Tag Archive for: Indonesia

This is not the time for increasing Indonesia’s defence spending

Indonesia could do without an increase in military spending that the Ministry of Defence is proposing. The country has more pressing issues, including public welfare and human rights. Moreover, the transparency and accountability to justify such a plan is also questionable.

The ministry proposed in January that defence spending should rise gradually to 1.5 percent of GDP by some unstated target year. The ratio has been 0.6 to 0.7 percent of GDP for the past decade, lower than that of many Southeast Asian neighbours and Indo-Pacific countries, including Japan, South Korea and India.

An increase to 1.5 percent would be subject to parliamentary approval. It could indeed significantly enhance Indonesia’s defence capabilities—for example, by modernising equipment, lifting research and development and improving welfare for military personnel.

With the extra money, Indonesia could prioritise key acquisitions such as radars, early warning aircraft, fighter jets, submarines and rescue submarines. The government could give military personnel higher performance allowances—bonuses that apply across the state sector and constitute large portions of employees’ remuneration. The armed forces’ allowance of 70 percent is low. Increasing it would help address longstanding concerns about the adequacy of military compensation.

Furthermore, Indonesia must enhance its defence capabilities given its strategic position overseeing four choke points, and concerns over airspace intrusions and maritime law violations. The current unstable geopolitical situation, especially in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, demands stronger defence.

However, such an increase must be handled transparently, accountably and with meaningful public participation, especially with 306 trillion rupiah (roughly A$35 billion) in budget cuts in other sectors. Indonesia has the democratic tools for proper oversight, but in practice the government and parliament do not attend closely to how the armed forces spend their money.

Moreover, this is the wrong time economically for increasing defence spending. The country is close to deflation and the danger to economic growth that it would bring. Prabowo is meanwhile slashing budgets for essential government activities such as healthcare, elementary and higher education, public works and infrastructure projects. Those are better places to spend any extra money that could be allocated to defence.

It isn’t at all clear that more military funding would be well spent. Indonesia lacks clear direction in defence policy. The government has yet to present a concrete plan following the failure of the Minimum Essential Force program, which concluded in 2024 with only 65 percent of the target assessed as achieved. Prabowo’s replacement program is Optimum Essential Force, but no concrete details have been announced. The public is increasingly sceptical of the administration’s ability to define a coherent defence policy.

The Indonesian Defence White Paper is outdated, being last revised in 2015. The global and regional security environment has evolved dramatically, and neighbouring countries—such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia—have updated their defence policies in that time. Cambodia, for instance, released its National Defence Policy in 2022 and its first Defence Strategic Update at the end of 2024, outlining Cambodia’s priorities such as border security, international peacekeeping and long-term reforms for its armed forces. In contrast, Indonesia appears to be lagging in addressing evolving security threats.

Indonesians have even more reason to be sceptical of rises in the defence budget as controversial military policy initiatives spark concerns about potential threats to democracy and seem to impede advancement of security sector reforms and professionalisation of the military. These include deeper influence down to the level of villages, helping with what should be a purely civil program to provide free nutritious meals, and assigning high-ranking active military officers to civilian roles. Revisions to the law governing the armed forces have added the growing suspicion about the military’s increasing role in civilian governance.

Altogether, this does not look like a good time to plan for more than doubling the armed force’s share of the national economy.

Indonesia’s cyber soldiers: armed without a compass

The Indonesian military has a new role in cybersecurity but, worryingly, no clear doctrine on what to do with it nor safeguards against human rights abuses.

Assignment of cyber responsibility to the military is part of controversial amendments to the Armed Forces Law which the parliament passed in March and which significantly broadened the armed forces’ role in civilian governance.

The government says these amendments are crucial for strengthening Indonesia’s capabilities in information operations, with the military playing a pivotal role in safeguarding national interests in cyberspace. Military officials have also said the military’s cyber capabilities will not be used to police digital spaces or restrict freedom of expression. They point to the establishment of the Singaporean armed forces’ cyber force in 2022 as a precedent and to cyber operations in the Russia-Ukraine war as developments the amendments aim to address.

However, cyber defence without a guiding doctrine is akin to navigating a battlefield without a compass. The Indonesian military lacks a published cyber strategy, so its mandate in cyberspace is unclear. The most recent strategic document, the Guidelines on Non-Military Defence, issued by the Defence Ministry in 2016, does not specifically address cyber operations and is now outdated. More recent policies, such as the 2020–2024 National Defence Implementation Policy and the 2023 State Defence Doctrine, mention cyberattacks and hybrid warfare but fail to clearly define the military’s role or response.

Important questions remain unanswered: What constitutes a cyber threat? Who are the adversaries? What measures are deemed appropriate responses?

Without clear answers, the military’s involvement in cybersecurity risks allowing actions that may infringe on civil liberties.

Historically, Indonesia’s security apparatus has prioritised conventional threats: separatism, terrorism and political instability. This traditional focus has shaped a strategic culture that is poorly equipped for the complexities of the digital realm. Since the establishment of its Cyber Unit in 2017, the Indonesian military has struggled to meet personnel requirements, filling only around 40 percent of planned positions.

Although recruitment criteria have been adjusted to attract more civilian talent, the shortened military education for these recruits has raised concerns among officials about their integration into military units, particularly regarding their understanding of the chain of command and commitment to military service. Rather than fostering a comprehensive cyber strategy, the recent amendments appear reactive, potentially leading to overreach and the suppression of dissent under the guise of national security.

Expanding the military’s role into cybersecurity also raises concerns about the militarisation of civilian spaces. Cybersecurity inherently intersects with civilian life, covering such issues as privacy, freedom of expression and access to information. Entrusting the military with significant authority in this domain, without stringent oversight and accountability, risks undermining democratic principles and human rights.

The military’s history of information operations complicates things. Traditionally, the Indonesian military has conducted psychological operations aimed at shaping public perception and behaviour. It has often portrayed online criticism as information warfare, sometimes framing it as part of a proxy war involving foreign entities attempting to erode public trust in the military.

This narrative is particularly evident in operations in Papua, where critics frequently highlight the military’s harsh treatment of civilians, its role in protecting government-approved businesses, and incidents involving the killing of non-combatants. Integrating such operations into the cyber realm without clear boundaries and oversight presents risks of enabling the manipulation of information, the dissemination of propaganda, and the suppression of dissenting voices under the pretext of maintaining national security.

Moreover, the process behind the amendments has drawn criticism for its lack of transparency and public consultation. Deliberations were reportedly fast-tracked and conducted behind closed doors and civil society was sidelined. This potentially risks unchecked military influence in civilian governance.

The digital age undoubtedly requires robust cybersecurity measures, but these must be underpinned by clear strategies and respect for values such as privacy and freedom of expression. Without a well-defined doctrine and appropriate safeguards, the military’s expanded role in cyberspace risks becoming a tool for repression rather than protection.

The new stipulation offers no substantial change from the military’s existing responsibilities to counter espionage and sabotage that target military networks and critical government infrastructure. It is therefore unclear which specific threats the new law seeks to address, especially given that an academic paper published by the parliament does not mention cyber threats even once.

To navigate this complex terrain responsibly, Indonesia must develop a comprehensive cyber strategy that clearly delineates military and civilian roles, establishes robust oversight mechanisms and upholds the democratic values that the nation has worked hard to build since the fall of authoritarian rule. Without such a framework, Indonesia’s cyber soldiers remain armed without a compass—operating on a complex digital battlefield without clear direction, to the potential detriment of the very freedoms they are meant to protect.

The threat spectrum

Democracy watch

Indonesia’s parliament passed revisions to the country’s military law, which pro-democracy and human rights groups view as a threat to the country’s democracy. One of the revisions seeks to expand the number of civilian agencies accessible to military personnel from 10 to 15, encompassing roles within the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court. The move is seen as blurring the line between military and civilian authority, effectively reviving the dual-function doctrine, under which the military had a role in both security and socio-political affairs.

ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights warned that expanding the military’s role in domestic security could lead to suppression of peaceful protests and civil society activities. It also cautioned that Indonesia’s move could normalise military involvement in civilian affairs across the ASEAN region, reflecting similar patterns of democratic backsliding in countries like Thailand and Myanmar.

A Strategist article highlights that the revision should raise concerns for Australia, the United States and other democratic nations that backed Indonesia’s political and military reforms during the Reformasi period.

Planet A

According to the CSIRO, sea surface temperatures in Australia’s marine jurisdiction have risen by 1.08 degrees C since 1900, with the past decade being the warmest period on record. Sea surface temperatures around Australia have reached new records in the past five months, and oceans are expected to stay unusually warm throughout autumn.

Rising ocean temperature, salinity and acidity can alter how sound travels and, therefore, affect submarine detection. A 2024 study found that submarine detection ranges are decreasing due to changing conditions in strategic regions, such as the North Atlantic and Western Pacific.

Info ops

Misleading posts are circulating on Chinese social media platform Rednote, with some experts fearing that the content could interfere in Australian domestic affairs. The posts include AI-generated deepfake videos claiming that the Australian government plans to expel Chinese Australians and revoke their citizenships—a claim that officials have strongly denied. Researchers note that the app has a unique algorithm that makes it easy for misinformation to spread.

According to experts, the misleading content could be part of a broader political disinformation campaign aimed at sowing fear and distrust within migrant communities. A federal election will be held on 3 May. The Australian Electoral Commission has said it is not actively monitoring the platform.

Follow the money

Critical minerals are primed as bargaining chips in trade negotiations. A range of minerals central to high-tech supply chains, such as graphite and rare earth metals, were exempt from the tariffs that the United States imposed last week.

The Australian government has begun leveraging Australia’s rich mineral reserves in negotiations with the US. On 4 April, it announced plans for a ‘strategic critical minerals reserve’. But details are scant so far. It’s unclear whether the government intends to hold back a certain volume from export for use as leverage or to move more refining and processing onshore. The Minerals Council of Australia has treated the whole idea with caution.

Terror byte

The Trump administration has withdrawn funding for counterterrorism research, including a grant of nearly $1 million for a project led by the Australian National University.

The grant in question was provided by the US Department of Homeland Security to investigate the prevalence and nature of grievance-fuelled violence and acts of terrorism within the US. The department says the project was terminated as it ‘no longer effectuates department priorities’.

Experts warn that these cuts will weaken intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, particularly around far-right extremism.

Joint naval exercises with Russia undermine Indonesia’s commitment to international law

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has repeatedly asserted the country’s commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy. But can Indonesia still credibly claim neutrality while tacitly engaging with Russia?

Holding an unprecedented bilateral naval drills with Moscow in Indonesian waters while Russia wages a full-scale war against Ukraine is a strategic misstep. The move risks undermining Indonesia’s own stated commitment to upholding international law. It also creates a perception of inconsistency in its foreign policy and weakens its moral standing on the global stage.

In November 2024, Indonesia and Russia held their first-ever bilateral naval exercise, Orruda Joint Training, in the Java Sea near Surabaya. While Russia had previously participated in regional maritime drills with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2021, this was the first time Jakarta engaged in naval exercises solely with Moscow. The move was deemed controversial, as it took place amid widespread condemnation of Russia for its serious breaches of international law.

Shortly after the drills with Russia, Indonesia also conducted its largest-ever combined military exercise with Australia, Keris Woomera. Taking place from 13 to 16 November under the Indonesia-Australia Defence Cooperation Agreement, the exercise involved around 2000 personnel from both nations’ navies, armies and air forces. Similarly, from 25 August to 6 September 2024, Indonesia hosted its annual Super Garuda Shield exercise with the United States in East Java. Twenty-three nations participated in the drills, with 11 countries actively involved in the exercises.

By conducting drills with both Russian and Western militaries, Indonesia emphasised its non-aligned stance. Analysts state that Jakarta was sending a signal to the world, particularly the Indo-Pacific region, that Indonesia will not take sides and intends to continue building relations with all major powers and regional players.

This position is often cited as part of Jakarta’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy, which reflects its desire to befriend all nations, regardless their political orientation. As Prabowo has stated on multiple occasions, ‘A thousand friends are too few, and one enemy is too many’.

Yet Indonesia’s decision to proceed with naval drills alongside Russia amid that country’s ongoing war in Ukraine is questionable.

Many legal experts have stated that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine violates the UN Charter and constitutes one of the gravest breaches of international law: the crime of aggression.

On 27 February 2022, Indonesia joined 140 other countries in a UN General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, reaffirming its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence unity, and territorial integrity. The resolution further ‘[deplored] in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter’. This signals Indonesia’s apparent stance against Russian aggression—a signal that contradicts its justifications for the joint military exercises.

On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Commissioner for Children’s Rights. This was followed by warrants on 5 March 2024 against Lieutenant General Sergei Kobylash and Admiral Viktor Sokolov for war crimes and crimes against humanity. On 24 June 2024, further warrants were issued for Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on similar charges.

Indonesia’s non-alignment provides the flexibility to engage in military training with any nation. However, conducting exercises with a state that is in flagrant violation of international law is highly imprudent, especially while the conflict is ongoing.

Moreover, if Jakarta intends to justify its position under the banner of non-alignment, it must revisit the principles set forth at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which served as the bedrock for the formal founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Chief among these principles is mutual respect for sovereignty and non-aggression. Engaging in military training with an aggressor directly contradicts the very essence of non-alignment.

Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia in 2035

Australian policymakers are vastly underestimating how climate change will disrupt national security and regional stability across the Indo-Pacific.

A new ASPI report assesses the ways climate impacts could threaten Indonesia’s economic and security interests in the next decade, driving consequences across the Indo-Pacific at a crucial time for both the country and the region.

If we fail to anticipate and adapt to accumulating climate-driven risks, we risk stumbling blindly into crises that could lead to severe losses in security, finance and life. Indonesia is one of Australia’s nearest neighbours and will play an increasingly important role in regional affairs in the years ahead. We must understand and address the full implications of climate change for Indonesia and, by extension, our shared future.

The report identifies three key pathways to compounding and destabilising climate disruptions in Indonesia.

One is significant food insecurity that comes from declining domestic production due to shifting rainfall patterns and seasonal extremes, heightened sensitivity to global food price shocks, and a diminished government capacity to absorb these economic disruptions.

The second is large-scale population displacement. Indonesia has a high coastal population density and so is particularly vulnerable and exposed to climate-amplified coastal flooding from sea-level rise and storm surges.

The third is slowed economic growth resulting from reduced agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, and rising disaster-related costs affecting infrastructure and supply chains.

While the physical impacts of climate change are already intensifying, the most concerning outcomes globally will arise from social, economic and political disruptions which are far more difficult to predict or manage than isolated disaster events.

Given an already unstable global context of rising geopolitical tensions, climate impacts will only magnify this volatility. For example, in 2023, a drought rendered the Panama Canal impassable, just as Red Sea shipping was being disrupted by Houthi attacks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 constrained a major source of global wheat supply, while India’s ban on certain rice exports further strained global food markets, affecting many communities globally that were already food insecure.

We have focused this report on Indonesia because of its geopolitical significance, rapidly growing economy, large population and its high exposure to complex climate risks. While we do not assess Indonesia’s considerable capabilities to manage these risks, we highlight the intensity of challenges that may be underestimated by policymakers.

With this in mind, the Indonesian government and its regional partners—including Australia—must work together to anticipate and prepare for climate disruptions of this scale. The report makes research and policy recommendations to guide those efforts and lays the foundation for proactive diplomacy and effective international development interventions in the Indo-Pacific. These include:

—Conducting future analyses of the systemic economic impact of climate change across the Indo-Pacific, with a particular focus on Indonesia;

—Prioritising regional collaboration on climate-amplified population displacement;

—Strengthening regional and global diplomatic efforts to enhance cooperation and reduce volatility in the global food system; and

—Expanding food security initiatives to mitigate the effects of climate change on domestic food production.

The report also suggests that Indonesia and its partners should prepare for diminishing economic and disaster relief support across Southeast Asia, including by advancing the value proposition for continued public and private sector investment in regional climate resilience

We hope this report sparks a vital conversation about how Indonesia, Australia and regional partners can better prepare for significant and rapidly emerging climate disruptions. In coming months, we plan to apply the same analytical approach to other countries across the region, as we have done by highlighting the significant risks Australia faces and the need for it to rapidly build climate resilience.

Beyond Indonesia’s preparedness, there is a pressing need for a deeper public discussion in Australia about cross-border climate risks. Despite Australia’s future being inextricably linked to the Indo-Pacific, awareness and discussion of these issues remain limited.

Neither the Office of National Intelligence’s national assessment of climate and security risks (or even de-classified findings from it), nor the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water’s National Climate Risk Assessment have been released publicly. In the absence of their release, more analyses like those in this report are needed to fill the gap in strategic public conversations on climate issues

We must clarify and prioritise national efforts to reflect the scope and scale of investments needed to adapt to climate change at home and abroad. Exploring complex climate risks also helps us better understand the underestimated high costs of inaction and the consequences of failing to prevent worst-case climate futures.

In the absence of this forward-looking conversation, we leave blinders on our security and economic outlooks, leaving us unprepared for climate-amplified disruption.

More unneeded officers, more military influence. Indonesia’s law revision is a mistake

Amendments to Indonesia’s military law risk undermining civilian supremacy and the country’s defence capabilities. Passed by the House of Representatives on 20 March, the main changes include raising the retirement age and allowing military officers to serve in more government agencies. These are not as harmless as they sound.

Under the changes, the maximum retirement age for officers will be increased from 58 to 60. Meanwhile, four-star generals could serve until 63, with an additional two-year extension applied at the president’s discretion.

This move could exacerbate a pressing issue: the growing number of high-ranking officers without official assignments. According to Indonesia Strategic and Defence Studies, at least 120 high-ranking officers currently lack active postings within the military. Extending their service would likely worsen this excess, delaying the regeneration of leadership and reducing opportunities for younger officers to rise through the ranks.

Furthermore, service extensions risk favouritism within the military. Because they will be discretionary, the system may prioritise loyalty over capability, potentially sidelining more competent officers from important roles. As shown by the Iran-Iraq War, in which the Iraqi officer corps mainly consisted of Saddam Hussein’s personal aide, this priority of loyalty over skills may hinder response and capacity.

Another contentious aspect is the expansion of the number of civilian government agencies where military personnel can work. Under the previous law, active military officers could serve in just 10 government agencies, such as the National Search and Rescue Agency and the National Resilience Institute. Initially, the new law increased the number to 15, including the Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office, National Narcotics Agency, and Ministry of Marine and Fisheries. After pushback from civil society, the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries was excluded.

While some may argue that the new regulation establishes clear boundaries for military involvement in government agencies, it remains unclear whether military personnel will be assigned only to specific positions or if they could occupy any available role.

In Indonesia, the military is often regarded as more disciplined and loyal than civilians, fostering an unhealthy and imbalanced power dynamic between military personnel and civilian professionals. This issue is further exacerbated by the military’s strong esprit de corps, which risks prioritising fellow soldiers for key positions over more skilled civilian candidates.

Additionally, the military’s hierarchical structure can weaken fair and inclusive decision-making within agencies. When military officers assume leadership roles, it raises the risk of groupthink and cognitive biases, as decision-making tends to be centralised around a single leader rather than following a more deliberative bureaucratic process.

More importantly, there are still loopholes, as some military figures can bypass regulations. For example, the appointment of active-duty officer Teddy Indra Wijaya as Indonesia’s Cabinet Secretary would normally have been illegal. To legitimise his decision, President Prabowo released a presidential decree, moving the Cabinet Secretary under the Presidential Military Secretariat. Prabowo’s efforts to accommodate Teddy show the ability of the president to override regulations, when necessary, which raises concerns about the effectiveness of safeguards against unchecked military influence.

This growing military involvement in civilian governance is a red flag for Indonesia’s democratic trajectory. If left unchecked, it could undermine one of the key achievements of post-Suharto reforms: the principle of civilian supremacy. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the military’s expanded role could erode investor confidence and comfort, potentially triggering capital flight.

Rather than raising the retirement age, a more effective approach would be restructuring and expanding combat units within the military to employ surplus officers. The military should also consider making its employment regulations more flexible. Currently, officers must complete 10 years of mandatory service before being eligible for retirement. Reducing this duration would allow them to retire earlier and, therefore, reduce surplus personnel. Additionally, the government may consider offering incentives for early retirees and upskilling programs to prepare them for career transition into the private and other civilian sectors.

Furthermore, to improve the military’s capability, defence policymakers should focus on combat capacity rather than only addressing personnel management issues. The law makes no comprehensive mention of modern warfare priorities such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence—despite previous commitments from armed forces commander Agus Subiyanto to integrate these elements into a new military doctrine. This omission is particularly striking, given the growing importance of cyber warfare in contemporary security dynamics.

The revision should concern Australia, the United States and other democratic powers that supported Indonesia’s political and military reform in the Reformasi era. This era is marked by numerous human rights violations by the military, such as the kidnappings of students in the 1998 riots and alleged involvement in the 1999 East Timor crisis.

This revision’s reversing of progress in military professionalisation and setting back of civilian supremacy reflect the ineffective use of spending intended to reform the military in the early 2000s. This includes the International Military Education and Training program, which focuses on professional military education, human rights training and joint exercises.

Sharing security interests, ASEAN’s big three step up cooperation

Southeast Asia’s three most populous countries are tightening their security relationships, evidently in response to China’s aggression in the South China Sea. This is most obvious in increased cooperation between the coast guards of the three countries – Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

But the three are moving closer together in bilateral arrangements, not as anything like a united trio. Going that far would be too damaging for their relations with China.

The obvious, though unstated, reason for collaboration is that all three have shared interests in a rules-based maritime order in the South China Sea. China’s widely disputed nine-dash line overlaps some territorial claims of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China also claims that areas of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea slightly overlap its claims.

Principally due to Beijing’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the region, there has been an escalation of military standoffs between China and each of Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

The three are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, but the grouping  has been unable to collectively act on territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines have instead found security cooperation on a bilateral level much more effective in advancing their domestic security interests. This is understandable as ASEAN is not a security alliance like NATO. Its principal focus and greatest success has been in economic development and trade.

For instance, amid the growing instability in the region, Jakarta has strengthened bilateral defence ties with both Manila and Hanoi. In 2022, Indonesia and Vietnam agreed to the boundaries of their exclusive economic zones in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Before the deal, they had overlapping claims in the North Natuna Sea.

In October, the Indonesian and Vietnamese coast guards jointly exercised off Ba Ria-Vung Tau, a southern Vietnamese province. The occasion also marked the first visit by an Indonesian coast guard ship to a Vietnamese port since a 2021 memorandum of understanding on maritime security and safety cooperation.

Last  month the two countries elevated their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and committed to strengthening defence cooperation, particularly in maritime security.

Furthermore, Indonesia and the Philippines have deepened their security ties through the 2022 Indonesia-Philippines Defence Agreement. The Philippines and Indonesia run regular maritime border patrols in their respective maritime boundaries. In 2014, the two neighbours resolved their existing overlapping maritime claims under UNCLOS.

Working with Malaysia under a trilateral cooperative arrangement, Indonesia and the Philippines have run regular joint maritime patrols since 2017. This arrangement shows both Manila and Jakarta are willing and able to conduct a trilateral maritime cooperation with a third ASEAN country.

Also last month, the Philippines and Vietnam participated in the Indonesian navy’s annual multilateral naval exercise, Komodo, in Bali. In January, coast guard personnel from the US, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines took part in a two-week maritime training course in Mindanao in the Philippines.

The Philippines and Vietnam have reinforced their maritime security awareness capabilities. Early last year, they signed a landmark maritime security deal. In it, Hanoi and Manila agreed to enhance maritime cooperation between their coastguards in the South China Sea, with a particular focus on working together to prevent and manage incidents in disputed waters.

However, the three countries may be reluctant to go as far as establishing a trilateral arrangement, because doing so could further provoke China, which now has the world’s largest navy. For instance, in 2023 China’s Nansha, the largest coast guard ship in the world, was sent to the North Natuna Sea. The incident occurred shortly after the Indonesia-Vietnam agreement on the boundaries of their exclusive economic zones. Some maritime security experts interpreted the deployment of the vessel as evidence that the new deal discomforted Beijing, which counts on intra-ASEAN divisions to prevent the emergence of a united front of claimant states against China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Another major obstacle to such a trilateral arrangement could be the three countries’ significant economic relationships with China. China remains the largest trading partner for both Indonesia and Vietnam. It is also one of the Philippines top trading partners.

Nonetheless, the three strategic partners have accepted that they cannot leave it to ASEAN multilateralism to advance their shared security interests in the South China Sea. Deepening bilateral defence ties between the trio could be an incentive to build toward a united and effective trilateral maritime partnership.

Indonesia wants an aircraft carrier. No one knows why

When it comes to fleet modernisation program, the Indonesian navy seems to be biting off more than it can chew. It is not even clear why the navy is taking the bite. The news that it wants to buy the Italian navy’s decommissioned aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi came as a surprise.

Operating such a ship with helicopters is a big enough challenge in itself, but now we hear from media reports that the navy also wants to operate Harrier fighters from it.

Despite the challenges, the Indonesian navy isn’t saying why it needs such capability. Neither current planning documents nor the recently ended Minimum Essential Force modernisation program outlined plans for Indonesia to acquire an aircraft carrier.

Still, this isn’t the first time we hear of an Indonesian aircraft carrier plan. In 2013, Indonesia expressed interest in purchasing the then recently retired Spanish navy aircraft carrier, Principe de Asturias. For unspecified reasons, Indonesia ultimately decided against buying the ship. Furthermore, PT PAL, a state-owned  shipbuilding company, has unveiled an indigenous design for a helicopter carrier, which it claims to be ready for production by 2028, should the navy decide to make an order.

For a country that straddles two vast oceans and aspires to project force beyond its exclusive economic zone, the acquisition of at least one aircraft carrier may seem like a sound policy. However, consideration of practicalities reveals that this is more like a case of blind ambition.

The wartime missions of fighters on an aircraft carrier’s can include air defence of a fleet, strike against enemy ships, ground units and fixed installations, and reconnaissance. A carrier can also operate helicopters, usually for hunting submarines. Because these aircraft are on a ship, these operations can be undertaken much farther from home than is possible with aircraft tied to air bases.

Aircraft from Garibaldi, for example, undertook combat operations over Afghanistan—far beyond the practical reach of Italian air force aircraft flying from their home air bases.

Peacetime aircraft missions include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). This appears to be the main appeal of an aircraft carrier acquisition for Indonesia’s Chief of Navy Admiral Muhammad Ali.

Yet this hardly gels with the reported plan to include several Italian navy AV-8B Harrier aircraft in the deal. They would have little or nothing to contribute to HADR operations.

The Indonesian navy’s Naval Aviation Centre last operated offensive aerial assets in preparation of Operation Trikora in West Papua in 1961–1962, using land-based Il-28 bombers. These assets were retired in 1969. Reintroducing offensive aerial capabilities, particularly with second-hand Harriers, would be highly costly, and doing it at sea would be highly difficult. The inexperienced Thai navy, for example, struggled to operate Harriers on its aircraft carrier, HTMS Chakri Naruebet, from 1997 to 2006 and finally gave up.

In addition to that, what message would Indonesia be sending to its immediate neighbours if it were to equip itself with such capabilities? Indonesia has already voiced concerns over neighbours acquiring advanced F-35 Lightning fighters, and was also perturbed by the AUKUS announcement. Indonesia’s pursuit of an aircraft carrier could also be perceived as an unnecessarily aggressive acquisition.

An aircraft carrier equipped with offensive aerial assets is vastly different from one operating solely with rotary-wing aircraft for military operations other than war. Indonesia has ample experience in operating unwarlike vessels. The navy’s Makassar-class LPDs, though retaining an amphibious assault capability, have been extensively used for HADR.

If the Indonesian navy is determined to acquire an offensive aircraft carrier, it must first define the role it seeks to play in the global maritime domain. Given current geopolitical complexities in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia should act with caution.

The acquisition of a highly sophisticated asset such as an aircraft carrier must be driven by a strategy of cooperation first, and military posturing second. Without a clear need for the ship, Jakarta would risk ending up with an aircraft carrier serving as a static tourist attraction.

Indonesia has cut funding for counterterrorism programs. Australia should step in

Indonesia’s government has slashed its counterterrorism (CT) budgets, despite the persistent and evolving threat of violent extremism. Australia can support regional CT efforts by filling this funding void.

Reducing funding to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNTP) and associated initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) risks undoing years of progress, creating security vulnerabilities that extremist groups and foreign actors could exploit. To support regional stability, Australia should strengthen CT cooperation with Indonesia, ensuring funding for important programs and enhancing adaptability of CT efforts.

On 22 January, President Prabowo Subianto introduced a sweeping budget efficiency policy for 2025. This directive aims to reallocate 306.6 trillion Indonesian rupiah (Rp), equivalent to AU$30 billion, from the national state budget to support a priority state welfare program focused on food security. About a third of the reallocation will fund the administration’s program for free nutritious meals for school children.

Indonesia’s CT programs are facing some of the most significant budget cuts. The BNPT has been hit particularly hard, with its 2025 budget slashed by 433 billion rupiah. This cut amounts to 69.1 percent of its original allocation of 626 billion rupiah.

Although Indonesia has remained relatively free from major terrorist attacks in recent years, the significant cut to the BNPT’s funding has sparked debate over whether terrorism continues to be a pressing concern for the nation.

The agency was established in 2010 following the suicide bombings targeting the Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott Hotels in Jakarta in July 2009. It has an expansive scope of responsibilities and significant access to resources and authority. It is mandated to oversee all aspects of Indonesia’s CT strategies. Additionally, the BNPT is led by a ministerial-level official who reports directly to the president, facilitating smoother inter-agency coordination.

While the BNPT has made progress since its inception, the recent budget cuts could undermine Indonesian CT efforts.

In addition, the broader implications of the push in the United States to defund USAID could affect Indonesia, particularly its already underfunded CT and CVE programs. Many such projects run by local NGOs in Indonesia face financial uncertainty. Defunding USAID will only make this worse.

Through its various programs in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—including Indonesia—USAID has supported programs aimed at countering the root causes of extremism.

For example, the USAID-funded Harmoni program was designed to support initiatives promoting tolerance and resilience against violent extremism in Indonesia. The project worked with various Indonesian government bodies, local civil society organisations and community groups.

Such programs have complemented BNPT activities, particularly in areas where government efforts have fallen short. Civil society organisations play a vital role in CVE, as they maintain close relationships with practitioners in the field, have strong local networks and offer specialised expertise in the Indonesian context. Collaboration between the BNPT and these organisations is essential for the success of CVE initiatives.

The programs should not be abandoned, even amid major funding reductions. Failure to invest in counter-extremism efforts now could lead to greater security threats in the future, which requires an urgent need for alternative sources of support.

Moreover, analysts warn that a loss of USAID support could provide Beijing with an opportunity to expand its regional soft power. The China International Development Cooperation Agency does seek to expand its government’s influence in the region. While it’s uncertain whether China would fund CT and CVE initiatives, the void could heighten their interest.

The decline in terrorist attacks by groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State should not be viewed as mission accomplished. Experts warn that terror threats are constantly evolving, and that complacency creates vulnerability. Sustained funding for CT and CVE is important for maintaining and strengthening national security.

Australia may be Indonesia’s best option for cooperation on CT and CVE. The two countries already have a history of collaboration in this area.

The Australian government has recognised the importance of international engagement strategies on CVE, and of reassessing such strategies. A 2022 report titled ‘Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism 2022-26’ acknowledged the need to ‘re-examine’ its CVE objectives through to 2026.

Similarly, in Australia’s 2025 CT and CVE strategy, titled ‘A Safer Australia‘, the government outlined its commitment to strengthening international and regional partnerships and continuing cooperation to build capability in Southeast Asia.

Australia can step in to provide support and funding to Indonesia’s CT and CVE programs. Continued investment in counterterrorism is essential—waiting until threats materialise will only lead to greater challenges and higher costs in the future.

Indonesia steps up defence relationships, but stays non-aligned

Indonesia has recognised that security affairs in its region are no longer business as usual, though it hasn’t completely given up its commitment to strategic autonomy.

Its biggest step was a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed with Australia in August 2024. The agreement acts as a de facto status-of-forces agreement, providing for the presence of foreign forces in Indonesian territory, traditionally an uncomfortable idea for the country.

Jakarta has also stepped up specific defence cooperation with other countries over the past five years, notably with Australia. The United States has also become a closer partner.

While China’s strengthening presence in Southeast Asia is an obvious factor in Indonesia’s diversification of defence relationships, Jakarta declares no policy of trying to counterbalance Beijing. Moreover, it is still far from tying itself down in close and permanent security relationships. Instead, Indonesia adopts a more nuanced approach.

Indonesia lacks a formal strategy to navigate great power competition. However, its impartial stance—rooted in what it calls its ‘free and active’ foreign policy—has resulted in a hedging strategy, balancing economic ties with China and strong political relations with the US and its allies. Meanwhile, Indonesia is expanding its global engagement through active participation in regional and international organisations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations, and through south-south cooperation.

Following its cautious foreign policy, Indonesia avoids alliances with great powers. This approach has allowed it to maintain neutrality and stay ‘defensively active’ for decades. Yet, Indonesia has begun to break from this tradition.

Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence aims to increase the defence budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP. In recent years, Indonesia has signed several arms acquisition deals. These include buying 42 Dassault Rafale fighters from France for $8.1 billion, 12 drones from Turkey worth $300 million and 24 Sikorsky S-70M Black Hawk helicopters from the US.

In the past five years, Indonesia has deepened various bilateral defence relationships. Australia has become a prominent partner, engaging in 48 defence diplomacy activities. These activities saw steady growth throughout the past five years, with the 2024 DCA as the pinnacle of their cooperation.

The 2024 DCA between Indonesia and Australia is their greatest commitment yet to enhancing defence collaboration and addressing shared security challenges. For Indonesia, it is historic as it allows military drills and mutual force operations within each other’s territories. For Australia, this agreement offers better operational proximity to potential flashpoints, such as the South China Sea.

Although yet to be a status-of-forces agreement, the DCA reinforces previous arrangements. It establishes a legal framework to enhance military cooperation and joint activities between the two countries. The agreement also includes provisions for enhanced educational exchanges and closer maritime operations.

However, this agreement does not signal Indonesia’s alignment with any bloc. The country continues to balance its relationships with major powers, staying true to its principle of strategic autonomy.

In 2023, Indonesia elevated bilateral ties with the US to a comprehensive strategic partnership, expanding defence cooperation, including joint exercises such as Garuda Shield. Simultaneously, Indonesia reinforced diplomatic ties with China and the two countries issued a joint statement in 2024 claiming ‘common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims’ in the South China Sea. This sparked controversy among maritime law and international relations experts. It appeared to contradict Indonesia’s long-standing policy of strategic denial regarding China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Additionally, Indonesia has sought to diversify its defence partnerships by engaging with other Global South middle powers, including Turkey, India and Brazil. Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS is also motivated by its willingness to enhance cooperation and collaboration with other developing countries.

The depth of the Indonesia-Australia DCA reveals several key aspects of Indonesia’s approach. First, as great power competition increases, Indonesia is moving beyond its ‘defensive-active’ strategy. Indonesia is now integrating bilateral strategies alongside multilateral approaches to better navigate the evolving security landscape.

Second, Indonesia’s deepening ties with Australia through the DCA serve as a regional safety net in its hedging behaviour. Consequently, Indonesia must reassure other countries that the DCA with Australia aims to enhance cooperation and doesn’t signal alignment with the West.

Finally, while it has shown adaptability in recent years, defence capacity remains crucial for Indonesia to maintain its independence and increase its bargaining position in the geopolitical landscape.

The DCA, alongside global engagement and enhancing defence capacity, indicates Indonesia’s shifting strategy to face the increasingly competitive environment while maintaining its strategic autonomy.

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Alfin Febrian Basundoro

Alfin Febrian Basundoro is a masters student at the Australian National University and a former expert staff at the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of Indonesia.