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Tag Archive for: India
Tag Archive for: India
Somaliland is where India can counter China in east Africa
India should develop closer relations with Somaliland, especially by using its port. This could provide India a valuable tool for countering China’s influence along the eastern coast of Africa.
In looking for access to the Red Sea, India should avoid overcrowded Djibouti and opt for Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Berbera handles 1/10 as much traffic as Djibouti’s port, but it is growing, thanks to investment by Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are new members of the BRICS grouping and key partners for India.
India has frequently deployed anti-piracy patrol boats and warships to the Gulf of Aden, north of Somaliland, to maintain stability in the region. As India strives to gain more influence, Somaliland itself could become India’s strategic lynchpin.
Somaliland’s location and history hold key advantages for India. A breakaway region of Somalia, it controls an 850km coastline along the Red Sea, and Berbera is one of Africa’s busiest ports. Before a civil war destroyed Berbera, the British used the port to connect Ethiopia with India. And earlier this year, Ethiopia signed a historic deal with Somaliland to gain commercial and military access to the port.
In developing closer relations, India would be joining Somaliland’s growing network of partnerships. In striking contrast to Somalia and many other African countries, Somaliland is relatively stable and has been a democracy for more than 30 years. Despite being broadly unrecognised as a sovereign state, it has begun partnering with many countries. Its capital, Hargeisa, hosts consulates of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Turkey, as well as liaison offices of Britain, Denmark, the UAE, Egypt and Kenya.
India and Somaliland already share strong trade relations. Somaliland imports various goods from India: food, petroleum, gas, machinery, building materials, apparel, tobacco, pharmaceuticals and cars. India is one of Somaliland’s major trading partners by container volume, along with the UAE, China, Turkey, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.
Berbera port’s impressive operations and location within Africa make it a strategic asset for India. Last year, Berbera ranked even above Kenya’s port of Mombasa in the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index.
It is also well placed for India to establish a naval base. From it, India could counter Pakistan’s attempt to spread Islamist extremism in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the regional influence of the Chinese army, which has a base in Djibouti.
Closer ties with Somaliland could also strengthen India’s relationship with the UAE, which has invested US$300 million in expanding Berbera port and the nearby free trade zone. Among other extensive investment and aid to Somaliland, the UAE is co-developing the Berbera Corridor with Ethiopia to connect that landlocked country to the port. In return for such help, Somaliland will allow the UAE to establish an air and naval base in Berbera.
The UAE has already docked ships at Berbera, about 250km south of Yemen, where the Saudi-led coalition that includes UAE troops was recently fighting Houthi rebels.
Because Ethiopia and the UAE became members of the BRICS in 2023, closer collaboration with them could enhance India’s status within grouping and provide opportunities for accessing Berbera port. Ethiopia is leading the way by shifting all its commerce to Berbera.
Crucially, a stronger bond with Somaliland would help India counter China’s influence in the region. In 2020, Somaliland recognised Taiwan. It continues to support Taiwan diplomatically, despite intense pressure from China and lobbying by members of the opposition Waddani Party. However, given the small size of its economy and lack of broad diplomatic recognition, Somaliland will not be able to resist China’s influence for too long—unless India shows up.
If India established a stronger economic presence in Somaliland, it would benefit Indian businesses and enhance Somaliland’s prosperity. As African countries increasingly seek to extricate themselves from China’s debt-trap diplomacy and look for alternatives, India’s growing engagement in the region could inspire other fence-sitters to eschew finance from China.
India must revisit its Africa strategy and partner with other like-minded countries to counter China’s influence in the region. Closer relations with Somaliland are crucial in developing a pax-India—a zone of influence for India—along the east African coast.
Chinese soldiers gear up for winter warfare
China is putting great effort into developing its soldiers’ ability to operate in high-altitude and cold environments, increasing its military capacity relative to India. Skills as simple as shovelling snow have become part of combat training exercises. Equipment, facilities and procedures are being improved in what appears to be a highly systematic approach to mitigating the challenges of moving and fighting in the Himalayas and adjacent areas.
Since 2015–16, under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, the People’s Liberation Army has undergone significant reforms. Those reforms have concentrated on enhancing combat readiness in the information age, transforming the PLA into a joint, network-centric fighting force by integrating its services, arms and systems. The PLA Western Theatre Command (WTC) has been particularly active in adapting to what the PLA calls ‘informatisation’ and ‘intelligentisation’, focusing on securing China’s southern and southwestern borders, preparing for both conventional and unconventional warfare and training its soldiers to operate in the challenging terrains and high altitudes of Xinjiang and Tibet.
Terrain and altitude training is a central pillar of the WTC’s jointness capabilities, as the ability to achieve interconnected goals in complex environments would shape the results of conflict. Moreover, given that it is the largest theatre command by area and covers both the arid northwestern deserts of Xinjiang and the high-altitude areas of Tibet, along the border with India, adaptation to terrain and altitudes determines the ability of soldiers to fight protracted conflict and conceal postures without disrupting the sustainable flow of everyday resources to combat bases.
Further, because the Indian border is one of the principal operational directions assigned to the WTC, the outcome of any contest between the Chinese and Indian militaries will be determined not just by the quality of weapons systems and combat doctrines, but also by the logistical superiority and adaptation tactics of the soldiers on both sides. In this regard, the WTC’s focus on terrain and altitude training is an attempt to gain advantage over the Indian soldier’s adaption to fighting in the Himalayas.
WTC’s terrain training work includes combat and non-combat tasks. Radar stations in the WTC, for example, are experimenting with ways to ensure a continued supply of tap water, since the detachments of trucks that supply water to base units are often irregular or snowed in. The new measures require investment of intensive resources. Soldiers in the WTC are laying water pipelines and ensuring replenishment of water tanks. A successful case study is that of a radar station under a WTC air force brigade based on a snow-covered plateau in Tibet, which, in February last year connected soldiers’ dormitories with running-water supply.
Similarly, shovelling snow in the Tibetan mountains or in the high-altitude desert areas of Xinjiang is a core non-combat task required of WTC personnel. While it is a non-combat task, it has significant applications in combat work. For example, a CCTV report from January 2023 highlighted the significance of practising snow-shovelling for a Xinjiang border detachment. The detachment, based at the foot of the Barluk Mountains, faced 200 days of gale-force winds in the new year period that led to snow accumulation, estimated to be as high as 2–2.5 metres and extending as far as 60 metres from the detachment’s base. So, when members of the detachment undertook a border observation patrol and encountered severe snow accumulation, they demonstrated snow-shovelling skills. Then they had to reach the final patrol point on foot.
Combat tasks are also designed to account for challenging terrain and high-altitude conditions. For instance, earlier this year, an army brigade from the WTC engaged in snowfield training to improve combat readiness in cold, high-altitude and low-oxygen environments. This approach aligns with the PLA’s standard of effective training, in which combat scenarios are accurately simulated and tasks are assigned to test various components of joint and integrated operations.
Further, WTC soldiers posted along the Kunlun Mountains (extending into Xinjiang and Tibet) have begun building army command posts concealed near snowlines at altitudes of over 4000 metres. The goal has been to continuously lead troops to conduct effective on-site research, planning and training in high-altitude zones. Officers in the command posts formulate measures for high-altitude training and preparedness and conduct concealment tests for soldiers, vehicles and tents, sometimes changing locations every few months. Then, soldiers are required to pursue other combat-preparedness tasks, such as testing of marching speed over several hundred kilometres, as well as practising live-fire shooting to determine ballistic performance of artillery at various altitudes. From the Indian perspective, this is significant because, over time, some of those concealed positions and tactical arrangements have come to restrict Indian forces’ access to key patrolling points along the de facto border, the Line of Actual Control.
Finally, since August 2022, border defence companies in Xinjiang have been testing a new ‘integrated individual system’, which includes a new-type helmet, multifunction night-vision goggles, a portable computer, an individual load carrier and an assault rucksack. The challenge will be to integrate adaptation to hypoxic conditions with the ability to carry heavy loads that come with this new integrated system. (The material load seems to be about 30kg). This indicates that the next step in combat altitude training in the WTC is for individual soldiers to become more independent and resilient.
Overall, as Indian and Chinese soldiers gear up for long winters along the border, India has much to look out for in relation to the WTC’s efforts in terrain and altitude training. At the same time, the challenges that personnel of the WTC encounter while operating in hypoxic conditions are intense and may require intensive investment in training and resource management to overcome.
The great potential of India-Australia quantum collaboration
A global race is underway to unlock the transformative potential of quantum technology, the next major leap in human innovation. Governments around the world are strategically investing in research and development, while big tech firms are pouring resources and talent into making the second quantum revolution a reality. The technology will offer a range of new computing, communications and sensing capabilities, which have implications for civilian and military sectors.
Though quantum technology is still in its nascent stages, its possibilities are vast, and synergy through international collaboration is critical to unlocking them. The bilateral cooperation between India and Australia has great potential in this domain. Both countries have become major players in the quantum tech race, making significant strides in research, development and application, and the collaborative projects established between them so far are promising.
Domestic initiatives by India and Australia
India launched the Quantum-enabled Science and Technologies initiative in 2019, which was followed by the US$1.2 billion National Mission on Quantum Technologies and Applications, focusing on aerospace engineering, weather prediction, secure communications and cybersecurity. Although this mission is just getting off the ground, it has spurred interest in India’s tech ecosystem, driving it to build locally developed applications to solve real-world problems.
Several scientific and academic establishments across India have taken the initiative to establish dedicated in-house facilities and labs. These include the I-HUB Quantum Technology Foundation at the Indian Institute of Science Education and Research, Pune, and a quantum technology lab at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru. Major corporations like Samsung, IBM, and Tech Mahindra are collaborating with them. The Indian military, with an eye on future defence and security needs, has also established a quantum computing lab to realise the potential of quantum key distribution, communication and computing.
Australia has unveilled several new initiatives, too. While its official National Quantum Strategy was launched in 2023, its pioneering research efforts stretch back much further. Australia has already produced more than 2,500 PhDs in the field, solidifying the country’s position as a front-runner in quantum technology research and application. Last year, scientists at Sydney-based Silicon Quantum Computing built the first integrated silicon quantum computer chip, the result of two decades of research.
The 2023 strategy focuses on building infrastructure, raising a skilled workforce and developing quantum standards that align with Australian national interests. It seeks to do this through collaboration with the quantum industry, driving commercialisation to incentivise the growth of quantum use cases, creating pipelines for investment in industry-ready quantum technologies and fostering innovation.
India-Australia collaboration
The India-Australia collaboration on quantum technology draws on the synergy of these national initiatives. At present, it is happening within the larger framework of cyber and cyber-enabled critical technologies, which also encompasses artificial intelligence and robotics.
The Australia-India Strategic Research Fund is one example. It opens doors for institutions in both countries to collaborate on research projects, such as the Centre for Quantum Computing at the University of New South Wales and IISc Bengaluru, which are tackling the problem of noise in quantum electronic devices. This has led to the discovery of a new state of matter, the development of new techniques for producing atomic-scale germanium and silicon transistors, and the repeated production of quantum electronic devices with the lowest levels of electrical noise to date.
Collaboration across the private sector has been on the rise as well. Infosys has partnered with Australian quantum cybersecurity firm QuintessenceLabs to create a quantum random number generator which can work with classical encryption systems, thereby significantly amplifying their cybersecurity capabilities. It is also working with Amazon Web Services, QuintessenceLabs and QCWare to set up Quantum Living Labs, which offers innovative solutions to clients by leveraging quantum computing technology. Another example is HCL Technologies, which has collaborated with Sydney Quantum Academy to provide students with quantum technology education and R&D opportunities.
The research communities in both countries are also working together. Through the Australia-India Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership, the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi has partnered with the Centre for International Security Studies of the University of Sydney to frame accords and guidelines for the ethical use of quantum technologies. This requires a multi-stakeholder, multi-disciplinary approach that combines social sciences, philosophy and pure sciences. Indeed, for the past two years, the two partners have mobilised experts from universities, businesses, governments and think tanks through virtual workshops and symposia to explore the societal, ethical and geopolitical ramifications of quantum innovations. They are now working to finalise and distribute a digital book and a documentary film about these topics.
Australia’s pioneering work in quantum technology and its growing partnership with India present a golden opportunity for the two nations to leapfrog ahead in this critical field. By pooling resources, expertise and ambitions, they can unlock the extraordinary potential of quantum technology, benefiting not only themselves but the entire Indo-Pacific region.
India in the Quad: insider or outlier?
The Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship conference on geopolitics and geoeconomics, was held from 21 to 23 February this year, and discussions on and around the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) took centre stage. Indian Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar summed up his opening remarks at the inaugural Raisina Quad Think Tank Forum, stating ‘The Quad is here to stay. The Quad is here to grow. The Quad is here to contribute.’ However, India’s commitment to double down on its ties with Russia, coupled with the potential impact of Japan’s new security bill on India–Japan relations, raises concerns over India’s suitability and reliability as a partner within the Quad alliance.
The Quad is a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the US initially formed in 2004 to provide humanitarian relief and disaster assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami. In 2017, the focus shifted to the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s growing assertiveness there. Over the years, the Quad has formed multiple working groups. While member nations have progressed bilaterally and trilaterally, substantial collective progress is missing. Security cooperation between the four members looks more like a symptom of regional instability than a solution.
The Quad essentially suffers from the drawbacks of minilaterals. Minilaterals are voluntary, non-binding and consensus-based, and, therefore, while the motivation to shape policies and actions is present, they lack effective implementation mechanisms. Minilaterals are issue-specific partnerships with shared interests and security concerns, as is the Quad, but the national interests and priorities of individual countries might take precedence, resulting in poor execution efforts. India’s relations with Russia could be a classic example of national interests being embedded in strategic decisions.
Even though India has historically trodden the path of non-alignment, rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have made it imperative for India, as a key player and middle power, to actively participate in alliances in counterbalancing China’s growing assertiveness. Consequently, India claims to have shifted to a multi-aligned strategy by playing a moderating part in the Quad, the G7, the G20, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey shows India’s improved standing as a trusted partner in the region: it jumped from the bottom to third place when its approval rating doubled from 5.1% in 2022 to 11.3% in 2023. However, it’s crucial to evaluate India’s evolving foreign policy, given its challenges in upholding international law, as seen in its responses to events such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Myanmar coup in 2021.
What might possibly explain India’s current approach? India’s porous borders have presented a longstanding and significant security concern for the country. Sharing borders with six countries (Pakistan, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh), India faces a diverse range of threats, from armed infiltrations to insurgency and smuggling activities. The 2020 Galwan clash and continuing Myanmar border challenges underscore the need for ongoing vigilance and decisive action. Strengthening border infrastructure is therefore a top security priority, shaping diplomatic and strategic ties. For instance, following the Galwan clash, India expanded its security cooperation, inviting Australia to join the US–India–Japan Malabar exercise for the first time since 2007. This could also explain India’s longstanding ‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’ with Russia. India–Russia relations were initially bolstered after the Soviet Union helped to mediate a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in their 1965 war. Ever since, India has relied on first the Soviet Union and then Russia for its military equipment, and, while India aims to diversify its defence procurement, reducing dependency on Russia might not be an option. At Raisina, Minister S Jaishankar advocated for strengthening ties with Russia, stating ‘It makes sense to give Russia multiple options’ and arguing that shutting doors to Russia could push it closer to China—a scenario undesirable for regional stability.
Looking ahead, shifts in the political landscape and the policies of member nations could add to the Quad’s challenges, amplifying doubts about India’s role in the alliance.
First, amid uncertainties over political leadership changes in Quad countries, including the possibility of a second Trump administration in Washington, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is probably well positioned for a third term. Modi’s re-election would mean a continuation and even a doubling down of India’s current approach to foreign policy matters and alliances, including the Quad.
Second, Japan’s new security bill could have indirect implications for India’s suitability as a Quad partner. Recently, Japan’s cabinet extended support to the Security Clearance Bill. When it’s enacted, the bill will certify the government’s and the private sector’s handling of sensitive economic information, including data on critical infrastructure, advanced chips and cybersecurity. The bill is expected to bolster Japan’s national security and promote further international collaboration.
The passage of the bill also stands to strengthen Japan’s ties with its Quad partners, particularly the US and Australia, by enhancing its credibility as a partner and facilitating greater information sharing. However, that may inadvertently strain relations between Japan and India, moving Japan closer to the other Quad partners and positioning India as an outlier and limiting India’s ability to cooperate, share intel and build trust with the partners. India, unlike Japan and Australia, is not an ally of the US and emphasises its strategic autonomy. India–Japan relations were initially strained when the main promoter of this bilateral relationship, Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe, was assassinated in 2022. Coupled with differences in policy approaches to the Ukraine–Russia war, that affected bilateral security cooperation, especially when India refused to land transport planes of the Japan Self Defence Force to carry UN stocks to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, India is still considered to be an important partner for Japan, as underscored at the recent Raisina roundtable held in Tokyo, where both the nations agreed to ‘step up‘ economic and security ties.
What could be a few possible ways to improve the effectiveness of the Quad?
One possible way could be to adopt a hybrid structure, keeping the ad hoc and flexible nature of minilaterals but having a governing body bounded by some legal framework to guide the implementation process and hold member nations accountable for progress. The governing body could consist of a rotating chair and secretariat selected from the member nations. Under each chair’s term, certain deliverables could be laid out as goals. At the end of the term, the member nations could organise a sitting to discuss successes and challenges.
Another mechanism could be to narrow the scale and scope of projects being undertaken by the Quad. That would allow countries to prioritise their most important issue while scoping out the feasibility and funds for the solution.
Finally, improving India’s credibility within the Quad could involve strict information-sharing protocols, including adopting standardised formats for exchanging information.
Adopting such measures will help build a framework that allows all member nations, including India, to contribute more effectively.
India in the Quad: insider or outlier?
The Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship conference on geopolitics and geoeconomics, was held from 21 to 23 February this year, and discussions on and around the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) took centre stage. Indian Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar summed up his opening remarks at the inaugural Raisina Quad Think Tank Forum, stating ‘The Quad is here to stay. The Quad is here to grow. The Quad is here to contribute.’ However, India’s commitment to double down on its ties with Russia, coupled with the potential impact of Japan’s new security bill on India–Japan relations, raises concerns over India’s suitability and reliability as a partner within the Quad alliance.
The Quad is a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the US initially formed in 2004 to provide humanitarian relief and disaster assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami. In 2017, the focus shifted to the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s growing assertiveness there. Over the years, the Quad has formed multiple working groups. While member nations have progressed bilaterally and trilaterally, substantial collective progress is missing. Security cooperation between the four members looks more like a symptom of regional instability than a solution.
The Quad essentially suffers from the drawbacks of minilaterals. Minilaterals are voluntary, non-binding and consensus-based, and, therefore, while the motivation to shape policies and actions is present, they lack effective implementation mechanisms. Minilaterals are issue-specific partnerships with shared interests and security concerns, as is the Quad, but the national interests and priorities of individual countries might take precedence, resulting in poor execution efforts. India’s relations with Russia could be a classic example of national interests being embedded in strategic decisions.
Even though India has historically trodden the path of non-alignment, rising geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have made it imperative for India, as a key player and middle power, to actively participate in alliances in counterbalancing China’s growing assertiveness. Consequently, India claims to have shifted to a multi-aligned strategy by playing a moderating part in the Quad, the G7, the G20, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey shows India’s improved standing as a trusted partner in the region: it jumped from the bottom to third place when its approval rating doubled from 5.1% in 2022 to 11.3% in 2023. However, it’s crucial to evaluate India’s evolving foreign policy, given its challenges in upholding international law, as seen in its responses to events such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Myanmar coup in 2021.
What might possibly explain India’s current approach? India’s porous borders have presented a longstanding and significant security concern for the country. Sharing borders with six countries (Pakistan, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh), India faces a diverse range of threats, from armed infiltrations to insurgency and smuggling activities. The 2020 Galwan clash and continuing Myanmar border challenges underscore the need for ongoing vigilance and decisive action. Strengthening border infrastructure is therefore a top security priority, shaping diplomatic and strategic ties. For instance, following the Galwan clash, India expanded its security cooperation, inviting Australia to join the US–India–Japan Malabar exercise for the first time since 2007. This could also explain India’s longstanding ‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’ with Russia. India–Russia relations were initially bolstered after the Soviet Union helped to mediate a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in their 1965 war. Ever since, India has relied on first the Soviet Union and then Russia for its military equipment, and, while India aims to diversify its defence procurement, reducing dependency on Russia might not be an option. At Raisina, Minister S Jaishankar advocated for strengthening ties with Russia, stating ‘It makes sense to give Russia multiple options’ and arguing that shutting doors to Russia could push it closer to China—a scenario undesirable for regional stability.
Looking ahead, shifts in the political landscape and the policies of member nations could add to the Quad’s challenges, amplifying doubts about India’s role in the alliance.
First, amid uncertainties over political leadership changes in Quad countries, including the possibility of a second Trump administration in Washington, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is probably well positioned for a third term. Modi’s re-election would mean a continuation and even a doubling down of India’s current approach to foreign policy matters and alliances, including the Quad.
Second, Japan’s new security bill could have indirect implications for India’s suitability as a Quad partner. Recently, Japan’s cabinet extended support to the Security Clearance Bill. When it’s enacted, the bill will certify the government’s and the private sector’s handling of sensitive economic information, including data on critical infrastructure, advanced chips and cybersecurity. The bill is expected to bolster Japan’s national security and promote further international collaboration.
The passage of the bill also stands to strengthen Japan’s ties with its Quad partners, particularly the US and Australia, by enhancing its credibility as a partner and facilitating greater information sharing. However, that may inadvertently strain relations between Japan and India, moving Japan closer to the other Quad partners and positioning India as an outlier and limiting India’s ability to cooperate, share intel and build trust with the partners. India, unlike Japan and Australia, is not an ally of the US and emphasises its strategic autonomy. India–Japan relations were initially strained when the main promoter of this bilateral relationship, Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe, was assassinated in 2022. Coupled with differences in policy approaches to the Ukraine–Russia war, that affected bilateral security cooperation, especially when India refused to land transport planes of the Japan Self Defence Force to carry UN stocks to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, India is still considered to be an important partner for Japan, as underscored at the recent Raisina roundtable held in Tokyo, where both the nations agreed to ‘step up‘ economic and security ties.
What could be a few possible ways to improve the effectiveness of the Quad?
One possible way could be to adopt a hybrid structure, keeping the ad hoc and flexible nature of minilaterals but having a governing body bounded by some legal framework to guide the implementation process and hold member nations accountable for progress. The governing body could consist of a rotating chair and secretariat selected from the member nations. Under each chair’s term, certain deliverables could be laid out as goals. At the end of the term, the member nations could organise a sitting to discuss successes and challenges.
Another mechanism could be to narrow the scale and scope of projects being undertaken by the Quad. That would allow countries to prioritise their most important issue while scoping out the feasibility and funds for the solution.
Finally, improving India’s credibility within the Quad could involve strict information-sharing protocols, including adopting standardised formats for exchanging information.
Adopting such measures will help build a framework that allows all member nations, including India, to contribute more effectively.
India has its own reasons for preventing a Taiwan war
With expanding national interests, India has stronger compulsions to act against far-off hazards. It finds its interests entangled in disputes on the far edges of Asia, including in Taiwan. China claims Taiwan as its own and is feverishly preparing to seize the island by force if necessary, while the United States has increasingly signalled that it would probably fight to defend Taiwan.
India is highly unlikely to fight in a conflict over Taiwan. However, it has vital economic and security interests, and valuable policy levers, to ensure that such a conflict never happens.
New Delhi has three main reasons to do so. First, it has a stake in the status quo, with Taiwan as a self-governing territory that does not declare independence. India and Taiwan have expanded trade seven-fold since 2001 and are exploring a possible free trade agreement. The Taiwanese firm Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation has partnered with the Tata Group to build India’s first semiconductor fabrication plant. An agreement was signed recently to send Indian workers to Taiwan. India’s industry, critical supply chains, and overseas population are all increasingly invested in an enduring peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
Second, any Chinese aggression against Taiwan would be catastrophically costly for India. Such a scenario would, in effect, cripple global trade with China and Taiwan, which would create disruptions throughout Asia and West Asia. A recent Bloomberg study estimates that the costs of a conflict would amount to more than 10% of global GDP. India’s economy would suffer a greater shock than the US economy and its most valuable sectors, from electronics to pharmaceuticals, would run dry of components and materials.
A protracted or general war between China and the US, spreading beyond Taiwan, could spill over in multiple directions. It could ignite the already tense India-China land border. It could wipe out or take offline sizeable portions of Chinese, American, and other regional countries’ industrial capacity, on which the world depends. And it could raise the risk of unthinkable nuclear escalation. A conflict over Taiwan is something that India simply cannot afford, especially as it seeks stability and growth for national development.
Third, while a conflict itself would be calamitous, its outcomes could further worsen India’s long-term international position, depending on which side prevails. A limited conflict, where China has relative advantages of concentrating force near Taiwan, is also the most likely scenario to end in a Chinese victory over Taiwan and a corresponding defeat of the US and its allies. If China, through the crucible of battle, thereby displaces the US as the region’s pre-eminent military power, it would undermine the region’s entire security architecture. American security guarantees would be less credible, neighbours may seek to assure their security with more arms or offensive postures, and China’s military would be free to further project unchecked influence, including into the Indian Ocean. It may even feel emboldened to press its claims on Arunachal Pradesh. India is not an American ally, but it does depend on the US for its military modernisation and a broadly benign strategic environment.
What, then, can India do to help prevent this calamity? Beijing’s strategy for Taiwan uses all instruments of national power, from international law to economic and political leverage, aside from military coercion. It would doubtless prefer to pursue less costly and disruptive non-military ways as long as they remain viable. Given the stakes involved, it would only resort to a military campaign once it is satisfied that it has adequately set the conditions for victory. The military balance across the Taiwan Strait will therefore be the most critical deterrent, but non-belligerent states like India can buttress deterrence by convincing Beijing that it has not adequately set the conditions.
India has six types of policy options at its fingertips: international law arguments; building narratives opposed to aggression; co-ordinated diplomatic messaging; economic de-risking; active information operations to support the Taiwanese people; and military support to the US forces in the Indian Ocean. Each option can be calibrated to variable levels of ambition and political appetite; and they can be adapted and applied by many other countries.
These options can also advance India’s grand strategic position, regardless of their impact on the China-Taiwan dispute. Enacting these policies would, first and foremost, lend India more leverage in its intensifying strategic competition with China. They also offer additional pathways for India to deepen its cooperation with the US, thereby accelerating India’s national rise. And they offer a wider agenda for Indian international leadership, especially among countries of the Global South, which otherwise would be passive or at best uncoordinated in deterring Chinese aggression more broadly.
Such policies, therefore, are not a favour to Taiwan or the US; they would be an act of Indian self-interest. Depending on the political context, they may invite Chinese retaliation, but no policy is cost-free, and India has recently shown a tough willingness to weather Chinese opprobrium when necessary. India’s expanding interests and ambitions suggest the need for different policy settings, and the costs of such policies would be dwarfed by the costs of doing nothing.
India needs to enact tougher policies to serve its own interests.
India has its own reasons for preventing a Taiwan war
With expanding national interests, India has stronger compulsions to act against far-off hazards. It finds its interests entangled in disputes on the far edges of Asia, including in Taiwan. China claims Taiwan as its own and is feverishly preparing to seize the island by force if necessary, while the United States has increasingly signalled that it would probably fight to defend Taiwan.
India is highly unlikely to fight in a conflict over Taiwan. However, it has vital economic and security interests, and valuable policy levers, to ensure that such a conflict never happens.
New Delhi has three main reasons to do so. First, it has a stake in the status quo, with Taiwan as a self-governing territory that does not declare independence. India and Taiwan have expanded trade seven-fold since 2001 and are exploring a possible free trade agreement. The Taiwanese firm Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation has partnered with the Tata Group to build India’s first semiconductor fabrication plant. An agreement was signed recently to send Indian workers to Taiwan. India’s industry, critical supply chains, and overseas population are all increasingly invested in an enduring peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
Second, any Chinese aggression against Taiwan would be catastrophically costly for India. Such a scenario would, in effect, cripple global trade with China and Taiwan, which would create disruptions throughout Asia and West Asia. A recent Bloomberg study estimates that the costs of a conflict would amount to more than 10% of global GDP. India’s economy would suffer a greater shock than the US economy and its most valuable sectors, from electronics to pharmaceuticals, would run dry of components and materials.
A protracted or general war between China and the US, spreading beyond Taiwan, could spill over in multiple directions. It could ignite the already tense India-China land border. It could wipe out or take offline sizeable portions of Chinese, American, and other regional countries’ industrial capacity, on which the world depends. And it could raise the risk of unthinkable nuclear escalation. A conflict over Taiwan is something that India simply cannot afford, especially as it seeks stability and growth for national development.
Third, while a conflict itself would be calamitous, its outcomes could further worsen India’s long-term international position, depending on which side prevails. A limited conflict, where China has relative advantages of concentrating force near Taiwan, is also the most likely scenario to end in a Chinese victory over Taiwan and a corresponding defeat of the US and its allies. If China, through the crucible of battle, thereby displaces the US as the region’s pre-eminent military power, it would undermine the region’s entire security architecture. American security guarantees would be less credible, neighbours may seek to assure their security with more arms or offensive postures, and China’s military would be free to further project unchecked influence, including into the Indian Ocean. It may even feel emboldened to press its claims on Arunachal Pradesh. India is not an American ally, but it does depend on the US for its military modernisation and a broadly benign strategic environment.
What, then, can India do to help prevent this calamity? Beijing’s strategy for Taiwan uses all instruments of national power, from international law to economic and political leverage, aside from military coercion. It would doubtless prefer to pursue less costly and disruptive non-military ways as long as they remain viable. Given the stakes involved, it would only resort to a military campaign once it is satisfied that it has adequately set the conditions for victory. The military balance across the Taiwan Strait will therefore be the most critical deterrent, but non-belligerent states like India can buttress deterrence by convincing Beijing that it has not adequately set the conditions.
India has six types of policy options at its fingertips: international law arguments; building narratives opposed to aggression; co-ordinated diplomatic messaging; economic de-risking; active information operations to support the Taiwanese people; and military support to the US forces in the Indian Ocean. Each option can be calibrated to variable levels of ambition and political appetite; and they can be adapted and applied by many other countries.
These options can also advance India’s grand strategic position, regardless of their impact on the China-Taiwan dispute. Enacting these policies would, first and foremost, lend India more leverage in its intensifying strategic competition with China. They also offer additional pathways for India to deepen its cooperation with the US, thereby accelerating India’s national rise. And they offer a wider agenda for Indian international leadership, especially among countries of the Global South, which otherwise would be passive or at best uncoordinated in deterring Chinese aggression more broadly.
Such policies, therefore, are not a favour to Taiwan or the US; they would be an act of Indian self-interest. Depending on the political context, they may invite Chinese retaliation, but no policy is cost-free, and India has recently shown a tough willingness to weather Chinese opprobrium when necessary. India’s expanding interests and ambitions suggest the need for different policy settings, and the costs of such policies would be dwarfed by the costs of doing nothing.
India needs to enact tougher policies to serve its own interests.
The promises of Australia’s pivot to India
Vital new dimensions overtake the ‘C’ cliches of Australia’s old relationship with India—cricket, curry and Commonwealth.
The new C words are community and commerce and contest in the Indo-Pacific—and China.
Community is a concept broad enough to cover the one-million strong Indian diaspora in Australia, as well as the sort of community the Indo-Pacific can be.
Other big Cs are the contrast between today’s growing closeness and the chasm between India and Australia that stretched from India’s independence into the first decade of this century.
The chasm shrinks due to another set of Cs flowing from the China challenge (cooperate, compete and avoid conflict).
All this drives Australian and Indian convergence.
The Australian ‘pivot’ is a startling departure from those 50 years when the diplomatic temperature between New Delhi and Canberra hovered around zero. The chilly chasm defined much hard history: white Australia, the Cold War, alliance versus non-alignment, and India’s nuclear weapons status. It’s emblematic that at the end of the 20th century, relations were at sub-zero following the five nuclear bomb tests by India in May 1998.
In the realms of diplomacy and strategy, there was only one significant change in the way India viewed Australia during the second half of the 20th century. First, we were disdained as British lackeys. Then, from the Vietnam war, we were dismissed as mere stooges of the United States.
The cricket-curry-Commonwealth cliches were camouflage for coolness rather than clues to closeness. The old differences mean today’s convergence course can still be hit by the confusions of contrasting histories and habits of mind.
Yet the coming together over two decades has happened on many fronts, for reasons both simple and complex. The warming is created by people, driven by mutual interests, and responds to huge international shifts.
The world had changed and so has India. Last century’s champion of non-alignment finds new comforts in forms of alignment (although, please don’t use that word ‘alignment’).
The romance with the United States is the key feature of India’s diplomatic shift. Following the basic logic of balance-of-power politics, the American strategist Joe Nye writes, ‘India and the US seem fated not for marriage but for a long-term partnership—one that might last only as long as both countries remain concerned about China’.
Partnering the US, India looks afresh at another nation with the experience of a 70-year-alliance—we’ve gone from stooges to possible stalwarts.
Grappling with China and embracing the US, India has junked non-alignment while clinging to its labels. Such contortion marks the pain of abandoning what was both ideology and identity throughout the Cold War.
Non-aligned muscle memory twitches at Indian foreign policy, but the language of neutrality from super-power standoff offers little guidance. Today, New Delhi speaks of ‘strategic autonomy’. The contortions of autonomy produce descriptors such as the ‘US and India’s non-aligned alliance’
India cannot stand back from the superpower contest because it is a key contestant. The central balance of international power this century will be set in the Indo-Pacific. So ends a 500-year stretch of history when the central balance was made in Europe and decided by the West.
In maintaining the central balance in the Indo-Pacific, who will be the crucial resident power—India or China? Will China or India be number one in the Asian century?
Australia grapples with the thought that maybe the winner will be India because of its ‘inexorable superpower trajectory’. That’s the conclusion offered by Dr Andrew Charlton, an economist who entered federal parliament in the 2022 election as the Labor MP for Parramatta.
As senior economic adviser to Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Charlton knows how profoundly China shaped Australia’s economic prosperity and regional future. In 2014, Charlton wrote a Quarterly Essay Dragon’s Tail on what the China boom meant for the lucky country, arguing ‘few nations have been affected more by China’s transformation than Australia’.
Charlton now sees the transformation baton handed to India. The chair of the Parliamentary Friends of India has written a 240-page meditation enthusing about Australia’s pivot to India. On the cover is a blurb from Foreign Minister Penny Wong, calling the book ‘a powerful declaration for the shared future between Australia and India’.
Charlton is fascinated by India’s ‘quixotic national journey from medieval powerhouse to colonial vassal to impecunious republic to its present incarnation as an emerging superpower’. Charlton thinks we are in the early period of the India century:
For all its twists and turns, India’s journey has brought it to a point of extraordinary promise. Just as the twentieth century was said to be the American Century, and the nineteenth century was the Age of Empire, we may well end the twenty-first century with India on top. India is already the largest nation in the world by population. And it’s growing so quickly that by 2070 its population should rival that of China, the United States and the European Union combined. India also has the fastest economic growth of any major nation. It has the second-largest armed forces and the fastest growing military capability in the world.
India crowds Charlton’s canvas, allowing only glimpses of the dragon and the eagle in the room. Those brief sightings of China and the US point to the power currents pushing at this pivot.
On the ‘Quad’ of Australia, India, Japan and the US, Charlton is clear on how China’s anger killed off Quad 1.0 in 2007: ‘Pressure from China was the immediate catalyst to dissolve the grouping.’ He isn’t as explicit about how Chinese pressure prompted the resurrection of Quad 2.0 in 2017. Instead, he quotes Penny Wong on the need for ‘strategic balance’ and the ‘power and influence of Japan and India’.
The pivot to India, Charlton writes, means understanding the limits India will impose, seeking always to keep its options open: ‘Australia should not mistake expressions of friendship for an alliance that implies any formal or exclusive obligation.’
Alliance is what Australia has with the US. With India, Australia can seek ever-closer partnership.
The difference between alliance and partnership and the meaning of new alignments must be defined and tested.
The Quad is a preliminary conclusion, facing many questions from China.
‘Australia’s pivot to India,’ Charlton writes, ‘should aspire to build a distinctive relationship that goes beyond transactional engagement and circumstantial alignment.’ The opportunity for the pivot ‘has only recently drifted within reach’ because the differences between Australia and India ‘seemed unbridgeable for many decades’.
Charlton’s caution against aspiring to alliance is buttressed by his description of the experiences that give the two nations ‘fundamentally incongruent outlooks’ on the world:
Economically, Australia became a trading nation, while India focused on self-reliance. Strategically, India’s preference for non-alignment was diametrically opposed to Australia’s enthusiasm for alliances. These orthogonal approaches prevented us from creating a relationship of substance in the second half of the twentieth century. They created a lacuna at the core of our relationship that no amount of diplomatic effort could fill. As the Indian proverb reads, ‘Nobody is born friend or born enemy, only circumstances bind you.’
The friend-enemy dynamic of strategic circumstances brings Australia and India closer. What has transformed ties is people. And people can build permanent foundations for the pivot. Charlton’s Sydney electorate has one of the largest Indian diaspora communities in Australia. The promise of the diaspora is the pulse of Charlton’s book:
The Indian Australian diaspora now numbers more than one million. India is Australia’s biggest source of skilled migrants and our second-biggest source of international students. Members of the Indian diaspora are active across all aspects of Australian life: business, medicine, arts, academia, politics, civil society and sport. This diaspora is young, energetic, ambitious, dynamic and influential.
The Indian diaspora will forever change the relationship. The human bridge banishes the old chasm. But a diaspora is no guarantee of smooth relations between nations. More than 1.4 million Australians identify as having Chinese ancestry and that diaspora has just suffered through a five year icy age between Beijing and Canberra.
The geopolitics of Australia’s pivot has polar elements—the attraction of India and the push of China.
Charlton judges that neither Australia nor India are ‘entirely clear about exactly what part it is willing to play, or what it expects of the other’. Australia has both security and economic aspirations: to be part of India’s extraordinary growth story and for India to help deliver regional stability. India wants Australia to support its arrival as ‘a first rank global power’.
‘As with any friendship,’ Charlton concludes, ‘its real strength is only tested in challenging times.’
Why Australia should work with India on a maritime strategic fleet
In November, the Strategic Fleet Taskforce released a report which found that Australia needs a strategic fleet and maritime workforce. noting that only 15 vessels over 2000 deadweight tonnes are now Australian flagged. The taskforce, within the Department of Infrastructure, said that with so few vessels, ‘in a crisis, we would have great difficulty accessing and controlling the maritime assets that we might require.’
However, if the purpose of a strategic fleet is to provide maritime capacity in a crisis, Australia needs to think beyond whether a ship is Australian or foreign flagged. For instance, India’s vast and growing maritime capacity could provide Australia alternative shipping in a crisis, both as Australia’s fleet takes shape and, once it’s established, to complement the fleet.
The report states that the three ‘prime strategic purposes’ of the proposed fleet include disruption event response, supporting sovereign manufacturing industries and supporting the ADF. According to the taskforce, ‘without a sustainable pool of Australian-flagged vessels and crew, the ability for Government to access a strategic fleet in times of need will be almost impossible.’
While the taskforce outlined a strategic fleet with 12 additional vessels as a priority, eventually it is envisaged as growing to between 30 and 50 privately-owned but Australian-flagged vessels. It proposes a range of financial incentives and subsidised training opportunities for Australian mariners to achieve this. The taskforce also said that a more conducive policy setting would revitalise Australia’s shipping industry in peacetime, which could then be requisitioned in times of crisis.
The idea of the fleet relies on the Australian Government’s ability to requisition strategic fleet vessels when needed—which it cannot currently do outside times of declared war. Requisitioning arrangements would be achieved through contracts which specify shipping capacity at certain times and locations, as well as through legislation, with corresponding compensatory arrangements.
But the strategic fleet need not be entirely Australian flagged. Indeed, the taskforce recommended (and the government agreed in principle) that partnership opportunities with other countries and foreign companies to secure additional capacity and supplement the strategic fleet be pursued. Australian policymakers should prioritise India as a partner.
Put simply, India’s maritime sector is booming. According to Invest India, as of 2023, 1,526 ships sail under India’s Tricolour and India is the world’s 16th largest maritime country. India’s Maritime India Vision 2030 strategy lays the framework for it to continue expanding its maritime sector.
In recent years, Australian and Indian strategic perspectives have largely converged. Reflecting this strategic alignment, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2020, the 2+2 dialogue (Defence and Foreign Affairs) dialogue is now held at the ministerial level, a mutual logistics support agreement was inked in 2021 and regular defence exercises are convened. Australia-India cooperation should extend to supporting Australia’s strategic fleet.
According to Australia’s 2023 defence strategic review, Australia is a significant Indian Ocean state and must continue expanding relations and practical cooperation with key powers, including India. Immense appetite exists at the political level for Australia and India to deepen defence and security cooperation, and the strategic fleet is a ripe opportunity.
To achieve this, Australia should contract Indian shipping operators to supplement the strategic fleet with Indian flagged vessels. Contractual arrangements can be implemented requiring ships to be made available at specific locations and timeframes upon notification. The Indian Government would need to support such agreements. A similar arrangement has contributed to NATO’s strategic sealift capabilities, which guarantees vessels upon demand. While Indian ships may not be legally requisitionable by the Australian Government, healthy retainers and contract activation fees would guarantee vessel supply in all but the direst of global catastrophes.
Indian ships need not transit maritime choke points or contested waters to reach Australia. In a conflict involving China, the South China Sea would most probably be inaccessible. Further, as half the world’s container traffic transits the Indian Ocean, and approximately 40% of the world’s offshore oil production is derived from this vast seascape, Indian vessels are uniquely placed to supply Australia in a crisis.
This capacity would be a cost-effective means of guaranteeing ship supply. While a retainer would be payable, activation fees would only be due in a true disaster when other commercial ships are not available. Such instances are rare.
Contracts with the Indian shipping industry would satisfy many of the requirements associated with a strategic fleet. While developing a sustainable and vibrant domestic Australian shipping industry is a sound strategy, the costs are considerable, and Australia’s international partners should not be overlooked. India’s sizeable and rapidly modernising shipping industry is a potential key partner, which could underpin the resilience of Australia’s shipping requirements in times of crisis.
This article was written as part of the Australia India Institute’s defence program undertaken with the support of the Australian Department of Defence. All views expressed in this article are those of the author only.
China’s ‘blue dragon’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific
To compete strategically with the United States and undermine President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific policy, China has quietly been advancing its stealthy divide-and-conquer foreign policy agenda on four different but connected frontiers. The core of Beijing’s comprehensive plan can be described as a ‘blue dragon’ strategy, anchored primarily between two ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. The plan targets three bodies of water in the Indo-Pacific region and the major river systems in Southeast and South Asia originating in the Himalayas.
Despite Washington’s public denial of a containment policy against China, the US has continued its global spy operations and increased its defensive military posture in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration’s recent re-engagement with Beijing emerges from the tense diplomatic hiatus following the Sino-Russian ‘no limits’ pact in February 2022 and the US Air Force’s downing of a suspected Chinese spy balloon in February 2023.
But can a traditional containment policy prove effective in countering China’s ambitious blue dragon strategy?
The first frontier in the strategy is related to territorial disputes over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands (as known in Japan). While continuing its operational air and sea activities encircling Taiwan and the cross-strait region, China has been penetrating the East China Sea and beyond into the Western Pacific. The increasingly militaristic China has clearly been demonstrating its show of force to Taiwan, while simultaneously sending a message to the United States and Japan.
Armed with two aircraft carriers—the Liaoning and the Shandong—and a fleet of modern ships and aircraft, China’s unyielding pressure on Taiwan is closely tied to President Xi Jinping’s dedication to the ‘reunification’ of the ‘breakaway province’. The Chinese government has explicitly stated that ‘national reunification is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and occupied again by foreign countries [and] to foil the attempts of external forces [i.e., the US] to contain China.’
The constant Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force exercises mark an escalation of Beijing’s grey-zone warfare in the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands, and even in the vicinity of US military bases in Okinawa and Guam. China’s strategy includes normalising Beijing’s territorial claims.
Beijing’s second frontier is linked to its militarised artificial islands in the South China Sea. With the release of the ‘new standard’ map of China in August, Beijing has claimed a vast swath of contested waters and reefs, reinforcing its ‘nine-dash line’ in the South China Sea. China’s neighbouring countries—including India, the Philippines and Vietnam—were infuriated by the new map.
In 2016, an arbitral tribunal ruled that Beijing had ‘no legal basis’ for its ‘expansive claim to sovereignty over the waters’ of the South China Sea. The global community at the time hoped that the landmark ruling would force China to reconsider its claims and honour international law.
Despite the ruling, however, China’s militarisation of the South China Sea continues, and its escalating assertiveness has compelled the US to try to thwart its expansion efforts. While the US hasn’t ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, it continues in practice to operationalise the convention’s principles, maintaining that ‘all States [should] enjoy the freedoms of navigation … [and] lawful uses of the sea’.
China’s third blue dragon frontier is associated with India, Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean. Beijing continues to claim Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory. These claims are carefully devised to keep India perpetually restless and to drain its military and financial resources rather than finding a permanent solution to the border conflict.
The northern encirclement of India is also strategically linked to China’s ‘Buddhist diplomacy’ with Sri Lanka and its surrounding Indian Ocean. Beijing’s goal is to transform the Indian Ocean into the ‘Western Ocean’—a name that can be traced back to ancient Chinese literature and poetry. This tale of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and historical relationships is showcased in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is the ‘crown jewel’ of the Belt and Road Initiative, as evidenced by Beijing’s construction of the Hambantota Port, the Colombo Lotus Tower and other massive infrastructure with loans to the island.
Sri Lanka continues to play a pivotal role between China, India and the US. When Sri Lanka was declared bankrupt after defaulting on its international loans and other financial obligations in May 2022, it was India that provided the needed loan of US$3.8 billion. Out of concern for disclosing China’s ‘art of war’ in secret dealings, Beijing has advocated a bilateral Sino-Sri Lankan solution and declined to involve a multilateral framework aimed at achieving a sustainable debt-restructuring scheme.
Instead, China has announced the sending of the Shi Yan 6 PLA Navy ship to Sri Lanka later this month, raising ’concerns’ in both New Delhi and Washington. In August 2022, India and the US also expressed security concerns over the Yuan Wang 5’s berthing at the Hambantota Port, which is widely considered the next Chinese military base. US Senator Chris Van Hollen recently reiterated in Colombo that Washington is committed to protecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty ‘whether it comes to a free and open Indo-Pacific or debt restructuring’ by providing assistance thro0ugh the International Monetary Fund and supporting the Sri Lanka Navy to safeguard the island’s territorial waters. Thus, the competition over Sri Lanka continues.
Beijing’s fourth frontier is related to the geopolitics of water in the Brahmaputra River basin in India and Bangladesh and the Mekong River in the Southeast Asia.
China has been using the rivers in East, South and Southeast Asia, derived from their tributaries in the Tibetan plateau, to produce hydroelectric power through a vast network of dams. Control over the sources of transboundary rivers, like the Brahmaputra and the Mekong, has also given Beijing significant geopolitical and geoeconomic leverage against the downstream countries. With the expansion of its dam system, China has manipulated the water level of cross-border rivers, disrupting agriculture, farming methods and transportation networks throughout Asia.
Beijing might keep using the powerful water card of manipulation against downstream countries, forcing them into various compromises and concessions. In other words, China possesses a water blackmail tool to pressure lower riparian countries and punish them for policies and actions that don’t correspond with Beijing’s will.
China’s philosophy to win a war without fighting a battle is illustrated by a range of carefully designed tactics from Taiwan to Sri Lanka. America’s traditional containment methods stemming from the Cold War can’t be used in the context of an increasingly versatile and powerful China. Today’s world is more closely interconnected by political and corporate lobbying as well as technology and trade than it was during the Cold War period. Thus, it is nearly impossible to divide the world into pro-American and pro-China camps, especially when the US-Sino trade regimes are inexplicably intertwined and expanding.
Washington needs to keep ahead of China’s scientific and technological advancements and maintain US security guarantees to allies and like-minded democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific. However, American military cooperation—in the forms of Quad and AUKUS, or bilateral defence treaties with the Philippines and Vietnam—is not a panacea. The US should treat its small allies and friends as partners in both the military and economic realms. The Biden administration has begun a ‘charm offensive’ by courting the 18-nation Pacific Islands Forum aimed at curbing Chinese inroads in the South Pacific.
With its growing centralised power and autocratic mindset, Beijing might miscalculate by overestimating its military might and economic capacities. After all, while America’s Cold War containment policy contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union, the autocratic empire in Moscow collapsed under the weight of its own miscalculations and weaknesses of the centralised system.
Unlike democratic governing systems that have naturally embedded self-correcting mechanisms—such as regular elections, multi-party platforms and freedom of expression—autocratic and centralised systems tend to erupt from the top, the sides and the bottom like a volcano. In this worldview, perhaps, China might be its own worst enemy. The US would be wise to sustain a highly agile containment policy through active partnerships with friends and allies while allowing Beijing to make its own mistakes and miscalculations.
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