Tag Archive for: Intelligence

Reuniting ASIO and the AFP under Home Affairs is the right move to address intensifying threats

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s decision to return policy responsibility for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police to the Department of Home Affairs is more than a machinery-of-government change; it’s a long-term strategic recalibration in response to a rapidly intensifying threat landscape.

The move, previously advocated by ASPI executive director Justin Bassi, lays the foundation for a more integrated and future-ready national security system that can address the complex interplay between societal resilience and statecraft. In doing so, it matches the threats that confront Australia and effectively puts an end to the perception that Home Affairs is owned by one side of politics. In national security, a bipartisan approach to governing architecture is vital for public confidence, even where policies may divide.

The reform responds to a clear signal sent by the director-general of security’s 2025 Annual Threat Assessment: that several of the organisation’s ‘heads of security’ are flashing red, and more could soon follow. The convergence of foreign interference, cyber intrusions, espionage, terrorism and transnational crime demands a whole-of-nation response. These are no longer discrete risks to be managed by siloed agencies; they are networked threats that exploit cracks between institutions and jurisdictions.

The so-called caravan incident—a bomb hoax in Sydney in January that triggered a large-scale counterterrorism response—made those cracks visible to the public. Although it was a false alarm, the event revealed systemic weaknesses in cross-jurisdictional coordination. Communication and command-and-control arrangements faltered at critical moments.

The decision to move ASIO and the AFP back to Home Affairs was a response to these past shortcomings, as acknowledged by the prime minister. But the decision also reflects a forward-leaning posture that better positions us for future crises by recalibrating how we define and deliver national security.

The rationale for creating the Home Affairs portfolio in 2017 remains valid: Australia had a coherent foreign and defence policy architecture but lacked the same level of domestic integration. However, in 2025, challenges no longer relate only to domestic security. Whether it’s youth radicalisation, cyber-enabled foreign interference or coordinated attacks on democratic institutions, these problems cannot be solved by intelligence collection or law-enforcement action alone. They are societal challenges.

ASPI analysts have consistently argued that we cannot arrest our way to social cohesion, nor spy our way to reduced radicalisation. The spread of extremist ideology online, the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions and the exploitation of social and economic vulnerabilities all point to a need for a security architecture that is integrated not only across operational agencies but across policy departments and sectors. Education, online regulation, community services, migration policy, economic development and democratic integrity are now inextricably linked to national security outcomes.

Over the past two decades, ASIO, the AFP and state and territory police forces have built deep mutual respect and cooperation at tactical and operational levels. These relationships are now embedded in culture, not just protocol. But while operational trust is strong, strategic alignment remains uneven. Successful national-level integration requires a federal policy owner that fosters the same level of cohesion across policy and coordination functions. It must be backed by clear governance, empowered leadership and a mandate that reinforces collaboration rather than assumes it.

In this context, the institutional boundaries of Home Affairs matter deeply. Machinery-of-government changes will certainly take time to operationalise. The disbanding of Home Affairs’ intelligence division under the previous administrative settings hindered the department’s ability to convert intelligence feeds into coherent policy advice. The announced reform rebuilds that bridge between national security operations and strategic policymaking.

In doing so, it gives effect to Home Affairs’ 2024 Independent Capability Review, which warns against the dangers of reactive, crisis-driven leadership. The review calls for the development of foresight capabilities, stronger internal coherence and improved integration with the broader machinery of government. In response, Secretary of Home Affairs Stephanie Foster committed the department to a more forward-leaning, strategically aligned model of leadership. Since then, the department has initiated reforms to embed a clear strategic purpose across its functions, build advanced foresight capabilities and enhance whole-of-government integration. These include:

—Establishing structures to anticipate and prepare for emerging threats, rather than merely responding to existing ones;

—Advancing partnerships with industry, community organisations and other levels of government to build a unified security ecosystem; and

—Aligning disparate operational and policy units under a single strategic direction to better coordinate law enforcement, protective security, cyber, immigration and cohesion functions.

Rebuilding strategic capability is one half of the equation. The other half is political leadership. Australia’s national security not only demands capable intelligence professionals; it requires ministers who can lead from the front. The appointment of Minister for Home Affairs Tony Burke to oversee ASIO and the AFP, on top of his portfolios in Cyber Security, Immigration, Citizenship, and the Arts, signals a recognition that contemporary security challenges defy old silos. Burke has a good track record in high-pressure portfolios and strong political authority within cabinet, positioning him as a minister with the bandwidth and weight to drive reform across competing agendas. His portfolio mix reflects that social cohesion, migration policy, cultural identity and cyber resilience are now core aspects of national security, not peripheral concerns.

In a world of converging, escalating threats, the fragmentation of domestic security activities is an untenable liability. Returning ASIO and the AFP to the Home Affairs portfolio is necessary, timely and grounded in operational experience and strategic foresight. But to be meaningful, it must go beyond the symbolic. It must address deep structural vulnerabilities, restore lost capability and operationalise a whole-of-nation vision for security.

That means positioning Home Affairs as the federal government’s strategic coordinator for national security policy, supported by a restored intelligence division, strengthened internal capability and a clear mandate to tackle both immediate threats and the underlying societal drivers of insecurity. Crucially, this must be exercised in genuine partnership with the states and territories and must be enabled by a minister who can lead from the front and work effectively across disparate portfolios. National security cannot be imposed from Canberra; it must be built collaboratively with those on the front lines of implementation. With bipartisan backing, the momentum of an independent review, and the leadership of a minister with the political weight to drive reform, the opportunity is real.

The Pacific needs to upgrade regional intelligence cooperation

Strengthening regional partnerships can help Pacific intelligence capabilities overcome rising challenges. The Pacific should establish a centralised intelligence hub alongside or through the expansion of the existing Pacific Fusion Centre to deliver greater intelligence capabilities to the region.

Resource constraints present some of the most significant difficulties for intelligence efforts in the Pacific as they face growing maritime domains threats and transnational crime such as drug and arms trafficking. Many Pacific island security forces and governments face financial constraints that hinder their ability to invest in modern intelligence systems. As a result, their capacity to collect, interpret and respond to vital information is significantly limited. But a regional hub would help alleviate the financial load and make it easier for international partners to support the region’s needs.

The Pacific Fusion Centre is one example of a regional information-sharing initiative that could be expanded to address these challenges. Analysts from across the region are seconded to the centre and collaborate in producing strategic assessments for the region against priorities outlined by regional leaders at the Pacific Island Forum in 2018. However, the centre relies heavily on open-source data, which may not be sufficient for analysis of complex threats such as transnational crime networks, cyberattacks and maritime domain threats. These threats often require access to classified or more sensitive intelligence sources to develop effective responses. Strengthening the integration of diverse data types available at the centre could enhance its ability to tackle such complex issues.

Training initiatives for Pacific intelligence groups involving advanced technologies or international partnerships also often come with substantial costs. Pacific countries struggle to allocate sufficient funds for comprehensive training programs. Moreover, training models developed for other regions may not always be suitable for the Pacific’s specific cultural and operational settings, which can limit their relevance and effect. Partners such as Australia should focus on developing and delivering region-specific intelligence training that uses regional knowledge and expertise in its examples.

The Pacific also has an issue with staff retention in intelligence roles. Enhancing staff retention demands strategies that address the region’s specific needs. Competitive compensation packages that acknowledge the importance of intelligence work can help retain talent. The Pacific intelligence community can sustain employee engagement and motivation by establishing clear opportunities for career progression, as well as offering training and professional development programs. Designing programs and practices that align with the cultural and operational context of the Pacific would also enhance employee connection and commitment. Offering long-term incentives, such as bonuses or educational support, can also encourage employees to stay. Another option is more exchange or secondment opportunities within member nations of the Pacific Islands Forum.  The fusion centre allows for secondments from the region to the centre. But, for many, such one-and-done initiatives aren’t enough to sustain long-term interest and development.

Intelligence sharing is also an obstacle in the Pacific as nations are often wary of disclosing sensitive data and prioritise the protection of their national sovereignty. This reluctance to share information restricts cooperation and hampers the creation of thorough analyses of potential threats. Also, the decentralised structure of governance in many Pacific countries hampers the dissemination and influence of intelligence evaluations, which diminishes their utility in shaping effective policies. Many Pacific island countries also lack access to secure communication systems, making it difficult to share sensitive intelligence without risking breaches. Limited funding and a lack of infrastructure prevent the establishment of robust information sharing networks, leaving gaps in regional security.

This is why the region needs to push for the expansion of the Pacific Fusion Centre to serve as a hub for greater sharing and coordination of intelligence across Pacific nations or establish, in partnership with the existing centre, a new hub dedicated to some of the more sensitive intelligence work. Intelligence hubs are needed to provide secure communication systems and advanced tools for data collection, to conduct data analysis and to use surveillance systems to improve intelligence capabilities. As a hub, it needs to foster greater collaboration with international allies, such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States, to leverage expertise and resources to offer training programs tailored to the unique cultural and operational contexts of the Pacific. Without greater support for regional intelligence collaboration, the Pacific will remain behind in countering some of the region’s largest security issues.

This article is part of ASPI’s Pacific Perspectives series, dedicated to championing the assessments and opinions of Pacific island security experts. All opinions presented, including any errors or omissions, are the sole responsibility of the author.

Editors’ pick: Australia’s security architecture must evolve, not regress

Alongside Monday’s cabinet reshuffle, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese returned responsibility for the Australian Federal Police and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to the Home Affairs portfolio. ASPI executive director Justin Bassi outlined reasons for such a change in a 27 March Strategist article that called for the reform. We repeat it below.

The Independent Intelligence Review, publicly released last Friday, was inoffensive and largely supported the intelligence community status quo. But it was also largely quiet on the challenges facing the broader national security community in an increasingly dangerous world, in which traditional intelligence is just one tool of statecraft and national power.

After the January discovery of a caravan laden with explosives in Dural, Sydney, confusion emerged around what federal and state governments knew and when. The review was completed before the caravan was discovered, and the plot was likely beyond the review’s scope. However, government responses to the event should prompt a discussion about Australia’s national security architecture.

Australia faces an unprecedented convergence of threats. We are confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, global conflict, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyber warfare.

Luck will not protect us; we need structure and certainty. Australia saw these threats early and began to modernise its security architecture in 2017, including the establishment of the Home Affairs portfolio.

But the government has gradually reversed some elements of the consolidation, returning various security responsibilities to the Attorney-General’s portfolio, including for the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. This reversion to an outdated model risks leaving the system ill-equipped to confront the challenges of the 21st century.

Debate on Home Affairs seems fixated on the leadership style of its former head, Michael Pezzullo. Leadership is crucial, but obsession with individual style over substance distracts from both strategic thinking and the fundamental issue of resurrecting a system that had structural inadequacies and was demonstrably unfit for purpose. We are not simply revisiting a past model; we are resurrecting a failed one.

The Attorney-General’s portfolio, in its traditional guise, was designed for a simpler, less dangerous era. Domestic threats were minimal and tended to come one by one—for example, after the end of the Cold War, security focus shifted from espionage to the emerging threat of Islamist terrorism. The Attorney-General’s oversight was appropriate, as it focused primarily on the legal framework while security agencies executed operations.

However, the proliferation and intersection of modern threats have overwhelmed this antiquated model.

When confronted with asylum-seeker boat arrivals, global terrorism, China and hybrid threats including cyber, the previous system—notwithstanding highly talented people—struggled as the Attorney-General’s portfolio held both the legal and security responsibilities.

The system’s limitations were evident well before the 2017 restructure. In 2011, prime minister Julia Gillard moved cybersecurity from the Attorney-General’s purview into her own department. Similarly, the 2012 review of illegal boat arrival policy was managed within the prime minister’s department, reflecting that the framework was not up to the task. And as a result of a review after the 2014 Martin Place terrorist attack, the Abbott government created a Counterterrorism Coordinator within the prime minister’s portfolio.

The rise of the Islamic State terrorist group in 2014 exposed policy deficits. While terror laws rightly fell under the Attorney-General’s remit, the broader policy response demanded a more strategic perspective and decisive approach. Changes were needed, partly because laws were so out of date.

But it was China’s rise that finally revealed the urgent need for a dedicated focus on national security policy. The 2016 review into foreign interference was a direct consequence of Australia’s evolving threat landscape.

Few of our closest partners’ chief law officers also function as security ministers. Typically, a dedicated security minister focuses on threat assessment and policy development, while the Attorney-General ensures that all actions are lawful.

Australia’s Home Affairs model strengthened the legal checks and balances by separating security policy and operational functions from the legal oversight function. It ensured that a single minister could not simultaneously identify a threat, determine the appropriate response and authorise the necessary actions without independent scrutiny. The previous system essentially allowed a single minister to mark their own homework.

Dividing security responsibilities between the Attorney-General and Home Affairs portfolios limits the effectiveness of both departments.

If this gradual dilution portends a future abolition of Home Affairs altogether, that would be a mistake. As the Dural caravan controversy unfolded, no one seemed able to agree on what was an appropriate amount of information-sharing between police and security agencies, and state and federal governments. This underscores the need for clarity that Home Affairs is responsible for setting, coordinating and implementing national security policy.

Home Affairs was created because the threat environment was evolving and, within our national security architecture, foreign and defence policy were covered but the third aspect of national security—domestic security—was lacking. So, what security evolution has justified its regression? The Attorney-General’s department has not shown itself to be more capable than Home Affairs in terrorism, cybersecurity or foreign interference.

Home Affairs—to the government’s credit—led the world by banning DeepSeek from government devices. Could we count on such decisive action if lawyers were doing all the work and then reviewing it themselves? Would you allow your lawyer to run your business, rather than provide essential legal counsel?

Technology amplifies threats and is advancing much faster than new laws can be written. Terrorists use encrypted apps to plot attacks and social media to attract recruits. China spreads propaganda through social media and has already begun using cyber intrusions to prepare to conduct sabotage operations in future conflict.

Australia must not only reinstate the separation between the security minister and the attorney-general; it must evolve further to confront 21st-century threats. This should include establishing a National Security Council or Secretariat, like those of many of our partner nations, including Quad countries. This body should be led by a national security adviser who provides strategic coherence and policy coordination.

To navigate the increasingly complex and dangerous global security landscape, we need to evolve, not regress.

Not so risky after all: bilateral consequences of compromised intelligence operations

It’s a staple of screenwriters and novelists, stock news footage and a spectre haunting ambassadors’ dreams: a spy unmasked; riots outside embassies, flags and effigies alight; newspaper headlines blaring outrage; and the chilling words persona non grata. Another intelligence operation compromised, another delicate diplomatic relationship ruined. To what extent, however, are such fears borne out?

For all the nervousness about diplomatic risks of espionage, offensive counterintelligence and covert action, it turns out that exposure rarely creates much of a significant mess in relations between countries.

Where consequences have been significant they have correlated to particular features of those operations. That’s the conclusion of my research, recently published by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs.

When foreign intelligence activities are compromised and exposed, it’s easy to assume there will be profound negative impacts on the bilateral relationship. Foreign intelligence professionals—and the policy-makers and envoys they serve—are, indeed, preoccupied by possible consequences of compromised operations, which may include sanctions, expulsions or other adverse actions directed at the perpetrating state. Anticipating these consequences informs intelligence planning and risk assessment in capitals across the world.

I systematically analysed 174 historical cases of compromised intelligence operations from 1985 to 2020 (supported by an updated sample of cases in the following four years) and their real-world impact on bilateral relations. The study reveals not only how common espionage is but that the bilateral consequences for states caught have actually been much less serious than might have been expected.

Catastrophic consequences, where a bilateral diplomatic relationship drastically changed, were simply not evident in the results. Critical consequences, involving major damage and pervasive deterioration of a relationship, appeared in only 10 cases. Significant consequences, with moderate but recoverable impacts, occurred in only 16. All other cases demonstrated minor or negligible consequences.

It should be noted that the study focussed on bilateral consequences and not on other costs the exposed party might face, including loss of intelligence capabilities and insights, actual danger to people involved, and negative impacts on broader international policy objectives.

The research also identifies the factors that best explain outcomes. Most significantly, the nature of the compromised operation—namely, its egregiousness—correlated strongly with negative bilateral outcomes. These include operations involving: violence, intentional or unintentional, such as the French sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985 or Russia’s attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in 2018; material damage, including cyber effects; covert influence or interference, such as Russian interference in the 2016 US election; or personal effects on national leaders, such as several instances exposed by Edward Snowden.

Less closely correlating but still noteworthy was where the target country of the operations was historically or culturally predisposed to be unusually sensitive to actions by the perpetrator or to intelligence activities more generally.

Pre-existing relations also influenced outcomes. Spying on allies was risky, although not as risky as might be supposed, while, surprisingly, transgressing on adversaries proved less damaging than doing so to neutrals.

Perpetrators’ responses played an important and counter-intuitive role in the consequence: a strategy of unrepentance often proved safer than vociferous denial.

The effect of timing was more ambiguous. Compromise at politically or diplomatically inopportune moments could prove problematic. But on some occasions inopportunity also generated mutual incentives to downplay incidents. On other occasions it was difficult to separate the influence of timing from the circumstances of timing precipitating the activity itself: for example heightened tensions might exacerbate fall-out, but those tensions may have also precipitated the intelligence operation.

Interestingly, the power dynamic between perpetrator and target had significantly less explanatory power. Stronger consequences correlated closely with the degree of publicity, but publicity was almost always a function of consequence, rather than vice versa.

This analysis suggests risk assessments used in intelligence operational planning should consider the egregiousness of the operation, with particular sensitivity to prospects for violence and loss, effects on national leaders, and international norms.

Even though timing is a somewhat ambiguous factor, prudent consideration should be given to prospective events which might worsen possible consequences. This reinforces the need for continuous risk assessment. Efforts should be made to regularly review risk assessments to consider prospective developments.

Finally, the research reinforces that the fundamentally dynamic nature of intelligence should not be ignored, including in academic study. Intelligence activities are a covert contest of capabilities and wills—and risk calculations and appetites—between states carried out for decision and action advantage, and as an expression of contest in itself.

This detailed and comprehensive study reflects how states actually interact when the lights are off, with consequences that are not always what one would expect.

AI is reshaping security, and the intelligence review sets good direction

The 2024 Independent Intelligence Review found the NIC to be highly capable and performing well. So, it is not a surprise that most of the 67 recommendations are incremental adjustments and small but nevertheless important recalibrations. However, to thrive in a contested, fragile and volatile security environment more must be done, and collectively.

The review found that despite great progress, some practical and cultural barriers impede the interoperability and adoption of data and technology. Most of the review’s technology recommendations are clear-cut and important steps to overcome this.

Robust data is the foundation for good intelligence and a versatile, strategic asset. Thus, the review recommends that National Intelligence Community (NIC) agencies should develop a top secret cloud transition strategy and should support data cataloguing efforts to maximise interoperability.

The AI recommendations focus on AI governance principles, frameworks, senior officer responsibility and, crucially, NIC-wide senior officer training to understand ‘applications, risks and governance requirements of AI for intelligence’. These measures will hopefully establish an educated and accountable leadership cohort in the NIC that can drive AI adoption while thinking critically about risks and effective governance. As always, execution will be key—assuming the government in office after the 3 May election accepts the recommendation.

Despite the global hype about AI, the review acknowledges its significant risks as well as many opportunities. It echoes my book in suggesting that, in practice, NIC agencies are predominately using AI for collection and such analytical functions as triage and translation. Given the review’s focus on improving the intelligence-policy interface, how technology could contribute, beyond using AI to curate intelligence for consumers, was curiously absent.

Using AI to ‘transform and improve the intelligence cycle’ is necessary. However, there is space for a more imaginative approach to using it—for example, identifying and monitoring new threats, anomalies and providing early warning.

Curiously, the basic question of what it means to know something—fundamental to both AI and intelligence—didn’t feature. While it was excellent to see misinformation and disinformation addressed, albeit not publicly, I’d argue government and intelligence expertise on it is already crucial, not just ‘becoming essential’, as the review puts it. It was also interesting to see the evaluation of open-source intelligence (OSINT), an important function, kicked down the road to the next review.

We should approach technology as an ecosystem. This is reflected in the review, which noted: ‘NIC needs a stronger enterprise approach to technology, one that recognises and exploits the interdependencies of the technology ecosystem.’ We need to develop a technology strategy to articulate the vision, requirements, priorities, as well as current and future technology risks. While that seems a little vague, if it were well executed, it would be a big step forward.

Technology, data and privacy were, in the main, addressed well as threats in the scene-setting section, where the review highlighted technology’s foundational role in Australia’s context, alongside global contest and fragmentation and transnational challenges like climate change. But few recommendations dealt with current issues with data harvesting, cyberattacks or AI in biotech, let alone their use in conflict. Yet, our technology will be a target and our dependencies on data, technology and AI infrastructure will be weak points for adversaries to exploit.

There is, naturally, a section on innovation. The recommendation that government scope the establishment of a national security focused technology investment fund is welcome and balances narrowing the Joint Capability Fund, which has had mixed results.

While exorbitantly expensive, secure spaces outside Canberra are critical to mission. While the review addressed options for integrated locations outside of Canberra, the lack of urgency on this is a missed opportunity. In conflict, they’d be not only ‘helpful’, as per the review; they’d be essential. They also support recruitment and retention, stakeholder engagement, collaborative operational and strategic work, and contingency planning.

The technology-related oversight recommendations are noteworthy and substantial. I welcome the recommendation that the first full-time Independent National Security Legislation Monitor undertake a review of the NIC’s use of AI to inform legislative and policy changes. I’ve long advocated for a panel of technology advisers to serve the oversight bodies so was pleased to see this recommended, although I would have preferred one advisory body accessible to NIC and oversight agencies. Perhaps to elected officials too.

The terms of reference explicitly included the NIC’s preparedness for crisis and conflict. It is addressed throughout—and I agree with the co-authors that most adaption will happen in a crisis or conflict, not before—however, I also think more could be done to prepare. OSINT, disinformation and AI or technology frameworks and strategies are important, but action will need to be expedited if, or as, conflict looms. Increased centralisation, while straightforward for education, workforce and policy, could be an asset or a risk in conflict, especially with varying levels of technology sophistication and expertise.

Technologies’ effects are not occurring alone. They converge with a crumbling global order as well as increasing contest and uncertainty in international trade, creating a tinderbox for exponential change. Occurring amid a vacuum of global leadership, there is no clear path for non-transactional collaboration on technology or climate change; the same possibly holds true for intelligence.

The review handled how technology is affecting our security environment and how it can be harnessed by the NIC well. The recommendations are sensible and considered improvements for an already world-class intelligence enterprise. The real test, if it happens, will be how it performs in conflict.

Reviewing the intelligence reviews (so far)

With the report of the recent intelligence review by Heather Smith and Richard Maude finally released, critics could look on and wonder: why all the fuss? After all, while the list of recommendations is substantial, the review overall recommends only incremental change. To understand what’s happened here, it helps to reflect on the historical context. This article provides a review of previous intelligence reviews that predated this one and what they mean for today.

Two things to note upfront. First is the incremental and spasmodic shift for intelligence organisations from operating under often secretive prime ministerial executive edicts last century to operating today under formalised and publicly available legislation that can be scrutinised by practitioners, pundits and critics alike.

Second is the expansion in the number of intelligence organisations and the number and consequence of the various oversight mechanisms that have accrued over the years. These mechanisms include a range of parliamentary, executive and independent accountability oversight mechanisms as captured in the below diagram of the NIC Structure and Accountability Arrangements (compiled by the author). The end result is a range of government instrumentalities intended to provide accurate reliable and timely intelligence support to government decision makers coupled with parliamentary, executive and independent accountability mechanisms that are unmatched internationally. But first, let’s review how we got there.

World War II Legacy

The intelligence organisations that emerged following World War II were different from their wartime antecedents. Back then, the combined arrangements working with the United States under General Douglas MacArthur had spawned collaborative agencies in 1942 in which Americans and Australians worked hand in hand. The Central Bureau (for signals intelligence) and the Allied Intelligence Bureau (for espionage, or human intelligence, sabotage and special operations), as well as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Services and Allied Geographical Section are the better known entities. When the Americans left at the end of the war, though, they took with them much of the organisational apparatus, people and equipment behind these organisations.

Source: author.

Early Cold War Arrangements

The Australian remnants of these once combined US-Australian entities were gathered at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne until a post-war plan was formulated. By 1947 a national signals-intelligence agency, the Defence Signals Bureau had emerged; this was the precursor to the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). Also by 1947 there was an analytical arm, the Joint Intelligence Bureau, precursor to today’s Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). By 1949 the wartime domestic security service was seen as unreliable and compromised. It was replaced by prime ministerial edict with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). By 1952 Alfred Brookes was commissioned to establish a foreign human intelligence collection agency, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). None of these agencies had any media profile to note.

The Petrov Royal Commission

The defection in 1954 of KGB officer Vladimir Petrov, and his wife, Evdokia, who was the embassy cipher clerk, was a major coup for ASIO and led to national and global headlines that put ASIO in the spotlight. A Royal Commission on Espionage followed which looked at espionage, but not at ASIO or other intelligence organisations. The commission was engulfed in controversy as the Labor Party saw it as a ploy launched by prime minister Robert Menzies on the eve of a federal election. As David Horner writes in his official ASIO history, The Spy Catchers, the truth was less dramatic. Yes, Menzies capitalised on the opportunity, but the defection was genuine. In the end, ASIO was placed under legislation. No one was prosecuted, because much of the corroborating evidence of the so-called nest of spies came from what was then a still highly sensitive source, decrypted Soviet diplomatic messages pointing to Australians supplying secrets to the Soviets. The ASIO Act 1956 followed. This was the first time an Australian intelligence agency was placed under legislation, although it would be some time before ASIO was made accountable to parliament.

The first Hope Royal Commission

Two decades would pass before another royal commission probed into the workings of Australia’s intelligence apparatus. In 1974 prime minister Gough Whitlam commissioned Robert Marsden Hope, a New South Wales judge and civil libertarian, to undertake the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS). Hope reviewed the post war intelligence arrangements and recommended a series of reforms, most implemented by Whitlam’s successor, Malcolm Fraser. This included establishing the Office of National Assessments (ONA) in 1977 as well as pushing through parliament a revised and expanded ASIO Act 1979. A Security Appeals Tribunal was established and later absorbed into the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), recently rebadged as the Administrative Review Tribunal.

Protective Security Review

Shortly after completing the RCIS, Hope was tasked to undertake a Protective Security Review (PSR) in February 1978. This followed the explosion of a bomb at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Sydney, which coincided with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional meeting chaired by Fraser. Hope was not tasked to identify the culprit (the bombing was linked to the Ananda Marga sect), but his review led to closer coordination of intelligence and policing, both at state and federal levels, and the prioritisation of organising to counter acts of terrorism.

Second Hope

In March 1983, newly appointed prime minister Bob Hawke commissioned Hope once again, this time to review progress of the intelligence community (AIC) had made since Whitlam had commissioned him a decade earlier. The Royal Commission on Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies (RCASIA) coincided with revelations of KGB shenanigans with former ALP National Secretary David Combe, which led to the expulsion of KGB officer Valery Ivanov. The review was then expanded to also consider a bungled ASIS exercise conducted at the Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne. In the public hearings that followed, Hawke took the stand and defended the efficacy and significance of Australia’s intelligence community. Hope subsequently recommended, and Hawke approved, the creation of an Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), with enduring powers of a royal commissioner. The IGIS office holder still has these powers.

First Richardson, Holloway and Cook

Hawke’s successor as prime minister, Paul Keating, commissioned Dennis Richardson in 1992 to review ASIO and consider where a peace dividend following the Cold War could be harvested. Mindful of the searing cross-examination Hawke had experienced with the RCASIA a decade earlier, this review was managed behind closed doors and went largely uncontested. But it dealt with weighty issues, including reports of penetration by Soviet spies. It did so by downsizing and clearing out personnel. Also, Sandy Holloway was commissioned to review shortfalls in Australia’s foreign intelligence collection. A former director-general of ONA, Michael Cook, is widely seen as associated with internal security reviews as well. He would have been pleased with Richardson’s work.

Samuels and Codd

By the mid-1990s reports were emerging of further inappropriate behaviour in ASIS. Justice Gordon Samuels and Michael Codd were commissioned to review the matter and make recommendations. Their mid-1995 report proposed that ASIS come under legislation (as ASIO had in 1956 and again in 1979). This led to a drawn-out process as parliamentarians debated over how to respond. Reports in 1999 of a surveillance network run by the Five Eyes partners, Echelon, accelerated the momentum for reform not just for ASIS. Eventually ASIO, ASIS and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD, later ASD) came under what would become the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS).

By the end of September, parliament passed the Intelligence Services Act of 2001. This saw ASIS and DSD come under legislation for the first time. In addition, the powers of the IGIS would come to cover all six agencies of the intelligence community. These were ASIO, ASIS, DSD, DIO, ONA and the nascent Defence Intelligence and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), which later became the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO).

Flood

Following the East Timor crisis of 1999, the first Bali bombing in 2002, and a scandal revolving around the unfounded claims of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2003, the former ONA director Philip Flood was appointed to conduct a fresh review in 2004. His Report on the Inquiry into Australia’s Intelligence Agencies identified weaknesses in the analytical reporting process and reinforced the need for separation of intelligence analysis from policy formulation. He also called for a bolstering of resources and a reinforcing of ONA’s central role of AIC coordination.

Cornall and Black

In line with a recommendation by Flood for periodic intelligence reviews, Robert Cornall and Rufus Black were appointed to conduct an Independent Review of the Intelligence Community (IRIC) in 2011. In addition to commissioning the IRIC that year, prime minister Kevin Rudd established the National Security College (NSC) at the Australian National University (ANU) and appointed an Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM).

AustraliaUnited StatesCanadaBritainFranceIndonesia
Overarching Inspector-General/Commissioner✓✓✓
Agency-specific Inspector-Generals✓
Ministerial oversight✓✓✓✓
Parliamentary oversight✓✓✓✓✓
Executive oversight✓✓✓✓✓✓
Independent reviews or bodies✓✓

Oversight and accountability mechanisms of Australia, compared with allies and partners. Source: author.

L’Estrange & Merchant

In 2017, a former secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and first NSC director, Michael L’Estrange, along with a former Defence deputy secretary of intelligence and security, Stephen Merchant, were commissioned to undertake the next periodic review, the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (IIR), aided by Sir Iain Lobban from Britain. Their review identified the expansion of the Australian intelligence community with the emergence of intelligence functions within the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the intelligence arm of the Australia Federal Police (AFP) and the intelligence function within the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now Home Affairs). This called for the renaming of ONA as the Office of National Intelligence (ONI), headed by a director-general of national intelligence (DGNI) with more resources and a remit to more closely coordinate and manage this expanded National Intelligence Community (NIC).

The L’Estrange Merchant report was written separately from the plan to establish a more expansive Home Affairs portfolio that would, in addition to ASIO, encompass the four latecomers to the NIC: AUSTRAC, ACIC, AFP Intel and Home Affairs Intel. This construct would in part be reversed under Prime Minister Antony Albanese, who returned ASIO, AUSTRAC, ACIC and AFP to the Attorney-General’s portfolio.

Second Richardson

After having overseen the culling and later rebuilding of ASIO, Dennis Richardson was called back to review the growing body of intelligence legislation, mindful that the Home Affairs arrangements had been announced at the same time as the 2017 IIR report was released. With a wealth of historical insights into the functions performed, in a lengthy report Richardson and his team outlined where significant streamlining of legislation would be useful.

And now Maude and Smith

With all of this before them, Smith and Maude, no doubt, would have realised that in conducting their Independent Intelligence Review, they were following a well-worn path of review and reform that’s been summarised here. The incremental and periodic reforms undertaken over more than half a century have seen Australia bequeathed an intelligence apparatus of state with high levels of accountability.

In the espionage business the secret of success is often enough in keeping one’s successes secret, there are always limits in how transparent these agencies can be. Mindful of this, successive reviewers and governments have recognised the need to bolster accountability mechanisms, including parliamentary, executive and independent ones as well as periodic reports to parliament and the Australian people. In an age of heightened foreign interference, misinformation and disinformation, the importance of these oversight mechanisms is more important than ever.

The surprise of the Independent Intelligence Review: economic security

After copping criticism for not releasing the report for nearly eight months, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese released the Independent Intelligence Review on 28 March. It makes for a heck of a read. The review makes 67 sweeping recommendations to overhaul Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC) on everything from legislation to oversight, open-source intelligence and investment.

But hidden in plain sight in the review is a surprising recommendation that Treasury lead a review relating to ‘economic security’.

That’s a surprise because Australia hasn’t really talked about economic security before. There isn’t a federal policy on achieving economic security, our ministers don’t address economic security in press releases, and it remains a bit of a foreign concept in Parliament.

The review doesn’t stop there. Authors Heather Smith and Richard Maude—both well-known figures in Canberra—say their ‘consultations suggest that more holistic and structural changes across the public service are required’. Two more key recommendations were to establish a dedicated economic security unit inside Treasury and embed members of the NIC in economic security policymaking.

One wonders why the government hasn’t done this already.

It’s because Australia’s security has historically been about its military. As an island nation in the Indo-Pacific, we’ve been forced to use our privileged location to achieve political and diplomatic advantage. We’ve had defence white papers for decades calling for more spending, more alliances, more things. Look no further than the 2023 Defence Strategic Review. Australia’s security was said to be linked to our alliance with the United States and achieving force projection, meaning spending billions of dollars on long-range missiles and nuclear-powered submarines.

Now, it seems the government has finally stopped thinking military power alone will cut it in this degrading geopolitical environment.

In his budget speech, Treasurer Jim Chalmers seemed to glibly admit that ‘in these uncertain times, economic security and national security are increasingly intertwined’. His Future Made in Australia Act, passed in December last year, is the first specific mention of economic security by the Commonwealth ever. The National Reconstruction Fund has finally started handing out some of its $15 billion of investment funding.

But we have a lot more work to do.

A 2024 report by the United States Studies Centre shows that Australia is well behind our closest allies. We don’t conduct outbound investment screening, as the US does, or ban investments with entities that could compromise our research and development, as Canada does. Our investment review bodies don’t seem to have actual teeth like the ones in Britain do, and unlike Japan we don’t have an economic security law.

Don’t forget, a former treasurer (advised by our Foreign Investment Review Board) took no action against a 99-year lease given to Chinese company Landbridge to operate the Port of Darwin. That decision is still haunting the corridors in Canberra today.

Australia needs leadership on economic security and it needs it now, or certainly after the election.

We need to beef up our existing legislation to protect Australian investment from both internal and external threats to our economic security. We don’t even need new levers; we just need to use the ones we have. In the past, we have arguably prioritised investment over security, instead of attracting investments that offer both. For those that we deem contrary to foreign policy, our foreign minister already has the power to cancel any foreign agreements—they just haven’t wanted to.

The Foreign Investment Review Board needs to be given the teeth—and, more importantly, the political capital—to make hard decisions about investment in Australia. The current review of the board is a fantastic opportunity change our inbound and outbound investment framework. Making the board independent from Treasury would go a long way to achieving that, as would a broader ability for it to call in and review investments that could pose security risks, rather than await applications.

More broadly, the NIC needs to be integrated not just with Treasury, but with industry and academia, where technological breakthroughs fuelling our economic growth are being made every day. Having a dedicated economic security policy would probably help too. And we can do all of that without resorting to protectionist or xenophobic responses such as banning whole countries from doing business.

Economic security is not a new concept, but we are definitely late to the party. Hopefully, no matter which government is elected in May, economic security doesn’t prove to be just another election buzzword.

Intelligence review is strong on workforce issues. Implementation may be harder

The 2024 Independent Intelligence Review offers a mature and sophisticated understanding of workforce challenges facing Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC). It provides a thoughtful roadmap for modernising that workforce and enhancing cross-agency and cross-sector collaboration.

But overcoming entrenched barriers—such as institutional resistance, rapid action alongside careful implementation, and investing in change while delivering core responsibilities—will require careful planning, strong leadership and a phased approach to ensure sustainable change.

The 2024 review builds on previous reviews, addressing persistent workforce issues in the NIC. These include security clearance process inefficiencies, inadequate resourcing, difficulties in attracting and retaining specialised skills, a need for greater workforce diversity, and leadership development and agency mobility.

The report acknowledges progress made since the 2017 review, including establishment of the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) and introduction of the Top Secret–Privileged Access (TSPA) Vetting Authority. It notes that recruitment and retention strategies have evolved, highlighting some agencies’ innovative approaches.

The latest review addresses the rapidly evolving workforce landscape and mounting pressures on intelligence agencies in increasingly competitive environments—both geopolitical and the labour market. It considers emerging dynamics such as the expectations of younger generations, increasing demand for remote and flexible work arrangements, disparate allowance structures and constrained intra-community mobility.

The review argues for a more sophisticated approach to workforce data collection and bolstering the collective elements of workforce management, such as by developing a NIC-wide employee value proposition, adopting talent management and mobility programs, and introducing a NIC chief people officer role.

Overall, the 2024 review continues to push the thinking about Australia’s intelligence workforce. People and skills are presented not as individual agency concerns, but as an enterprise-wide challenge requiring improved collective action and a stronger focus on modern workforce expectations.

But translating the review’s recommendations into concrete changes is easier said than done. The review itself notes differences across the NIC in work practices, allowance structures, security requirements and workforce data reporting. Alongside a reluctance to commit to workforce mobility, these findings hint at the potential for deeper resistance to centralised action by agencies accustomed to managing their own staffing functions.

Underlying constraints may mean some NIC agencies are not on board with taking a collective approach to building the skills and commitment needed to keep pace with shifting national security threats.

The first constraint is institutional resistance to centralisation. Until the establishment of ONI in 2018, NIC agencies had operated independently in almost all functions. Staffing and workforce planning were no exception. Those accustomed to control over their own processes may resist centralisation—for example, recommendations of a new NIC chief people officer, continued use of a single TSPA clearance and a NIC-wide employee value proposition.

To overcome this, the benefits of centralisation should be emphasised as a complement to agencies’ own efforts. These include enhanced efficiency, consistency, shared purpose, and the ability to meet workforce shortages through collective strength instead of individual action. The proposed chief people officer will need to be a facilitator, not an enforcer, driving alignment while respecting individual agency needs.

The second constraint is the balance between speedy action and rigorous security and procedural practices. The challenge lies in ensuring that necessary processes, such as security clearances and formalising shared programs, do not become bottlenecks that slow down the implementation of key initiatives.

The key to balancing speed with rigor is agile execution. This means having an effective implementation plan where smaller scale initiatives are implemented quickly and adapted iteratively, within the security and process parameters of the day. The NIC should focus on quick wins that demonstrate progress while laying the groundwork for longer-term changes.

Finally, there is the challenge of committing time and funding to achieving collective action on workforce issues, which are already stretched by core responsibilities. Intelligence agencies today address a wider range of security challenges and threats than ever before. Without committed resources, the move towards greater centralisation and optimisation of workforce processes risks detracting from core duties or lacking follow-through.

The government’s allocation of $44.6 million over four years to ONI is a good, but initial, start on implementing the many recommendations, which range from intelligence support for ministers and leveraging collective capabilities to legislative reform and oversight, alongside workforce management.

Australian intelligence work is more important than ever, as we face evolving global security threats highlighted in the review’s focus on conflict preparedness. Successfully implementing the review’s recommendations will not be a quick or simple process. It will require substantial investments of time, resources and goodwill from across the NIC and external partners.

The success of these reforms will ultimately depend on the NIC’s ability to embrace flexibility, innovation and collaboration. And to commit to a community that exists in more than name only.

Technology can make Team Australia fit for strategic competition

In the late 1970s Australian sport underwent institutional innovation propelling it to new heights. Today, Australia must urgently adapt to a contested and confronting strategic environment.

Contributing to this, a new ASPI research project will examine technology’s role in fostering national security innovation, particularly in transcending business as usual.

Australians love sport, especially the Olympics. They particularly love winning—even if they only beat New Zealand. Between 1956 and 1972 Australia won at least five golds (and 17 medals) at each summer games. This seemingly confirmed how effortless national success, prosperity and development were for the post-war ‘lucky country’.

And then the world changed.

Australia returned from Montreal 1976 with zero golds and just five medals. Humiliation was exacerbated by it being the first games broadcast in colour on Australian television. Worse, the Kiwis won two golds—even beating the Kookaburras at hockey.

Australia had missed the global shift in sports to professionalism and (sometimes questionable) sports science. Post-Montreal disquiet motivated Malcolm Fraser to reverse planned cuts and to establish the Australian Institute of Sport in 1981. Beyond the dollars, Australian sport underwent a profound cultural and psychological shift and continued to evolve: in May 2024 the Albanese government invested almost $250 million in the sport institute’s modernisation.

The result? Since 1981 Australia has won at least 20 medals at each summer games except 1988’s. We’ve even become regular winter medallists. Adaptation, innovation and commitment paid off.

Today much more consequential shockwaves are bearing upon Australian prosperity and sovereignty: the prospect of Chinese hegemony in our hemisphere; convulsions in US policy and relationships; and the metastasising threat environment described in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s 2025 Annual Threat Assessment.

Since the late 2010s, governments of both persuasions have rhetorically recognised the magnitude of the challenge. In 2020, the then prime minister said Australia was facing ‘one of the most challenging times we have known since the 1930s and the early 1940s’. According to a press release from Defence Minister Richard Marles, ‘Australia faces the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.’ Prime Minister Anthony Albanese describes ‘a time of profound geopolitical uncertainty’. Foreign Minister Penny Wong says it’s ‘nothing less than a contest over the way our region and our world work’.

So, where’s the imperative to address this ‘new world disorder’? We’re still not organising like a nation under this sort of challenge—despite warnings in ASIO’s threat assessments, the Defence Strategic Review and the National Defence Strategy. How do we create traction? How do we overcome the capacity gap of a nation of 26 million in a region of 4.3 billion?

Like after the 1976 Olympics, this isn’t just about budgets. It’s about creating cultural shift and encouraging and implementing novel, innovative ways of working—particularly through opportunities presented by technology.

A new research project by ASPI’s Statecraft & Intelligence Centre, in collaboration with Australian technologists Penten, is exploring the application of Australian sovereign technologies (including secure mobility) to business-as-usual work practices inside national security agencies. This aims to show how technology may foster innovation, bridge the capacity gap and sustain capabilities.

The project also explores how agencies and staff can access effective, secure tools so that ‘working better’ doesn’t become ‘working around’—which would introduce security and governance risks highlighted in a recent report by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner and shown by the Signalgate debacle in the United States.

Agency-level focus recognises that national adaptation will need to be comprehensive, including not just big-picture government and societal changes but organisational and workplace-level reforms. What’s more, it comes as historically significant investments are creating opportunities to transform default ways of working. This is also happening as the recently released Independent Intelligence Review finds that ‘the business model for meeting the intelligence needs of executive government is no longer keeping up with demand and needs re-imagining’ and, separately, that the National Intelligence Community must ‘work hard at recruitment and retention’.

Using internationally tested secure mobility options inside and outside high security spaces doesn’t simply promise convenience and speed. They offer possibilities for better bridging the interface between intelligence producers and consumers—moving beyond pieces of paper (and electronic versions of pieces of paper) to meet actual information preferences of a new generation of ministers, officials and war fighters. This in turn will transform how intelligence is generated, presented and evaluated.

Making IT use and IT-linked work practices inside national security facilities look more like 2025 and less like 1995 isn’t a nice-to-have. It’s an important shift towards meeting expectations of current and future workforce talent. Meeting their needs would improve retention and thereby addresses a key national security vulnerability.

These are just two examples of possibilities being explored as part of the ASPI-Penten project, which will report later this year and provide practical, implementable advice to the broader national security community – while building on the IIR’s findings and recommendations.

Business as usual didn’t cut it in sport 50 years ago. It definitely won’t cut it in the unforgiving international arena today—or tomorrow.

Australia’s security architecture must evolve, not regress

The Independent Intelligence Review, publicly released last Friday, was inoffensive and largely supported the intelligence community status quo. But it was also largely quiet on the challenges facing the broader national security community in an increasingly dangerous world, in which traditional intelligence is just one tool of statecraft and national power.

After the January discovery of a caravan laden with explosives in Dural, Sydney, confusion emerged around what federal and state governments knew and when. The review was completed before the caravan was discovered, and the plot was likely beyond the review’s scope. However, government responses to the event should prompt a discussion about Australia’s national security architecture.

Australia faces an unprecedented convergence of threats. We are confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, global conflict, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyber warfare.

Luck will not protect us; we need structure and certainty. Australia saw these threats early and began to modernise its security architecture in 2017, including the establishment of the Home Affairs portfolio.

But the government has gradually reversed some elements of the consolidation, returning various security responsibilities to the Attorney-General’s portfolio, including for the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. This reversion to an outdated model risks leaving the system ill-equipped to confront the challenges of the 21st century.

Debate on Home Affairs seems fixated on the leadership style of its former head, Michael Pezzullo. Leadership is crucial, but obsession with individual style over substance, distracts from both strategic thinking and the fundamental issue of resurrecting a system that had structural inadequacies and was demonstrably unfit for purpose. We are not simply revisiting a past model; we are resurrecting a failed one.

The Attorney-General’s portfolio, in its traditional guise, was designed for a simpler, less dangerous era. Domestic threats were minimal and tended to come one by one—for example, after the end of the Cold War, security focus shifted from espionage to the emerging threat of Islamist terrorism. The Attorney-General’s oversight was appropriate, as it focused primarily on the legal framework while security agencies executed operations.

However, the proliferation and intersection of modern threats have overwhelmed this antiquated model.

When confronted with asylum-seeker boat arrivals, global terrorism, China and hybrid threats including cyber, the previous system—notwithstanding highly talented people—struggled as the Attorney-General’s portfolio held both the legal and security responsibilities. Having public servants working on legal considerations and intelligence officers doing operations is no longer adequate.

The system’s limitations were evident well before the 2017 restructure. In 2011, prime minister Julia Gillard moved cybersecurity from the Attorney-General’s purview into her own department. Similarly, the 2012 review of illegal boat arrival policy was managed within the prime minister’s department, reflecting that the framework was not up to the task. And as a result of a review after the 2014 Martin Place terrorist attack, the Abbott government created a Counterterrorism Coordinator within the prime minister’s portfolio.

The rise of the Islamic State terrorist group in 2014 exposed policy deficits. While terror laws rightly fell under the Attorney-General’s remit, the broader policy response demanded a more strategic perspective and decisive approach. Changes were needed, partly because laws were so out of date.

But it was China’s rise that finally revealed the urgent need for a dedicated focus on national security policy. The 2016 review into foreign interference was a direct consequence of Australia’s evolving threat landscape.

Few of our closest partners’ chief law officers also function as security ministers. Typically, a dedicated security minister focuses on threat assessment and policy development, while the Attorney-General ensures that all actions are lawful.

Australia’s Home Affairs model strengthened the legal checks and balances by separating security policy and operational functions from the legal oversight function. It ensured that a single minister could not simultaneously identify a threat, determine the appropriate response and authorise the necessary actions without independent scrutiny. The previous system essentially allowed a single minister to mark their own homework.

Dividing security responsibilities between the Attorney-General and Home Affairs portfolios limits the effectiveness of both departments.

If this gradual dilution portends a future abolition of Home Affairs altogether, that would be a mistake. As the Dural caravan controversy unfolded, no one seemed able to agree on what was an appropriate amount of information-sharing between police and security agencies, and state and federal governments. This underscores the need for clarity that Home Affairs is responsible for setting, coordinating and implementing national security policy.

Home Affairs was created because the threat environment was evolving and, within our national security architecture, foreign and defence policy were covered but the third aspect of national security—domestic security—was lacking. So, what security evolution has justified its regression? The Attorney-General’s department has not shown itself to be more capable than Home Affairs in terrorism, cybersecurity or foreign interference.

Home Affairs—to the government’s credit—led the world by banning DeepSeek from government devices. Could we count on such decisive action if lawyers were doing all the work and then reviewing it themselves? Would you allow your lawyer to run your business, rather than provide essential legal counsel?

Technology amplifies threats and is advancing much faster than new laws can be written. Terrorists use encrypted apps to plot attacks and social media to attract recruits. China spreads propaganda through social media and has already begun using cyber intrusions to prepare to conduct sabotage operations in future conflict.

Australia must not only reinstate the separation between the security minister and the attorney-general; it must evolve further to confront 21st-century threats. This should include establishing a National Security Council or Secretariat, like those of many of our partner nations, including Quad countries. This body should be led by a national security adviser who provides strategic coherence and policy coordination.

To navigate the increasingly complex and dangerous global security landscape, we need to evolve, not regress.