Tag Archive for: Indo-Pacific election pulse 2020

Covid-19’s impact on elections in the Indo-Pacific

The Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted almost all aspects of life, and elections have been no exception. Across the world, elections in 2020 were conducted under the shadow of the pandemic, providing a stress test not only for governments but also for the very process of casting votes. This year’s collection of Strategist posts by experts from different countries and fields, Indo-Pacific election pulse 2020, zooms in on some of the most consequential elections in the region—Taiwan, Singapore, New Zealand, Myanmar and, of course, the United States.

Unsurprisingly, public health and the economic, political, social and security implications of Covid-19 have loomed large on election agendas. Only the elections in Taiwan, which took place in January, before the pandemic spread globally, weren’t dominated by Covid-19. Rather, Taiwan’s was about China and Taipei’s survival strategies. President Tsai Ing-wen received a record number of votes (8.2 million) in a testament to people’s confidence in her ability to manage cross-strait tensions. But Tsai’s administration also proved to be well placed to guide Taiwan efficiently through the Covid-19 crisis. In fact, in many assessments, it was the world’s best performer.

For other countries, the pandemic has presented more of a challenge. People’s ability to exercise their democratic rights by casting their votes also increased the risk of infections.

In New Zealand, that caused the postponement of the election by a month after a small spike in coronavirus cases.

In Myanmar, the election was plagued by voter safety concerns after a large surge in coronavirus infections, and yet voter turnout was higher than expected. The election commission put it at around 70%, which narrowly beat a previous record turnout of 69% in 2015.

The US also recorded its highest voter turnout in over a hundred years as 65.1% of enrolled voters cast their ballots.

Amid a continually high count of Covid cases in Singapore, opposition parties called for a delay in the city-state’s election. Long queues at polling stations led to the extension of voting hours to 10 pm, leading to the highest voter turnout since the 1997 general election.

As the virus forced campaign activities online, candidates and electoral authorities also faced the challenge of countering misinformation, disinformation and cyber-enabled attempts at foreign interference, and it’s clear that many countries have a long way to go in safeguarding their elections against these new and increasing threats.

In Singapore, where for the first time the election campaigns took place without physical rallies of candidates and supporters, the government invoked a ‘fake news law’, claiming that a Facebook post by an opposition party contained ‘false and misleading’ information about government policies. While ostensibly the law seeks to combat mis- and disinformation, it’s been used as a weapon by the government to limit freedom of expression.

In Myanmar, Muslim candidates were hit with ‘racist abuse and misinformation’, and civil society organisations and journalists identified ‘dozens of networks of accounts, pages, and groups spreading ethnically and religiously charged falsehoods’.

In the US, President Donald Trump himself emerged as the biggest source of election disinformation, spreading incorrect information about the results, the counting and even the timing of voting, all to claim his own ‘victory’. Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter also faced increasing scrutiny over their efforts during the US election, prompting the companies to do more to label or take down false or misleading information.

The Covid-19 pandemic turned out to be a legitimacy test for many governments. In most cases, the voters rewarded leaders for their competent responses to the outbreak. Nowhere was that more clearly demonstrated than in New Zealand, where Jacinda Ardern’s Labour Party secured a second term in government after delivering one of the world’s most effective responses to the pandemic. Conversely, in the US, the Trump administration’s disastrous response to Covid, which has resulted in more than 230,000 deaths to date, cost him re-election. If the pandemic is a stress test, it’s one that Trump has not passed.

People’s appetite for risk is often lower during crises. The electoral victory of incumbents during this year’s elections—in New Zealand, Singapore and Myanmar—could also reflect a desire for stability and the security offered by known quantities, particularly during a time of regional and global upheaval. Taiwan would also fit into that category, although the threat perception there is mainly of Xi Jinping’s harsh politics, rather than the pandemic.

Despite perceptions that democracy is in some kind of creeping retreat globally, which is arguably being exacerbated by Covid-19, the election results show that democratic activism and accountability are doing well. New Zealand stands out as a prime example of a well-functioning democratic government that has secured the confidence of voters to get the country through the pandemic and deliver economic recovery. Opposition parties were able to make historic gains in Singapore, where the Workers’ Party achieved its most significant increase in its number of seats in parliament since independence. In Taiwan, the victory of the pro-independence party reaffirmed the island’s desire to remain democratic and resilient.

The situation in Myanmar has come under scrutiny by many due to the unfair disqualification of some ethnic minorities from voting. Some believe that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy provides the clearest path towards greater constitutional reform. Higher support for the league could increase pressure on the military to allow constitutional reform that could facilitate greater democratisation in Myanmar. However, the military appears to be unwilling to concede power, and the treatment and disenfranchisement of ethnic minorities in Myanmar places a serious question mark over the country’s democratic future.

In the US, while Joe Biden was able to pull off an electoral victory, 2020 will go down in history as one of the country’s most controversial elections. The structural problems with the electoral and political system in the US and the high degree of polarisation within American society have come to the fore, and conversations about necessary reforms will continue long after the Trump era.

The Indo-Pacific democracies, like all nations, have had their fair share of challenges this year, but those that had the additional task of conducting general elections and charting a course for the next term have done well. The year’s been short on good news, but here’s some: it ends on the rather positive note of good electoral outcomes.

What Tsai’s re-election in Taiwan means for Australia

Given the landslide election victory of President Tsai Ing-wen, and the likelihood that Beijing will intensify tactics to isolate Taiwan and pressure its government, Australia should consider stepping up its support for Taiwan’s de facto independent status in the interests of cross-strait stability and regional security.

Of central importance are the manner of the election wins and the emphatic show of support by the Taiwanese electorate for Tsai and the policies of her Democratic Progressive Party. For the Chinese party-state, an equivocal result would have offered more convincing justification for its belief that, despite a ‘temporary counter-current’, Taiwan was on a path to unification. Such an outcome would also have created fresh opportunities for the Chinese Communist Party to exploit political and social divisions by cultivating links with the business and religious communities and with specific figures in Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang.

Instead, the result was a demonstration of political unanimity by the people of Taiwan. It made visible what has been obvious to close observers for decades—that Taiwan is not moving towards unification with the People’s Republic of China. At the most fundamental level, the election results demonstrate Taiwan’s political sovereignty through the practice of democracy.

How Tsai will use her strong mandate to manoeuvre between the pressure points likely to be applied by Beijing will matter a great deal for the region, and for Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy. That’s especially so if China intensifies its pressure on Taiwan.

The hardening of party policies under CCP Chairman Xi Jinping—notably, his rejection of the degree of pragmatism and flexibility of his predecessor Hu Jintao—and the US determination to counter Beijing’s regional ambitions increase Taiwan’s vulnerability.

The CCP’s leaders strongly believe that unification with Taiwan is the expression, in its distinctive Marxist sense, of the inevitable trajectory of history towards national rejuvenation and the realisation of socialism in the ‘New China’. For Beijing, that involves a non-negotiable offer to Taiwan of unification under the one country, two systems formula as a stage towards that ultimate goal.

So foundational are these beliefs to the party that any rethink of policy on Taiwan is highly unlikely. Beijing will continue its tactics of diplomatic isolation, military threats, economic inducements and domestic interference.

Canberra has no capacity to initiate systemic change or ideological reform in the PRC and it has pragmatically pursued a relationship with Taiwan over a range of trade, cultural and security links that is overshadowed by Canberra’s much larger relationship with Beijing. This was demonstrated, for example, when negotiations on a free trade agreement with Taiwan stalled in the face of Beijing’s objections.

However, the election shows that Australia needs to take seriously the gap between Taiwan’s aspiration for a democratic political future and the destiny envisioned for it by the CCP.

While avoiding a cross-strait military conflict must always be Australia’s goal, the opposite of war is not ‘peaceful reunification’. The election result highlights the reality that it’s impossible for Taiwan to become part of the PRC without destabilising the region, the Taiwan Strait, and ultimately China itself.

So, in the interests of peace and security, Australia must help limit Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation by using high-level contacts; opposing Beijing’s military threats; strengthening economic, cultural and education links; and collaborating on shared threats to democratic practices.

The number of visits to Taiwan by properly briefed politicians and officials should be increased. Canberra should also work actively with state and local governments to support contact with Taiwan and build policy capacity at all levels.

Australia’s Pacific step-up is an important avenue for collaboration. Despite Taipei’s shrinking number of allies, Taiwan is a long-term Pacific actor with a substantial footprint in the region. It offers Canberra opportunities to partner in developing quality infrastructure and governance.

Beyond the immediate region, both Taiwan and Australia have met Beijing’s sharp power and foreign influence operations in their domestic policymaking and have shared experiences of cyber threats identified as originating in the PRC.

In an era of borderless challenges such as climate change and the unfolding coronavirus crisis, Australia’s interests will be best served by an active and high-level relationship with Taiwan that modulates concern for Beijing’s sensitivities.

Despite these drivers of policy, Taiwan remains a significant challenge for Australia. The prospect that a US military defence of Taiwan could involve an Australian military commitment remains in the background of Australia’s policy calculus. That’s complicated by the extent to which the US has become a less reliable partner in the region. A second term for Donald Trump seems likely, but even if the administration changes, the positions of all of the Democratic contenders point to an inward-looking US government without a clear vision of global power.

Under these evolving conditions, Australia’s policy towards Taiwan needs to be grounded in a proper understanding of the histories and politics of both China and Taiwan and a willingness to identify specific instances when the traditional strong emphasis on trade with China, and on the US alliance, doesn’t serve Australia’s national interests.

In her post-election comments to the international community, Tsai said Taiwan should be seen as ‘a partner, not an issue’. Australia doesn’t take sides in the democratic choices of the Taiwanese people, but it can recognise them in a values-based foreign policy, as prescribed in the 2017 white paper. To maintain Australia’s own security and prosperity, we would do well to take seriously the opportunity offered by a closer bilateral partnership and find ways to realise it.

The significance of Tsai’s victory in Taiwan

In Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections on 11 January 2020, Tsai Ing-wen secured a second term as president and her party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), maintained its legislative majority. The elections attracted unprecedented international attention in the context of US–China strategic competition and the hardline stance of the Chinese Communist Party in the Xi Jinping era.

Beijing continues to insist on the inevitability of ‘reunification’ and has intensified pressure on Taiwan. Meanwhile, Washington has increased the tempo of its engagement with Taipei, including arms sales, general diplomatic support and high-level interactions under the Taiwan Travel Act. The significance of the election result reaches beyond domestic party politics: the poll also reflects voters’ assessments of the successes and failures of Beijing’s Taiwan policies, US–China relations and regional security.

In the week before the elections, there was a surprising level of uncertainty about the outcome. At the end of 2018, Tsai had poor opinion poll numbers and her government had been challenged by rivals within her own party, by a stalled domestic policy agenda and by diplomatic reversals as Beijing poached Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies. Public opinion had turned strongly in her favour by the middle of 2019, but the DPP remained cautious up until election night. In the end, not only did Tsai secure a second term, but she received 8.17 million votes (57.13% of ballots cast), the largest number ever for a candidate since direct presidential elections began in 1996.

The political sentiment around Tsai’s win has been as much about expectations as her total vote count. Large winning margins are not unprecedented in Taiwan’s elections, but they’re usually associated with a change in the governing party. For example, in 2008, the leader of the pro-Beijing Kuomintang party (KMT), Ma Ying-jeou, was elected by a similar margin after eight years of a DPP government under Chen Shui-bian that was dogged by corruption allegations. However, Ma’s win in 2012 was by a much closer margin amid disillusionment about his government’s China policies. Similarly, in the legislature in this election, although the KMT made gains, they were smaller than expected for a second-term correction, and a minor party that is a key KMT ally, the People’s First Party, was wiped out.

The results, therefore, point to structural changes in Taiwan’s political landscape. The DPP can stake its claim to being the ‘natural’ party of government with strong support in the north, while the KMT retrenches to divisive politics that mobilise its core supporters but don’t carry the broader electorate.

The KMT’s presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu—who in the 2018 mid-term elections took the mayorship of traditionally very pro-DPP southern city of Kaohsiung—initially offered a disruptive and populist alternative to the staid Tsai. His political style seemed suited to the era of social media in which disinformation and rumour, generated both domestically and by the Chinese state, circulated in Taiwan’s febrile political atmosphere.

The turning point for Tsai’s campaign was Xi’s 2019 New Year speech on Taiwan marking the 40th anniversary of the National People’s Congress’s letter to ‘Taiwan Compatriots’. Xi asserted unification under the ‘one country, two systems’ model as the necessary and non-negotiable outcome for Taiwan. Tsai’s quick and decisive rebuke boosted her popularity domestically, with tacit support from the US administration.

Like previous Taiwanese presidents, Tsai Ing-wen rejected ‘one country, two systems’, but she used her statements after Xi’s speech to regain the political initiative. The KMT’s Han also stated his opposition to the policy, but was caught between criticising the DDP for not managing the relationship with China and promising openness towards China to support business interests.

Meanwhile, Han’s campaign machine was dysfunctional and the KMT was beset by an identity crisis. In the second half of 2019, the protests in Hong Kong left few in Taiwan under the illusion that Beijing would honour any arrangements that would respect any form of autonomy. The younger generation of Taiwanese in particular saw an urgency to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty, maintain their democracy and refuse a future like Hong Kong’s.

On election night, Tsai herself emerged politically stronger as a democratically elected president in a way never before seen in Taiwan. She faced down rivals in her own party, defeated the KMT and also challenged an emerging populism in Taiwan’s politics.

Having secured an election victory, the Tsai government faces continuing challenges internationally and in cross-strait relations.

Tsai was extremely disciplined in her cross-strait actions and rhetoric in her first term, despite the pressure within her own party and from Beijing, limiting the possibility of escalation or crisis. She has conveyed directly her intention to maintain that approach in her second term. In her acceptance speech, she vowed to continue with a policy based on peace, parity, democracy and dialogue, explaining that:

‘Peace’ means that China must abandon threats of force against Taiwan.

‘Parity’ means that neither side of the Taiwan Strait should deny the fact of the other’s existence.

‘Democracy’ means that the future of Taiwan must be decided by our country’s 23 million people.

‘Dialogue’ means that we must be able to sit down and discuss the future development of cross-strait relations.

None of those is an easy goal. On one side is Beijing’s intransigence and growing capacity for action and Xi’s strongman tactics. On the other is a disciplined and experienced Tsai administration whose leader has been greatly elevated in political stature both at home and abroad. Having seen off a populist contender for the presidency and a number of presumptive men in the senior ranks of her own party, she will likely be inclined to use her political capital to its fullest to secure Taiwan’s interests over the next four years.