Tag Archive for: Iran

Persian Gulf fault line could be a new front in US–China competition

As the rivalry between the United States and China spirals into a new cold war, it carries the potential to widen and deepen many geopolitical fault lines in world politics. One such fault line is dangerously embedded in the strategically vital, oil-rich, but unstable, Persian Gulf. It divides the Gulf into northern and southern zones.

China has so far sought to operate above this division in its dealings with both sides of the divide. Yet it shares strong anti-US interests with the states and subnational actors that make up the northern zone, where it could enhance competition with the US at the cost of further regional volatility.

The adversarial lines are more clearly drawn in the Persian Gulf than in any other part of the Middle East. The traditional ethnic, sectarian, cultural and historical rivalries between Arabs and Iranians are now topped by a new fault line that has been fuelled primarily by the US and Russia in recent years.

A US-backed, Saudi-led Arab coalition has, with Israel’s support, come to dominate the southern zone against Iran as the ‘destabilising’ actor in the region. A Russian–Iranian axis has established a countering dominance in the northern zone, where Moscow and Tehran, backed by the Iran-allied force of Lebanese Hezbollah, have acted to save the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In this zone, Tehran’s influence stretches from Baghdad to Beirut.

China hasn’t remained aloof from this regional development. Having forged an all-round camaraderie with Russia, it has operated across both zones in the Gulf for two main objectives. One is to meet its economic needs by securing oil and expanding trade relations with all of the region’s constituent states. The other is to forge deeper strategic ties with those actors in the region who are adversarial to the US.

China has become an indispensable economic and strategic partner for Iran. Over the last decade, Chinese companies have invested more than US$5 billion in upgrading Iran’s gas refinement and oil infrastructure, expanding highways, updating Tehran’s metro system (which was originally built with Chinese assistance) and developing the Mehran Petrochemical Complex in western Iran.

China has also provided funding and technical assistance for projects ranging from railways to hospitals. In 2018, a Chinese state-owned investment company, CITIC Group, established a US$10 billion credit line, and the China Development Bank promised US$15 billion more.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran in January 2016, President Hassan Rouhani announced that ‘China and Iran plan to build economic ties worth up to $600 billion’. The volume of trade between the two sides grew from US$1.6 billion per year in the 1980s to US$15 billion in 2007 and around US$45 billion in 2014–15 (in 2018 it dipped to US$33 billion).

Today, China is Iran’s second largest trading partner after the United Arab Emirates, and despite American sanctions on Iran, China still imports some 9% of its oil from Iran. Beijing has also found it in its interest to have Iran on board as an important link in its Belt and Road Initiative for global influence.

After Russia, China has been a major arms provider to the Islamic republic, especially since 1986. China’s supply of weapons has included HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles, and the country has played an instrumental role in Iran’s ballistic missile program, particularly in providing technological and design help. The two countries signed a defence agreement in November 2016, pledging closer military and counterterrorism cooperation.

Although Beijing has refrained from providing military support to Russia and Iran in Syria, it has strongly backed those operations and joined Russia in vetoing any proposed UN Security Council resolutions against its Syrian adventure, or against Iran.

As the US–China cold war and US–Iran hostilities progress, and in the event President Donald Trump is re-elected in November, Beijing can be expected to deepen its strategic involvement in the Gulf’s northern zone. This doesn’t mean that it will seek to jeopardise its economic relations with Arab states in the Gulf and, indeed, with Israel, with which it maintains a level of intelligence and technological cooperation. If Xi is pressed hard by Trump, though, he has plenty of space to up the ante in conjunction with like-minded forces in the Gulf.

An escalation in US–China rivalry in the Gulf can only solidify the dangerous geopolitical fault line in a region that is economically and strategically significant, but highly unstable and insecure. Under Trump, the US and Iran remain on a collision course and the Gulf doesn’t need any further stimulus to become even more explosive.

Iran’s campaign for the removal of sanctions is a smokescreen

As the number of coronavirus victims mounts, making Iran one of the pandemic’s epicentres, the ruling ayatollahs have spotted an opportunity.

They are driving an international campaign to have international sanctions lifted. Their main target is the tough economic sanctions imposed by the United States in response to Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

Those arguing for an end to the sanctions say that Iran’s economy, health systems and infrastructure are crumbling under their weight, preventing the government from effectively curbing the spread of the coronavirus among its citizens.

President Hassan Rouhani, in an open letter to the American people, declared: ‘The sanctions have drastically undermined the ability of the Iranian people to fight the coronavirus and some among them are losing their lives as a result.’

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed: ‘Iran is the only country in the world that does not have access to all of its resources in order to protect its citizens [and] cannot buy equipment and medical supplies easily. The combination of sanctions and the coronavirus makes it a more dangerous and terrible complication.’

These claims are contradicted by other public statements made by senior Iranian officials.

Rouhani himself said on 1 April: ‘The sanctions have failed to hamper our efforts to fight against the coronavirus outbreak.’

Mohammad Reza Shanehsaz, who heads Iran’s Food and Drug Administration, promised Iranians that the government could meet all needs ‘thanks in large part to imports’. He added, ‘I believe that soon we will not even need imports.’

If Iran is indeed in need of aid and supplies to deal with the undoubtedly severe medical crisis, why, on 23 March, did the regime kick out of the country a team from Medecins Sans Frontieres that was setting up a 50-bed field hospital in Isfahan to help Covid-19 patients?

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei very publicly rejected a US offer to provide medical aid to help fight the virus. He resorted instead to blaming America, jinnis (demons) and the Jews for creating the coronavirus crisis in the first place.

So, are sanctions undermining Tehran’s ability to meet the medical challenge of the coronavirus outbreak or not? And would lifting or loosening sanctions improve the lot of Iranian victims of the pandemic?

The short answer is no.

The sanctions don’t prevent humanitarian supplies from reaching Iran. The US State Department has stated that ‘humanitarian goods, including medicine and medical supplies, are exempt and not subject to any trade restrictions’ by the US.

While it is true that sanctions have complicated the process of importing these products into Iran, pathways have been established to expedite their flow, especially the Swiss humanitarian trade agreement channel established earlier this year.

A memo by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a US-based think tank, notes that official Iranian and external data confirms Iran is ‘receiving billions of dollars in essential goods that it needs to address its health crisis’ from both the US and Europe.

Meanwhile, it’s clear that the regime has vast financial resources that can be used to fight the epidemic, including billions of dollars in various religious funds and trusts directly controlled by Khamenei. Last year, Rouhani asked Khamenei to release US$2 billion from one of those funds ’as a last resort’ to assist with reconstruction of areas recovering from floods.

Tehran’s public relations bid to get sanctions lifted is nothing more than a smokescreen to divert attention from the regime’s own failures in meeting the coronavirus threat, and to further the regime’s aggressive regional agenda.

Instead of devoting more money to fighting the pandemic, Khamenei increased the budget of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The ayatollahs are hoping that removal of sanctions will save their rule over Iran and lead Iranians to forget the many years of economic mismanagement as the regime spent what the US says is more than US$16 billion on terrorist proxies across the Middle East since 2012.

It can’t be assumed that the ayatollahs will use humanitarian aid for humanitarian purposes. Such money has been diverted in the past for illicit and dubious purposes.

Lifting sanctions against the individuals who make up the regime and their sources of wealth might free up more money, but that money may not go into fighting the virus. Instead, it could be diverted to fighters in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Iran’s expensive nuclear weapons program—the original target of the sanctions—is steadily progressing under the cover of the pandemic, which is making monitoring more difficult than ever.

The Iranian people should get all the medical supplies and other assistance required to meet this medical emergency, but that aid should be supplied through existing channels or, even better, through reliable NGOs, thus bypassing the regime altogether.

Simply lifting or loosening sanctions would do little or nothing to help the pandemic’s Iranian victims, but would empower the regime to both extend its oppressive rule over Iranians and escalate the violence it has already launched across the Middle East.

America, Iran and Covid-19: humanitarianism versus regime change

While the United States and China squabble about the origins of the novel coronavirus, a more serious contest is underway over the severe economic sanctions against Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe.

Some argue that it’s necessary to ease the sanctions, if only temporarily, to better coordinate the global fight against the virus and to minimise economic hardship in these countries for basic humanitarian reasons.

Those who want the sanctions to continue, especially unilateral US sanctions, say they don’t apply to the supply of medical or other humanitarian needs, so there’s no need to ease them.

The contest is largely focused on Iran, a country of some 83 million people, and the epicentre of the pandemic in the Middle East. As of 4 April, Iran had 55,743 confirmed cases, the seventh highest number globally, and 3,452 related deaths. While the numbers affected are high, the death rate is likely limited by the low median age of Iran’s population, about 32 years.

To put this in a regional context, only four of Iran’s Middle Eastern neighbours had more than 1,500 cases: Turkey with 23,934, Israel with 7,851, Pakistan with 3,157 and Saudi Arabia with 2,402. The remaining countries had fewer than 1,500 confirmed cases each and most had under 500.

Some of these numbers are widely considered unreliable or deliberately understated. It has been claimed that Iran initially understated its numbers, and Pakistan’s remain an underestimate. Turkmenistan, a Central Asian neighbour, claims it has no cases and its government-controlled media have shunned the use of the word ‘coronavirus’. Syria has 16 confirmed cases, but given the civil war, the displacement of millions of its people, and the country’s totally inadequate medical facilities, its officials simply wouldn’t know.

While Iran got off to a slow start in implementing adequate countermeasures, indications are they are now in place. Early on, the World Health Organization and China provided specialist medical advice and support, including urgently needed medical supplies. Iran also lodged an early request with the International Monetary Fund for US$5 billion to help mitigate the negative effects of the virus on its economy.

While Iran wrestles with its response to the pandemic, there’s considerable concern among health professionals about some neighbouring countries that are highly vulnerable to infection and have a limited capability to prevent the virus’s rapid spread, especially among crowded refugee communities, and to treat those infected.  The economic and social impacts on their populations, and their viability as functioning states, could be devastating.

Those who want sanctions against Iran and other countries eased to help combat the virus are committed to fighting it and providing humanitarian support to alleviate suffering from the economic consequences. They include UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, and the WHO.

Unexpected support for the suspension of specific sanctions has also come from Democrat presidential candidates Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders, and from more than 30 other Democrats in the Congress and the Senate. They say saving lives is the right thing to do, both morally and because of  broader US national security interests.

While the EU hasn’t openly challenged US sanctions in the coronavirus context, it has agreed to send €20 million in humanitarian aid to Iran. And France, Germany and the UK have separately exported humanitarian goods, including food and medicine, to Iran under their INSTEX trade mechanism. This is reportedly the first time INSTEX has been used since its inception in 2018.

Presumably the US was consulted beforehand to ensure that banks and trading companies associated with both actions wouldn’t incur punitive responses. Although Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said several times that unilateral US sanctions don’t apply to medical or humanitarian goods, many international banks and companies have claimed intimidation and refused to become involved for fear of direct or indirect US reprisals.

The US administration has stood firm in its opposition to easing sanctions, even temporarily. Its principal concern is that the proposed humanitarian assistance would undermine President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign to facilitate regime change, especially in Iran, but also in Venezuela.

Washington also believes that Iran would exploit humanitarian assistance to divert scarce resources to enable continued support to its ‘malign’ activities regionally. The US, therefore, isn’t expected to support Iran’s IMF bid for special economic assistance.

Trump did make a tentative offer to help Iran last month, though it was rejected because Tehran regarded it as unacceptably conditional. A separate offer by Pompeo to help Venezuela effectively insisted that President Nicolas Maduro step down from office. It, too, was rejected.

The administration’s position has damaged the US’s image and left Trump and Pompeo, in particular, looking insensitive and uncompromising at a time of global crisis and humanitarian need. In contrast, both Biden and Sanders have quickly picked up on the negative implications for the US and highlighted that there are wider human and national security interests at stake.

No winners in US–Iran standoff

When it comes to American policy in the Middle East, the only certainty is complete uncertainty. What conclusions can we draw from the past 24 hours in the decades-long Iran–US crisis?

First, Iran was the mouse that didn’t roar. After mobilising millions in the streets to damn America following the killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, Qassem Soleimani, Tehran launched a deliberately ineffectual retaliation—a ‘fake’ strike.

Last September the Iranians mounted a devastatingly effective missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. Multiple targets were accurately hit. They know how to use these weapons. The fact that around 20 missiles were fired at US bases in Iraq without any American casualties shows that the operation was about delivering theatre rather than high explosive. This is a blow to the standing of the IRGC and the Iranian regime.

Second, America was the eagle that didn’t land. After threatening devastating attacks on 52 locations—Iran ‘WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD’, Donald Trump tweeted—the president was content to do nothing because no US lives were lost. For all his blustering, Trump is the most risk-averse commander-in-chief since Jimmy Carter.

It’s a good thing that the White House is reluctant to use military force, but the emerging Trump doctrine—that America will retaliate only if its troops are attacked—is a strategy of immobility. Iran knows that it can do what it wants in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq so long as the red line on US casualties isn’t crossed.

That leads to a third conclusion: there’s no US strategy for Iran, Syria, Iraq or the wider Middle East beyond the president’s instinct to disengage and his impulsive reactions to daily events. A phone call with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan prompts Trump to abandon years of American support for Syria’s Kurds; an annoying tweet from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushes Trump spontaneously to authorise a missile strike on Soleimani.

Sometimes these gut reactions produce positive outcomes; on other occasions the results are catastrophic. Always they leave allies—and, one suspects, the US military and intelligence agencies—wondering what on earth is going on.

Conclusion number four is that the president is shaping policy almost completely in isolation. If there is any attempt on the part of his senior cabinet and military commanders to shape his thinking it was not evident in the president’s statement to the American people after the Iranian strike.

In less than 10 minutes, and with his stony-faced commanders around him, Trump said he would impose tougher sanctions against Iran, lobbied for more NATO involvement in the region, threatened dire military retaliation, claimed the Obama administration had funded the Iranian missiles used in the strike, and called for working together with Iran towards a ‘new deal’ on nuclear weapons. How any of this resolves itself into actionable policy is unknown territory.

For Australia the best approach is business as usual for our military commitments in the region. Our forces will remain on high alert, but it would be damaging to bring them home too quickly. That said, we need to be mindful that Iraqi politics might well force our Taji training team home soon. That would be no bad thing, as the original purpose of the mission—training Iraqis to fight the so-called Islamic State terror group—has been overtaken by more recent chaotic events.

Finally, it’s best to think of the current outcome as a pause rather than a conclusion to US–Iranian hostilities. The region is still on a hair-trigger. The IRGC is unlikely to accept that Tehran’s ‘fake’ strike closes the account on Soleimani’s killing. He spent decades building up proxy forces through the region that would be only too pleased to cross Trump’s red line on US casualties. The risk of conflict remains high in this odd standoff where neither side wants to fight or to back down.

Iran and the US avoid war for now, but political sparring will continue

President Donald Trump’s public response to Iranian missile strikes on two US airbases in Iraq suggests that he and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have reached a mutual ‘no war’ agreement. Barring any miscalculation by either side that triggers military escalation, the confrontation will continue to be played out politically, with the US maintaining its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign that seeks to force regime change through severe economic sanctions. There will be a lot of bruising ahead for Iran, but Trump will not win politically.

The absence of any US casualties or significant equipment damage from the strikes at the Al Asad and Erbil air bases in Iraq yesterday, and Trump’s decision not to retaliate as threatened, suggest the no-war agreement was reached through intensive back-channel negotiations.

By capping military escalation at this point, Trump can still boast that he’s tough and decisive. He can claim Iran that has backed down to US threats, and that his commitment to countering terrorism is well demonstrated by the killing of the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. Trump’s branding of Qassem Soleimani as the world’s ‘number one terrorist’ not only ‘justified’ his assassination but also implicitly matches his predecessor Barack Obama’s resolve in killing Osama bin Laden.

Iran’s missile attacks against the two US bases will go some way to necessarily demonstrating Khamenei’s vow of ‘severe revenge’ for Soleimani’s killing. Tehran may be planning a longer-term response that goes further, but not so far that it precipitates a much stronger US military reaction. To achieve this, Iran will need to be able to control the actions of its proxies. That can’t be guaranteed, and Trump has made it clear he will hold Iran accountable for proxy actions.

Who initiated the negotiations is not known, but clearly Iran understood that it couldn’t win an all-out military confrontation with the US. Iran’s assessments of Trump’s possible responses to retaliatory military action by Iran and/or its proxies would have included a controlled, proportional tit-for-tat escalation. Iran also would have planned for a scenario in which Trump ignored proportionality and ordered strikes against Iranian and proxy command-and-control centres, missile and drone facilities, and other military and strategic facilities.

Nuclear facilities would almost certainly have been included in any such strike—especially given Iran’s announcement on 5 January that it is now disregarding all uranium enrichment controls under the nuclear deal. Trump’s morally indefensible threat to destroy Iranian cultural sites, however, was always unlikely to come to pass.

Trump’s frustration and ego suggest that there would have been a higher likelihood of large-scale US strikes if Iran’s action had incurred any American casualties. Trump could have achieved all his targeted outcomes within 24 hours, before conceding to an inevitable urgent UN ceasefire resolution.

Although Iran, as the underdog, could be expected to acquit itself credibly through conventional and asymmetric means, Khamenei could not afford the threat of such carnage to his country or regime. For Iran, softer, largely political, action will remain its preferred option.

Although Trump can boast military superiority, he will not win politically. US influence in the region is diminishing, and while Trump has largely blamed Iran for this, there are other reasons for America’s waning power. For its part, Iran will want to exploit Soleimani’s assassination through political action, including promoting condemnation of Trump and US policies in the UN and other international forums, and at the parliamentary and party levels in individual countries, as well as through non-violent street demonstrations and social media. This is already happening regionally, especially among Shia communities, and in India through demonstrations outside the US embassy in New Delhi.

Iraq will continue to be a major arena for Iran–US confrontation. Its sovereignty was blatantly breached in the attack on Soleimani assassination, which also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces. The Iraqi parliament has passed a non-binding motion rejecting the presence of US and coalition, including Australian, forces in Iraq. While this does not require the immediate expulsion of these forces, it does impose restrictions on the activities of those forces and anticipates their eventual withdrawal.

Trump threatened to impose severe economic sanctions on Iraq if US forces are expelled. The insensitivity of this will resonate with other countries hosting US forces. Iran will be hoping other countries (especially those in the region) hosting US and allied forces will expel them or impose similar restrictions.

There are clear implications for Australia’s military deployments in Iraq, and for our deployments elsewhere in the Middle East. While it’s unlikely Australia or other US non-regional allies would be deliberately targeted if the situation re-escalates, the possibility of those integrated with US forces becoming unintentional collateral damage cannot be dismissed.

The latest events also send a very timely message to the Australian government about the need to carefully consider its response, consider why and whether the Australian Defence Force should remain in Iraq, and re-evaluate other and future commitments in the region.

Is the killing of Iran’s Soleimani a prelude to war?

Qassem Soleimani’s assassination in an American attack at Baghdad airport, on US President Donald Trump’s orders, could be a prelude to a full-scale war between the US and Iran despite the reluctance of both sides to enter into direct confrontation.

As commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force since 1998, Soleimani was the mastermind behind Iran’s regional strategy and in charge of its foreign military operations as well as those of its allies and proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. One of his major achievements was to help the Assad regime regain control of much of Syria from opposing forces that were supported by several outside powers including the United States.

His assassination is a dramatic escalation in the ongoing US–Iran confrontation. Former US vice-president Joe Biden, now a Democrat aspirant for the presidency, said of Soleimani’s assassination that ‘President Trump just tossed a stick of dynamite into a tinderbox’.

Most experts believe that the Iranian reaction will take the form of asymmetric warfare, as Tehran knows it will be devastated in a conventional war with the US. Iran has mastered this art of indirect confrontation, and created a network of proxies able to carry out attacks that cannot easily be traced to Iran itself.

It’s too early to predict with any certainty the exact nature of the Iranian response and that of its allies and proxies. That such a response will take place was clearly indicated by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s statement that Iran will exact ‘harsh revenge’ for Soleimani’s assassination.

Iran has several retaliatory options. In theory, its most effective would be to unleash Hezbollah, which now possesses more than 100,000 rockets that it can launch against Israeli targets. But it’s unlikely that Iran will choose this option, as it will certainly lead to harsh Israeli retribution that could severely destabilise Lebanon, which is already on the verge of state failure. Moreover, Hezbollah is not just a stooge of Tehran. It is an autonomous actor whose leadership is very wary of providing Israel the excuse to once again destroy most of its infrastructure, which it has rebuilt after it was demolished by Israeli attacks in 2006.

Iran’s proxies in Iraq, the Shia militia groups, are likely to be Iran’s first choice as there are several soft American targets, both civilian and military, in Iraq. There are still 5,000 American troops in Iraq and a large diplomatic mission that could become the focus of such attacks. The assault on the American embassy last week by supporters of the Shia militia, Kataib Hezbollah, foreshadows what could happen on a much larger scale once Tehran gives the signal for such attacks.

Saudi and other Gulf oil installations are very vulnerable to Iranian-sponsored attacks, as was demonstrated by September’s assaults on major Saudi oil facilities. A repetition of such attacks on a larger scale that could not be directly attributed to Iran is likely to form part of the Iranian retaliatory strategy.

The US has a huge number of military assets in the Persian Gulf. The Al Udeid air base in Qatar and the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain are two of its major bases. There are US military installations and troop concentrations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as well. Any of these could become targets of sabotage or missile and drone attacks. Iran would consider this fair game now that the US has moved from covert to overt targeting of Iranian assets.

Iranian attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz—sending oil prices skyrocketing—can also not be ruled out. With Iranian oil exports close to zero, Tehran will not suffer much from such a blockade but other Gulf exporters (all of whom are US allies) will suffer greatly if Iran is able to force even a temporary closure of the strait.

The impact of Soleimani’s killing will not be limited to Iran. Iraq was the scene of the assassination and it has heightened anti-American feeling there, especially since the drone attack killed not only Soleimani but also the deputy head of the Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi called the assassinations an act of aggression and a breach of sovereignty ‘that will lead to war in Iraq, the region, and the world’. He went on to say that the strike ‘violated the conditions of US military presence in Iraq and should be met with legislation that safeguards Iraq’s security and sovereignty’.

Iraq’s parliament has already passed legislation calling for all American forces to leave the country in the wake of Soleimani’s assassination.

If this occurs, it could put an end to the US military presence in both Iraq and Syria. American bases in Iraq are essential to support and supply its much smaller presence in Syria. Such an outcome will be a major victory for Iran, leaving Tehran unchallenged as the external power with the most significant ability to influence Iraq.

While all-out war may not be imminent, asymmetric warfare and the cycle of action and reaction that it will entail could easily get out of hand and lead to a full-scale conflict that neither Washington nor Tehran desires. In assessing the possible consequences, it’s worth recalling that the killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 in Sarajevo led to a devastating conflagration that no one had anticipated.

The post-American Middle East

It was 5 August 1990, just days after Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had invaded and conquered all of Kuwait, and US President George H.W. Bush could not have been clearer as he spoke from the South Lawn at the White House: ‘This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.’ Over the next six months, Bush proved to be a man of his word, as the United States sent half a million soldiers to the Middle East and led an international coalition that liberated Kuwait.

Three decades later, a very different American president embraced a very different US policy. In the wake of abandoning its Kurdish partners in Syria who had fought valiantly in defeating Islamic State terrorists, the US stood by as Iranian drones and missiles attacked Saudi Arabian oil installations, temporarily taking half of its capacity offline.

Welcome to the post-American Middle East. To be fair, the phrase is something of an exaggeration, as the US hasn’t withdrawn from the region. In fact, it has recently sent additional troops to deter and, if necessary, help defend Saudi Arabia from future Iranian attacks and possibly respond directly to them. But there’s no getting around the fundamental truth that the US has reduced both its presence and role in a region that it has dominated for nearly half a century.

The roots of this trend date back to President George W. Bush, whose decision to launch an ill-advised and poorly designed war of choice against Iraq proved to be a turning point in US foreign policy. The high costs and poor results of that war turned the American public against military involvement in the region, which influenced President Barack Obama as he chose not to follow through on his warnings to Syria’s government that use of chemical weapons would cross a ‘red line’ and trigger grave consequences. Obama also decided not to follow up the NATO-led intervention in Libya that removed Muammar Gadaffi’s regime but left behind a divided country and a failed state.

President Donald Trump shares this aversion to military involvement in the region. In addition, increased domestic production of oil and gas has diminished the direct importance of the Middle East to the US. Renewed great-power rivalry, meanwhile, has increased the need for the US to shift resources and attention to Europe to counter Russia, and to Asia to offset China.

The Trump administration has distanced itself from the Middle East in myriad ways beyond demonstrating a reluctance to use military force or station soldiers in conflict zones. Diplomacy is largely absent. Trump has chosen to ignore human-rights violations in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and his administration hasn’t made any serious effort to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The greatest source of uncertainty in the region involves Iran. The Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement, despite Iran’s compliance with it. The administration then introduced a policy of ‘maximum pressure’, consisting mainly of severe economic sanctions, which are having a demonstrable impact on Iran’s economy—by some estimates causing its GDP to shrink by nearly 10% this year.

But if the impact of the sanctions is apparent, their purpose is not. What’s clear is that Iran will respond to America’s economic warfare with warfare of its own. In addition to Saudi oil installations, Iran has already attacked tanker traffic moving through the region, and is gradually breaking out of the constraints set by the nuclear deal. As the economic pressure on the regime intensifies, the US and its allies should expect additional Iranian responses.

This presents the Trump administration with a dilemma. Its unstated but apparent preference is for regime change in Tehran, but 40 years after the Iranian revolution, the regime remains resilient, despite public protests. Responding militarily to Iranian actions could lead to just the sort of conflict Trump doesn’t want in the run-up to next year’s presidential election. But allowing Iran to free itself from the limits of the nuclear accord increases the odds that Israel will attack Iran, dragging the US into war. And even if that doesn’t happen, US inaction might lead one or more of Iran’s neighbours to acquire nuclear weapons to balance Iranian capabilities and the possibility that the US withdraws further from the region. Such a development in what is already the world’s most unstable region would be a nightmare.

The best way forward would be for the US to articulate what policy changes it wants from Iran regarding its nuclear and missile programs, as well as its behaviour throughout the region, and what it is prepared to offer in return. Such a policy should be announced in public, thereby forcing the regime to explain to its frustrated citizens why it is turning down much-desired sanctions relief in order to continue its destabilising activities in the region and its nuclear and missile programs. In the face of intense economic and political pressure, the regime just might agree to negotiate, much as it did when it agreed to end its decade-long war with its arch-enemy Iraq. Thus far, though, no such US initiative has been forthcoming.

In short, the Trump administration is learning that pulling back from the Middle East is neither easy nor without risks and costs. The US still has a stake in fighting terrorism, resisting nuclear proliferation, supporting the free flow of oil, and promoting the security of Israel and American partners in the Arab world. What is needed is clear: greater US readiness to use limited military force, if necessary, and a willingness to pair sanctions with diplomacy. What is less clear is whether such a policy mix can be expected anytime soon.

The Gulf whodunnit

It is an enigma worthy of the genius of an Arthur Conan Doyle or an Agatha Christie. What is indisputable is that a ‘murder’ has been committed: Saudi oil installations in Abqaiq and Khurais have been attacked, possibly by a combination of drones and cruise missiles. As a consequence, more than half of the Saudi oil supply and 5% of the world’s oil supply has gone offline. However, who is responsible for the attack is still a mystery.

Although the Houthis of Yemen have claimed responsibility, serious doubts have been raised about this assertion. These include the sophistication of the weaponry employed and the direction from which the attacks originated. The attacks, according to US sources, seem to have originated from the west and north, which to them indicates Iranian culpability, and not the south where Yemen is located. Unnamed US officials have stated that the trajectory of the attack makes it clear it came from southwest Iran.

But independent observers with knowledge of weapons systems have disputed this analysis and argued that the drones and especially the cruise missiles used in the attack are sophisticated enough to change direction mid-flight and to re-route if faced with physical obstructions while proceeding to their targets. Moreover, it’s common knowledge that Iran has transferred drones and missiles to the Houthis that they have used against Saudi targets in the past.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in his initial statement issued on Saturday clearly laid the blame on Iran. However, President Donald Trump, while implying that Iran was the culprit, has refused to directly name Tehran. In fact, Trump has been sending mixed messages. On the one hand, he has declared that the US is ‘locked and loaded’ to retaliate for the attack. On the other, he has stated that he would like to avoid war with Iran and would defer to the Saudis in making a decision about identifying the source of the attack.

On 18 September, the Saudi defence ministry declared that the attack was ‘unquestionably sponsored’ by Tehran and put on display the debris of drones and cruise missiles to demonstrate that they were of Iranian origin. A total of 25 drones and missiles were used in the strike launched from Iran not Yemen, ministry spokesman Colonel Turki al-Malki told a news conference. ‘The attack was launched from the north and unquestionably sponsored by Iran’, he said, adding that Iranian delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles were used in addition to cruise missiles. But he went on to qualify his conclusion by saying that an investigation into where the attacks were launched from was still underway and the result would be announced at a later date.

Trump announced almost simultaneously that he had instructed his Treasury secretary to impose further sanctions on Iran. What those sanctions will include remains unspecified, but there’s not much left in Iran for the US to sanction. Trump’s announcement sounded like an attempt to find an alternative strategy that would make him look strong while avoiding entering into another conflagration in the Middle East a year before the elections, especially since his 2016 platform promised to bring the military back home from the volatile region.

Moreover, it seems unlikely that the government of Iran would have ordered such an attack at a time when signals were still being exchanged between Tehran and Washington about the possibility of a meeting between Trump and President Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session later this month. The prospect of such a meeting has since dimmed, and Trump says he’s not looking to meet Rouhani in New York. On their part, Rouhani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, under pressure from hardline factions, have declared that no negotiations with the US will be held until Washington removes the sanctions reimposed by Trump.

Nonetheless, it doesn’t make strategic sense for the Iranian government to launch such an attack as long as there’s some hope of a deal with the United States. Prospects for such an eventuality had improved following Trump’s somewhat reconciliatory statements in Biarritz at the time of the G7 conclave, thanks to French President Emmanuel Macron’s efforts at mediating between Washington and Tehran.

The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to Biarritz, which coincided with the G7 meeting, had also raised hopes that moves towards an interim deal might succeed. With Iran’s daily exports of oil reduced from a million barrels, on which Iranian budgetary estimates were based, to a mere 100,000 barrels, no government in Tehran can overlook the consequences of an impending economic meltdown, and therefore the necessity for an eventual accord with the US.

There has been some speculation that Iran’s hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has its own air force and opposes any reconciliation with the US, may have been behind the attacks. However, most experts believe that an operation of such magnitude, that could possibly entail war with the United States, couldn’t have been carried out from Iranian territory without the authorisation of the supreme leader. A US official has reportedly told CBS that this is indeed what happened and that Khamenei gave his authorisation on the condition that the attack be carried out in such a way that Iran could deny involvement.

Despite the Saudi claim that the attack came from Iranian territory, it’s imprudent at this stage to completely disregard the Houthis’ claim of responsibility for the incident. If their claim turns out to be correct, then it’s a strong signal to Riyadh that it must re-evaluate its policy on the conflict in Yemen or find itself at the receiving end of further attacks that could have significant negative consequences for the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf.

The US and Israel aren’t on the same page on Iran

On 24 August, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyhau announced, ‘I repeat: Iran has no immunity, anywhere … I have given the instruction to prepare for any scenario. We will continue to act against Iran and its proxies with determination and responsibility for Israel’s security.’

This declaration followed Israeli air attacks on Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Shia militia targets in Syria that, according to Israeli military sources, were preparing to launch drone strikes on Israel. Such attacks in Syria, by now numbering in the hundreds, have become routine and no longer hit newspaper headlines.

However, on 19 July Israeli aircraft bombed an Iranian base in Iraq, thus escalating its provocative acts against Iran. Some reports suggest that the same base, Camp Ashraf northeast of Baghdad, was attacked again on 18 August. These air attacks follow four strikes in the past three months against munition storage facilities used by pro-Iranian Shia militias in Iraq.

While no one has claimed responsibility so far, two American officials confirmed recently to the New York Times that these attacks were carried out by Israel. When asked about the Israeli air attack on Iranian targets in Iraq, Netanyahu, without confirming the specific attack, replied, ‘Iran doesn’t have immunity anywhere … We will act—and currently are acting—against them, wherever it is necessary.’

Israeli attacks on Iranian and pro-Iranian targets in Syria haven’t caused much concern in Washington because of the Trump administration’s aversion to the Bashar al-Assad regime. However, US policymakers worry about similar attacks in Iraqi territory, because that could foul up America’s relations with Iraq at a crucial juncture. US displeasure at Israeli attacks on Iraqi territory was a major reason why American officials outed Israel for the 19 July attack.

American policymakers are concerned that such Israeli attacks could lead to demands within Iraq to expel all American forces from the country, since many Iraqis believe that the US is complicit in these attacks and that Israel would not have carried them out without getting a green light from Washington. They’re concerned that America’s ally, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi, might not be able to resist such demands, especially if they’re couched in terms of a violation of Iraqi sovereignty by America’s foremost ally in the Middle East.

Tensions between the US and Israel on this issue could well lead to increased anti-Israel sentiment in Washington, especially in the wake of Netanyahu’s decision—paradoxically at President Donald Trump’s urging—to deny entry to two Democratic congresswomen into Israel because of their criticism of Israel’s continued occupation of the West Bank and their support to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement.

That decision was harshly criticised not only by Democratic members of Congress, including several firm supporters of Israel, but also by several Republicans. Netanyahu also faced criticism from a broad spectrum of Jewish organisations in the United States, including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which has been his faithful ally for the past decade.

Israeli adventurism vis-à-vis Iran also seems to run against Trump’s basic instincts, despite his bluster about Tehran’s ‘provocative’ policies and his decision to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear deal and reimpose stringent sanctions on Iran.

Although some of his closest advisers, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton, have been promoting a policy that amounts to advocating regime change in Iran even if by force, Trump is fundamentally averse to leading the US into a full-fledged and open-ended war with Iran. He seems to be still clinging to his campaign promise of bringing American soldiers home and doesn’t relish the idea of sending more of them to the volatile Middle East.

These instincts were on display again at the recently concluded G7 meeting in Biarritz, France, following the unscheduled visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif for talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has been trying to find a way to reconcile American demands and Iranian needs. Trump did not oppose Zarif’s visit, although he said the time was not ripe for the two to meet.

Macron announced at the end of the G7 conclave that a meeting between Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was likely to take place in the ‘coming weeks’. Trump in turn abjured any intention of imposing regime change on Iran and said that, ‘if the circumstances were right’, he would ‘certainly agree’ to a meeting. In a speech hours earlier, Rouhani also signalled that the Iranians were willing to talk, declaring, ‘If I know that by meeting someone, the problem of my country will be solved, I will not hesitate.’

This softening of stands by both sides, especially if it acts as a prelude to a negotiated settlement, will not be music to Israel’s ears. It suggests that, in the final analysis, embroiling the US in a war with Iran with unforeseen consequences doesn’t appeal to Trump. On the other hand, Israel, and especially Netanyahu, would like nothing better than a US assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities, regardless of the consequences that might have for the region.

There is, therefore, a fundamental disjuncture between American and Israeli objectives for Iran, and recent events have begun to bring the fissures between their approaches to this issue into the open.

Why Australia joined the US-led coalition in the Strait of Hormuz

There are two strong reasons behind the Morrison government’s decision on 21 August to join the US-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) in support of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

The first is our near-total dependence, as an island nation, on guaranteed freedom of navigation for international shipping for fundamental trade and economic reasons. That guarantee, both in principle and in practice, applies as much to the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent Gulf waters as to other maritime areas of importance to Australia, including the South China Sea and critical passages to our north.

The second is the depth of our alliance relationship with the US. The US pressed Australia hard for an early commitment. With only two other nations—the UK and Bahrain—reluctantly on board, Australia’s participation was important to boost both the international viability and visibility of the IMSC.

It was a request we couldn’t refuse, notwithstanding the lack of clarity about the IMSC’s structure and rules of engagement.

Europe’s reluctance to join the IMSC mostly hinges on concerns that President Donald Trump will exploit it to interdict legitimate Iranian commercial shipping vessels as part of his sanctions campaign against Iran. To distance itself from that possibility, the EU is considering options such as joining the IMSC on the condition that it transition to European leadership or establishing a separate taskforce.

Aware of European concerns and pending finalisation of the IMSC’s structure, Prime Minister Scott Morrison has largely modelled Australia’s rules of engagement in the operation on those of the UK. The prime minister emphasised that our national interests will dictate all decisions and reaffirmed our commitment to international maritime law. He also explained that Australia’s commitment to the IMSC and Trump’s campaign of putting ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran are ‘completely separate issues’.

There’s been no rush, however, to send Australian assets to the region. Morrison announced that a RAAF P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft would be deployed to the Middle East late this year and a RAN frigate early next year, both under Operation Manitou, our longstanding program for supporting counterpiracy and counterterrorism efforts in the Gulf region. Operations in support of the IMSC would be additional tasking. This hurry-up-and-wait approach suggests that Australia’s commitment is at least as much symbolic as operational.

In signing up to the IMSC, the Australian government is well aware that it is entering an international political minefield. The Persian Gulf is a major international arena where any interdiction of shipping, or maritime or other provocations, by any party could trigger an escalation of tensions that tests the boundaries of Australia’s planned involvement.

Iran’s oil exports are a prime US sanctions target that Trump wants to reduce to zero as part of his maximum pressure campaign. They are also Iran’s major source of foreign currency. US sanctions have hit Iran’s exports and foreign earnings hard. While the Europeans established INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) to technically facilitate Iran’s oil sales and bypass US sanctions, it has been largely ineffective so far.

Tougher US sanctions triggered the commencement in June of Iran’s harassment of selected foreign shipping in the Gulf. Tehran’s aim is twofold: to signal the potential vulnerability of foreign oil shipments through the Gulf if Iran is denied its right to ship its oil, and to pressure the Europeans and other parties to implement an effective INSTEX. The situation escalated in July with the UK’s seizure of the Iranian super tanker Adrian Darya 1 off Gibraltar and Iran’s tit-for-tat seizure of the UK-flagged tanker Stena Impero in the Gulf.

The Adrian Darya 1 has been released but the Stena Impero is set to remain in Iranian custody until the Adrian Darya 1 reaches its as yet unknown destination. Adding to this saga is the explicit US threat of punitive measures against any countries that buy that ship’s oil.

The seizure of the Stena Impero was a significant factor in the UK’s decision to join the IMSC. As an island nation that is dependent on shipping through the Gulf area, it was compelled to act. However, being aware of the potential for conflict of interest, it will operate under its own rules of engagement, quite separately to Trump’s sanctions campaign.

With its recent harassment of foreign oil shipping in the Gulf, Tehran has made its point. As the Europeans expected, Iran held off on any further interdiction of commercial shipping in the lead-up to the G7 summit in France, which concluded yesterday.

The functionality of INSTEX and Europe’s commitment to the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) were major discussion items on the summit’s sidelines. The surprise visit of Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, at French President Emmanuel Macron’s invitation, for separate meetings with France and other JCPOA signatories, added significant gravitas to those discussions. Zarif did not attend the summit itself or seek to meet Trump, but Macron offered to broker a future meeting between Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to work towards settlement of the US–Iran crisis.

Iran’s next moves will depend on what comes from the discussions on INSTEX and the JCPOA—and from the proposal for a Trump–Rouhani meeting.

Correction: An earlier version of this piece named Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei as the country’s president instead of Hassan Rouhani.