Tag Archive for: Indonesia

Australia needs soft power as Asia’s strategic balances shift

Edited image courtesy of Flickr user Anne Ruthmann

Soft power is essential to any nation wishing to influence others. A term coined by Harvard professor, Joseph Nye, it’s an alternative to the traditional diplomatic theory of ‘carrot or stick’ (economic and military power). Soft power is the ability to effect change through persuasion, positive engagement, and global clout. As Nye put it, ‘hard power is push; soft power is pull’.

Australia is generally regarded as a leading soft power nation. The 2015 Soft Power 30 index ranked Australia at 6th in the world, behind the UK, Germany, US, France and Canada.

Australia has effective global reach through its soft power. However, its direction is misguided. Australia desperately needs an effective soft power campaign in key Asian nations to secure its economic prosperity and national security.

Australia’s relationship with Indonesia surely represents its greatest foreign policy failure. Since the Reformasi in 1998, consecutive Australian governments have highlighted the importance of our northern neighbour. Australian opinions on Indonesia are regularly expressed in the media—see the cases of Schapelle Corby or the Bali Nine. In contrast, we seem to pay little attention to what Indonesians think about Australia.

The 1999 INTERFET operation in East Timor remains a source of Indonesian resentment towards Australia. The carefully stage-managed Concert for the Troops may have played well to Australian voters but it saw our soft power in Indonesia rapidly erode. For Indonesian politicians, ‘stand up to Australia’ became more effective rhetoric than ‘cooperate with Australia’ within their electorates.

Australia’s failed amnesty campaign for Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran revealed how threadbare the soft power influence had become. Even if President Widodo had been inclined to grant clemency, it wasn’t a politically viable move. The fact that Indonesia appeared to enact a moratorium on capital punishment just months after the executions of the Australians speaks volumes.

Academic Priyambudi Sulistiyanto has suggested that some Indonesians feel frustrated by Australia. Be it terrorism, drug trafficking, or people smuggling, there’s a palpable sense that Australia always blames Indonesia for its problems. And yet, in geopolitical terms, there’s no country more important to Australia than Indonesia. With its strategic position in Southeast Asia, the country is both literally and metaphorically Australia’s gateway to Asia. Australia must invest in positive relations with this vital neighbour, not just at a governmental level, but at a popular level also.

Even with China, on track to surpass the US as the world’s largest economy, Australia has done little to foster its soft power. At an Asia Leaders’ Forum in Beijing in 2000, then-foreign minister Alexander Downer went as far as to state that the relationship was based on economic benefit rather than any mutual affection. He called this ‘practical regionalism’ as opposed to ‘cultural regionalism’.

The 2007 ALP landslide election saw Kevin Rudd become the first Mandarin speaking leader of a Western nation. That golden opportunity to grow soft power with Australia’s largest two-way trading partner was lost in a comedy of missteps. A key 2008 speech at Peking University was seen to support government critics, while Rudd’s 2009 Defence White Paper appeared to single China out as a strategic threat. An expletive-laden rant against China at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 further exacerbated tensions.

Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper was firmly rebuked by China, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying noting some of the comments were ‘negative’ and that China was ‘dissatisfied’. That came only a month after Beijing criticised Julie Bishop for her comments on the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

The pattern is repeated in many strategically important Asian nations. The Abbott Government’s attempt to resettle asylum seekers in Cambodia proved a costly embarrassment to Australia with only four individuals being resettled, costing around $55 million. While Australia is a major aid provider to Cambodia, there’s little in the way of cultural exchange and people-topeople diplomacy. The resettlement plan was immediately met with angry protests outside the Australian embassy. In that case, a dearth of soft power restricted the ability to use economic power.

Australia has the right (and the obligation) to speak out on moral issues like human rights and capital punishment, but a failure to develop and wield soft power in Southeast Asia limits its effectiveness. Australia has largely failed to heed the call of the famous 1989 Garnaut Report for greater Asia literacy and meaningful engagement with the region.

From 1788 until today, Australian foreign policy has been Spartan in its simplicity. The approach has been to wed itself to one powerful protector, first Great Britain, then the US. In Asia, Australia sometimes pays the price for being seen as a US satellite.

While Government must be the driver of a foreign policy initiative, the potential for Australians to develop and export soft power is enormous. Through exchange programs, joint business ventures, charity work and even private travel, individual Australians can enhance their country’s reputation internationally. People-to-people diplomacy is highly effective but hinges on a genuine national desire to engage with the vibrant and complex region to our near north.

With Australia’s volatile political climate providing five prime ministers in five years, it’s perhaps unsurprising that MPs have their focus firmly on local polling. Regardless, the broad opinion of Asian nations and Australia’s regional reputation is vital for both trade and national security. Soft power is the key to diplomatic success in an increasingly globalised world. It’s time to take it seriously.

How should Indonesia manage the China challenge?

Image courtesy of Flickr user stratman2 (2 many pix!)

Indonesian president Joko Widodo’s strategy for reinforcing state sovereignty and strengthening maritime integrity is being tested with the latest incursion by Chinese fishing boats into Indonesian waters off the Natuna islands. Indonesian Minister for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Susi Pudjiastuti’s public criticism of China’s activities is the first step in what’s likely to become a series of reluctantly enacted but necessary responses from Jokowi’s administration—unlike in the past, Indonesia can’t afford to do otherwise.

This isn’t the first time Indonesia has had to contend with Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Over the last four years, Jakarta’s attempts to enforce its fisheries’ laws by arresting Chinese fishermen operating illegally in Indonesia’s EEZ has led to a series of confrontations between the Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command and Indonesian law enforcement vessels. Traditionally, Indonesia’s foreign ministry has tried to dismiss those engagements as minor in order to maintain its relationship with China.

While such events aren’t related to sovereignty disputes over the Natuna Islands (which China has stated it doesn’t claim), the EEZ created by the islands overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. Previously, the Indonesian foreign ministry has demanded clarification of the legality of the nine-dash line but has received no response. Pudjiastuti’s summoning of China’s ambassador to Indonesia, Xie Feng, on the 21 March to discuss China’s latest claim that its fisherman were within ‘traditional Chinese fishing grounds’ is also unlikely to clarify the matter. Rather, it’s apparent that the recent incursion by China into Indonesia’s waters is an intentional challenge to Jakarta’s resolve.

So far, Jokowi’s administration has been cautious with China. That wariness has been clearly displayed in its hesitancy to sink Chinese-flagged boats as a part of its ‘Sink the Vessels’ policy directed against illegal fishing. The Administration abstained for six months until it eventually destroyed a Chinese vessel on 20 May 2015 that had been in custody since 2009.

Indonesia’s soft approach to Chinese illegal fishing vessels—compared to the brazen destruction of those of belonging to its neighbours—has drawn significant derision. Moreover, it’s a sign of Indonesia’s diplomatic inconsistency. Last week’s heightened tensions in the waters surrounding the Natuna islands has the potential to undermine the more positive diplomatic relations that developed between China and Indonesia during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency. In 2013, China and Indonesia signed a wide-ranging strategic partnership that extended cooperation between the two nations, with a particular emphasis on economic investment. Around the same time, the two countries enacted a number of cooperative security initiatives, including agreements on joint counterterrorism training and the shared development of anti-ship missiles. The Jokowi Administration is keen to retain those economic and security ties, which it desperately needs to fulfill its domestic infrastructure development plans and pre-election promise of stemming the tide of growing economic inequity.

But Indonesia can no longer downplay China’s excursions into its territorial waters as minor incidents in the hope that they won’t increase in frequency. Moreover, Jokowi’s political ambition of creating a ‘strong state’ and his nationalistic and populist agenda demands that he address those maritime issues with China, lest he appear weak in the eyes of the Indonesian public.

Jokowi has only a select number of options to address China’s incursion. The first is to make a calculated and explicit display of Indonesia’s displeasure with China that may range from recalling its ambassador to dragging its feet on various bilateral initiatives, which are detailed in the October 2013 Comprehensive strategic Partnership. While that’ll bolster the perception of Indonesia’s resolve domestically and internationally, it may result in the loss of significant investments from China that Indonesia desperately needs for its faltering economy.

Second, Jokowi could make a concerted effort to build a stronger coalition both within Indonesia and across the region to constrain China’s low-intensity coercion. That would require strong leadership from Jokowi to settle the differences between Indonesia’s Armed Forces and Foreign Ministry. That will be integral to establishing a coherent foreign policy that inspires confidence in Jakarta’s capabilities and displays intent to its neighbours. An inclusive regional policy on maritime disputes would serve to further Indonesia’s desire to be perceived globally as a regional leader that can manage regional tensions.

Third, Jokowi could display a greater interest in balancing behavior, possibly by encouraging the purchase of coastal patrol vessels from Japan or providing greater port access to the US navy. However, overt engagement with the likes of the US or Japan is doubtful given Indonesia’s long tradition of ‘non-alignment’.

At an operational level, Jokowi could also seek to quicken the enhancement of Indonesia’s maritime surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as bolster protection for its coast guard and fishing vessels. However, Indonesia will run into difficulties when attempting to find resources for those improvements.

Regardless of the path that Jokowi chooses to take, it’s a decision that he doesn’t want to make, and a decision that will come at a cost to Indonesia’s economy—but ultimately, Jokowi has no other choice.

The dividing trench: Indonesia’s offshore resource development

Australians will notice an interesting parallel between oil giant Woodside and its impasse with the Timor Leste government and an internal conflict within the Joko Widodo administration over how to develop what will be Indonesia’s biggest producing gasfield in the Arafura Sea.

The common denominator for both is a 2,500–3,000-metre-deep undersea trench, part of the earthquake-prone Indian Ocean fault line that skirts Sumatra and Java and curls around the coast of eastern Indonesia’s Nusa Tenggara island chain.

Marking the convergence of the Indo-Australian and Eurasian tectonic plates, the Timor trench is one reason for Woodside’s adamant refusal to pipe gas from its Sunrise field to Timor Leste, despite all the benefits that would bring the tiny island republic.

The company last year shelved plans to develop the 5.1 trillion cubic foot Sunrise field in the Australia–Timor Leste Joint Petroleum Development Zone after giving Dili an ultimatum to either accept floating LNG technology or leave the gas in the ground.

Hard up against the maritime boundary with Australia, about 400 km northeast of the Sunrise field, the Masela block has the same issue.

After acquiring 100% of the Masela exploration concession in 1998, Japan’s Inpex Corporation drilled six appraisal wells between 2002 and 2007 that showed the Abadi field located in the Masela block contained at least 9 trillion cubic feet. Given the remote location, that still made it a marginal proposition.

Authorities approved an initial development plan in late 2010 calling for a 2.5 million tonne floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal. But with Shell joining the venture in 2013 further drilling saw proven reserves climb to 12.4 trillion cubic feet, with confident expectations it will grow to more than 40 trillion cubic feet.

That’s three times more than BP’s Tangguh operation in West Papua’s Bintuni Bay, of which Inpex is a 7.7% stakeholder; Tangguh was recently given approval to expand from two to three onshore production trains.

Only the Natuna D-Alpha field in the South China Sea is bigger, at 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves, but the huge volumes of associated CO2 have deterred its development since the early 1970s—and will continue to do so.

Commercially, it would have made sense to pump the Abadi gas through a 400-kilometre pipeline to Darwin’s LNG processing terminal, an idea Inpex initially broached with Jakarta when the real size of the field became clear.

Politically, that was never on the cards. As one analyst exclaimed: ‘Indonesian gas going into Darwin? Never!’ But it became a lot more complicated when President Joko Widodo brought in Rizal Ramli as maritime coordinating minister in an August 2015 Cabinet reshuffle.

An avowed resource nationalist, Ramli questioned why regulator, SSKMigas, and Mines and Energy Minister, Sudirman Said, had approved a revised Inpex development plan which increases the capacity of a proposed floating gas terminal from 2.5 million tonnes to 7.5 million tonnes.

Anxious to find more ways to boost the eastern Indonesian economy, Ramli insisted the gas should instead be piped to a proposed onshore terminal in the remote Tanimbar Islands, 170 kilometres to the northeast of Masela.

Under Indonesia’s 2001 Oil and Gas Law, provinces aren’t entitled to any benefits if the producing field is more than 12 miles offshore, in which case all the revenues go to the central government. But the same trench that has bedeviled the Timor Leste project lies between the Abadi field and the Tanimbars, the target of a daring World War II Dutch–Indonesian commando raid launched from Australia against Japanese occupation forces.

What all this means is yet another delay that could get even longer as the two sides haggle; apart from the earthquake danger, building a new an onshore facility will also pump up the overall cost of the project from US$14 billion to US$19 billion.

Ramli, a former finance minister with little knowledge of the petroleum industry, agreed to bring in New York-based Poten & Partners to study the project. But their independent assessment supports the floating terminal concept as the most viable choice, according to an industry source familiar with the report.

Even if Ramli relents and Widodo pronounces himself satisfied with other arrangements, including the state-run Pertamina oil company acquiring a 10% stake worth $500 million, Inpex and Shell still have to get their contract extended past 2029—a must when production will only begin in 2021–2022.

The joint venture partners have sought to answer their critics by suggesting that a fleet of tankers could be used to supply gas directly from the floating platform to small power stations on the Tanimbars and other islands across eastern Indonesia.

Indonesia has a record of dragging its feet on large-scale resource projects, starting with ExxonMobil’s Cepu oil field in East Java, which took more than a decade to bring on stream because of land and other issues Jakarta seemed incapable of resolving.

ExxonMobil will only be ready in March to begin pumping 168,000 barrels a day from what is now the country’s second biggest oilfield, despite the fact that Indonesia’s oil output has slumped over that period from a million barrels to 788,000 barrels a day.

While Cepu will boost production to 830,000 barrels, the first time it has actually increased since 1996, it’s unlikely to halt a general decline that led to Indonesia relinquishing its membership of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 2009.

As the global oil market continues to slide, it could well be the Indonesian Government, through its inaction, who ends up being the biggest loser of all.

Japan’s presence and partnerships in Southeast Asia

Indonesia expressed its interest in purchasing Japanese US-2 amphibious aircraft

As the Asia–Pacific becomes increasingly contested, Southeast Asian nations find themselves courted by a range of Asian powers interested in their strategic locations and burgeoning economies. Both China and India seek to expand their influence in Southeast Asia, as the US pushes to maintain centrality and credibility. But one of the most determined suitors is Japan. Japan’s determined re-engagement in the sub-region risks reviving dark memories of Japanese military aggression during World War Two, which continue to simmer under the surface. But those concerns will be tempered in at least some Southeast Asian capitals by fears of Chinese assertiveness in the region, coupled with a desire to strengthen their relations with the West. As such, ASEAN’s members must walk a fine line as they seek maximum economic benefits from China while maintaining their security and sovereignty.

In Japan’s ideal Asia, Southeast Asian states would effectively counterbalance China’s increasing regional influence. While Tokyo can’t hope to match China’s economic muscle, it expects Southeast Asian nations to shoulder some of the burden by hedging against China’s growing weight. That could be achieved by nurturing their links with a range of Asian partners, and pursuing their own interests in maritime security and a regional architecture that reinforces an order based on rules and laws—a central element of Prime Minister Abe’s intention for Japan to become a ‘proactive contributor to peace’. For Tokyo, that’s a good outcome, and far more preferable than a Southeast Asia that bandwagons with China. Moreover, China’s economic slowdown offers new opportunities for Japan to lift its own economic game. Increasingly, Japan finds itself a more prominent competitor in the ring as Southeast Asia seeks investment and support from sources other than China.

But what’s in it for Southeast Asia? Well, having competing economic powerhouses vying for your patronage is no bad thing. Take a look, for instance, at Indonesia’s high-speed rail project. After a protracted bid, Indonesia selected China to complete the construction of the Jakarta–Bandung line in September 2015, disappointing Japan in the process (although the project has recently stalled after a series of bureaucratic hold-ups). Despite sore feelings, Indonesia and Japan subsequently held a successful 2+2 ministerial dialogue attended by both countries’ defence and foreign ministers, where Indonesia expressed its interest in purchasing Japanese military products, such as US-2 amphibious aircraft for use in maritime rescue operations. So, on two fronts, Indonesia has been able to position itself adroitly between two hefty Asian powers. The ability to hedge in that way will of course vary from state to state; the Southeast Asian nations who rely on China’s ‘no strings’ economic assistance will find it more difficult to play one side against the other.

Japan believes it can make gains in two major areas in Southeast Asia: economics, and defence and security. First, strong economic growth and development in Southeast Asia could have positive trickle-down effects for the Japanese economy, which has suffered at the hands of structural weaknesses, stagnant incomes and China’s slowdown. Southeast Asia’s rapidly growing middle class, with a projected membership of 400 million by 2020 (PDF) is an attractive market to both Japanese exporters and private sector—which already has a competitive edge in ASEAN (PDF)—who stand to gain plenty from engaging Southeast Asia on infrastructure and development projects. A heightened Japanese presence could also have the added effect of diluting China’s economic penetration of the region.

Second, Japan’s efforts to strengthen the maritime security capabilities of Southeast Asian states, among other actions, could potentially lead to a more equitable balance of power in the South China Sea, and potentially draw China’s attention away from tensions in the East China Sea. There have been a number of instances where Japan has sought to strengthen its relations with Southeast Asian nations through defence cooperation, and the transfer of technology and equipment.

Japan will again participate in the upcoming Exercise Cobra Gold, to be held 9–19 February; the annual multilateral exercise will afford Japan an opportunity to continue to strengthen its military relations with co-hosts the US and Thailand, along with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. Japan also has observer status in Exercise Balikatan, jointly organised by the Philippines and the US. Japanese plans to transfer defence equipment to Southeast Asian nations’ coast guards and militaries have ramped up since April 2014, after the Abe administration loosened its self-imposed ban on arms exports (save for states embargoed by the UN), opening avenues for defence and technology transfer and cooperation. See, for instance, the potential export of second-hand Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force TC-90 aircraft and the gifting of 10 44-metre patrol boats to the Philippines, and the pledge made by Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida of a donation of six vessels to Vietnam in 2014.

The recent changes to allow for limited collective self-defense by expanding the remit of the Japanese Self-Defense Force add to Japan’s ability to engage with Southeast Asian countries on defence and security issues, albeit in limited ways. While those changes fall well short of suggesting that Japan will take an aggressive posture vis-à-vis China in Southeast Asia and on the South China Sea in particular (which is ‘simply not a life or death issue for Tokyo’), they do signal that Japan is increasingly willing and able to engage the region on defence issues. Additionally, helping claimant states reach a level of minimum credible deterrence is demonstrably in Japan’s interests, given its dependence on open sea lanes for resource imports.

Many in Southeast Asian capitals no doubt harbour memories of Japan’s World War Two aggression. However, their real-time concerns about Chinese assertiveness in the region will likely remain a higher priority. Japan’s recent efforts to make amends for historical atrocities—on the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue, for instance—might just see Southeast Asian states give Japan the benefit of the doubt as it seeks stronger partnerships across the region.

China–Indonesia cyber plans: three questions for Canberra

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In late January, China and Indonesia showed their mutual capacity for strategic innovation  when a senior Indonesian official revealed the wide-ranging scope of their cooperation on cyber issues. Since cyber space was described in China’s 2015 Military Strategy as one of the two ‘commanding heights’ of international security competition, along with outer space, the agreement is worthy of the closest study by Australia.

Of special note is the plan for Beijing and Jakarta to work together on cyber war simulations, though they’ll most likely work on the civil infrastructure impacts rather than military combat applications.

The China–Indonesia agreement poses a number of interesting questions for Canberra. Here are three.

Is Indonesia shying away from  a closer embrace by the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence community, possibly as a result of Edward Snowden’s revelations of their espionage effort against  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he lived in the Merdeka Palace?

Does the agreement demonstrate a greater capacity for institutional and diplomatic innovation in our region on cyberspace issues than Australia has so far shown?

Since Indonesia is a relatively close partner of Australia, and China isn’t our enemy, can Canberra benefit from the new cyber relationship and insert itself into its implementation?

And now to deal with those questions in turn. First, is Jakarta leaning towards China and away from the ‘Five Eyes’ for support in its cyber security?

Jakarta and Canberra do have useful cyber collaboration, some dating back a number of years, especially in countering cyber crime—since 2011 the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has helped to establish a number of Indonesian centres for countering cyber crime. The two countries collaborate on cyber issues in a number of regional frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the APEC Telecommunications and Information Ministerial Meeting.

On the other hand, on 2 December 2015, according to the ABC, the Australian Reserve Bank believes that it fell victim to a cyber attack that Indonesia was behind. In late January 2016, the ABC reported that an Indonesian government agency was using surveillance software embedded in the Global Switch data centre in Sydney. So one might be forgiven for believing that the cyber security relationship between the two countries may be trending downwards.

Countervailing evidence on a strategic shift has come from the senior responsible official in Indonesia as recently as September last year. According to Chairman of the National Cyber Information Defense and Security Desk (DK2ICN) of the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security, Air Vice Marshal Agus Ruchyan Barnas, Indonesia has ‘studied cyber defense systems in various countries such as USA, Australia, Singapore and others’ and that ‘Indonesia will cooperate with these countries in terms of cyber defense while maintaining a neutral stance’.

We probably need more evidence to be certain one way or the other. We do know that Indonesia has long prided itself on non-alignment but the recent announcement on cyber cooperation with China seems to have trumped anything in place between Indonesia and other partners.

Second, the agreement  reveals a surprising element of diplomatic innovation in that specific field than Australia has shown to date. While Indonesia and China foreshadowed deeper cyber cooperation through 2015, the scale and scope of what’s now on the table may put Indonesia ahead of all other developing countries in terms of China’s foreign cyber relationships. The apparent breadth of the relationship may be explained by the fact that the two countries have new or emerging cyberspace agencies, each of which has the resources, bureaucratic weight and independent authority to deliver such an outcome. Those agencies also have an incentive to be seen to be delivering.

In mid-2015, a year after China set up its Cyber Space Administration, President Widodo announced a plan to up the National Cyber Security Agency (BCN), to report directly to him. The agency is being formed on the foundations of the existing DK2ICN, the unit in the -Coordinating Ministry mentioned above. In comparison, Australia lacks a cyber agency with similar power and diplomatic freedom as the Chinese and Indonesian organizations. Australian cyber diplomacy is still managed in at least five separate agencies (DFAT, Attorney-Generals, Justice and the AFP, ASD and Defence, and Industry), none of which report directly to our head of government.

Thus,  the innovative agreement between China and Indonesia may be an example of the sort of breakthroughs that can occur if governments are prepared to consider institutional innovation in their diplomacy for the cyber era.

Third, can Australia benefit from the fast-moving pace of cyber diplomacy to its north? It most certainly can. In some respects, the Australian cyber security sector is more advanced in technological terms than that in Indonesia or even in China. Indonesia will need a raft of expertise and equipment that can’t be supplied by China. The planned new Cyber Security Growth Centre in Australia could exploit the opportunities provided by this agreement.

And just as importantly, the agenda of those two countries for the cyber collaboration, focusing on civil infrastructure, isn’t in any way against Australian interests, but highly complementary to them. It is an area where Australian capability urgently needs to be developed, as argued in ‘Australia Rearmed’, a paper recently released by the Australian Centre for Cyber Security,

Smart diplomacy would see Australia talking to both China and Indonesia about how we might support their joint efforts.

Indonesia: the challenge of jihadist-inspired terrorism

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Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim state, and because of the previous activities of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) it’s the Southeast Asia country with the most extensive experience of dealing with trans-border jihadist-inspired terrorism. It’s now receiving considerable attention as a potential beachhead for regional ISIL extremism and, as in Malaysia, there are definite signs that the group is making decisive inroads into the polity.

Scores of Indonesians are believed to have travelled to the Middle East to wage jihad with various Sunni militias. In August 2014, General Sutarman, the national police commander, told reporters that he had the names of at least 54 nationals who were in Syria, including four who had died as suicide bombers.

In the same month, Ansyaad Mbai, the head of the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT, National Anti-Terrorism Agency), said that at least 34 Indonesians had joined ISIL—a number derived from interrogation depositions gleaned from would-be jihadists detained over the previous year. Those figures were early approximations, and the true total is almost certainly far higher. Indeed, by 2015 the BNPT had already revised its estimates, citing numbers over 500. Of those, 43 are known to have died while fighting alongside ISIL.

Indonesian prisons have proven to be an especially effective conduit for ISIL recruitment by both disseminating the group’s propaganda and fostering support for it. A strong sense of jihadist solidarity and affinity has been allowed to develop among inmates, making the penal system a hub for terrorist indoctrination.

Several factors have contributed to this dysfunctional state of affairs, including corruption, overcrowding, organised violence, protection rackets, the limited available intelligence on detainees and their activities, and poorly managed, trained and paid staff. Even in maximum-security penitentiaries, prisoners have had a remarkable degree of latitude to not only access ISIL literature and translations but also to issue proclamations of allegiance that have found an audience among other detainees as well as the public.

A number of Indonesian Islamist entities have openly campaigned for ISIL. The largest and most vocal is the Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI), which was set up in early 2013 under the combined leadership of Tuah Febriwansyah (aka Muhammad Fachry) and Bahrum Syah, with Aman Abdurrahman acting as the spiritual mentor.

The group’s ostensible aim is to impress on the public the theological criticality of the current struggle in Syria, presenting it as the fulfilment of an ancient Islamic prophecy that the final battle at the end of the world will begin and end in the Levant.

FAKSI has also consistently emphasised that ISIL is more than a jihadist organisation and, indeed, has the trappings of a state, given the large tracts of territory it controls and administers. A variety of tools have been used to promote these messages, including a magazine (Al Muhajirn), social media networks, online discussion forums (known as Multaqad Da’wiy) and a dedicated jihadi website (Al-Mustaqbal). As part of its campaign to solicit popular backing for ISIL, FAKSI has also organised mass ceremonies in which participants pledge support to the concept of an Islamic state.

Another entity that has been influential in generating grassroots support for ISIL is the Forum Pendukung Daulah Islamiyah (FPDI). Dr Amir Mahmud (a veteran of the Afghan mujahideen) founded the group on 15 July 2014 and, like FAKSI, it has staged a series of public gatherings to promote al-Baghdadi and his cause. More than 500 men attended FPDI’s inaugural meeting outside the Baitu Makmur Mosque in Solo, during which they openly backed the establishment of a dedicated Islamist caliphate in the Middle East.

Several prominent members of Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), which was established in 2008, have also sworn allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Notably, they include Abu Bakar Bashir, the incarcerated founder of the movement, the former spiritual emir of JI, and a highly prominent figure among Indonesian Islamists.

Along with 24 other prisoners, he uploaded a letter on FAKSI’s website pledging his bai’at (oath) to ISIL in July 2014, posting the written statement from the praying room of what was supposed to be the highly secured Pasir Putih penitentiary on Nusakambangan Island off Ciulacap, Central Java.

In their letter, Bashir and his fellow inmates announced that they considered themselves to be part of al-Baghdadi’s army and stood ready to obey the orders of the caliphate that he led. Bashir followed up the letter with a proclamation that it was obligatory for all members of JAT to both respect and obey his bai’at, declaring that any who refused to do so would be thrown out of the group. Some did indeed rebuff allegiance to ISIL and were duly expelled.

The country’s most active terrorist group, Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT), has also pledged allegiance to ISIL. Santoso (aka Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi al-Indonesi), a former field commander in JAT, leads the group. It acts as an umbrella movement for militants based in the simmering conflict zones of Poso, Palu and Bima and has been linked to numerous attacks on the police.

Despite an intense crackdown on its activities, MIT continues to threaten domestic security and, according to intelligence officials, has a high potential to commit terrorist acts and accept fighters from the international Islamist network into its membership. The group has also allegedly sought out individuals proficient in information technology who have reportedly been highly active in urging Indonesians to wage a domestic jihad via videos disseminated over the internet.

Apart from FAKSI, FPDI, JAT and MIT, at least two organisations have been identified as local branches of ISIL in Indonesia. One is Anshar ul Khilafah, which was discovered in August 2014 and had apparently been operational for at least a month using a village mosque in Sempu, Malang, as its headquarters.

The group’s influence has reportedly spread to several areas of Central Java, particularly Solo, where local media sources say growing numbers of Muslims are using it as a vehicle for pledging loyalty to ISIL. The other is the somewhat amorphously named Tasikmalaya Group. Ustaz Dani and Amin Mude are believed to be the chief coordinators of the cell, which is thought to have established a dedicated committee to oversee the selection, training and travel of Indonesians wishing to fight for ISIL in Iraq and Syria.

Overall, more than 2,000 Indonesians are thought to have declared support for ISIL. While many of those individuals will probably neither seek to go to Syria or Iraq nor propagate violence, the figure is indicative of the residual appeal that the idea of a caliphate can have in a devout public.

ASPI suggests

Petronas Twin Towers, Kuala Lumpur.

Welcome back to another round-up of reading picks, podcasts and videos in security and defence.

America is not ready to fight today’s ‘grey war’s, says former US Special Operations Commander Eric T. Olsen. Defined as conflicts that fall just short of the formal state of war between state and non-state actors, they’re characterised by ambiguity including the nature of the parties involved and the relevant legal frameworks. The concept at length in this US SOCOM white paper entitled ‘The Gray Zone’, relevant to our understanding some of the ways to address entities like daesh and al Qaeda.

Malaysia’s new National Security Council Bill passed Parliament last week. The legislation formally establishes a National Security Council comprising eight high-ranking Cabinet members and grants the Prime Minister the power to declare any area a ‘security area’, among other powers. Also established under the bill is the Director of Operations role vested with ‘the power to do all things necessary or expedient for or in connection with the performance of his duties in the security area’. It’s worth reading this critique of key clauses in the bill by the president of the Malaysian Bar who called it an ‘insidious piece of legislation’. Also check out Mong Palatino’s rundown on The Diplomat and Austin Ramzy’s coverage on The New York Times.

For more on the current play of domestic politics in Kuala Lumpur, The Economist looks at PM Najib’s staying power despite the 1 MDB corruption scandal that broke earlier this year.

New Mandala continues to deliver expert analysis of Myanmar’s post-election future, with Gregory Catchcart on trends in the militarisation of government ministries and Tamas Wells on understanding Myanmar’s communal violence.

Also, two new RSIS commentaries on Indonesia’s submarine ambitions: the first by Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto evaluates the strategic imperative for submarines and the perils of a slow acquisition process, while Adhi Priamarizki, Fitri Bintang Timur and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki argue that the country needs to revamp its current strategic policy guidelines and enhance naval operational support.

Why does violence perpetrated by some women like Chechnya’s ‘black widows’ continue to be sensationalised but others, like female suicide bombing, normalised? Laura Sjoberg looks back on a decade of research on women, gender and terrorism and draws important conclusions about the women of daesh today. For an inside account of daesh women (heads up, it’s a long read), the NYT‘s Azadeh Moaveni interviews three women who were recruited as part of the Khansaa Brigade (the all-female morality police) on their collaboration in punishments against their former neighbours, their anguish and eventual escape.

For those following the Paris COP21 talks, a draft version of the Paris Agreement (version 2 of 10 December, PDF) was released overnight. CIGI’s Christopher Campbell-Duruflé has a useful summary of the modest developments, though noted that there seemed to be an increasingly broad consensus that the global temperature increase should be kept below 1.5 degrees, rather than 2 degrees. More commentary, check out The Guardian‘s live blog here.

Also on climate change, this new Observer Research Foundation report compiles essays by Samir Saran on India’s specific challenges as a developing country.

Meanwhile, can cyber warfare be deterred? Joseph Nye argues that attribution is a ‘matter of degree’ and that economic entanglement can raise the stakes for states like China. For the rest of his points, keep reading here.

It’s official, former Treasurer Joe Hockey will replace Kim Beazley as Australia’s Ambassador to the United States. Responding to rumours of the appointment back in September, former Australian Ambo to DC John McCarthy had a few words of wisdom to impart to the incoming envoy:

Over the years we Australians have lost the capacity to make up our own minds on our security (even though we have been robust on trade issues). In an era of growing geopolitical complexity, remember that in the final analysis Australian interests may not be the same as those of America. Recognise that and when you have to, put our case.

You will be an ambassador – not a sycophant. You may have uncomfortable days – but if you know what you are doing, you will win respect. The best ones do.

Lastly, the US Navy unveils its new strategic planning technology for the maritime battlefield, BATTLESHIP.

Podcast

Does the United States have a gun problem or terrorism problem? That’s the latest topic debate by Foreign Policy‘s David Rothkopf, Rosa Brooks, Kori Schake and Lara Jakes (34mins).

Event

Canberra: ANU is hosting a free panel event deciphering the Paris COP21 talks on climate change and their implications for Australia. The panel features experts who attended the summit including HE Sem Fabrizi, Ambassador of the delegation of the European Union to Australia. The event is on Wednesday 16 December at 6 – 7.30pm, registration and details here.

Australia and Indonesia: investing in a more secure future

The grand power shifts currently taking place in the Asia–Pacific are likely to gradually draw Indonesia and Australia closer together in order to face common strategic challenges. Elements of the bilateral relationship will probably remain prickly and contested, but the more difficult the broader region becomes—as historical disputes mix with heady power politics and posturing—the more sense it makes for Australia and Indonesia to increase bilateral collaboration.

Notwithstanding that the duo make the world’s most starkly different neighbours, a positive relationship with Indonesia has the propensity to contribute profoundly to Australia’s national security. Along with the rest of the Asia–Pacific, Indonesia is undergoing a significant economic transformation—one that will potentially see the archipelagic nation become the world’s fourth largest economy by 2050. It’s important then that Australia makes the most of the goodwill generated by Prime Minister Turnbull’s recent successful visit to Jakarta and that Australian policy makers explore additives that will contribute to a stronger partnership over the long term.

In order to work together to face common security challenges in an evolving Asia–Pacific, it’s important that Indonesia be prepared to increase its focus on international policy issues. Since President Joko Widodo took office in October 2014, Indonesia has focused on domestic affairs like stimulating the economy and upgrading the country’s infrastructure to meet growing demand. In the long run, a strong bilateral partnership will require a joint willingness to act in ways that further our shared objectives.

But a real opportunity also exists for the two countries to cooperate on infrastructure development in Indonesia. That possibility wasn’t lost on Turnbull in Jakarta, who identified such investment as ‘crucial’ to developing a deeper and more positive relationship between the two countries.

Both foreign and domestic investment in Indonesian infrastructure have been low since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As such, the country has long been hampered by a lack of adequate infrastructure: underdeveloped sea transport facilities, limited amenities to cope with the country’s frequent extreme weather conditions, and the resultant steep logistics costs. According to an Indonesian Foreign Ministry official, the country’s maritime connectivity ‘remains abysmal’, an issue that will need to be addressed to enhance Indonesia’s competitiveness in the ASEAN Economic Community. Those deficiencies not only reduce Indonesia’s attractiveness to investors, but also prevent Indonesian economic growth from reaching its full potential. With investors wary and the largest drop in exports recorded since August 2012, 2015 marked a six-year low in GDP growth. With this in mind, we should expect Jokowi to continue to view his engagement with international actors squarely through the lens of domestic politics.

On his trips abroad this year, Jokowi has actively sought investment opportunities, not foreign aid. While Australia’s 2015–16 budget shows Indonesia to be our second largest foreign aid recipient after Papua New Guinea, the projected sum of $366.4 million will only account for 0.03% of Indonesia’s GDP. If we’re looking to deepen and strengthen our relationship with Indonesia, helping Jokowi with his main priority—investment in infrastructure—would be a good start.

The Widodo Government’s five-year infrastructure plan is projected to cost a total of approximately A$22 billion per year, and will see the creation of 25 dams, 10 airports, and 2,000 km of roads across Indonesia, among many other projects. However, this falls far below the A$500 billion identified by Bappenas, Indonesia’s planning ministry, as being essential to help the country reach the World Bank’s middle-income standards by 2019.

Australia’s Trade Minister Andrew Robb recently announced that he’d like to quadruple the number of Australian businesses engaged with Indonesia from 250 to 1,000. Australia’s superannuation industry, predicted to reach A$7 trillion by 2035, has also been identified as a potential goldmine for Indonesia thanks to companies like Industry Super Australia’s prior experience in investing in infrastructure projects. That said, there’s no way that Australia can even come close to narrowing the gap between Indonesia’s actual infrastructure budget and Bappenas’ projected sum.

Still, Australia’s real value to Indonesia might lie in providing advice on skills and services as the country pursues project planning and implementation on a range of fronts. Indonesia has been hindered by lack of coordination between government agencies and advice on financial services, and has faced difficulties when it comes to managing public–private partnerships, leaving infrastructure projects behind schedule, beyond budget or abandoned altogether. Each of those are areas where Australia has proven experience and expertise, as noted by a recent ANZ–PwC report (PDF). The report also suggests Australia offer advice to Indonesia in specific areas of infrastructural implementation processes, such as planning for the construction of ports to help Indonesia facilitate trade with its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Even with an enhanced capacity to deliver infrastructure projects, Indonesia will continue to prioritise domestic policy over foreign policy. It’s unrealistic for Australian policymakers to expect that Jakarta will, as it grows, actively participate in the international realm (particularly in regional forums) in ways Canberra might desire. Even beyond Jokowi’s focus on domestic politics, Indonesia’s engagement with external actors will continue to be guided by its bebas-aktif foreign policy, and its strategic culture of nonalignment, both of which prevent it from entering into formal alliances and potentially stunting the level to which it can enjoy mutually beneficial relationships with other states.

In this context, Australia’s challenges are two-fold. First, it must be willing to support an Indonesia with a stronger sense of self. Second, it must encourage Indonesia to become an even more active regional player, particularly in multilateral forums such as ASEAN—where Indonesia plays a central role to Australia’s diplomacy with Southeast Asian nations—and APEC—where strong relations would be beneficial for multilateral diplomacy. Australia must also support Indonesia in forming its own foreign policy agendas, such as firming up the finer details of the Global Maritime Axis doctrine.

Indonesia is on track to become a larger, more influential and more powerful player in the Asia–Pacific over the coming decades. That shift will increase our dependence on our northern neighbour to secure our economic, political and security interests in the Asia–Pacific. Australian investment in Indonesian infrastructure, both financially and through the provision of our expert advice, looks like a good way to strengthen an important relationship for both countries well into the future.

Creating synergy: an agenda for Turnbull’s visit to Jakarta

Jakarta

Tomorrow Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull will sit down with Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) for some valuable face time. Just over a year into his presidency, Jokowi has already had some experience dealing with Australian foreign policy challenges, having responded to both the boat turn-back policy of the Abbott government and rockier diplomatic ties surrounding the execution of two Australian prisoners in Bali in April.

This meeting is a chance for the countries to start afresh and, with economics and trade set to be on the agenda, there should be plenty to discuss given Turnbull’s and Jokowi’s respective business backgrounds. But should the leaders’ first meeting be so straightforward?

More than merely a meet-and-greet, this Jakarta visit could potentially set the tone for Australia–Indonesia relations for the foreseeable future. Despite their business backgrounds, the two heads of government should see to rise above transactional diplomacy. We face a world of shared challenges, from terrorist networks to environmental concerns, so it’s never too early to start deepening cooperation and discussing shared responsibility.

Jokowi’s global maritime axis vision is likely to remain a dominant feature of his foreign and domestic policy and this is a good chance for Turnbull to develop a firsthand understanding of Jokowi’s intentions. In essence, the vision involves reinvigorating Indonesia’s character as a maritime nation, building up its maritime defences, optimising oceanic resources, and seriously upgrading its ports and related infrastructure to help boost the economy (PDF).

Of course, most foreign investment will come from major players like Japan, China and the US. However, there are other challenges that could hamper the realisation of Jokowi’s maritime vision and it’s in these areas where Australia can offer targeted cooperation. Those include defence capability and acquisition, maritime research and conservation, policy development and interagency coordination, and anti-corruption efforts. With Jokowi’s term set to last another four years, it’s a good time for the Turnbull administration to establish a solid working relationship in areas that play both to our strengths and to Jokowi’s needs.

The face-to-face meeting also affords Turnbull the chance to ask Jokowi how he perceives both China’s actions in the South China Sea and the recent US freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) near Subi Reef. Australia and Indonesia are both deepening their economic and investment ties with a rising China, with Indonesia–China ties growing even closer under Jokowi and Xi. With the Royal Australian Navy and the Indonesian Navy kicking off Exercise New Horizon on Monday, Turnbull could discuss the future of South China Sea defence diplomacy with his counterpart.

It would be beneficial to discuss international order in the light of China’s land reclamation activities and what role Jokowi envisages for Indonesia as a middle power diplomatic actor. During his recent trip to the US, Jokowi revealed to a Brookings Institute audience that he wanted Indonesia to take a more active role in the South China Sea. What’s less clear is exactly what this role would entail. Thus far, unlike the previous administration, Indonesia isn’t falling over itself to engage ASEAN as a framework for regional diplomacy and in any case, the adoption of a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea continues to move at a glacial pace, if at all. Complicating matters further, the Chinese nine-dotted line puts Indonesia in direct conflict with China even if Indonesia doesn’t like to admit it—the line cuts through Indonesia’s UNCLOS-enshrined maritime territory. If Indonesia were to play an ‘honest broker’ role, what other regional organisations or diplomatic instruments could it rely upon, and what role could Australia play?

The growing threat of ISIS globally is undoubtedly one Australia and Indonesia should tackle together, particularly given our history of effective counterterrorism cooperation. The head of Indonesia’s national counterterrorism agency has warned that foreign fighters from Malaysia are finding safe haven in some parts of Indonesia’s archipelago. There are already a number of regional terrorist groups who have sworn allegiance to ISIS. Indonesia has responded to the domestic manifestations of this threat by, among other steps, blocking the content of radical websites and, in June, standing up a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) drawn from all three of the military’s special forces units.

In a positive move, Australian and Indonesian authorities will co-host the inaugural meeting of a regional counter-terrorism financing summit in Sydney later this month. However, more can be done in areas like prison reform, cyber radicalisation and anti-radicalisation programs. Strong statements from both leaders that continue to stress the shared threat posed by global extremism and the need for sustained cooperation would help signal both the importance of collaborative efforts and publicly reinforce our security partnership.

The point of a broader agenda is not to step on the toes of the Defence and Foreign Ministers; they’ll be able to build on those themes while also discussing other issues including development assistance, the growing role of Indonesia’s military in domestic security affairs, and environmental issues such as the haze and climate change.

The point is to be more businesslike than confrontational and to signal a maturing of the relationship (especially since the 2013 spying scandal) where the two leaders are comfortable discussing difficult issues. A stronger Australia–Indonesia diplomatic relationship can also form a more robust backbone around which other multilateral initiatives like joint interagency task forces or MIKTA-related diplomacy can further develop. Jakarta won’t be the only time Turnbull and Jokowi will see each other this year: this month, they’ll also meet at the G20 summit in Antalya, APEC in Manila and the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, and again at COP21 in December. Developing a rapport is part of the game so the next time we need Indonesia, Jokowi might take the PM’s call.

A joint statement on those sorts of issues probably isn’t on the cards for this trip but it might be something to consider for future gatherings. While our leaders remind us that ‘Indonesia matters to Australia, Australia matters to Indonesia’, carefully articulating areas of mutual interest that extend beyond economic and trade issues and then crafting them in the language of shared responsibility brings us closer to a working partnership. Let’s see what unfolds after the first handshake.

ASPI suggests

Syrian refugees in Vienna, September 2015.

This week’s most talked about security development has been the freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) conducted by the USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of China’s controversial artificial islands. For multiple takes on what the development means, read Scott Cheney-Peters via CIMSEC and Bonnie Glaser via The Interpreter on why the move was justified, and Graham Webster over on The Diplomat on how China maintains strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea. For a quick refresh of the islands’ geography and history, check out AMTI’s new feature here as well as their maps illustrating the evolution of Asia’s contested waters.

With Australia set to engage the PLA-N in naval exercises next week, here’s a new report from the Australia–China Relations Institute (ACRI) by Thomas Boak that finds Australia’s bilateral economic, diplomatic, cultural and defence ties with China are overall solid, when compared with ties with other states including the US. Check out the full report and its metrics here (PDF).

In other international developments, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo dropped by Washington, DC this week. In their joint statement, Jokowi and Obama agreed to enhance the US–Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership and strengthen ties in areas such as maritime cooperation and defence, including greater interaction on defence trade and cybersecurity. Outside of the White House, it’s worth watching the full video of Jokowi’s visit to the Brookings Institution in which he describes Indonesia’s role in the world. Of note are his statements that his country is ‘not becoming inward-looking’ and is ready to play a more active role in the South China Sea disputes—what kind of role that entails remains to be seen. Lastly, Jokowi announced that he intends for Indonesia to joint the US’ Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal. Read Bloomberg’s Chris Brummitt on why that’s easier said than done and CSIS Jakarta’s Rocky Intan on why waiting to join the agreement has cost Indonesia the chance to shape it.

Closer to Europe, Katarzyna Pisarska (who was recently in Australia) explains on Australian Outlook exactly why some parts of the EU have welcomed refugees with open arms while others have built walls as part of a hardened anti-immigration policy. In particular, she highlights the different historical experiences between Western and Central Europe as one of the drivers for the divergent policies. And it appears Russia can’t be counted on to help with this issue: one Syrian family has been living out of Moscow’s Sheremetyeveo airport for seven weeks, in limbo, accused of using fake passports and denied thus asylum.

Three US Army captains built a gun that kills drones, and it took them 10 hours at a cost of US$150 (AUD$230). This week’s technology pick is a War On The Rocks article, authored by those Army captains, on what the US military can learn from innovating like insurgents. Meanwhile, in other technology news, China’s DJI, a leading manufacturer of consumer drones, is set to open a new R&D centre in Silicon Valley, seen as an attempt to capitalise on American engineering talent.

For the bibliophiles looking for something different, here’s a list of ten fiction books about war in Iraq and Afghanistan. And for a more personal account, Associated Press Baghdad bureau chief Vivian Salama, set to leave her post on 24 November, penned a reflection of her experience in Iraq through the many meals she shared with politicians, tribesmen and colleagues. Enjoy.

Podcasts

This week’s podcasts picks hover around the Middle East. The first is Jihadology‘s latest offering with Mokhtar Awad on the development of jihadism in Egypt and the influence of the Islamic State there (1hr 23mins). The second (and highly recommended) pick is an interview with Will McCants and Joby Warrick on their respective books on ISIS and why Zarqawi has had a stronger influence on the movement’s fighters than its leader, Baghdadi (51mins).

Video

As Australia develops its own amphibious capabilities, what’s happening with the US Marine Corps? Capability wonks might like to check this recent CSIS and USNI event featuring Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration on the future of the USMC (1hr).

Events

Canberra: the Institute for Regional Security has two upcoming events. The first is the Spring Networking Event in Braddon’s Hopscotch next Thursday 5 November at 5.30pm, details and registration here. The following week, check out IFRS Next featuring seven up-and-coming strategic leaders at Palace Electric, Friday 13 November at 5.15pm, details and registration here.