Tag Archive for: Interpol

The case for Taiwan: observer status at Interpol’s world congress

Interpol’s vision statement is ‘connecting police for a safer world’. Yet it isn’t connecting all police and is leaving some people less safe. Excluding Taiwan from Interpol observer status undermines international cooperation and hinders the development of an effective security network to address the challenges posed by modern crime.

Last week, outgoing Interpol secretary general Jurgen Stock said, ‘The world is confronted with a dramatic surge in international organised crime in a way that, definitely, I haven’t seen in my now long 45-year career.’

The escalation of transnational crime, fuelled by technological advancements, poses challenges that no single nation can effectively address alone. The complexities of modern criminal activity necessitate robust international collaboration. Yet, a crucial democratic player that has much experience to share in this security landscape remains sidelined: Taiwan.

As Interpol prepares for its upcoming World Congress in November 2024, the 196 member states—nations committed to collaboration despite ongoing conflicts and geopolitical tensions—must address a critical question: why is Taiwan, a proven champion of global safety, denied observer status? The exclusion undermines Interpol’s principles of international cooperation and its collective ability to combat transnational crime. It’s time for Interpol to rectify this oversight and include Taiwan as an observer in the conversation.

Let’s be clear: many international institutions do not require nation status for members or observers. Interpol is one of them. And Taiwanese society consistently ranks among the safest worldwide. As with the World Health Organization, the refusal to include Taiwan results from China blocking the decision and from other countries being fearful of upsetting it.

If these institutions claim that all that can be done is being done in the name of public health and safety, they’re uttering a known untruth.

Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol hampers the island’s law enforcement agencies by denying them access to vital real-time intelligence that could enhance efforts to combat crime, domestic and transnational. Without Interpol observer status, Taiwan must rely on indirect information that often arrives too late.

The case of Lisa Lines, an Australian who fled to Taiwan in 2017 after allegedly arranging a violent attack on her ex-husband, illustrates how Tawain’s exclusion from Interpol helps criminals. Interpol issued a red notice—an international request to law enforcement agencies worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest an individual pending extradition. Australian authorities had to send the request through Interpol because Taiwan had (and has) no extradition treaty with Australia.

But Taiwan did not receive the red notice quickly enough. Lines was not arrested until 14 months later, when she travelled to Palau.

Taiwan’s law enforcement consistently demonstrates a commitment to tackling international crime, and Interpol has recognised this. The Interpol Stop Online Piracy initiative recognised Taiwanese police for their efforts against illegal broadcasting, illustrating their valuable insights and experiences.

A lack of observer status at Interpol also severely restricts Taiwan’s ability to contribute to important discussions and initiatives. And Interpol’s members miss out on the possibility of Taiwan providing timely intelligence on emerging criminal methods and alerting them to threats from criminal groups exploiting Taiwanese passports.

Beijing opposes Taiwan’s inclusion in health and safety bodies because it is wants to shift the view of the rest of the world on the status of Taiwan. It fears that Taiwanese participation in Interpol could weaken its attempts to advance its own claims over the self-ruled democracy.

Taiwan’s police can already cooperate directly with law enforcement agencies elsewhere. There is no good reason why it should not do so through Interpol, too.

Interpol was established to facilitate international police cooperation, not to serve as a tool of geopolitics or international relations. Its constitution emphasises the need for mutual assistance among police authorities, a fact that emphasises that its focus is on crime prevention and enforcement, not political manoeuvring.

Excluding Taiwan undermines this foundational principle and weakens the global network essential for addressing threats that cross borders. The 1984 Interpol General Assembly resolution that replaced Taipei with Beijing as the organisation’s representative of China does not preclude other participation by Taiwan. Interpol does in fact have both the authority as well as the responsibility to grant observer status to Taiwan.

As Interpol prepares for its 92nd General Assembly in Glasgow on 4 November, the moment for decisive action has arrived. It should welcome Taiwan as an observer, facilitating the island’s involvement in key meetings and initiatives that shape global policing efforts.

Australia should be a champion for Taiwan’s observer status. Recognising that a collaborative approach is essential for the security of all nations, we must ensure that Taiwan has a voice in global law enforcement dialogues. This is not just about Taiwan, and Interpol mustn’t allow itself to be a pawn in China’s pursuit of global power. It is about building a more effective security network that can adapt to the challenges of modern crime through international cooperation.

China could pull Interpol funding after Meng Hongwei’s arrest

Interpol, the world’s pre-eminent international policing organisation, is a busy place at the best of times. Facilitating international police cooperation among its 192 members in a world where crime is increasingly transnational and geopolitical relationships are fraught is tough.

It must have been rather inconvenient, then, for its executive to deal with the disappearance of its president, Meng Hongwei, in late September. Meng’s exact whereabouts are still unknown, but some light was shed on his situation when the Chinese government announced he was under investigation by an anti-corruption body for allegedly taking bribes and violating the law. Interpol later said it had received his resignation, effective immediately.

Meng also held the position of vice minister of public security, was both well connected and respected in the powerful ministry, and was a long-time member of the Chinese Communist Party.

His election as president by the Interpol general assembly in November 2016 was testament to his reputation and a matter of great pride for a Chinese government striving for greater global influence.

Meng was an active president. He focused on reforming Interpol and appears to have been actively engaged with the organisation’s executive committee and general secretariat. He sought to bring the 70-year-old agency into the 21st century, overseeing the development of clearer structures for cooperation and innovation.

Interpol, with Meng’s influence, played an important role in Chinese president Xi Jinping’s crackdown on corruption and dissidents. Interpol itself was pivotal in the pursuit of corrupt Chinese officials who had fled the country. Meng’s leadership also provided a mechanism to legitimise China’s international efforts to silence critics among its diaspora.

Meng was the face of China’s active engagement with Interpol. By September 2017, the Chinese government had over 3,000 active investigations being actioned through Interpol, with some 200 red notices—international arrest warrants—submitted by Chinese authorities. Meng also championed greater Chinese involvement in the planning and development of Interpol.

Despite his good work, more than a few members of the Interpol executive committee were concerned that China was using the international policing organisation to pursue dissidents and outspoken members of its diaspora.

Meng was a poster boy for the Chinese government’s international branding: a qualified and capable Chinese bureaucrat navigating the fine line between international obligations and Chinese policy while serving in an international government organisation. His speech at the opening of the 86th Interpol general assembly on 26 September last year illustrates this point:

We had the pleasure of hearing a far-reaching speech from President Xi, a demonstration of his strategic foresight and leadership. His recognition of the vital role of INTERPOL and announcement of generous support on behalf of the Chinese government are an inspiration for us. I am sure that the counsel and contribution from China will give a significant boost to this meeting, the future of INTERPOL and the security landscape worldwide.

So is Meng’s arrest part of Xi’s crackdown on corruption or a case of an official who crossed a line defined by the Chinese Communist Party?

It seems, from a Western perspective, that Chinese officials must have feared something significant to have taken an action that has not only jeopardised Meng’s successes at Interpol but also further tarnished China’s international reputation.

From a Chinese government perspective, there are two likely reasons for this action. One is that Meng was involved in such egregious corruption that its imminent discovery would harm the party. The second is that the party had lost faith in Meng’s loyalty.

There can be no doubt that Meng’s long-term engagement with the Ministry of Public Security and role as vice minister had, at the very least, put him in contact with officials involved in corruption. If Meng himself wasn’t involved in such activities, he would have known where the bodies were buried—figuratively and perhaps literally. But if corruption was the reason, then it seems reasonable to ask why the Chinese government didn’t handle the whole issue through Interpol, as it has done with thousands of other cases.

It seems unlikely that we’ll know the truth for some time, if ever.

If the media coverage is anything to go by, the Chinese government’s ‘disappearing’ of the head of an international organisation merits substantial attention. But in China domestic security and the party come before all else and negative foreign press is unlikely to move the country’s leadership.

Nevertheless, Interpol is in good hands despite the loss of Meng. Much of the day-to-day responsibility for its activities resides with Secretary General Jürgen Stock, who has more than 40 years of law enforcement experience. South Korea’s Kim Jong Yang will be Interpol’s acting president until a new one is elected at the next general assembly in November.

Interpol has long struggled to find the resources necessary to realise its full potential. For the most part, its budget has been dependent on donor money from member countries. When Meng was at the helm, Interpol received offers of new support from the Chinese government. While the Chinese government hasn’t yet cut its support for Interpol, it’s likely that it will, given that it now has no representatives on the organisation’s secretariat or executive council. For the time being, at least, there’s a big question mark over the future of Chinese financial support for Interpol’s reform agenda.

China says Meng’s arrest shows its unwavering determination to ‘combat corruption and criminal activities’. What it means for Interpol and the future Chinese leadership of international organisations remains to be seen.

Cyber wrap

John Kerry

Last week saw the conclusion of a series of high-level meetings in Washington between US and Chinese government officials as a part of the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). There were a couple of interesting takeaways for the cyber community, namely John Kerry’s comments during a press conference with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang. When delivering final remarks, Kerry spoke about how the US and China need to ‘develop and implement a shared understanding of appropriate state behaviour in cyberspace.’ That’s standard State Department fare but his follow on comment—‘I’m pleased to say China agreed that we must work together to complete a code of conduct regarding cyber activities’—was out of left field.

China has been actively working with Russia and others to push for adoption of its ‘International Code of Conduct for Information Security’. Versions of the Chinese code of conduct (both the original and the latest from earlier this year) have been met with widespread disapproval from western democracies. The code seeks to formalise rules for governing cyberspace and cements the primacy of the state in internet governance, as opposed to utilising norms and embracing the multi-stakeholder model preferred by the west. It’ll be interesting to see if the US has indeed come to the table on China’s code or if Kerry simply missed the memo on the baggage attached to the code of conduct terminology.

Regardless of the intention behind the words, China has drawn a line in the sand when it comes to re-starting the stalled US–China cyber working group. During a press conference in Beijing a MFA spokesman said:

China and the United States had previously always had a good dialogue mechanism on issues of Internet security. Because of reasons that everyone knows about, and not because of China, this dialogue has stopped … Resuming these talks probably needs the United States to properly handle the relevant issue to create conditions for dialogue.

If you’re wondering what the ‘relevant issue’ is, look no further.

China’s big three internet companies—Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent—are reportedly throwing their weight around with Chinese authorities. Many of China’s indigenous start-ups have become heavily involved with China’s economy and society. The communist party is said to be struggling to strike the right balance in regulating the increasingly powerful companies. Alibaba alone handles 80% of China’s total e-commerce, which gifts them an influential position in the burgeoning business community. To see their influence in action, check out how the state administration for industry and commerce was recently waved away after challenging Alibaba for selling counterfeit goods on their website.

In the wake of the high-profile Japan Pension Service hack, the Japanese government has announced that it will create two new cyber bodies. The first, an administrative unit, will monitor the security of personal information related to Japan’s new My Number system; the second is a Security Operation Center (SOC) that will ensure the security of connections between local government entities and the federal government. The government also announced that the federal government’s SOC will now cover public corporations and independent administrative agencies handling ‘important data’. The Abe government has also pushed back the launch of its Cyber Security Strategy to better coordinate with other departments in the wake of the leak and more cleanly integrate the resulting initiatives into the strategy.

In Australia the government has put out for comment a draft bill that legally requires telecommunications companies to protect their networks form unauthorised access and interference. The bill would also compel companies to inform the government if they intend to make changes to the management of their networks and systems that could adversely affect their ability to repel cyber intruders. If passed, the bill would give ‘direction and information-gathering powers’ to the Attorney-General’s Department in the form of fines to the tune of $250,000 should companies fail to protect themselves adequately.

And if you’ve ever wondered how INTERPOL’s new high tech crime centre in Singapore goes after the bad guys, check out Kaspersky Lab’s interesting Q&A with Vitaly Kamluk, a member of INTERPOL’s Digital Forensics Lab.