Kicking off today is Russia’s attempt to cosy up to Indonesia. A week after President Joko Widodo was inaugurated, the Russian government announced it’ll support Jokowi’s maritime policies and offer Indonesia ‘various types of ships, multi-level intelligence systems, as well as establish a ship service center and a production center for spare parts.’ The president of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, established by President Putin, will be in Jakarta next week. That development was reported after the US Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, expressed interest in boosting maritime cooperation with, you guessed it, Indonesia.

Also on Indonesia, CNAS’ Alexander Sullivan has a new report on strengthening US–Indonesia defence ties which recommends Indonesia ensure its goal of 1.5% GDP defence spending is met within Jokowi’s first term. Keep reading here. Read more

Late last year, as the bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia struggled with the revelations of the spying scandal, Colin Brown, an adjunct professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, described the history of the relationship in a carnival metaphor:

For anyone interested in Australia–Indonesia relations, nothing so characterises the phenomenon as a car on a roller-coaster. Any rise is followed inevitably by a fall. The ride is never boring, and in a bizarre kind of way it is quite predictable. But sometimes you might hope for a little more stability, a few more moments of calm.

That image of the roller-coaster is an old one—Brown himself has used it before. Indeed, it’s been around long enough (and been true long enough) to induce a weariness in even the most determined optimist. But in this post I’m hoping to convince readers that, strategically, there’s still much to play for here. Read more

On Monday 20 October Joko Widodo (Jokowi) will be inaugurated as Indonesia’s seventh president. Australia–Indonesia relations will shift to a new and more mature plane due to differences in character between Jokowi and his predecessor, highly contested domestic politics, and Indonesia’s potential economic ascent. The certainties of the past will be shaken as a more engaged President seeks to show that a civilian can command respect as home and abroad. At the same, the Prabowo-led opposition coalition will seek to diminish his standing and achievements in the eyes of the electorate.

Despite much speculation, little is known of Jokowi’s foreign and defence policy except that he’s a pragmatist with few political debts to limit or distort his policy options. Even so, his options will be anchored by history and geopolitical realities. There’ll be no fundamental change in Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy. And geographic imperatives will tie Indonesia’s primary focus to the region, despite inclinations in some quarters for Indonesia to take a more assertive global role. Nevertheless, within those boundaries there’s considerable scope for innovation in style and substance. Read more

Fairfax’s Michael Bachelard kicks off this week’s recommended readings and podcasts with this op-ed on how Australia ‘won’ the spying row with Indonesia. He argues that the language of the Code of Conduct, signed yesterday by Ministers Bishop and Natalegawa, hardly alters the position PM Abbott adopted when the spying scandal broke in November last year: we’ll keep spying but we promise not to use it against you. Keep reading here.

Also on Southeast Asia, two pieces on Thailand’s politics. The first by Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang on New Mandala examines how the newly-appointed National Legislative Assembly works and what impact it’ll have on democratisation. The second by Panida Pananond on East Asia Forum looks at why high economic growth in Thailand will continue to be challenging as long as the junta’s in power.

On Northeast Asia, Pacific Forum’s Brad Glosserman has a newish Washington Quarterly piece that paints a picture of a smaller Japan as the most likely future—a view that might differ from that held by Australia’s political leadership. Glosserman’s assessment turns upon the attitudinal constraints in Japanese society. Read more

In the next few months, Australia’s leader will have four opportunities to spend quality time with Indonesia’s new president.

Prime Minister Abbott can (will/should/must) attend Jokowi’s inauguration in Jakarta in October, following the precedent John Howard established with SBY. Then in November, the new President and the Oz PM can meet at three summits: APEC in Beijing, the East Asia Summit in Burma, and the G20 in Brisbane.

Disregard the jest that the only change from summit to summit is the fancy shirts in the leaders’ photo op—although I admit to describing one APEC mountaintop moment as high diplomacy and low fashion.

In a region short on trust that is groping desperately—gasping even—for a bit of law and order those summits are gold. Read more