I recently had the pleasure of attending the National Security College’s workshop ‘Indonesia’s Ascent: power, leadership and Asia’s security order’ at the ANU. The presentations were delivered as part of a larger publication project that will explore and challenge different elements of Indonesia’s rise. In this Canberra workshop (the other being in Jakarta), the key message of most speakers was that, overall, Indonesia is on the right trajectory but is still grappling with questions of democratisation, governance and security.

Sue Thompson from the National Security College presented a historical overview of Indonesia’s self-perception as a leader and discussed the legacy of colonialism and great power interference in Indonesia’s affairs. Delivered at the outset of the workshop, these historical experiences provided an important framing device for subsequent presentations that explored the potential for Indonesia to assume a more powerful and influential role in the region. Also discussing historical legacies, independent researcher Robert Lowry explored a number of security fault lines in Indonesia—in particular, separatism—that could threaten its ascent if not addressed carefully. Read more

There’s been talk lately about building our relationship with Indonesia beyond the usual military exercises and defence engagement. But while government statements like the National Security Strategy have emphasised building security ties via the Lombok Treaty, developing the overall relationship (as called for in the Asian Century White Paper) might begin to include more discussion on economic matters. In fact, that’s something that both Australian and Indonesian leaders have flagged at past summits, and the direction in which Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (amongst other Indonesian voices) would like to see the bilateral relationship go. So if we’re serious about moving the relationship forward, then why not a 3+3 dialogue?

The 2+2 dialogue is a newish forum held annually between the Australian foreign and defence ministers and their Indonesian counterparts. A 3+3 could broaden the agenda by adding the Trade Minister (a natural inclusion given DFAT’s structure) or the Treasurer. While the foreign minister bears responsibility for raising trade issues in the context of the 2+2, having a trade minister in person means the ability to address the specifics of ideas and discussion around the table. But while there might be appetite for more bilateral cooperation opportunities, the test of whether it’s worth adding more acronyms (or numbers) to the alphabet soup is really weighed up in terms of process and substance.

In terms of process, aligning six busy ministerial schedules will be no easy feat. The 2+2’s precursor, the Australia–Indonesian Ministerial Forum (AIMF), which lasted from 1992 to 2008, had to muster around 11 or 12 ministers at a time. But the logistics toll can be eased when you think of the number of smaller, more focused meetings that could be held along the sidelines of a larger forum. And there’s diplomatic mileage to be gained by expanding the 2+2 in a way that more meaningfully reflects our aspirations with Indonesia. In the coming years, there’ll be a lot of business sector as well social and cultural initiatives flourishing under the auspices of the Asian Century White Paper but it’s still crucial for high level talks to grow in symbolic terms. Read more

The short answer is ‘not very much’. And that’s a good thing. In the past we’ve had government and opposition policy pronouncements such as the 2009 Defence White Paper, proposed asylum seekers solutions in East Timor, American Marines rotating through our north and the proposed towing of boats back to Indonesia that have raised the eyebrows of our near neighbours. Some of the concern has been about language directly concerning Indonesia, some about a lack of consultation and some about the way we see regional security in general. This time, neither the text of the National Security Strategy nor its launch have caused much of a stir in Jakarta, at least so far.

Let’s start with the text itself. As my colleague Graeme Dobell noted last week, there’s a separate section on Indonesia (page 12) which describes the security relationship as ‘deep and productive’. What’s notable about the outline is the number of key areas where there is solid and ongoing cooperation and the concrete agreements such as the Lombok Treaty that frame that cooperation. This isn’t to say the security relationship is perfect or comprehensive, but it shows that we’ve arrived at a point where there is a strong foundation with positive future potential.

The rest of the Strategy reinforces messages from the Asian Century White Paper about Indonesia as a partner country and an important and emerging member of the international community, whether in security architecture or the G20 (pages 27, 38 respectively). Read more

As I mentioned in last week’s ‘ASPI suggests’, there’s a useful paper from CSIS Jakarta researcher Evan Laksmana that looks at the history of US military assistance to the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and the effect this has had on Indonesia’s ongoing defence reform process. The state of Indonesia’s military reform is of key interest to Australia, as we steadily expand defence cooperation and increasingly look to Indonesia as a key state in our Asian Century White Paper strategy. Knowing what components of US military assistance work, which don’t (and why) will help inform our military engagement under the Defence Cooperation Program.

In dealings with post-dictatorship Indonesia, the US and Australia will naturally seek to aid the defence reform process, which includes facilitating the observance of new norms and governance, as well as helping with force modernisation. While these are sound goals in broad terms, it’s not immediately obvious how foreign military assistance can be translated into defence reform and the building of democratic civil-military relations.

The academic literature doesn’t shed much light on this topic, which is why Laksmana’s paper is a valuable contribution. It examines the historical and ideological development of US military assistance, the history of US military engagement with Indonesia (from the Cold War to today), and the implications and future challenges for Indonesia’s defence reform. He chronicles the shift in US foreign military assistance from a Cold War mentality to one aimed at promoting professionalism, democratic ideals and human rights. Read more