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Tag Archive for: Indonesia
Tag Archive for: Indonesia
Trumped or bust: how will the post-inauguration cards fall for Australia?
As the Trump bandwagon rolls down Pennsylvania Avenue and into the White House, the Australian government faces a number of policy conundrums, solutions to which will strain both its policymaking skills and its resolve.
The Trump presidency challenges many of the assumptions on which Australia’s economic and security policy has rested for almost seventy years—all of those assumptions best summed up in the lazy phrase “rules-based international order”. That order was underwritten by US power. It’s now under challenge as other big players, particularly China and Russia, no longer want to abide by US rules. Nor, perhaps, does President Trump.
Of greater concern, however, is the fact that the challengers to the US are tackling the issue from diametrically opposed perspectives: where Russia, and Putin in particular, sees opportunity, China, and Xi in particular, sees threat. And where the US in the past might have taken comfort from the support of its allies, many of the latter are now wallowing in a sea of uncertainty that reduces their status to bit-players at best and liabilities at worst.
As it cashes in what’s left of its chips as a winner (albeit bankrupt) in 1945, Britain’s increasingly untidy divorce from Europe erodes its strategic value to the US. France is locking itself into a new competition with Germany, Europe’s southern underbelly (unhappily identified as the PIGS) is headed for penury, and the opportunistic optimists from the East who rushed into the EU after the Soviet Union’s collapse are now re-learning past habits as they install authoritarian governments. So Russia sees as many opportunities to its west as it does to its east across the Pacific.
Europe’s a mess and Asia’s not much better. Japan is undergoing a prolonged crisis in confidence. South Korea is transfixed by a scandal that’s symptomatic of the sclerosis affecting its symbiotic economic and political elites. Taiwan, like the canary in the mine, thinks that it can scent freedom when only disaster can result from an attempted break out. And ASEAN is experiencing centrifugal forces greater than any in its 50-year history.
So into this global mêlée comes President Trump. While he’s not the cause of it, it’s hard to see that he’s the solution either. That’s at the centre of the problem facing Australia’s policymakers. And to judge from the alacrity with which Prime Minister Abe decided to visit Southeast Asia and Australia—little warning and even less fanfare—Japan is onto this new dispensation much faster than we are.
So what might Australia’s policymakers come up with if we are not to be trumped by a new brand of US exceptionalism that promotes protectionism over free trade, or busted by a new form of sabre-rattling that would want to exclude China from the South China Sea or confront Russia.
The first thing they need to address is the fact that regional security (and that includes the security of China, by the way) is an artefact of regional economic strength, not national military power or the disposition of armed forces. Our long reliance on ANZUS has inoculated Australian policymakers to view security as a defence issue. If ever it has been, it is less so now: national security is about improving the lives of citizens and ensuring that a growing economic cake is shared equitably. Trump’s decision to can the Trans-Pacific Partnership impacts directly on the region’s economic security.
A second imperative is the quality and intensity of our diplomacy. Because we see the US as our security blanket, we have a preference for a transactional foreign policy. It’s easier to deal with problems as they occur rather than set an agenda and an implementation plan that might forestall those problems in the first place. Transformational policymaking is hard because it demands both clarity of thinking and perseverance in execution—something our present political paradigm doesn’t help.
To take just two problematic examples: the brittleness of our relationship with Indonesia and the insouciance of our relationship with the Philippines. Xenophobia is always a subcutaneous manifestation of nationalism. In Indonesia’s case, wannabe Presidential aspirants find it easy to appeal to religious ideologues and the alienated. Largely due to our marginal position in Indonesia’s consciousness, Australia is a convenient whipping boy, as General Gatot Nurmantyo’s recent media appearances have again reminded us.
In the confused world in which both Indonesia and Australia find ourselves, “business as usual” is no solution. Our policymakers need to focus their energies more on building strong relationships between our economic institutions, and our government leaders need to invest in building substantial and deep relationships with their counterparts. And at a time when President Jokowi is increasingly isolated domestically due to pressure from Islamic ideologues, his authority and legitimacy should be reinforced by more frequent visits by regional heads of government, including ours.
Similarly, President Duterte is going it alone, with unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences for the region, as he responds to China’s overtures. Australia has an abiding interest, evident since SEATO days, in the stability and security of the Philippines. Yet where are the indicators of any serious investment on Australia’s part?
The third, and perhaps most important, step is to begin capitalising on both the strength and enduring nature of our relationship with the US. Taking up office as one of the most unprepared presidents in US history, Trump needs friends. At a time of strategic flux, the US is critical to any re-articulation of the ‘rules’ on which ‘the international rules-based order’ is built. Trump himself, and perhaps the US political elite more broadly, is more comfortable with acolytes than friends. Australia, the Bush-anointed ‘deputy sheriff,’ has been one of the most constant acolytes of all.
That needs to change. As a close friend, we need to transform the ANZUS alliance from a followership to a partnership. We need to know what we bring to the table—not just a ‘suitable piece of real estate’ as the late Des Ball described Pine Gap (and might have so described the Northern Territory training base where the US Marines are stationed), but as an ally that brings wisdom and counsel to the policy dialogue. That means knowing what our interests are and being able to articulate them.
For all its puzzling features, the Trump presidency is an opportunity for Australia. We hold some pretty good cards. The real question is just how well we are able to play them.
Indonesia and Australia: building a more resilient strategic partnership
In my talks with Australian politicians, leaders, policymakers, academics and NGOs, one thing is clear: Indonesia is strategically and economically important for Australia. However, not much has been said about the importance of Australia for Indonesia.
Well, let me say this: Australia is an important international partner for Indonesia. A strong Australia–Indonesia partnership contributes to the growth and security of our region.
However, the relationship has been too unstable in recent years. It was good for the media, I’m sure that their ratings went through the roof for their coverage of the beef, spying, execution and boats issues. But it was bad for the overall relationship. Frequent shocks, falls and freezing of cooperation are disruptive at best and endanger our respective security interests at worst.
Unpredictable relationship makes it much more difficult for these two emerging powers in their own rights, to act in real partnership to contribute to the region’s economic growth and security.
Over the years, both Indonesia and Australia have been responsible global citizens. We’ve worked together with our regional partners to build frameworks for cooperation that actually work, achieve their intended objectives and even serve as models for other regions. Our collaborative experiences show that when we act as a team we can achieve more than we could on our own.
That alone gives us a strong incentive to invest in our relationship in a way that increases its value and reduces its instability. Persistently forging small but frequent, deep and broad links might go a long way toward that goal to make the relationship more resilient.
First, we should work to grow and expand our military relationship. It’s admirable to have good and consistent links between our military through joint naval, military and air exercises. However, to truly deepen that link, we need to think hard about ways to connect and open ways for our defence industry to collaborate and grow their capabilities and technologies. Thales and Pindad are making inroads in producing tactical vehicles with secure electronic communication combat systems, for instance. And there are many more opportunities for collaboration as Indonesia’s defence industry expands into producing more advanced naval ships, aircraft and weapons.
Another point I would like to make is that we shouldn’t let the darkest periods in the relationship define our future relationship. We should move on and build up our partnership based on Indonesia’s and Australia’s many common values of democracy, open economy and internationalism.
Second, we should together prepare to engage in a region defined by the growing importance of the major economies of the Indo–Pacific. For the medium-term we should together prepare for the changes brought about by leadership styles, domestic political pressures and shifting coalitions that are unfolding in our region.
We’re already seeing it unfold in ASEAN for example, as well as in the bilateral relationship among members of the East Asian Summit. Agreements in ASEAN are harder to come by. Adventures in the South China Sea are becoming bolder. There are instances of some laid-back attitudes to international laws.
If left unchecked, there’s a real danger that the regional framework and international law such as the UNCLOS, that Professor Hasjim Djalal for example has helped to shape, may lose its potency. There is a real need more than ever for Australia and Indonesia to collaborate even closer together in the region to help provide solutions at the source of the problems and prevent them from spilling into our respective borders.
And third, Australia and Indonesia should direct our engagements in the Indian Ocean, through IORA and with other emerging economies, through MIKTA, to build a common understanding of an international code of behaviour and the commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes consistent with the principles of international law. Building those links bilaterally and with other countries in the region becomes much more urgent and important when we look at it from a broader perspective.
A case in point is when we view our relationship from the standpoint of the fast-changing political dynamics and shifting alliances of the region; pressures from increased demands for food, energy, water and other finite resources; and the chronic border tensions in our region.
Another perspective is to view our relationship in the context of the seismic changes in the political orientation of a number of decision makers around the world. Some openly deny the existence of climate change, question the value of international trade and doubt the real causes of migration.
Those changes might make it more elusive to achieve the greenhouse gas emission cuts target agreed in Paris last year and more difficult to further open the economies of the region for international trade and investment. A case in point is the immediate future of the TPP. And they might make it more difficult for genuine refugees to be protected and resettled.
We have a genuine chance to invest in a strong and resilient Indonesia–Australia partnership. That kind of relationship would provide a solid anchor for the Indo–Pacific region and prepare us for an uncertain future that may be full of strategic challenges and opportunities.
MANIS: the way to sweeten regional cooperation
After a succession of sour patches in bilateral ties between Jakarta and Canberra, there’s now a sweet breeze in the air in the Australia–Indonesia relationship. But what can be done to help it survive the next squall which could blow things off course? One way to help would be by bringing in close and trusted neighbours to help stabilise the mix.
Manis is the Indonesian word for ‘sweet’. It also could symbolise a grouping of maritime partners on the southern edge of Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore. A MANIS regional maritime cooperation forum (PDF), could address a vast range of concerns for the member countries.
A MANIS Regional Maritime Cooperation Forum could be organised in a number of ways, depending on the consensus of the participating nations. With a view to the sensitivities of Indonesia and others, it would be best to start slowly. Over time, the forum could generate goodwill and political momentum to grow. Ideally the political leadership of participating states would see the utility of gradually building up the forum and associated networks of contacts and issues covered, broadening and deepening the range of issues shared and addressed collaboratively.
Starting with a second track or one-and-a-half track approach would probably be easier, rather than launching into a fully-fledged governmental initiative. One way to do so would be to establish working groups to examine a range of non-traditional security concerns.
Topics on which regional representatives could consult, share experiences and cooperate are the security implications of region-wide challenges including climate change, illegal fisheries, natural resources management, illegal immigration, terrorism, smuggling and transnational crime, including trafficking in drugs, endangered wildlife and weapons. The forum could also focus on improving search and rescue and natural disaster coordination.
That approach would involve collaborative government, university and think tank teams from the various participating countries meeting to form working groups to discuss a range of possibilities including police, immigration, border security, legal, judicial, environmental, intelligence, and financial matters. Such encounters could examine shared issues of concern and other information exchanges, including on operating procedures. They also could consider possible collaborative activities to facilitate closer engagement and cross-pollination of personnel, ideas and sharing of experiences.
Ultimately, this Forum could take regional cooperation beyond the levels achieved through the Bali Process and help to better address the implications of a new security agenda centred on environmentally vulnerable communities and climate change.
Eventually, if successful and mutually agreed to, military and other security concerns could feature under this framework as well. For instance, maritime security measures could be workshopped and collaborative activities developed. Efforts could be made to help regional coast-watching aerial surveillance patrols to be coordinated, more information exchanged and additional police and other liaison and exchange positions established.
Those arrangements would then enable the participating nations to consider coordinated and shared activities. Such activities could gradually build up, starting with conferences and workshops, to planning meetings, demonstrations and, eventually, actual collaborative exercises and operational activities. In time, and with the goodwill and agreement of the participants, such activities could utilise a range of civil and military resources to plan and conduct a range of related activities together.
Critics may argue there are too many regional forums already. But existing forums have great difficulty reaching consensus. A smaller grouping like MANIS would find it easier. Potentially, it could be empowered to bolster regional stability in and around Indonesia and the areas governed by the affected neighbouring states in a way that circumvents the existing consensus-driven constraints. Enhancing cooperation and collaboration this way, with timely and consultative decision-making by participating nations, could significantly bolster stability and prosperity in areas of mutual concern.
A MANIS Regional Forum wouldn’t make redundant the region’s other bilateral and multilateral forums and arrangements. Indeed, foreign ministries are already stretched thin with responsibilities relating to ASEAN, let alone other forums. With a maritime focus and additional resources, perhaps the respective ministries of defence or border protection may be better placed to take the lead in engaging with the MANIS forum.
With a growing range of maritime and non-traditional security challenges, there’s a compelling argument to be made for the countries of Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore to join hands and work together in a new way. This could be something far more than a straightforward multilateral forum. With unprecedented and growing challenges, there is an opportunity for the MANIS countries to work together across a wide range of domains to bolster shared regional stability. The way ahead involves respectful, patient, collegial and determined collaborative engagement to sweeten regional ties.
After arbitration: enforcing the rules in Southeast Asia
The recent award handed down by the Arbitral Tribunal through the Permanent Court of Arbitration undoubtedly favours the Philippines (PDF) and is unlikely to end Beijing’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. Beijing has wasted no time in rejecting the ruling, claiming it to be ‘null and void’, but the superpower isn’t likely to go running away with its tail between its legs. In fact, China has vowed to ‘take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty in the South China Sea’, including potentially establishing an ADIZ across the region. But how other claimant and non-claimant states act in response to the Tribunal’s ruling will set an important precedent for dealing with behaviour that challenges the rules-based global order.
Despite the Tribunal concluding that ‘there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the “nine-dash line”’, China’s fishermen militia will continue to fish in areas where China believes it has overlapping maritime claims. Such challenges will be hard to counter, since Southeast Asian claimants have only limited capability to enforce their sovereignty, and a fluctuating willingness to confront China. Ideally, Southeast Asian nations would present a united front that’s both aligned with international law and remains cognizant of where the red lines lay.
That course poses a particular challenge for Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte, who faces the dilemma of continuing with his plan to ‘reset’ the Philippines’ relationship with China or coming down hard on the Philippines’ largest two-way trade partner. Actually, China might decide that its best prospect for blurring the Tribunal’s decision lies in its achieving a bilateral deal with Manila that recognises some of China’s claims in exchange for concessions elsewhere. So Duterte’s course of action could be formative.
How the Philippines acts in response to the Tribunal’s award could also set a precedent for both claimants’ and non-claimants’ responses to future disagreements with China. And with China flying nuclear-capable H-6K bombers and fighter jets near the contested Scarborough Shoal last week, Beijing’s signaling there’s still much to play for.
Indonesia, which also gained from the Tribunal award, is a case in point. Its formal position— that it has no border dispute with China—has now been given legal reinforcement by the Tribunal’s ruling. But that won’t stop Chinese fishermen from encroaching on Indonesia’s EEZ, nor will it prevent Chinese naval vessels from offering them protection. If Duterte doesn’t firmly enforce the sovereignty of the waters surrounding his country, it could not only indicate that claimant states will bend to Chinese pressure, but also serve to discourage Jokowi from continuing with his more assertive stance on Chinese incursions on Indonesian waters.
Indonesia recently ramped up its efforts against China’s behaviour in its waters, in particular slamming a recent statement from China’s foreign ministry espousing ‘overlapping claims for maritime rights and interests’ in the waters off the Natuna Islands. After the third confrontation between Indonesia and China this year in Natuna waters, President Joko Widodo signalled to Beijing that his country wouldn’t be cowed. He visited the Natunas and hosted a limited Cabinet meeting aboard the Indonesian Navy vessel that fired warning shots at Chinese trawlers the week before. And following the ruling, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu detailed plans to deploy warships, fighter jets, SAMs, and drones—as well as construct port facilities—around the Natunas.
Now, as the de facto head of ASEAN, Indonesia’s challenge will be to encourage a regional response that sets a precedent on how to address future Chinese territorial incursions. In its formal statement on the Tribunal’s ruling, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated the importance of refraining from any escalatory actions in its near region, as well as resuming peaceful talks with a basis in international law on any existing overlapping claims. The Ministry also emphasised the important role that a zone of peace and neutrality would play in strengthening ASEAN’s political and security communities. Indonesia has requested states to respect international law, with the statement spurring criticism from Chinese experts for being less ‘objective, just and fair’ than its traditional non-claimant stance on the South China Sea.
Cultivating that uniform response across ASEAN states—or even across claimants—is no simple task. Some expected the award to help ASEAN achieve a consensus position, but the evidence so far has been weak. The 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ and Post Ministerial Conference meetings in Vientiane this week provide another opportunity for China to ‘divide’ and ‘coerce’ member states.
A united ASEAN could produce and finalise an ASEAN–China Code of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea that would soothe tensions after the arbitration and establish precedents for the future of the region’s maritime security. But the challenges of coordinating such a diverse grouping of states, all with differing levels of economic dependence on China, has been demonstrated in last month’s spectacular failure by ASEAN to stick to a firm position on China’s aggressive island-building. And with a traditionally non-aligned foreign policy and a now legitimised stance as a non-claimant on the issue, there’s little reason for Indonesia to seize ASEAN’s reins over a unified position.
If states in the region move towards no longer seeing ASEAN and its regional architecture ‘as the vehicle through which to resolve territorial disputes’, Indonesia might seek to engage its neighbours in new forms of defence diplomacy to build confidence and concord. Those could take the form of finalising the terms of the proposed Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines joint patrol of the Sulu and Celebes seas.
Whatever the outcome, the coming months might well prove pivotal in shaping the future of the South China Sea. Both claimant and non-claimant ASEAN policymakers should use the confidence gained from the ruling to assert their sovereignty and commitment to the rules-based order. Inaction could prove a dangerous precedent as China attempts to save face and seize the initiative once more.
The Strategist Six: Dewi Fortuna Anwar
Welcome to The Strategist Six, a feature that provides a glimpse into the thinking of prominent academics, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world.
1. How do you think Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities have changed under President Joko Widodo?
As a candidate, President Jokowi tried to define himself as being different from the outgoing administration of SBY. President SBY was very much a globalist and a multilateralist, and the discourse then was about one million friends, zero enemies. The Jokowi Administration looked, from the very beginning, at what the economic benefits for the common people are from Indonesia’s foreign policy, what economic gains it could make from its diplomatic achievements. So the priorities were trying to focus on balancing a number of key bilateral relations and focusing on trade investment and the role that key countries can bring to Indonesia’s own economic development. But in reality, Indonesia already has a serious regional and international commitment which it cannot easily walk away from. So ASEAN is very much a cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. While focusing on various economic priorities, Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Joko Widodo doesn’t look that different from the previous administration, precisely because Indonesia is a very active member of the regional and global community.
2. How do you view China’s stance on the South China Sea?
Indonesia is very consistent in its position regarding the South China Sea. It isn’t a claimant in the Spratlys or the Paracels, but we are a maritime country and Indonesia has a border with the South China Sea over its Natuna waters. So Indonesia would view with great concern any movements in the South China Sea which could lead to open conflicts. Indonesia believes that all countries should refrain from provocative action, from any unilateral action, that all parties should adhere to international law, particularly UNCLOS 1982, and as a member of ASEAN we believe that the mechanism for that is already in place. We need to implement the Declaration of Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea, and we need to work faster for the completion of a more binding code of conduct.
3. Why’s it so difficult to get a unified ASEAN position on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea?
It’s not that difficult to get a unified ASEAN position in terms of those countries that have claims. I don’t think that the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have different attitudes in that respect. But ASEAN is very diverse in its membership. All countries in ASEAN have a relationship with China, but the intensity of that relationship differs from each country, and Cambodia has become very dependent on China. So to that extent, it has become vulnerable to pressure from China as we can see from the incident from when Cambodia was Chairman of ASEAN and there was no joint communiqué that was issued after the ASEAN ministerial meeting. So the different strategic interests of different ASEAN countries have continued to be a real issue, and I don’t think that it will go away any time soon.
4. Do you believe President Jokowi is committed to deepening and broadening relations with Australia?
Any Indonesian president will be committed to deepening and broadening relations with a close neighbour like Australia. Australia is a very important neighbour for us. We don’t choose our neighbours, so the only way that we can go forward is to develop close cooperation which could deliver both promises of harmonious, peaceful relations as well as prosperity together. So yes, I believe that President Jokowi will continue to place importance on Australia. And in fact, in his assessment, the key bilateral relationships will receive special attention because of the possible economic benefits that they bring. Australia is one of them. Indonesia–Australia bilateral relations are regarded as important, not just for diplomatic reasons, but also for what they can contribute to Indonesia’s economic development.
5. What is your view on the state of the relationship between our two countries given recent ups and downs, and what issues in the bilateral relationship will still trouble policymakers in Jakarta?
The ups and downs in relations usually do not generate from Indonesia. Our bilateral relationship is never an issue in Indonesia’s domestic politics. Quite often the changes of policy in Australia, and the way that it looks at different issues and the rhetoric sometimes can create trouble. But under the Turnbull government, the Prime Minister has visited Indonesia, and a number of key leaders from Australia have come to Indonesia and the same way from Indonesia to Australia. We work together on many issues including those related to counterterrorism, people-smuggling, climate change and regional security. But Indonesia and Australia continue to have differences and disagreements on certain issues.
Indonesian criminal law still allows the death penalty and Indonesia is very committed to this fight against drug trafficking, and, as we know, this can lead to diplomatic troubles. That’s one we will have to continue to pay attention to. The issues in Papua could also impact bilateral relations. Indonesia’s very committed to improving the welfare of people living in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, and President Jokowi himself has taken a very hands-on approach dealing with various vertical and horizontal conflicts.
6. What do you consider to be the biggest threat to global security?
State failure is one of the greatest threats to global security because when a state fails, the territory of that particular state can become fertile ground for the rise of radicalism, extremism, and that becomes a transnational issue. That is what happened in the Middle East allowing the spread of ISIS from Iraq and Syria. But we also have problems stemming from the global economic crisis, which has created hardship all over the world. We are all integrated and interconnected now, and so economic crisis can lead to social conflicts as well. And when people are competing for scarce resources, and if you don’t manage it well, it can lead to conflict. Climate change is not just an issue because of the rising waters and the sinking of small islands, but it also affects crops, it has a real impact on livelihood, and it creates dry seasons in Indonesia. So there are many, many issues that we need to pay attention to and particularly this kind of transnational problem necessitates closer cooperation between countries.
The Natuna Islands matter
In case anyone thinks that Indonesia’s somewhat diffident assertion of its fishing rights in the waters around the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea is just the usual squabble between fishermen from neighbouring countries, it’s important to recognise the issue for what it is: another potential trigger for serious force escalation in the South China Sea. And in case anyone thinks that China is going to back down and let Indonesian patrol vessels open fire on Chinese fishing vessels and then arrest them, it’s important to recognise that capitulation is about the last thing that China would contemplate.
First, a bit of geography. The Natuna archipelago consists of 272 islands with the largest, Natuna Besar, lying approximately 600 kilometres east of Kuantan (Malaysia) and 150 kilometres north-west of the northernmost tip of Kalimantan and almost 2,000 kilometers south of Hainan. Indonesia’s maritime border extends approximately 20 kilometers north of the most northern island of the group, Pulau Laut. Indonesia’s maritime border is recognised by Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, and there are no maritime issues in contention between them.
Second, a bit of geopolitics. China’s ‘nine dash line’, on which it stakes its South China Sea claims, was initially a Taiwanese claim, manufactured in 1947 with the assistance of the US. It includes the Paracel Islands to the east of Vietnam, Scarborough Reef to the west of the Philippines and the Spratly Islands to the west of the Philippines and north-west of Sabah. Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines have conflicting claims to parts of the Spratley Islands, while China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the lot. The problem for Indonesia, and China for that matter, is that the ‘nine dash line’ is not continuous, and just how the sixth and seventh dashes might be linked is part of the issue. But not all of it.
Third, a bit of strategic policy. China has long sought to secure its heartland through the creation of buffers—land buffers to its north and west, and, more lately, a massive sea buffer, its South China Sea claim, to its east and south. For strategic reasons, it would be impossible for China to resile from its South China Sea claim, not least of all because it wishes to afford maximum security and protection to its Yulin submarine base in southern Hainan province. And therein lies the current ‘fisheries’ problem around the Natuna Islands. While China seems ever ready to ‘beggar its neighbours’ by cleaning out what’s already a fish stock on the verge of collapse the real ‘fish’ in question are SSNs, not tuna and travelly.
So the core issue is a strategic one, not a maritime or seabed resources one. And that’s where the nature of any regional or international response becomes one of strategic moment. Like its ASEAN partners, Indonesia has hitherto been reluctant to take on China, preferring either to hope that the problem goes away (which it won’t) or that a regional resolution of the problem will not be to Indonesia’s disadvantage. Hence its offer of an ‘honest broker’—in a situation where there isn’t much honesty and even less brokering.
The US, particularly the USN, is keen to assert its rights to freedom of navigation by sailing a warship within China’s claimed EEZ in the South China Sea. And it would be happy for Australia to go along for the ride. The question is: just how smart would it be to risk escalation of the issue by testing China’s resolve with military vessels when China has evidently placed no restriction on the freedom of navigation of commercial vessels, very few of which fly US or Australian flags?
For its part, China will claim such an assertion of what it will describe as ‘so-called’ rights to be a provocation and an escalation. The US will thumb its nose at Chinese protests, but cause no change to China’s claim. So, for the US it’ll amount to little more than a demonstration of impotence, and for China a demonstration of its intransigence. And notwithstanding the fact that some 74% of Australians apparently favour Australia’s ‘conducting maritime operations…in an effort to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea’, the Australian government would need to take a long hard look at the strategic consequences of such an action. For we, too, would be doing little more than demonstrating our impotence.
There’s no doubt that China is bullying the ASEAN claimants. What’s more, China is getting away with it. And if the ASEAN nations are unwilling to act either individually or collectively in their own interests, what’s the advantage for Australia in taking a stand? Were Indonesia, for instance, to request RAN participation in a demonstration of freedom of navigation rights, there may be merit in such an exercise. It’s all very well for Indonesian President Joko Widodo and his senior Cabinet officers to meet on Natuna: China isn’t contesting Indonesia’s sovereignty, but rather Jakarta’s EEZ. Indonesia needs to find a more assertive way of standing up for its interests.
Strategic problems demand strategic solutions. Should the Permanent Court of Arbitration find in favour of the Philippines in its ruling on 7 July, China will certainly ignore the judgement, and may even repudiate the UNCLOS system entirely. And, as a non-signatory, there isn’t much that the US can do about that. Australia’s best strategic course is to continue to press for an international rules-based system for the management of international relations and the resolution of disputes, a system that China must both help to design and then abide by. A demonstration of impotence wouldn’t advance Australia’s regional strategic posture, and may be seen in ASEAN as just another example of Australia’s willingness to insert itself where it’s not needed.
An Indonesia time-bomb
Deep into the Press Club foreign affairs debate a faint ticking started—the hint of a time-bomb in Australia–Indonesia relations.
The Indonesia time-bomb wasn’t directly mentioned, just hinted. That is apt because Australia’s international relations have hardly been mentioned in this election.
In that spirit, come to the Indonesia time-bomb after inspecting surface issues.
Foreign affairs obviously matters in the Australian system. See the eminence of those doing foreign policy, even if it’ll have minimal impact on Saturday’s vote.
The Liberal deputy leader is Foreign Minister while the Labor deputy leader is shadow Foreign Minister.
The foreign affairs debate at the National Press Club last week was a contest between two women who—in party hierarchy and seniority—are one step away from being Prime Minister.
Julie Bishop and Tanya Plibersek can warm their leadership ambitions by the bonfire Kevin Rudd lit under the hoodoo that you can’t step from Foreign to be leader.
The Kevin won leadership the first time from the shadow Foreign job and got his second go as leader after being shunted as Foreign Minister.
Thus died the tradition that Foreign was the consolation prize given deposed leaders such as Hayden and Downer.
Tony Abbott wants to create a new tradition—the discarded leader gets Defence. If Malcolm Turnbull wins, the size of his majority will have a big say in whether he adopts this fresh custom.
Turnbull could rule that a-win-is-a-win and act as he pleases (the usual Liberal way).
Or he might bring Abbott inside the cabinet tent. Cue The Godfather music…’keep your friends close and your enemies closer’…
Majorities deliver power. The meaning of the mandate is less absolute. The voters decide and the winner can then devise and dispatch and deploy and divide the spoils.
Whatever mandate Turnbull wins—or Shorten snatches—it’ll have a domestic flavour. This has been an election about the internals, not the international.
The Press Club foreign affairs debate last week and the defence version the week before showed those areas won’t decide the outcome.
Bipartisanship reduces political brawling. Plibersek referred to Labor’s broad agreement with the Liberals on the US alliance, international institutions and engagement with Asia. Bishop nodded the same way.
What, then, separates the Libs and Labor in foreign policy?
You’ll not be surprised that on the answers from the two deputy leaders, Labor presents as the multilateralist/internationalist, the Liberals as pragmatic realists.
Plibersek’s analysis:
‘The greatest difference is in our approach to those problems without passports—the big global issues that face us. Climate change, the movement of people, the rise of non-state actors, health pandemics in an increasingly interconnected world. We think that Australia’s best chance of security and prosperity, too, is being part of a secure and prosperous world. And that requires us to be a good global citizen.’
The Libs aren’t going to let Labor own ‘good international citizen’, even if Gareth Evans has part copyright. Bishop said the Libs do good by being good at what they do:
‘I believe the difference comes down to approach. There’s a commendable level of bipartisanship in most areas of foreign policy. But it’s the difference in approach. Labor is very keen on White Papers and strategies but then not funding them and not delivering on them. It’s all very well to have an Asian White Paper but then if you don’t fund it and you don’t deliver any outcomes, it’s of no use. They had Defence White Papers but didn’t ever fund them. So, as Sir Arthur Tange said, a strategy without funding is no strategy at all.’
Now to the Indonesia time-bomb. As so often, it arrives via East Timor. Poor Timor Leste – independence won at grievous cost yet still buffeted by the needs of two big neighbours.
Plibersek announced in February that a Labor government would accept international arbitration over Australia’s sea boundary/resources dispute with Timor Leste.
At the Press Club, Plibersek said Australia should do what it’s urging China to do in the South China Sea—abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice.
Labor would ditch Canberra’s stance that the existing bilateral treaty with Dili is generous and shouldn’t be reopened.
The stand rests on Australia’s 2002 decision to withdraw from the maritime jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
Bishop told the Press Club: ‘We should maintain our commitment to the existing treaty.’
Plibersek: ‘We have decided it’s time for this issue to be settled.’
Bishop swiped Plibersek for not getting detailed briefings from Foreign Affairs before making the Timor change. Plibersek retorted that she was briefed and understood the issues.
The to-and-fro about full knowledge is when that faint ticking started.
Australia is being tough about Timor Leste’s border so it doesn’t set off the border time-bomb with Indonesia.
If Australia accepts international arbitration because the existing Timor treaty is ‘unfair’, that opens the way for Indonesia to do the same.
Jakarta has long maintained it was ‘taken to the cleaners’ by Australia in two seabed boundary agreements signed in 1971 and 1972.
Those treaties divided ownership by referring to the continental shelf, drawing the boundary well north of the median line between the shores of Australia and Indonesia. More for Oz, less for Indonesia.
Since then, international law has embraced the median-line concept. In international arbitration today, Indonesia would expect to get a lot of what is currently Oz.
Tick…tick…tick….
A powerful partnership to counter terrorism: Australia and Indonesia
On Wednesday last week on a rainy day in Sydney, Australia’s fight against terrorism took a significant step forward. We’re now looking outward towards wide-ranging and real collaboration with a significant and capable partner and neighbour: Indonesia.
At the second meeting of the Indonesia–Australia Ministerial Council on Law and Security, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Luhut Pandjaitan, cemented the powerful partnership on counterterrorism with his Australian counterparts Attorney-General Senator George Brandis and Minister for Justice and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Counter-Terrorism Michael Keenan.
For the third time in a year, our region’s counterterrorism capability has been enhanced by strong and strategic leadership from individuals looking beyond the challenges of the bilateral relationship to our shared interest in countering terrorism. Pandjaitan was in Sydney in November last year for the inaugural Asia–Pacific Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit, a joint initiative between Australia and Indonesia to enhance cooperation across the region and across the banking and finance sectors. Summit outcomes included resolving to produce the region’s first counter-terrorism financing risk assessment and common standards for data sharing, and to collaborate on educational tools. Brandis and Keenan followed soon after with a pre-Christmas visit to Jakarta for the first Ministerial Council meeting.
Those meetings are significant. The November visit was the first by an Indonesian minister since the cooling of relations over the November 2013 Snowden leaks revelation that the mobile phones of former President Yudhoyono and his wife were tapped by the Australian Signals Directorate, and the early 2015 controversy surrounding executions of drug-smuggling duo Myuran Sukumaran and Andrew Chan.
There’s a profound and urgent need for collaboration between the two countries on counterterrorism. And an equally serious need to rethink and recast our understanding of not only the very real challenges Indonesia faces on terrorism but also how our near neighbour is dealing with the issue. And we certainly have more to learn than is sometimes indicated by Australian commentators.
Against a backdrop of complex economic and political challenges, Indonesia has presented somewhat of a success story in its counterterrorism efforts. In just over a decade, Indonesian government elements and community groups, supported by international partners including Australia, had managed to degrade Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) once-lauded capabilities to relative insignificance.
Then came Syria.
We’re familiar with the impact of the Middle East conflict on terrorism in Australia, particularly the threat of returning foreign fighters. Indonesia also has foreign fighter concerns, compounded by JI using the rise of the so-called Islamic State as an opportunity to revive its flagging fortunes. Estimates of the number of Indonesian foreign fighters vary, with Minister Pandjaitan suggesting as many as 500 are currently fighting for Islamic State in the Middle East. As in Australia, Indonesian success in stopping would-be foreign fighters has had the knock-on effect of refocusing efforts to domestic attacks.
So how can Australia and Indonesia get the greatest value from this renewed focus? The agreement identifies priority areas as intelligence sharing, counterterrorism financing, counter-radicalisation and foreign fighters.
Useful work is already underway in relation to intelligence and counterterrorism financing.
The agreement is right to focus also on foreign fighters and counter-radicalisation. There’s enormous opportunity for complementary efforts in those areas.
While Australia’s concern with returning foreign fighters relates primarily to the threat of terrorist attacks, the concern in Indonesia is that the Middle East conflict is being used as a training ground for the resurgence of JI and the establishment of a wilayat (a province of a caliphate) in Indonesia. A successful and renewed JI running territory in Indonesia would be disastrous for the entire region; it’s directly in Australia’s interest to do what it can to fight and deny the resurgence of JI.
But Indonesia has defeated JI before: operationally by its government, and religiously and ideologically by its people. And Australia can only benefit from collaborating further with its neighbour to stop the re-emergence of JI in the region.
Indonesia’s counter-radicalisation efforts to date have been problematic and exacerbated by broader economic and social challenges—including its prisons effectively operating as sanctuaries and recruiting centres for extremists. But some progress is slowly being made and Australia could play an important supporting role to Indonesia’s counter-radicalisation efforts. We face a comparatively smaller radicalisation problem and a more current countering violent extremism (CVE) program. We could support Indonesia through targeting some of our considerable research effort—around half of Australia’s overall CVE activity according to one study—into areas of mutual benefit.
The real value of the partnership between Australia and Indonesia, however, may lay beyond the bilateral relationship. The challenge of terrorism extends throughout Southeast Asia and across the Indo–Pacific. As is happening already in the counterterrorist financing sphere, Australia and Indonesia could bring together their considerable shared expertise and reach to provide joint leadership to assist our region to work together better to counter terrorism.
A jointly-hosted regional summit on counter-radicalisation, and others on agreed priorities such as foreign fighters, would bring together public, private and community group stakeholders who may be affected and able to assist in addressing the problem. An initial contribution from Australia might include resourcing a database reference on CVE programs across the region to support information-sharing and building practitioner networks across the various fields that cross over on CVE.
The terrorist threat isn’t confined to state borders; nor should our responses be so constrained. Australia and Indonesia have been through political ups and downs, and as is invariably the case with neighbours, and those will undoubtedly continue. But collaborating in an area of shared interest will improve both our capability to counter terrorism, and our longer-term relationship.
Abu Sayyaf and terrorism in the southern Philippines
When Washington dispatched a joint special operations task force to the southern Philippines in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, it was motivated by evidence that the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) militant group had links with Al Qaeda and was expanding its influence beyond the immediate region.
Backed by helicopters and drones, the 600-strong force may have been there in little more than an advisory and training role, but it was one effective way of demonstrating to Americans that its government was responding to the worst terrorist assault on US soil.
In the end, the unit stayed until 2014, but sources familiar with the mission now say it was never aimed at destroying the ASG, only at degrading it to a point where US citizens and interests in the southern Philippines were no longer under threat.
Whether that was accomplished is a now point of debate after a Jakarta shipping firm last week paid a US$1 million ransom to free 10 Indonesian crewmen who had been abducted from a tugboat towing a coal barge through the Sulu Sea. Another four Indonesian and four Malaysian sailors are still being held by what’s believed to be the same al-Habsy Misaya faction of ASG, which operates from Tapul island, lying halfway between the island provinces of Tawi-Tawi and Sulu.
The case had taken on new urgency after a separate Abu Sayyaf gang beheaded a Canadian mining executive, seized along with a second Canadian and a Norwegian from a marina in Davao, 595 kilometres to the east of Sulu, last September.
If the Indonesians had ever contemplated a rescue mission, they would have been confronted with a baffling range of complexities, all centering around the way the ASG’s motives and affiliations are tied up in the often-bloody turbulence of southern Philippine politics.
As much as it trumpets its allegiance to the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), only one ASG faction—on Basilan Island to the northeast of Sulu—appears to have direct links to the extremist group, and few if any Filipino militants are among the hundreds of Indonesians and Malaysians fighting in the Middle East.
Back in the early 2000s, US intelligence officers knew very little about the extent of ASG’s connections to Al Qaeda. Even today they have serious reservations about what constitutes links to ISIS, apart from militants waving its familiar black flag.
It’s certainly doubtful whether any of the disparate gangs that make up ASG take orders or are receiving material or financial support from ISIS Central. The presence of foreign fighters over the years, including a Moroccan killed on Basilan recently, doesn’t prove much either.
In fact, Islam now plays an increasingly peripheral role in the ASG’s activities, which these days are more focused on kidnapping for ransom than bombings and other outright terrorist attacks. In other words, it’s back to business as usual in one of Asia’s most lawless regions.
The Indonesian Government refused to pay the ransom for the 10 sailors, but said it wouldn’t stop the tugboat owners from doing so. That’s similar to 2011 when the Samudera shipping line paid US$3 million to secure the release of a bulk carrier and its 20-man crew off the coast of Somalia.
In that case, a 1,000-strong combined services task force sent to the Horn of Africa did actually intervene when a second group of pirates sought to seize back the ship after the original abductors had left with the ransom.
Indonesia’s only previous rescue mission was in March 1981 when Special Forces commandos stormed a hijacked Garuda Airlines plane at Bangkok’s Don Muang International Airport and freed its 53 passengers and crew.
Mindanao presented a whole new challenge. While an Indonesian intelligence team was embedded with Philippine troops on Sulu, a rescue this time would have been extremely difficult in such an uncontrolled environment.
Indeed, a range of local sources claim there are ties between al-Habsy Misaya and Sulu Vice-Governor Abdusakur Tan, who unsuccessfully ran against incumbent Mujiv Hataman for the governorship of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the May 9 elections.
That has led to speculation that the taking of the Indonesians and Malaysians—and a surge in unreported abductions of wealthy businessmen across the wider region—were aimed at raising election funding for Tan and other politicians.
A Chinese Tausug, Tan is no stranger to violence. In mid-1990, forces loyal to the then-congressmen and his uncle, Saud Tan, the mayor of the Sulu capital of Jolo, fought a pitched battle with mortars and heavy machineguns against the followers of Vice-Governor, Kimar Tulawie.
By the time the Philippine Marines intervened from their hilltop base overlooking Jolo, the fighting had claimed more than 20 lives, destroyed an 800-metre swathe of the ramshackle city centre and left more than 800 people homeless.
The Abu Sayyaf was not around then and the ARMM, created only a year earlier by binding together western Mindanao’s five mainly Muslim provinces, was still struggling to get off the ground. In many respects, it still is.
What made the latest round of kidnappings a more serious escalation was the pressure being put on the Philippine government to allow the Indonesian and Malaysian governments to take direct action to intervene.
No one thinks that would have been a good idea, particularly at a time when the Philippine Army is still reeling from the loss of 18 soldiers last month in a single 10-hour firefight on Basilan island.
But if ASG is not the threat it once posed as an Al Qaeda beachhead in Southeast Asia, Indonesian and Malaysian officials are increasingly worried its piratic raids could turn the Sulu archipelago into another Somalia.
That has led to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines agreeing to mount joint patrols along the Sulawesi-Sulu corridor, which carries an estimated 18 million people and 55 million tonnes of cargo a year.
But whether those patrols expand into a much bigger sea-lane—the one running through the disputed waters of the South China Sea to the west—is a completely different question.
Australia: Indonesia’s apathetic neighbour
For those privileged to attend the second day of ASPI’s Defence White Paper: from the Page to Reality conference on 8 April 2016, the address by the former President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was galvanizing. SBY spoke with conviction, enthusiasm and optimism about the strategic potential immanent in the bilateral relationship.
Former Defence Minister Kim Beazley’s reply from the floor was no less stimulating for his powerful sense of Indonesia’s critical place in Australia’s long term prosperity and security—and, one should note, for his recognition of the central role that SBY played in the restoration of an effective bilateral relationship during his presidency.
If only their views were shared by those who lead our government and our Foreign Affairs and Defence organisations. For all the elegant rhetoric of Ministerial speeches and the noble aspirations of the Defence White Paper itself, words remain exactly that: words. To put substance on the bones of sentiment demands understanding, alignment and action—things that are in short supply when it comes to operationalising our foreign and defence policies.
Complacency is the enemy of opportunity, especially when it’s comfortably cushioned by the smug, self-satisfied superiority that distinguishes Australia’s approach to all things Asian. So long as we can preach to the region, there’s no need for us to listen to our neighbours, to understand their cultures or to converse with them in their own languages.
SBY’s audience listened attentively as he delivered his beautifully crafted speech in nicely articulated English. But not a single senior member of the government or the opposition, not a single secretary or public sector leader, not a single service chief was there to listen. One wonders whether President Bill Clinton, had ASPI been able to secure his contribution as a speaker, would have been so ignored by our government and public sector elite.
Australians like to think that we can leverage ‘the Asian century’ by talking about how capable we are, the remarkable amenity we enjoy, and about the need for regional nations to honour human rights and observe the international rules-based order created for them by the distribution of power in the post WW2 world. We want to prosper on the back of Asia’s need for raw materials, food and, increasingly, services—on our terms.
But what we’re actually demonstrating is a kind of institutional ignorance that pays no attention to the linguistic and ethnic diversity of our neighbours (just as we pay lip service to our own), preferring instead to remain defiantly monolingual and stubbornly unaware of their cultural sensibilities. As the Asian Century White Paper (PDF) pointed out, the study of Asian languages has been on the decline for two decades, except among children with an Asian background—a fact to which Michael Wesley drew our attention five years ago.
The Asian century offers extraordinary promise, both to the peoples of Asia as they move from poverty to affluence, and to us as we partner them on their journey. But to realise that promise, the nations of Asia need participative political systems and open economies, which will happen only to the extent that their political, economic and legal institutions are robust and transparent.
That means working beyond the western-educated elites that tend to form the political superstructures of regional governments to engage with the emerging middle class—the business leaders and emerging capitalists, the public servants, and the specialist service delivery entrepreneurs such as accountants, architects, bankers, economists, engineers, educators, health service deliverers, importers and manufacturers as they leverage Australian know-how to improve the lives of their fellow citizens.
To do that, however, means speaking their languages, understanding their cultures, and embedding ourselves in their new economies. For Australia, this’s a deeply strategic issue. The prevailing orthodoxy, however, would have them come to us—to learn and absorb—in much the same way that Australians in the early 20th century went to Britain. That has to be turned on its head: we must go to them—to coach and mentor, to engage and partner.
With PNG, Indonesia is our closest neighbour and our most important. Indonesia recognises that fact, just as it recognises that Australia has the capacity to play a constructive role in its own political and economic development.
SBY is without doubt Australia’s greatest strategic asset in Indonesia, not simply because of his intelligence and goodwill, but because of his imagination and vision. He understands our mutual history, with its ups and downs. More importantly, he appreciates the breadth of the opportunities presenting themselves to both of us. To deliver on those opportunities, we need to build a sense of common enterprise, whether through education, scientific cooperation, security collaboration, capacity building, institution strengthening and, importantly, the nurturing of ties between our parliaments.
Truculent insularity is no substitute for respectful engagement. That starts with knowing who our friends are, extending to them the respect that’s demonstrated by showing up and listening when they take the trouble to talk to us. And, by the way, it would really help if we could talk to them on their terms.