Tag Archive for: INTERFET

Australia’s 1999 mission to East Timor part 2: lessons learned

Australian Army soldiers assist Indonesian Army personnel on the Tully training area obstacle course as part of the Junior Officer Combat Instructor Training course conducted by the Australian Army's Combat Training Centre—Jungle Training Wing from 28 September to 10 October 2014.

The East Timor crisis presented Australia with a unique opportunity to act like a real regional middle power. For a long time Australia has been a middle power with small power pretensions.

East Timor made Australia step up to the plate and actually lead. For years Australia really didn’t want to lead: it simply wanted the problem to go away. There are some important lessons in this for Australia today, because for the 14 years or so since 9/11, with a couple of exceptions—notably the response to terrorist bombings in Indonesia and the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004—the Australian Defence Force has been distracted by events in the Middle East.

The ADF has made contributions there to defeat terrorism and to support the US alliance. But as we look back and we think about the effectiveness of that strategy, there’s a need for some cool headed introspection. Arguably, while it may have bolstered the alliance, we haven’t effectively grappled with terrorism. If anything, the multi-headed Hydra has just reappeared with more heads.

With a new prime minister and a new defence minister, it’s an appropriate time to step back and reconsider our strategic posture in the Middle East and our security engagement in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

As good international citizens, there’s nothing to be gained by precipitously withdrawing our forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. But the commitments to these two countries need to be considered separately.

Our commitment in Afghanistan should be seen in a different category. Australia has been engaged there since the outset. There’s a strong case to be made that Australia has a moral obligation to see that through, to support a democratically elected government that’s precariously placed and buffeted by dark opposing forces. Plenty of criticism can be levelled at the state of affairs in Afghanistan but there is still considerable hope for Afghanistan. We shouldn’t walk away from that.

In Iraq however, it’s a different equation. We are really fiddling round the edges. Despite the best efforts of true professionals in the ADF we aren’t making a substantive difference on the ground. All the indicators suggest that in a few years’ time there will be not much to show for what we’re doing now.

As we take stock, we need to remember the two things we’re there for: the alliance and defeating terrorism.

The best thing we can do for the alliance is to focus on our neighbourhood and bolster security and stability in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. That’s where we value-add for the alliance and to our own national security.

In terms of terrorism, what we’re doing in Iraq and Syria is simply poking the hornet’s nest. We’re far better dealing with terrorism in our patch: developing the relationships, expertise and cultural understanding to nip that threat to our neighbourhood in the bud. There are enough security challenges in Southeast Asia to more than occupy our defence and security institutions for many years to come.

The most important relationship of enduring consequence for Australia is with Indonesia. We need to get that right. We need to treat it with kid gloves. We need to treat Indonesia with respect. We need to treat Indonesia as a security partner, and we need to foster that partnership. That’s already happening up to a point. But a much sharper focus needs to be directed on managing that relationship in a sustainable and constructive manner.

Beyond that, there are a whole range of traditional and non-traditional security concerns that affect both Indonesia and Australia and the neighbourhood. There are also conventional ones beyond: the developments in the South China Sea over the last year or so have worried all of the countries in Southeast Asia.

That’s where we need to be investing our energies and we’re pretty light on in that department at the moment. The arrival of the new landing helicopter dock ships is potentially a game changer in the Pacific. We should be looking creatively to employ these vessels to be bridge builders—literally and metaphorically—with our neighbours in Papa New Guinea, Timor Leste, Indonesia and beyond.

Beyond that, Australia’s long involvement with the Five Power Defence Arrangements has been of invaluable benefit. We need to find a way to include Indonesia in a similar way. ‘Manis’, in Bahasa, means sweet. To sweeten regional ties we need to include the MANIS countries, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore in a regional security forum where traditional and non-traditional security concerns can be discussed and regional solutions explored. The time has come for us to channel the creative energies of our best and brightest into the growing challenges confronting our immediate neighbours. Our neighbourhood could use our undivided attention.

Australia’s 1999 mission to East Timor part 1: the decision to intervene

NTERFET troops take up positions on the Suai shoreline.

Sixteen years ago, Australia was on the brink of a major confrontation with Indonesia. A United Nations peacekeeping mission to the Indonesian province of East Timor, which was pushing for independence, had the potential to put Canberra and Jakarta on a collision course. Those tense moments turned into the birth of a new nation.

It’s an extraordinary story that resonates today. A new book, East Timor Intervention, explores the crisis through the eyes of key participants involved in the lead-up and conduct of the intervention.

How Australia stumbled into that predicament and how it responded offers some reminders about the uncertainty of our region, and the importance of military capabilities balanced with effective regional engagement.

In the lead up to the intervention, key defence policy advisers in Canberra, like Hugh White, struggled to reconcile the policy contortions involved in trying to maintain stable and amicable relations with Indonesia in the face of ominous signs leading up to the independence ballot in East Timor in late August 1999 and its aftermath, when pro-Indonesian militias went on the rampage.

In early September, as the security situation threatened to spiral out of control Australia was given a mandate by the United Nations Security Council, and a begrudging invitation from Indonesia to organise and lead a multinational peacekeeping mission to East Timor. The violence which wracked the territory was sparked by militias opposed to East Timor’s overwhelming yes vote for independence, leading to key Timorese political leader, Xanana Gusmao, calling for a UN peacekeeping force.

That force, known as the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), involved some 20 countries, and included more than 5,000 Australians.

The deployment could have gone horribly wrong and, 16 years later, understanding the implications for Australia’s relations with Indonesia and the wider region is critical as we seek to bolster regional security. One trigger pulled, for instance, by a nervous soldier at a checkpoint in Dili, or one irresponsible act by an individual or group could have easily escalated into a bloody clash from which it would have been difficult to extricate or back down.

Prime Minister John Howard maintains Australia’s involvement in the 1999 liberation of East Timor still resonates strongly with the Southeast Asian nation: ‘It directly led to the birth of a very small country whose people remain deeply grateful for what we did.’

The real security challenge for INTERFET was always going to be in the first week or so, and the stakes were high. Militia groups harassment of the East Timorese, could have led to combat with INTERFET forces and there was the real risk, by mischance or misjudgment, that the Indonesian military (TNI) might clash with INTERFET troops.

The Indonesian Martial Law Commander, Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri, surprised those most critical of the Indonesian military by masterfully helping to avoid what could have degenerated into a vicious and ugly fight between neighbours. He understood the high stakes and the potentially devastating long term consequences of an armed clash leading to a more extensive conflict between Australia and Indonesia.

The then-Chief of the Australian Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, was instrumental in cobbling together the multi-national coalition. He sent Air Marshal Doug Riding on a tour of the region mustering support for INTERFET.

The early commitment of a deputy force commander from Thailand and battalion sized task forces from Thailand and the Philippines helped ensure the mission’s success. Additionally, the rapid deployment of large numbers of combat troops, initially from Australia, New Zealand and the UK, was an emphatic deterrent to the continued presence of militia groups.

Thereafter, INTERFET could undertake a sort of ‘benign occupation’ of East Timor to restore confidence and, crucially, to allow the return and spread of UN and non-government organisation services.

East Timor’s President and former Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao, has a different perspective on how the intervention panned out. To him reconciliation, honouring those lost in past conflict and looking optimistically to the future, is a hallmark of his approach. Mandela-like in his forgiveness and generosity, Gusmao’s remarkable effort to stimulate reconciliation is one of the greatest indicators of hope for the young nation of East Timor.

In essence, the 1999 East Timor intervention led to a shift in perceptions of how Australia should see itself and what it could and should do to act decisively in its neighbourhood. For much of the time since those tumultuous days of September 1999, the ADF has been preoccupied by threats in the Middle East. But today security challenges are emerging aplenty in Australia’s neighbourhood: from territorial disputes in the South China Sea that threaten war between great powers to the resurgence of jihadists in our region.

Australia’s experience of mustering and managing the disparate INTERFET coalition and its engagement with regional security partners, serves as an important pointer of where Australian military engagement needs to focus. Indeed, the experiences learnt from that mission are particularly relevant today and are the subject of my next post.

ASPI suggests

String-like Ebola virus particles are shedding from an infected cell in this electron micrograph. Credit: NIAID

I’m kicking off today with biosecurity: Ebola outbreaks in West Africa have raised fears it might spread to other continents. In a new video interview (7mins), CSIS Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, Dr J. Stephen Morrison says ‘this is far and away the worst [outbreak] we’ve ever seen’. He explains that it’s the scale and scope of this outbreak that’s concerning and discusses the capacity challenges in African states that undermine attempts to keep the spread under control. Keep watching here.

The Strategist has featured an ongoing debate about power shifts in the Asia Pacific and a potential ‘choice’ between China and the US. If you’re looking to read more on this strategic competition, over at Inside Story, Graeme Dobell reviews the contributions of three authors, Geoff Dyer, Robert D. Kaplan and Malcom Fraser, and concludes that ‘this will be more a nineteenth- than a twentieth-century struggle – a contest over power rather than ideology. Australia’s opt-out options are limited’. Read more

The ADF and expeditionary warfare

An INTERFET patrol extracted from the mountainous East Timor border region transports an extra passenger to the care of the INTERFET field hospital in Dili.  An INTERFET soldier shields the childs father from the wind as he cradles his young baby, suspected to be suffering from malaria.

Al Palazzo’s post ‘A defence dividend need not become a defence liability’ raises some important points and provides sage advice to those responsible for the management of the Defence budget. One of the critical points in his argument is set around the fact that the Australian way of war is fundamentally ‘expeditionary’.

But what is meant by the term expeditionary? Especially in relation Dr Palazzo’s call for the ADF to maintain core expeditionary capabilities in order to ‘retain [its] utility to Government’.

Interestingly, while Dr Palazzo identifies expeditionary as at the heart of the Australian way of warfare you won’t find any mention of it in the 2002 ADF publication The Australian Approach to War Fighting (PDF), nor is there any joint ADF expeditionary doctrine. The Army’s publication The Fundamentals of Land Warfare talks about the ADF being prepared ‘to provide a versatile, adaptable and agile expeditionary force’ but it provides no definition of the term. Meanwhile the Air Force views almost everything that it does as expeditionary in nature to the point where one senior RAAF officer has even described its participation in air shows as expeditionary. Read more