

On 18 April the State Department issued a press statement concerning a letter from the Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, to the House Speaker, Paul Ryan, under the title ‘Iran Continues to Sponsor Terrorism’. However, the very first sentence of the statement contradicted its title. It unequivocally stated that ‘The US Department of State certified to US House Speaker Paul Ryan today that Iran is compliant through April 18th with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).’

What then was the purpose of the letter’s Orwellian title? Well, it was basically an attempt to shore up President Trump’s hard-line anti-Iranian image for the benefit of those of his allies at home and abroad who harbor a visceral hatred of Iran. Legally speaking, Tillerson could do nothing other than certify that Iran was in compliance with the agreement that had been entered into with the P5+1 in July 2015. That’s because the IAEA had repeatedly reported—most recently on 24 February 2017—that Iran was in compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal whether regarding the heavy water plant at Arak or the enrichment of uranium above 3.67% U-235.

However, the Trump administration have gone out of their way to portray Iran as America’s inveterate enemy that needs to be ostracised and, if possible, militarily decapitated. There are important constituencies, both inside and outside the US, which would prefer Iran be confronted militarily in order to neuter its real and potential interventionist capabilities in the Middle East.

Those in the US egging on the Trump administration to confront Iran are the right wing of the Republican Party and the powerful Israel lobby. Outside the US several American allies are also baying for Iranian blood. Israel, which feels threatened by a potential nuclear-armed competitor that could erode its nuclear monopoly in the region, is the prime advocate of a military invasion of Iran in order to denude it of its prospective nuclear capacity. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies aren’t far behind in exhorting the US to go after Iran. Saudi Arabia’s endorsement of the Iranian nuclear deal was extremely lukewarm and came with several caveats and warnings to Washington. However, unlike Israel, it refrained from attacking the deal publicly for fear of alienating the Obama administration.

Since the nuclear deal, however, the Saudi–Iranian competition in the Middle East has amplified. That’s particularly been the case in Syria where President Assad, supported by Iran, appears to be gaining ground at the expense of Saudi surrogates. The Saudi–Iranian cold war is also evident in Yemen where the Saudis and their allies deliberately exaggerate Iranian support for the Houthis in order to justify their own intervention on land and from the air in the Yemeni civil war. In general, the Saudi rhetoric against Iran has become increasingly shrill, as Riyadh perceives that Tehran is gaining diplomatic ground in the region and internationally at the kingdom’s expense. On top of that the JCPOA convinced Saudi Arabia that it could no longer count the US as a reliable ally in its cold war against Iran.

In contrast with their perception of the Obama administration as weak-kneed vis-à-vis Iran, the Saudis have high hopes of President Trump overturning his predecessor’s strategy and confronting Iran more vigorously, even militarily. These hopes are largely based on Trump’s campaign rhetoric denouncing the JCPOA and vowing to tear it up.

However, on assuming office the Trump administration has found that it can’t renege on the deal above all because the JCPOA is a multilateral agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council. The other partners to the agreement, especially Russia and China but also America’s European allies, have made it clear that they won’t follow the US if it decides to go back on the agreement. That means the deal will stand minus the US; such a course will inevitably exacerbate tensions between the US and its European allies, not only on Iran but other issues as well.

Consequently, the Trump administration is stuck with the Iran nuclear deal whether it likes it or not. The only way for President Trump to placate the anti-Iran constituencies both at home and abroad is to introduce extraneous issues and engage in moral grand-standing and anti-Iranian rhetoric on the basis of these issues. That’s why Secretary Tillerson’s letter to Speaker Ryan, after certifying Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, goes on to declare that ‘Notwithstanding, Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror through many platforms and methods.’

It’s this sentence that provides the wording for the title of the State Department press statement regarding the Secretary’s letter to the Speaker. According to some sources President Trump personally intervened to toughen the language of that letter although these words had nothing to do with the substance of the communication. The Iranians are intelligent enough to see through this game. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif when asked to comment on the issue declared ‘Do not pay much attention to Trump’s words.’

The main problem with the introduction of extraneous issues in discussions regarding the JCPOA is that it undermines public confidence in the value of an agreement that brought the world back from the brink of a major war. But maybe that’s the very reason why the Trump administration is engaged in this exercise. An additional reason could be that the Trump administration is calculating that by consistently taking a hard line vis-à-vis Iran despite the JCPOA it will succeed in discrediting the moderate President Rouhani, who strongly supports the nuclear deal, and thus help one of his hardline opponents to win the presidential election scheduled for 19 May. A hardliner in office in Tehran would complement President Trump’s disdain for the nuclear agreement. It would thus make it easy for Washington to renege on the agreement and blame the Iranians for the breakdown of the deal.

The death on 8 January of Iran’s former President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, could weaken the political influence of Iran’s reformists and moderates, and potentially threaten President Hassan Rouhani’s re-election bid at this year’s presidential election to be held in May.

Rafsanjani, 82, was an original member of the pre-1979 revolutionary leadership, and from 1980 until his death, held a number of influential appointments in the Iranian government. Initially, he served as both a member and Speaker of Parliament (Majlis) during 1980–89, and as deputy chief of Iran’s armed forces, and at times acting chief, during the latter part of 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war.

From 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani served two four-year terms as Iran’s president. His immediate predecessor was Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei as Supreme Leader on the latter’s death.

Rafsanjani also served continuously on both Iran’s Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, from their establishment in 1983 and 1988 respectively, until his death. He served as Chair of the Assembly during 2007–11, and was Chair of the Council from its beginning. The principal role of the Assembly is to appoint the Supreme Leader. The major role of the Council is to resolve differences between the Guardian Council and parliament, but it gradually evolved into the major advisory body on national policy to the Supreme Leader. The role of the Guardian Council includes interpreting the Constitution and vetting legislation and electoral candidates to ensure consistency with Islamic values.

Rafsanjani’s revolutionary credentials, experience and influence were never in doubt, but his power and influence were often challenged by the conservatives.

A pragmatist, Rafsanjani progressively parted from the broader conservative camp to lead the political reformist movement. As president he sought to bring Iran in from the cold by seeking to establish more collaborative relations with the West, especially the US, on issues of common security concern. He also sought to boost stalled economic development by encouraging foreign investment, and commenced social reforms including lessening Iran’s strict religious codes. Rafsanjani’s successor, Mohammad Khatami, also a moderate, who served as president during 1997–2005, sought to continue Rafsanjani’s reforms.

For both men, the reform process was slowed, largely for ideological reasons by the conservative opposition, and partly for political reasons by Khamenei who saw Rafsanjani as his major rival. Negative responses by the West, especially the US which incorrectly claimed Iran was involved in 9/11, and George W. Bush’s branding Iran of 2002 as a member of the ‘axis of evil’, enabled the conservatives in Tehran to discredit calls for closer Western engagement and other political reforms. With Khamenei’s support, they won power at the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hard-line conservative, replaced Rafsanjani, and served two terms as president from 2005 to 2013. His re-election in 2009 was marred by allegations of significant electoral fraud, triggering student demonstrations which were brutally repressed. Ahmadinejad’s presidency was a period of high turbulence, domestically and internationally, and took Iran back into a long period of international isolation.

Keen to reverse the damage caused by Ahmadinejad and reinstate his reformist agenda, Rafsanjani initially proposed to stand again as president at the 2013 elections. But his ambitions were dashed by the Guardian Council, presumably under pressure from Khamenei, which disqualified him as a candidate. Rafsanjani responded by successfully directing his support to the election of Rouhani, a like-minded protégé, as president, and to the return of a parliamentary majority of moderates and reformists.

Had he lived, Rafsanjani could have played an important role in Iran’s future in a number of ways. The first would have been his moderating influence if relations between Iran and the US turn sour now that President Trump is in the White House and Washington backs away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the JCPOA or nuclear agreement. A new surge of disillusionment with the US and the West in Iran would boost the electoral prospects of the conservatives. This would be a repeat of the circumstances that brought Ahmadinejad into power in 2005.

The second was the political importance of his support for Rouhani’s re-election, and the return of a parliamentary majority of moderates and reformists at the upcoming May elections. Finally there’s the question of Khamenei’s successor as Supreme Leader. Khamenei, 77, is suffering from prostate cancer, and who replaces him—conservative, moderate or reformist—will  determine Iran’s political trajectory. As a most senior member of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani was expected to play a key role in that selection process.

If the conservatives regain power, Iran might again be taken back into the cold. If economic development and social reforms are also seriously checked or reversed, Iran could face serious internal dissent and disruption. There would be no winners, nationally or internationally.

Rafsanjani’s death is certainly untimely, and given the many challenges ahead, his internal influence and counselling on both international and domestic issues will be missed. There’s no immediate successor to fill the gap left by his passing.