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While everyone’s anxiously watching and analysing the events unravelling in the South China Sea, there’s another resource conflict involving China that also deserves attention. In the Himalayas, China and India are competing for valuable hydropower and water resources on the Yarlung Tsangpo–Brahmaputra River. The dispute offers some important lessons for regional cooperation (on more than just water), and highlights what’s at stake if China and India mismanage their resource conflict.

The Yarlung Tsangpo–Brahmaputra River is a 2,880km transboundary river that originates in Tibet, China as the Yarlung Tsangpo, before flowing through northeast India as the Brahmaputra River and Bangladesh as the Jamuna River.

The resource conflict began on 11 June 2000, after a natural dam-burst in Tibet caused a flash flood that resulted in 30 deaths and serious damage to infrastructure in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. Some Indian government officials believed the flood was intentionally caused by China, even suggesting China would weaponise or interrupt water supply to leverage over India. The issue dominated reporting on China, but later subsided after satellite imagery confirmed the natural dam. Later in 2002, China and India signed their first Memorandum of Understanding for the provision of hydrological information during the monsoon months, previously discontinued after their 1962 border war.

The issue gained serious traction in 2008, when the Chinese government announced plans to begin construction of the Zangmu hydroelectricity dam. Located on the middle reaches of the Yarlung–Tsangpo River, the dam was perceived by many Indian observers as the beginning of a major river diversion project that would dry up the Brahmaputra River. Speculation and suspicion were further stoked by Chinese refusal to divulge information deemed ‘internal matters’ and conflicting information released by government officials. Indian fears drove some commentators­—led by Brahma Chellaney—to warn of a coming water war over the river; suggesting a river diversion would be tantamount to a declaration of war. The contentious issue soon sparked concern in the Indian Parliament, and became a priority in high-level bilateral exchanges with China. In its exchanges, India sought reassurances and pushed for more extensive water data sharing practices (negotiating an extra 15 days of data).

The crux of the resource competition thus relates to mass dam building and diversion plans. With the Yarlung Tsangpo representing 79 gigawatts of hydropower potential (more than enough to power NSW, ACT and South Australia combined), China is planning the construction of 20 hydroelectricity dams along the river. In addition to these dams, China is also considering a potential Grand Western Water diversion plan (redirecting water to the dry north). India fears upstream China will ‘turn off the tap’ that makes up 30% of its water resource. However, despite calls for greater transparency and consultation, India is also racing to construct hydropower dams on the Brahmaputra River. While India’s dam building drive is primarily motivated by a desire to take advantage of the river’s hydropower potential, the dams also help to consolidate India’s territorial claim on the contested border state of Arunachal Pradesh (known as ‘South Tibet’ in China).

Despite Indian alarm, there’s little reason to fear a water war. Numerous facts indicate Chinese activities won’t impact river flow. For example, Chinese dams have been confirmed as run-of-the-river—they don’t store water). China has also dismissed plans of river diversion due to high economic costs and environmental risks. On top of this, Chinese leaders have reiterated that they don’t want to antagonise their closest neighbours. Perhaps the most convincing rebuke of the water war myth is the scientific evidence that shows China has limited control of India’s water. Contrary to popular belief in India, up to 70% of the Brahmaputra’s water resource comes from rainfall collected in India.

Although a water war is unlikely, Sino-Indian water security issue warrants further consideration for three key reasons. First, the dispute highlights that phantom problems risk the escalation of conflict causing unnecessary distractions. Second, the dispute has wider implications for regional resource management and security. And third, shared resources like water present less politically-loaded opportunities for greater cooperation.

First, much of India’s alarm was unwarranted. The information vacuum created by the Chinese Government’s refusal to divulge details of ‘internal matters‘ combined with inconsistent messaging gave rise to worst-case scenario speculation and fear in India. The dispute revealed the importance of transparency for guiding an informed conversation, not defined by historical biases. The incident showed that transparency can save time that would be otherwise wasted on reassurance and crisis management. China and India could devote efforts to developing goodwill and relations needed to establish joint scientific research projects in the Himalayan region, and more extensive water-data and information sharing norms.

Second, how India and China manage their domestic water and energy shortages has wider implications for the economic, environmental and social stability of the world’s two most populous countries. The dispute will test the strength and maturity of China and India, by requiring them to look past their strained history and the nationalist sentiments associated with it. Their response will set a precedent for cooperation in other areas of the Sino-Indian relationship, as well as transboundary resource management more broadly.

Finally, while a lot of mistrust exists between China and India—not least from its 1962 border war and its unresolved border dispute—cooperation in water data-sharing, dam building planning and joint scientific research projects offer less politically charged opportunities where deeper people-to-people relationships can be created. Such initiatives would not only improve the two countries’ perceptions of each other, but also help to develop a common language and understanding of the regional resource and environmental challenges.

India and China’s contested land border and the associated political sensitivities remain a serious barrier to bilateral cooperation on regional issues. However in the area of transboundary water data sharing, China is showing an increasing willingness to seriously consider and reassure the concerns of downstream countries. While this is promising, uncertainty about China’s commitment to regional cooperation persists, particularly because China’s willingness to talk about transboundary water issues remains subject to the political climate and is often used as a political tool for negotiation.

The water dispute combines domestic issues of resource scarcity and economic security with complex international relations challenges of transboundary resource management and bilateral Sino–Indian relations. How these issues intersect will be important for the region and its future. The water dispute comes at an interesting time where China and India’s relationship is developing within a shifting regional power dynamic. It’s certainly worth watching.

For India and Australia, a striking new reality is in view. One of the great negatives in India’s traditional view of Australia is turning into a positive. Suddenly Australia’s alliance with the US makes us look interesting. Australia’s alliance addiction no longer counts against Canberra.

For decades, India saw Australia as little more than a pale reflection of US policy. At its most dismissive, this Indian perspective saw a US stooge that would do as Washington wished.

New Delhi may not yet give Canberra much credit for independent thought or action. But being rusted on to the US no longer causes India to dismiss Australia as essentially irrelevant in the geopolitical and defence discussion.

India seeks greater bilateral defence cooperation with Australia as an Indian Ocean actor with some useful assets. See this, partly, as India slowly responding to Australia’s long-held aspirations to improve naval cooperation. More importantly, it reflects India’s rising capabilities which are starting to lift to match India’s core beliefs about its central role in the Indian Ocean (one of many effects of the China challenge).

India is reaching towards a quasi-alliance with the US, having already created the forms of a strategic partnership; in the slow moving realms of strategic realignments, this US–India partnership has been built in double-time.

Broadening the lens from bilateral to multilateral is where the reality shift shows vividly. The multilateral focus brings in the strongest US allies in the region—Japan and Australia. What for so long was a big negative when India bothered to think about Australia is turning into a positive.

An India in the process of arriving at the top wouldn’t want to see only two chairs reserved for the US and China in the throne room. Concert rather than condominium is more attractive. And the rest of Asia is equally interested in a soft concert to get more chairs in the command space.

India’s choices are not as broad as it proclaims. Forget non-alignment—another time, another international system, fading into the last century. India is a committed power. It must be committed to making the Indo-Pacific system work because India will have a huge stake in the system (however weak the concert may be). India can’t stand aloof. A lot of options are really impossible dead ends. India can’t and won’t align with China; their destiny is as rivals. The old Cold War friend, Russia, is a difficult comrade today. If Russia leans towards anyone in Asia, it will be China.

India can’t stand aloof from the emerging Indo-Pacific security system. The choice for India is how close it stands to the US, Japan and even Australia; it’s a matter of degree, not choice.

Acknowledge that this description of India’s narrowing strategic choices sounds nothing like the foreign policy narrative coming out of New Delhi. This story is a happy rejoicing that India, on its way to being rich, can now function as an independent superpower, picking and declining as it wishes. Imagine a non-aligned giant with rainbow options. India always talks a great game. What it actually does, though, is usually tougher and tighter.

For a window on this, go back to a long ago Australian High Commissioner to New Delhi, who recorded this reflection on the difference between allied Australia and non-aligned India in approaching international affairs:

There was not much in India’s policies to emulate. Yet, wrong-headed and hypocritical as India’s policies sometimes were, one’s mind was gripped by the undeviating direction of India towards national self-interest without concession to sentiment towards others, or to the “loyalty” so evident in Australian official policies towards our “traditional friends”.

The words are from one of the great Canberra mandarins, Sir Arthur Tange, who served in India for five years after his time as secretary of the External Affairs Department (1954–65) and before taking the top job in the Defence Department (1970–79).

Tange would be just as acid today on the costs to Oz of its loyalty habit. As the flintiest of realists, Tange would see India acting true to form, being typically hard-eyed about the future of the Indo-Pacific. Such a realist view will open some interesting opportunities for Canberra and New Delhi. India still sees Australia as having the default instincts of a US stooge. But being close to the US is now the strategic choice India is embracing. The stooge will get more of a hearing, if not much respect. Australia and India have a lot to play for. And for the first time ever, the demands of the international system could drive them towards each other, not apart.

US President Barack Obama visited India between 25 and 27 January, becoming the first US president to visit India twice while in office and the first US president to be the Chief Guest during India’s Republic Day celebrations. In a visit high on symbolism, substance could easily have been lost. But in the official engagements that spanned this visit, India and the US moved much closer to achieving the kind of cooperation that’s repeatedly eluded them in the last decade. While the personal chemistry between the two leaders seemed to be the driving force behind reinvigorated cooperation, shared national interests underpinned that chemistry. Even the joint statement issued at the end of the bilateral dialogue reflected that with its title Shared Effort; Progress for All.

The present Indian government enjoys a substantial majority in the lower house of parliament and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has articulated a clear vision of development. US analysts have hailed what they see as a predictable environment for investment, and the revision of India’s land and labour laws by the Modi government should help to make investments in India even more attractive. Read more

Kicking us off, War is Boring carries a piece on the ‘distressing and predictable’ effect of mortars used by state and non-state forces in Africa and the Middle East. Data collected over three years indicated that 92% of mortar casualties were non-combatants. Foreign Policy has detailed reporting on the civilian casualties of air strikes conducted by the US and its 11 allies in Iraq and Syria.

Pacific Forum CSIS has this week released two analyses on the Asia–Pacific. Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman explore the competing narratives of American and Chinese power (and perceptions of that power) in the region. David Santoro and Carl Baker identify nuclear governance as the next important Asian project in light of plans to significantly increase the quantum of nuclear power plants—and thus nuclear materials—in the Asia­–Pacific. ‘This is worrisome’, they note, ‘for a region that hosts several nuclear-armed states, has been involved in illicit trafficking networks, and continues to experience significant terrorist, insurgent, and pirate activity’. Read more

Headlining today’s round-up is a CTC Sentinel post by Andrew Zammit on new developments in Australian foreign fighter activity. Among the key changes, he notes that since November 2013 Australian fighters have preferred to fight with ISIS rather than with Jabat al-Nusra or other Free Syrian Army groups, and that Australian jihadists are now playing leadership roles. He also outlines changes in the domestic threat situation and state responses.

Over at The Bridge, Brandee Leon sheds more light on women and the Islamic State. While many women in the captured territory have been kidnapped and then married off, given as rewards or raped, she notes not all are victims: at least two female brigades in the Islamic State enforce sharia law and reports say over 50 British women have joined them.

Missed ANU’s Indonesia Update? New Mandala has uploaded ten YouTube videos of the conference, with our pick being session 8 with IPAC’s Sidney Jones discussing security developments in the country. Read more