Tag Archive for: Indonesia

Indonesia: more than a buffer zone

Presiden SBY dan PM Australia Tony Abbott memberi keterangan pers bersama, seusai pertemuan bilateral, di Istana Merdeka, Jakarta, Senin (30/9) sore. (foto: laily/presidenri.go.id)

Daniel Grant is to be congratulated for his interesting post on the limited prospects for Australia–Indonesia strategic cooperation. I have two comments in response.

First, I think the piece underplays the idea of strategic cooperation as ballast and overplays the notion of strategic cooperation as a wartime alliance. Because of that, Grant is drawn to an argument about differing national interests based on Indonesia’s probable unwillingness to provide a buffer role for Australia when the fighting is actually happening in Indonesian living rooms.

But the great bulk of strategic cooperation between even close partners unfolds in peacetime, not in conflict. Close cooperation empowers partners. It adds to their strategic weight and it deters adversaries. It’s worth doing for a host of reasons that are less related to direct conflict than to what some strategists call the ‘gravitational’ use of force. Read more

Indonesia: setting the tone

President SBY meeting with then Opposition Leader Tony Abbott in October 2012, Jakarta.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s visit to Indonesia, starting on 30 September, will set the tone for the bilateral relationship, at least for the first term of the Coalition Government. The stakes are high: Mr Abbott has repeatedly stressed that Indonesia is ‘our most important single relationship’. Pre-election comments about Australian operations in Indonesia designed to disrupt people smugglers have annoyed some Indonesians. But with the election won, calmer language now prevails. And the PM has been relentlessly on message about ties:

Three points. First of all, I have no argument with anyone in the Indonesian establishment or Parliament. My argument is with people smugglers and my point to the people smugglers is the game is up. The game is up. Second point I make is that we absolutely totally respect Indonesia’s sovereignty. Third point I make is that we aren’t going to conduct discussions with Indonesia through the media. Too much damage has been done in the past by megaphone diplomacy and it’s never going to happen under this Government.

Well, let’s hope so. Mr Abbott can expect a friendly and courteous welcome from President Yudhoyono, who’s long been a supporter of the bilateral relationship. For as long as he’s President, SBY can temper the views of individuals such as Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, who seems to have no such concerns about conducting discussions through the media. It’s often said that the next Indonesian President—whoever that may be—is unlikely to be as well disposed to Australia as SBY. That fear may well be exaggerated because pragmatic governments tend to find ways to deal with each other. But Mr Abbott would be wise to put the foundations in place for a strong bilateral relationship while SBY is still in power. Read more

ASPI suggests

Last week’s Australian election  has raised the question of how the new Abbott government will manage our foreign and security policies. Here we have Michael Fullilove and Hugh White in the New York Times and Foreign Affairs respectively, talking about Australia’s balancing act between the US and China. The Economist has this analysis, and James Brown has a more Defence-focused look at Australia after the election here. Lastly on this topic, ASPI’s Peter Jennings has this video on the opportunities and challenges for the new government (with videos here on the same subject from Andrew Davies and Anthony Bergin):

The Syria crisis grinds onwards (for Obama as well as Syria). John Kerry made this apparently off-the-cuff remark when asked how Assad could avoid military action by the US. Russia then leapt on the proposal, leading to a week of slightly half-baked political wrangling. Highlights included this speech from Obama, described by the Economist as ‘a little confusing’, and Vladimir Putin’s oped in the New York Times. Read more

Why does Indonesia need Apache gunships?

A U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter prepares to depart Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, on Jan 7, 2012. The Apache conducts distributed operations, precision strikes against relocatable targets, and provides armed reconnaissance when required in day, night, obscured battlefield and adverse weather conditions U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Matt Hecht

The recent visit by the US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to Indonesia was concluded with a decision to sell eight Boeing AH-64 Apache Longbow gunship helicopters worth US$500 million to the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD). The package includes pilot training, radars, and maintenance. However, arguments surrounding the purchase echo concerns about Indonesia’s decision to buy 100 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks. The Apache gunships are primarily designed to attack other gunships, slow low-flying aircraft, or are used for ground attack and as anti-tank strikes. It simply doesn’t make sense when Secretary Hagel says that they ‘will help Indonesia respond to a range of contingencies, including counterpiracy operations and maritime awareness’. So why did Indonesia buy them?

Similar to the Leopard purchase, there seems to be a sense of ‘catch-up’ with the region in Indonesia’s Apache decision. As one analyst notes, Indonesia’s military procurement strategies seem to be emotionally driven, with a desire to keep up with neighbouring countries. But there are other reasons too.

The Army has been eyeing gunships for some time under the so-called ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF). As per President Yudhoyono’s decree, the MEF is a capability upgrade program for TNI to be achieved in three stages by 2024. Moreover, Indonesia’s Defence Minister said that the TNI should have more modern capability, which it has lacked for the last 20 years. In March 2007, the Army revealed its 25 year plan to acquire around 135 helicopters to form eight squadrons. The plan started with the purchase of Mi-35 gunships in 2003 and 2008. Other than the Apache, the Army also intends to procure Eurocopter AS 550 Fennec light military helicopters. Read more

Indonesia’s new military chief

Current TNI commander, Admiral Suhartono, (left) with Lieutenant General Moeldoko (right) at the handover ceremony for Chief of Army, 23 May 2013.

On 21 August, the Indonesian House of Representatives endorsed the candidacy of General Moeldoko, Indonesia’s Army Chief, moving him a step closer to becoming commander TNI. With defence ties a key pillar of the Australia–Indonesia bilateral relationship, it’s worth knowing more about the Indonesia’s future military leader (known as ‘Panglima TNI’) and what this means for Australia.

Moeldoko finished top of his class and is generally considered to be a high-performing officer. If his first public statements can be taken to encapsulate his approach to the military, then expect an emphasis on military professionalism and soldier welfare. Moeldoko has promised to improve soldiers’ welfare by increasing their pay by 15%. He also intends to improve soldier discipline, minimise the import of foreign military equipment in order to support Indonesia’s defence industry and remain neutral during the upcoming 2014 elections. Read more

Mr Rudd goes to Jakarta

Then Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hon Kevin Rudd MP met with Indonesian President HE Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Jakarta on 29 March 2011.

One wonders whose opinions the reportedly more consultative Kevin Rudd sought in advance of his press conference last week, when he speculated about confrontation with Indonesia under a Coalition government. ‘I am very concerned about whether if Mr Abbott became prime minister and continues that rhetoric and that posture and actually tries to translate it into reality I really wonder whether he is trying to risk some sort of conflict with Indonesia’, Mr Rudd said. ‘It’s not a good thing, it’s a really bad thing’.

Confrontation with Indonesia would be an unspeakably bad thing for any Australian government, but it’s difficult to see how that outcome would emerge from a difference of view over asylum seekers. The Australian Navy will always operate with the safety of individuals at sea as their prime concern, and no political direction can alter that. It’s simply misleading to imply that the unhappy and complicated asylum seeker issue could degenerate into war between Australia and Indonesia. The constant influx of boats carrying asylum-seekers makes the bilateral relationship difficult, but so too do differences over live cattle exports, the attitudes of some Australian NGOs on Papua, drug-mules and a range of other issues. The fact is that relations between the two countries remain on a positive track notwithstanding specific points of tension. Read more

ASPI suggests

Indonesian peacekeepers with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) prepare to leave their base for a patrol near Al-Taybe, South Lebanon.

In case you missed it, yesterday was the launch of Mark Thomson’s magnus opus for the year, The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2013–2014. And the cost of Defence? It’s AUD$69,081,980.82 a day.

What about the cost of a UN peacekeeper? The answer is US$1,028 a month. David Bosco’s new Foreign Policy piece looks at the military and political value of the blue helmets which Colum Lynch describes as the “UN’s own caste system”: richer states foot the bill for UN peacekeeping while poorer ones provide the troops.

Who is Obama’s Kissinger? In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael Hirsch evaluates Hillary Clinton’s legacy and the soft-power touch to US foreign policy.

Xinhua news reports that Indonesia is developing its own ‘cyber army’ to combat attacks against government websites in recent years. The Indonesian Defence Ministry’s Director General of Security Potentials said that the ministry would develop a ‘National Cyber Security’ system. Read more

Is Papua the next East Timor? Part II

East Timorese Defence Force personnel were on parade on 20th August to celebrate the 34th anniversary of Falintil Day.

In my previous post, I explained how separatist attempts throughout Indonesia’s history have led to Indonesian sensitivities over Papuan separatism today. We take every opportunity to earnestly reassure the Indonesian side of our unwavering support for Indonesian territorial sovereignty, as enshrined in the Lombok Treaty. For their part, the Indonesians pretend to believe us. Of course, they don’t. Why should they? After all, we were the only nation on the planet in 1975 to recognise Indonesian sway over East Timor, a mantra we intoned for more than 20 years, until we were forced to change our tune.

Indonesians see an inherent disconnect between our stated support for Indonesian rule over Papua and our actions, like the granting of asylum to 43 Papuans in 2006, which was enough to see a furious Jakarta recall its ambassador to Canberra. There are sophisticated and educated members of the ruling elite in Jakarta who genuinely believe the bizarre fiction that agents of influence from Australian government agencies are engaged in a covert campaign to destabilise Indonesian rule in Papua. Read more

Elephant in the room: is Papua the next East Timor?

Indonesia's first president Sukarno

One issue, above all others, starkly differentiates the jobs of Indonesian President and Australian Prime Minister. When our Prime Minister wakes each morning, the first question she asks isn’t: “Do I still have a whole country to govern today?”

The challenge of maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity has beset incumbents of Jakarta’s presidential palace since the earliest days of the Indonesian republic. Not all Indonesians were as enthusiastic about a macro Indonesian state as the mostly Javanese and Sumatran nationalist leaders who declared and struggled for independence from 1945. Insurrection and separatism have been constant features of the Indonesian experience since the 1950s.

In the west of the archipelago, disaffected elements of the Indonesian Army formed an anti-Jakarta revolutionary government in Sumatra, which was quashed in 1957. Separate attempts to create an Islamic state in Aceh began in 1953, inflamed as much by oil and gas revenues as by religious zeal—it took the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, and the persistence of former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, to bring a lasting peace with the Free Aceh Movement. Read more

ASPI suggests

Arch of Reunification is on the entrance of Pyongyang.Today’s a public holiday in Canberra so we’re taking a short break from regular blogging, but here’s our weekly round-up of news, reports and events in the defence, NatSec and strategy world.

First up, Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s NBR essay provides an Indonesian perspective on the US rebalance toward Asia. Take note of her concerns about the military dimension of the rebalance and Papua, and how Indonesia is hedging between the US and China.

How will sequestration affect the US Marine Corps? Marines Chief General James Amos says it’ll ‘cut into bone’. Troops deploying to Afghanistan will have the required resources, but with Marines deployed to Darwin, we’ll have to see what budget cuts mean for the rebalance efforts here.

Sticking with US defence budget cuts, the US Navy plans to ground four air wings and cancel eight ship deployments to help save the service USD$10 billion. Read more