Donald Trump’s ‘Iran strategy’, summarised in a White House media release on 8 May and fleshed out by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a speech in Washington on 21 May, has significant direct and indirect policy implications for Australia.

Both Trump and Pompeo made it clear that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear deal is only one part of a broader strategy to end Iran’s ‘malign activities’ regionally. Options within the strategy include forcing ‘regime change’ by breaking Iran’s economy if the Iranians fail to meet all US demands.

Both men also confirmed that the economic interests of the Europeans and others—including, by implication, Australia’s—are expendable unless they coincide with Trump’s ‘my way’ strategy. For Australian policymakers, it must now be clear—if it were ever in doubt—where Australia and others fit within Trump’s worldview.

Trump is highly egotistical and unconventional—a deal-maker, a risk-taker and a firm believer that might is right. His supporters see him as gutsy and outcomes-driven. He makes things happen, and is refreshingly unconstrained by stodgy international norms of diplomacy. His detractors see him as unpredictable and untrustworthy, whether dealing with friends or foes. But many see Trump as a mix of both, depending on the circumstances.

Trump’s overriding commitment, as for all his predecessors, is to put American interests first and make America great again. All his actions derive from this. He interprets—or makes up—the rules to accommodate his ‘my way’ strategy. But this hasn’t diminished the importance of the Australia–US bilateral relationship.

On most major foreign policy issues, US and Australian interests have generally coincided. Where differences have occurred, the principals and officials have worked through them, drawing on the relationship’s historic goodwill and agreeing to respect and accept differing views.

But changes in personalities and policies serve as a reminder that neither Australia nor other allies and friends can be complacent about their relationships with the US, and that goodwill has its limitations where national interests, however defined, are contested.

In the Middle East, Australian policy objectives broadly coincide with those of the US. We want a de‑escalation of tensions and conflict, non‑proliferation of nuclear weapons, and progress towards security and stability. Where we differ, as in the case of Iran, is in how to reach that goal.

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull unequivocally supported the European position in a statement on 9 May, calling for the US to remain in the JCPOA and to work through its issues with Iran within that framework. Australia has a stake in the issue, in both politico/strategic and economic terms. Unlike the Europeans, however, Australia’s not a direct participant in the escalating transatlantic test of wills. Nor does it have billions of dollars in trade and investment under direct threat as a result of Trump’s strategy.

Economically, Australian two-way trade and investment with Iran in 2016–17 was a modest AUS$446 million, comprising exports of $265 million and imports of $181 million. Even so, Australia isn’t completely  immune to the direct cost of US sanctions and their chilling effect on new trade. While most of Australia’s trade falls outside the scope of current sanctions, an as-yet-unquantifiable amount is expected to be adversely affected by both US ‘snap-back sanctions’ and other punitive measures.

Nor is Australia immune to potential indirect costs. If US targeting of Iran’s oil exports results in a global shortage of oil, every Australian motorist will be hit by higher prices at the petrol pump. At this stage, other Gulf producers are expected to make up for any shortage, but expectations aren’t guarantees.

Turnbull’s support of the European position could be tested in two possible ways. The first could involve Australia becoming embroiled in a transatlantic stand-off, for example if the Europeans negotiate what they consider an acceptable supplementary deal with Iran that Trump then rejects. That assumes that the Europeans can reach such a deal. Iran’s commitment is a key factor here. If it pulls out of the JCPOA itself, or recommences uranium enrichment, all bets will be off.

The second test could occur if Trump pursues his proposed ‘broad coalition of nations to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and to counter the totality of the regime’s malign activities’, and asks Australia to join. Pompeo explicitly identified Australia, India, Japan and South Korea—together with other Gulf and Arab states—as countries that he wants in the coalition. He didn’t specify any countries from Europe, Africa or Latin America. Naming the first four countries implies a quid quo pro for US support and solidarity in Asia, which is especially relevant given Trump’s quest to denuclearise North Korea and guarantee freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.

Whatever the outcome of Europe’s efforts to salvage the JCPOA, it’s essential that the US see Australia’s position for what it is—standing firm on the principle of supporting a UN‑approved agreement, particularly where compliance with conditions has been consistently verified.

Australia should firmly decline any invitation to join a new ‘broad coalition’. There’s no suggestion of a UN mandate for such a coalition, and Australia would be a token player only, with no controlling interest. Also, the proposed coalition’s mandate is wide open, and could extend to an expectation of military support.

Arguably, Australia could contribute considerably more to its Middle East policy commitments from outside, rather than from within, any improvised coalition. Asian quid pro quo calculations don’t apply—Australia already fully pulls its weight in the Indo-Pacific.

While the Middle East is important, the Indo-Pacific is crucial for Australia. It’s Australia’s primary area of political, military, economic and strategic interest. It’s where the Australia–US bilateral relationship counts most. The challenge for Australia is to ensure consultation on how to reach mutual goals without compromising its interests.

Herewith, nine conclusions to be drawn from President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.

POTUS runs the show

As the President told Fox News’ Laura Ingraham last November: ‘Let me tell you, the one that matters is me … I’m the only one that matters, because when it comes to it, that’s what the policy is going to be. You’ve seen that, you’ve seen it strongly.’

He wasn’t kidding. Trump was twice talked out of walking away from the JCPOA by Defence Secretary Jim Mattis and National Security Council staff before John Bolton took over. It’s hard to think of a weaker Cabinet in modern American presidencies. This isn’t necessarily bad if one can rely on the President’s sound judgement, but Trump looks to decide on gut instinct rather than carefully balancing options.

It’s a two-speed administration

Trump isn’t a details guy and there’s much going on in American public administration in Washington DC that looks every bit like past administrations. US officials are masters at interagency policy development, which we can see in the National Security Strategy, among many documents.

The risk is that when the President pays attention, he won’t hesitate to cut a Cabinet secretary off at the knees if the policy looks like a ‘bad deal’. Happiness in Washington is to work in policy areas the President doesn’t really care about.

Trump is erratic but consistent

We can’t say we weren’t warned. Trump proclaimed that he was going to get rid of the Trans-Pacific Partnership; kill NAFTA and get rid of the JCPOA, which according to the President was ‘one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into’.

There’s something to be said for a political leader implementing his election platform. While Trump is a policy weathervane on many issues, he has been consistent on the JCPOA from the get-go. What a pity the European signatories didn’t think about how they might try to accommodate some of Trump’s quite reasonable concerns about flaws in the agreement.

Trump has a big appetite for risk

A more cautious President might have stuck with the JCPOA but pushed to get international consensus to pressure Iran on missile technology development, support for Hezbollah, and its destructive presence in Syria, Iran, Lebanon and Yemen. Not Donald.

The Iranians have responded to his action by saying they’re preparing to restart uranium enrichment. That would lose them whatever residual support they may have in Europe for the JCPOA. Trump has raised the stakes. He embraces risk in ways that American presidents have avoided since Richard Nixon.

JCPOA had too many flaws to survive

At best the JCPOA was a flawed agreement. It kicked Iran’s nuclear weapons program further down the road, which was valuable but more a delaying mechanism than closing off Tehran’s nuclear aspirations. The agreement’s inspection mechanisms were inadequate, especially on covert military programs. Worst of all the agreement looked the other way while Iran made a play to become the Middle East’s dominant great power.

That was a good deal for Iran: it entered the JCPOA within a 12‑month sprint of acquiring a nuclear weapon. It could exit the agreement a decade later, still within the 12‑month sprint but with a much stronger strategic position in the Middle East. President Trump is right to say that this was a bad deal, but now it’s up to him to deliver something better.

Iran has no real option other than to renegotiate

It will be impossible for Tehran to resume uranium enrichment without bringing down international sanctions on itself far more effective than those before the JCPOA. (The North Korean experience has shown how to apply sanctions more effectively.) Trump is also tickling a nerve the ayatollahs will hate about domestic opposition to their regime, which could be sharpened by stronger sanctions.

The Iranians will realise that Trump is a tougher nut to stare down than Barack Obama. Yes, it’s risky, but Iran doesn’t have the whip hand and might conclude that it would be better to talk rather than risk Donald’s unpredictability.

This could bring to a head the simmering confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia

It could get ugly from here. If Iran decides it needs to sprint to a nuclear capability, the Saudis won’t sit back to watch it happen. And while Trump is raising the pressure, the Saudis may decide that now is the time to try to put an end to Iranian ‘influencing’ in the region. We may see the risk of state-on-state conflict between the two regional giants and a heating up of the already hot proxy wars happening in Yemen and elsewhere.

Cutting a deal with Kim Jong‑un just became harder

The North Koreans will be in an agony of indecision. They may have hoped that something like a JCPOA was theirs for the asking. They have a better sense now of the price Trump will want to extract for any agreement. Can Kim countenance such intrusive inspections of his nuclear facilities to verify real and irreversible denuclearisation?

America’s allies must rethink how they deal with Trump

We should have got this point a long time ago. Foreign ministries around the world slumped into an extended period of denial that Obama had really left the building. Surely the sweet blandishments of Boris Johnson on Fox News would make the President see reason?

But Trump is a different breed of cat: a big, ginger Cheshire cat, no doubt grinning from ear to ear in the White House. We all need to start dealing with him on his terms if there’s any hope of shaping the President’s world view.

President Donald Trump has stunned allies and adversaries alike by accepting North Korean President Kim Jong-un’s invitation to meet with him in May to discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The speed with which he made the decision—all of 45 minutes—and even without consulting Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who has since been fired, was typical of Trump’s unique decision-making style based on instinct rather than reason.

Trump’s decision to meet with the North Korean leader has broader implications in the arena of nuclear non-proliferation. The most important of these is the message this decision has sent to Iran. The irony that the same administration that’s considering imposing fresh sanctions on Iran and withdrawing from the JCPOA—the nuclear agreement that has almost indefinitely postponed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons—is willing to talk directly with a nuclear-capable North Korea hasn’t been lost on the Iranians.

Trump’s divergent approaches towards North Korea and Iran are all the more surprising because where there have been differences between the two countries’ attitudes toward the United States, it’s North Korea that stands out as the more threatening of the two.

Iran has never fought a war with the United States. The closest the two countries have ever come to trading blows was during Iran’s war against Iraq. In that war, when Iraq was clearly the aggressor, it acted as a proxy both for the United States and for Saudi Arabia in their attempts to nip the Islamic Revolution in the bud.

North Korea, on the other hand, fought a very bloody war against the United States and its ally, South Korea, from 1950 to 1953 that led to at least 33,652 American battle fatalities. North Korea has constituted a real military threat, through both conventional and nuclear weapons, to America’s close allies, South Korea and Japan. In addition, North Korea has threatened the US homeland and, according to recent reports, is close to developing an ICBM capability that can reach as far as Washington, DC.

The Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, confirmed these reports at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In the same hearing, General Dunford categorically declared, ‘North Korea certainly poses the greatest threat [to the United States] today.’

Iran, on the other hand, has never posed a threat to the US homeland or threatened to incinerate American allies, such as Saudi Arabia next door, with nuclear weapons. Its threats against Israel are rhetorical rather than realistic given Israel’s conventional and nuclear capabilities that can inflict tremendous damage on Iran. In fact, it was Israel that constantly threatened Iran with attacks on its nuclear facilities in the run up to the JCPOA.

The principal lesson that Iran is likely to draw from America’s decision to negotiate with North Korea at the highest level, while threatening Iran both with withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of new sanctions, is that it’s North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and delivery capabilities that have brought the American president to the negotiating table.

This is bound to give Iranian hardliners further ammunition to attack the Rouhani government for making the compromises it did in relation to Iran’s nuclear program to get economic sanctions lifted. Their criticism implies that had Iran developed nuclear weapons instead of signing away its right to do so, the American president would have gone running to Tehran to negotiate a nuclear deal more favourable to Iran than the JCPOA.

America’s rhetoric about re-imposing sanctions on Iran, as well as Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw from the JCPOA while agreeing to negotiate with North Korea at the highest level, has made Iranian moderates such as Hassan Rouhani and Javad Zarif look stupid in the eyes of an Iranian public still waiting for the economic benefits that were supposed to accrue to them in return for giving up Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Trump’s sacking of Tillerson, principally because Tillerson had opposed Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the appointment of Iran-hawk and blatantly Islamophobic Mike Pompeo in his stead, has sent a clear message to Iran that the United States is about to renege on its commitment to JCPOA.

Furthermore, there are reports that another anti-Iran hawk, John Bolton, is likely to be appointed National Security Adviser, replacing HR McMaster. This is likely to strengthen the Iranian sentiment that Iranian–American relations are once again destined to descend into unadulterated antagonism, as was the case before President Barack Obama came to power.

Given President Trump’s predilection for impulsive actions, some American commentators are even predicting another war in the Middle East, this time against Iran. The negative consequences of such a war both for the United States and for the region will be far worse than President George W Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003.

As a leading American analyst commented, ‘Bush went to war against Iraq, not Iran, because he knew that [Iran] was a much tougher nut to crack. If Trump becomes enmeshed in a new war in the Middle East [against Iran], his presidency will almost surely go down in history as a catastrophic failure.’

In a public statement on 12 January, President Donald Trump again waived US sanctions against Iran, keeping alive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), at least for now.

Trump gave ‘Europeans allies’ 120 days (until 12 May) to come up with a ‘supplemental agreement’ that ‘impose[s] new multilateral sanctions if Iran develops or tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon’. He also said he intends to ask the US Congress to amend the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) to add similar controls to the conditions for granting future waivers.

If the Europeans or Congress fail to meet his expectations, Trump insisted that he won’t approve any more waivers.

This is Trump’s second attempt to revise the deal’s terms. His demand in late 2017 that the JCPOA itself be changed to deliver his preferred outcomes was firmly rejected by all of the other signatories—the UK, France, Germany, Russia, China and Iran. They insisted that the JCPOA wasn’t negotiable, and that if the US withdrew and the agreement collapsed, security in the Middle East would deteriorate significantly.

Trump didn’t welcome that rejoinder and remains determined to get his way. His new approach leaves the JCPOA intact, but the arrangements would be substantially changed if his demands are met.

Trump has identified ‘four critical components’ that must be included in the amended INARA:

• International nuclear inspectors must be given immediate access to all sites requested, including military sites that haven’t been accessible to date.
• Iran must ‘never even come close to possessing a nuclear weapon’.
• The two conditions above mustn’t have an expiry date—‘My policy is to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon … forever.’
• There must be a provision stating ‘that long-range missile and nuclear weapons programs are inseparable, and that Iran’s development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions’—Iran has argued that its ballistic missiles are conventional defensive weapons only, unrelated to nuclear weapons.

Trump also referred to 14 new sanctions to be imposed by the US. They primarily target individuals and organisations that were involved in supressing the recent demonstrations in Iran.

Who might sign the supplemental agreement isn’t clear. Trump expects the UK, France and Germany to sign. Iran won’t be invited to sign; nor, apparently, will Russia and China. All three would most probably refuse to do so anyway, especially Iran. Whether other European countries deemed ‘allies’ will be invited to sign remains to be seen.

Trump made it very clear that he expects ‘all our allies’ to join with the US in taking much stronger action ‘to confront Iran’s other malign activities’. That would include cutting off funding to all organisations that contribute ‘to Iran’s support for terrorism’, designating Hezbollah—‘in its entirety’—a terrorist organisation, and deterring ‘Iran’s aggression against international shipping’.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is visiting Europe this week, and Iran is reportedly high on his agenda. Tillerson will be doing the hard sell, and the Europeans will be doing a lot of listening.

But according to European sources, there’s concern that Trump is on a ‘deal or no deal’ crusade, regardless of the cost to others. The US doesn’t have large-scale, long-term investments in Iran—but the Europeans do. And they don’t trust Trump. They’ll be looking for ways to respond to his latest demands that don’t compromise their interests or harm their relationship with the US. And they’ll be asking their own tough questions. For example, who’s going to umpire disputes over the definition of breaches of any revised agreement? Who will decide appropriate punitive action in the case of breaches?

What about Iran? President Hassan Rouhani said in October last year that all deals are off if the JCPOA is torn up or neutered. Trump’s demands appear to do the latter. But Rouhani didn’t rule out a separate agreement to the JCPOA. How will Iran assess the consequences of rejecting the new conditions? And if it’s willing to negotiate with the Europeans (and Russia and China), on what terms?

What effect the recent demonstrations in Iran will have on the government’s thinking isn’t known. Trump has sought to put the demonstrations’ causes and the Iranian government’s responses into the equation. His statement refers to the ‘Supreme Leader and his Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [using] mass arrests and torture to oppress and silence Iran’s people’, ‘the ruling elite [letting] their citizens go hungry while enriching themselves by stealing Iran’s national wealth’ and ‘a regime that is stifling basic freedom and denying its citizens the opportunity to build better lives for their families’. That Rouhani wasn’t included in these derogatory comments suggests that Trump acknowledges that he’s the key to managing a moderate outcome.

Trump is well aware that his commitment to getting a new Iran deal will be observed closely, particularly on the Korean peninsula. His personal credibility is at stake. His new approach leaves him, and others, with less room to manoeuvre.

On 4 December, Houthi rebels in Yemen killed former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. A few days earlier, Saleh had ended his three-year-old alliance with the Houthis and sought to re-establish relations with Saudi Arabia.

Saleh’s death is bound to complicate the ongoing crisis in Yemen. The country is already experiencing the ‘worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world’ with an estimated 7 million people facing severe food shortages and starvation. Saleh’s son, Ahmed, will probably take over as leader of the General People’s Congress political party. He’s unlikely to seek a ceasefire, though. Instead, it’s more likely that he’ll try to form an alliance with President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, his father’s successor and former vice-president. Hadi had said prior to Saleh’s death that he would support ‘any party confronting Houthi terrorist gangs’.

The political scientist William Zartman has argued that parties to a dispute opt to negotiate only when they are ready to do so. This moment of ‘ripeness’ may be brought on by a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ in which all parties recognise that they’re locked in a conflict they can’t win. A negotiated peace becomes the only way out.

Unfortunately, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia—the primary protagonists—has a clear path to victory. They remain unaffected by the conflict in Yemen. Each believes that it’s pursuing its own national interest. The suffering of Yemen’s population matters little to them.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, has noted that ‘Riyadh does not have a strategy to win the war’. It has opted for a strategy of attrition, disease and famine to wear down its opponents.

However, Iran is well versed in attrition warfare. It’s happy to support its Houthi allies for as long as necessary because it recognises the value of having a pro-Tehran government in Sana’a. And with the conflict in Syria effectively over, Tehran can now focus more on Yemen. Iran has been accused of ‘stepping up arms supplies and other support’ to its Houthi allies.

The Houthi rebels have their own grievances. The group, which emerged in the early 1990s as a theological movement that preached peace and tolerance, is linked to the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam. Zaydi imams ruled the northern province of Saada, the Houthis’ stronghold, for 1,000 years until Yemen’s 1962 military coup. The coup precipitated the first Yemenite civil war between the north and south.

Saleh participated in the coup, then showed great political acumen in climbing North Yemen’s military and political ladder. He became president of North Yemen in 1978 (North Yemen united with South Yemen in 1990 to form the current Republic of Yemen) after the assassination of President Ahmad al-Ghashmi.

Saleh saw the Houthis as a threat to his rule. In 2004, he sent troops to Saada to arrest the group’s founder, Hussein Bader Addian al-Houthi. Hussein was killed, sparking the insurgency that has continued ever since.

The conflict escalated after the Houthis bombarded the Dar al-Hadith seminary in Dammaj village in 2013, killing around 100 people. For the Houthis, the seminary was a Salafi proselytising entity advocating anti-Zaydism. Funded largely with Saudi money, the seminary had attracted an estimated 7,000 Salafists from across the world to study.

The Houthis’ latest foray into Sana’a demonstrates not only that they’re well organised and armed, but that they’re now united under a single command. Their opponents are fragmented, drawing support from different foreign backers (as seen, for example, with the UAE-backed  al-Hirak Movement, which is composed of nine factions, some of which want to secede from Yemen).

Complicating the situation further is the presence of a melange of Salafi-jihadi groups—some affiliated with Islamic State, others with al-Qaeda—and indigenous groups, with differing views about how Yemen should be governed. Giorgio Cafiero points out that Salafi-jihadi groups see Yemen as a safe haven from which they can launch attacks against Gulf Cooperation Council members and Western powers. The Trump administration has engaged in a bitter drone campaign against these entities, particularly al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). President Donald Trump authorised 40 airstrikes against AQAP inside Yemen in March 2017.

With so many actors pursuing so many agendas, the opportune moment for peace negotiations remains elusive. Until Tehran and Riyadh settle their competition for supremacy in the Middle East, it’s unlikely that the conflict in Yemen will end. That means that the burden of suffering will continue to fall on the shoulders of ordinary Yemenites.