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Australia is an important Indian Ocean power and it needs to start acting like one. As ASPI’s new report, Australia’s second sea: Facing our multipolar future in the Indian Ocean argues, it’s clear that the region has a much more multipolar future than ever before, which will require Australia to take a much more active role. In fact, Australia needs a comprehensive strategy to protect its interests and properly pursue opportunities in the region.

Australia has big stakes in the Indian Ocean. We have by far the longest coastline and by far the largest area of maritime jurisdiction of any country in the region. In one way or another, Australia relies on the Indian Ocean for much of its wealth. In 2016–17, sales of Western Australia’s mineral and petroleum industry alone totalled some $105 billion; in aggregate, around 42% of Australia’s goods exports by value came from Western Australia. A very large proportion of our maritime trade, both exports and imports, crosses the Indian Ocean.

But despite the magnitude of its economic and strategic interests, Australia tends to see itself as an Indian Ocean country only in a secondary sense—literally, the Indian Ocean is Australia’s second sea. We’ve long seen ourselves as principally a Pacific Ocean state, reflecting our history and demography. Indeed, most Australians have probably only seen the Indian Ocean out of the window of a plane, en route to a holiday in Bali or Europe.

Over the past 50 years, Australia has developed sophisticated and successful national strategies for the Asia–Pacific region, actively engaging on economics and security issues and supporting the building of regional norms and institutions. This engagement is the basis for our current prosperity. A comprehensive strategic, security and economic strategy for the Indian Ocean is now an imperative in light of the changes we’re seeing in the region.

For more than a century, our engagement with the Indian Ocean has taken place in the context of the military predominance of Australia’s great-power allies. This has benefited Australia in many ways, but this security blanket also meant that we paid only limited attention to the region. But after several decades of US military predominance, the Indian Ocean is now becoming a contested strategic space.

India is emerging as a major power, with aspirations to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean. China’s Belt and Road Initiative also has the potential to fundamentally alter the dynamics of the region. China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean is growing fast and will continue to grow.

This means that the current US military dominance in the region could be a lot more transient than it might seem. The US Congress may not be indefinitely willing to spend billions protecting the oil being shipped to China. A significant reduction in the US defence commitment in the Persian Gulf, for example, whether under President Donald Trump or one of his successors, could easily create a power vacuum that others will race to fill. This could happen much faster than we expect and could be very damaging for the stability of the region.

In the 1970s, the surprise withdrawal of the Royal Navy from ‘east of Suez’ created a vacuum that was soon filled by the United States. But don’t expect such an easy power transition in future.

The Indian Ocean is also a place of significant opportunities. Over the past 50 years, Australia has focused on economic integration with East Asia. But a string of countries on the South Asian littoral, led by India, are now experiencing high and potentially sustained growth. Other countries in the Middle East and East Africa also have the long-term potential to emerge as major economies. Their progress is far from assured and they’re subject to many risks, but there’s potential for some of them to stabilise and experience sustained ‘breakout’ growth. Australia needs to be ready for that.

And, not least, the Indian Ocean is also a region for opportunities in the ‘blue economy’ where Australia can become a leading provider of services and marine science. Perth is arguably already the region’s leading science and knowledge hub. We need to leverage and expand on the marine and climate science initiatives based in Western Australia for the benefit of the region and Australia.

It’s no longer ‘business as usual’ in the Indian Ocean. We can no longer afford to just muddle through. Priorities remain unprioritised, potential threats might not be properly planned for, and many opportunities are unpursued. Our regional objectives remain unclear. Our economic engagement with some of the world’s fastest growing economies languishes. There are compelling reasons why Australia must pursue a clearer and more coherent approach towards the Indian Ocean as part of an integrated Indo-Pacific strategy.

If Donald Trump’s Twitter feed and the words of his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are to be believed, Washington is set to defend disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea from being ‘overtaken’ by Beijing, as part of an effort to stand up to China more generally. While the Obama administration’s approach was more diplomatic, the perceived lack of consistency and backbone when it came to standing up to China spooked many throughout the Indo–Pacific wanting to see stronger US resolve.

If President Trump proves genuinely ready to step into the fray where his predecessor did not, like-minded states will have an opportunity to take stronger steps to defend the existing regional order. Having said that, there will be no free rides. As Trump has said, regional allies and partners will need to contribute more to their own security.

If that’s the case, it might be time to revisit the Quadrilateral Initiative.

Much has changed since Kevin Rudd unilaterally withdrew from the grouping in 2008. China’s assertive actions to extend and defend its territorial claims in the East and South China seas have undermined its own rhetoric about a peaceful rise. While Beijing’s complete rejection of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling in its dispute with the Philippines was anticipated, it also exacerbated fears about how China will use its growing military might and political influence.

There are five key reasons to believe that Japan, India, the US, and Australia, would value a resurgence of the Quad, as would many ASEAN states.

First, the revival of the Quad would be a key contribution to Shinzo Abe’s ‘pro-active contribution to peace’ policy initiative. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan’s taken purposeful steps to become a more flexible strategic partner, committed to making a stronger contribution to upholding the existing regional order. That’s included government legislative wins that allow Japan to export defence equipment and technology for the first time since World War II. The Self-Defence Force’s options to render military assistance to the US, and potentially other security partners, in the event of an armed attack was also boosted by the Cabinet’s 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, albeit only in circumstances where there is a clear threat to the Japanese state or its people. But one suspects the definition of ‘threat’ is evolving and will likely widen over time as Chinese power grows.

Second, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India has been more forthright with respect to articulating its strategic interests and also less reticent about offending Beijing than was his predecessor. Modi has made thinly-veiled critiques of China’s ‘expansionist policies’, and offered strong support for the position taken by the Trilateral Security Dialogue members—Japan, the US and Australia—on resolving South China Sea disputes based on international law. Concerned about China’s naval encroachment into the Indian Ocean, New Delhi has sought to deepen strategic and defence partnerships with both Japan and the US under a multi-alignment strategy that maintains India’s strategic autonomy. It would require relatively small steps to revisit the Quad’s return.

Third, the Trump administration may well favour a revival of the Quad as an explicit counter to China. Trump didn’t pull any punches when it came to comments on Chinese activities including in the South China Sea just days before his inauguration. His explicit distaste of free-riding by allies may well lead Trump to view a Quad as entrenching burden-sharing between two allies with direct stakes in Indo-Pacific stability. By the same token, a Quad would be one way for Australia and Japan to demonstrate to the Trump administration that they take their respective security responsibilities seriously.

Fourth, Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper makes clear Canberra’s stake in the longevity of US pre-eminence in the region and in maintaining the existing rules-based global order. Efforts by Canberra to revive the Quad, with particular effort going towards building economic and strategic relations with India would be the most effective means of furthering these strategic objectives. It would also provide a means of ‘mitigating and responding to …strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific,’ an area of focus specified in the upcoming DFAT Foreign Policy White Paper.

Finally, ASEAN nations are now more likely to view the resurgence of the Quad as a means of outsourcing hard-power balancing against China without directly incurring China’s wrath. The four Quad countries are members of the East Asian Summit and could easily meet on the sidelines of the ASEAN-backed meeting. Importantly, the cover of ASEAN centrality needn’t be threatened by the Quad should it remain an informal un-institutionalised grouping.

The resuscitated Quad could initially take a softly-softly approach through a focus on preserving stability in the Indian Ocean. Restricting the scope of the Quad to the Indian Ocean would suit India’s maritime interests and capabilities, thereby encouraging greater buy-in from New Delhi. Steering clear of contested waters would also potentially help avoid perceptions in Beijing that the initiative is part of a containment strategy, which would help enhance the Quad’s saleability to the Australian public and to ASEAN states. Initial activities could include a leaders-level summit between the four countries to discuss maritime security in the Indian Ocean, and building military-to-military links through naval exercises focused on anti-piracy, terrorism and HA/DR. These activities would constitute the group’s baseline engagement, with the implied promise of mission creep should China’s actions become more destabilizing.

The Quad mightn’t be a game changer. But its revival may complicate Beijing’s calculations as it works to challenge aspects of the existing regional order.

Did Macbeth have PTSD? Back in the capital, my first pick is a provocative take by sociology professor Anthony King on one of Shakespeare’s most infamous characters. King’s analysis dissects Macbeth’s actions throughout the ‘Scottish play’ and relates them to his experiences in battle.

The New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation has released a new report on the build-up of military forces (US, Japan, Australia, China and India) and naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region. Penned by Rajeswari Rajagopalan and Arka Biswas, the paper is a good introduction to the various strategic interests of the major players in the ocean before turning to the material capabilities including US assets along the African coast and the implications of power shift in the Asia Pacific.

Turning to the Persian Gulf, in a new Carnegie Endowment report, Frederic Wehrey and Richard Sokolsky argue that a new forum of Middle East regionalism that includes Iran could potentially lower tensions in the region and complement US interests there. Short on time? Read the summary here.

On Northeast Asian dynamics, is South Korea cosying up to its alliance partner the US or leaning back towards China? Writing in Foreign Affairs, Victor Cha argues that Park Guen-Hye’s ‘Diplomacy 2.0’ actually intends to bring the trio closer together. In Cha’s view, her approach is a ‘new form of diplomacy cuts against the grain in Asian diplomacy, where uncontroversial and one-dimensional thinking predominates.’ Keep reading here.

The struggle is over in the Indonesian province of Aceh, right? Think again. The indomitable Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict’s latest report paints a more complex picture there with the continued presence of armed groups. The report focuses on the group Din Minimi, tracing its history and examining the potential for serious violence in the province as a result of the group’s complicated relationship with violent extremists and security forces. An interesting read for Indonesia watchers.

Also on violent groups, Mohammed Sinan Siyech provides a quick snapshot of AQAP’s new leader in Yemen and recent developments in the group’s strength.

The week marked the 50th anniversary of the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which highlights the unique experience of women in conflict. Over on Defense One, chief executive of the Institute for Inclusive Security, Evelyn Thornton, examines the way in which women are on the frontline of every battle—but not in the way that you’d think.

Lastly, via the Duffelblog, an intelligence officer in the US has lost his job over the misuse of a classified stapler.

Podcast

In this week’s addition to the Foreign Affairs Unedited series, Sebastian Mallaby, Péter Krekó, Tara Zahra, Sebastian Elischer and Patrick Sykes discuss the effects of the global refugee crisis—including its effect on unemployment and economic wellbeing in the EU (21 mins).

Videos

If you’ve ever wondered about the US’ chemical and biological weapons program, this newly declassified video filmed in 1952 shows the Navy’s ‘offensive biological and chemical warfare’ tactics and capabilities with two specific tests with non-pathogenic agents (14mins).

Also for the visually-inclined capability wonks, check out this time lapse footage of the Air Warfare Destroyer being consolidated in Adelaide.

Events

Canberra: Marking the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, the Annual Civil Society Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security 2015 will be held next Thursday 22 October at ANU’s University House from 8.30am featuring an impressive line-up of speakers including journalists, police, scholars, NGO representatives and more (see the full program here). Details and tickets available here.

Should militaries be involved in providing humanitarian assistance during conflict? The ICRC and the ANU’s Centre for Military and Security Law are hosting a debate on this topic on Wednesday 4 November at 6pm with speakers Melissa Conley Tyler, Ned Dobos, William Maley and Mike Kelly. Register for this free event here.

In the Indo-Pacific, there are enormous challenges in oceans management. Last November, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, chaired by Australia, recognised that fact by issuing a formal declaration on the principles for peaceful, productive and sustainable use of the Indian Ocean and its resources. The Pacific Islands Forum that recently concluded also issued the the Palau Declaration, The Ocean: Life & Future ‘Charting a Course to Sustainability‘.

Australia’s a three-ocean country: the Pacific, the Southern Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. We have the largest area of maritime jurisdiction in the Indo-Pacific region. Our security largely depends on maintaining good relations with our archipelagic and island neighbours. Maritime and oceanic issues should be a key element in these relations. Read more

‘We cannot afford to be weak at sea … history has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s seaborne trade at her mercy, and in the second, India’s very independence itself.’ Jawaharlal Nehru

Indian strategic culture has been characterised by a preoccupation with land based threats (PDF), a bias evident from an examination of budgetary allocations to the three services. The Navy has traditionally got the least funding, resulting in it being called the Cinderella Service. This has been due to several factors. First, India has a history over millennia of being repeatedly invaded from the Northwestern plains. Second, the British stymied the growth of the Indian Navy, seeing it as a potential strategic competitor. Third, all of India’s major 20th century conflicts in 1947, 1962,1965,1971 and 1999 were against land powers. Finally, the trend was reinforced by the US alignment with Pakistan as a response to India’s perceived tilting towards the USSR, which had the effect of keeping India focused on remaining a land power and not transitioning to a maritime one.

Since the 1990s, India has rejected inward-looking economic models of growth and has increasingly integrated itself into the global economy. As a result, 75% of India’s trade by value and 97% by volume is now carried by sea. Sustained rates of economic growth towards double figures are required for India to pursue its primary national goals of lifting large proportions of its population out of poverty, and once again becoming a pivotal nation in global affairs. Fuelling this growth requires great quantities of energy. Read more