Over the last decade, India’s progressive economic and military development has resulted in a strategic rebalancing of the geopolitical and security dynamics shaping power relations in South Asia. As China continues to expand its influence, particularly in the Indian Ocean and the larger Indo-Pacific, Beijing appears to be revealing a grand strategy that implicitly seeks to retain influence in strategic maritime zones that are also vital to Indian interests. Such a strategy threatens New Delhi’s ability to maintain credible control over regions of economic and political importance, which increases the likelihood of the two countries facing destabilised power relations.

As part of China’s new strategy to secure marine interests and increase maritime power, the Chinese government has targeted for as much as 85% of the foreign crude oil purchased by China to be carried by Chinese-controlled ships. At the end of 2014, 625 ships were on order for Chinese fleet owners (PDF), 80 of which were super-large oil tankers. Once these ships are constructed and delivered, China will become the largest tanker owner in the world. The objective of oil tanker fleet growth is two-fold: first, the degree of control China will have over oil transiting strategic lines of communication (SLOCs), like those in the Indian Ocean, will increase as a larger merchant marine and tanker fleet will provide Beijing with  legal and administrative pretext to intervene on behalf of Chinese companies and organizations operating in the region; second, this pretext will directly improve the energy

China’s reliance on Indian Ocean SLOCs has given rise to security concerns in Beijing because the surrounding region is exceedingly vulnerable to foreign disruption compared to other critical maritime zones closer to the Chinese mainland, such as the South China Sea, where sea control capabilities are relatively significant. Beijing’s understanding that commercial maritime traffic and a substantial portion of the country’s oil supply could be interrupted has reinforced its commitment to sea control capacity growth in the Indian Ocean region. That growth has centered on a major resource and human capital investment in naval modernisation, which has already begun improving the capability of the PLAN fleet to exert influence, defend strategic interests and conduct operations beyond the country’s near-seas region.

China’s evolving naval capabilities have transformed the average PLAN surface combatant into a capable multi-mission platform. The improvements to surface and sub-surface vessels, combined with the deployment of increasingly accurate and long-range offensive missile systems aboard those platforms, have transitioned the PLAN (PDF) from a strictly regional fighting force to one capable of limited, distant power projection.

In addition, over the last decade the PLAN has been using more complex and realistic training programs to ensure that its expanding arsenal of high-technology weapons is being properly employed and that combat preparedness across the fleet is sufficient. Central to the new training programs are high-end naval combat tasks that are designed to teach PLAN commanders the fundamentals of fleet action in hostile environments where a foreign navy is actively intervening against Chinese national interests.

Also adding to Chinese encroachment anxiety in New Delhi has been the expansion of Chinese port facilities throughout the Indian Ocean region, which has enhanced Beijing’s ability to resupply, forward deploy, and maintain a naval and merchant marine presence in areas far away from the Chinese mainland. The construction of a port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and the development of a permanent facility at Obock harbour in Djibouti are central components of Beijing’s strategic manoeuvring. Those facilities have introduced a deep-water basing capacity for the PLAN and Chinese commercial marine fleets—a new opportunity for Beijing to establish itself as a permanent maritime player in the Indian Ocean.

China’s naval modernisation and its aggressive strategy of utilising highly advanced warships, foreign bases and a large civil commercial shipping fleet are challenging India’s ability to secure its vital SLOCs between the Persian Gulf, Europe and East Asia. Indian policymakers have revised the country’s maritime doctrine so that it prioritises reflexive naval modernisation and capacity-building to augment a more proactive and firm foreign policy. As a result of its modernisation efforts over the past decade, India has inherited the position of one of the largest navies in the world with carrier-based air power, an expanding fleet of modern major surface combatants, and conventional and nuclear-powered submarines. The navy’s evolution has demonstrated New Delhi’s ambition to project influence and power across the Indian Ocean region and beyond—both to ensure guaranteed access to and use of SLOCs, and to develop the necessary capabilities to offset strategic gains made by China in the region.

That proactive strategy underwrites a similar trend in newly constructed Indian maritime doctrine that calls for the transition from forward presence to forward projection. An enhanced naval force structure that has the capacity and capabilities to sustain such a projection strategy and compete with an increasingly powerful PLAN will assist New Delhi in attaining security over national interests and defending against proactive threats to critical trade routes, maritime economic resources and its own merchant marine fleet.

Bite by kilometer-size bite, China is eating away at India’s Himalayan borderlands. For decades, Asia’s two giants have fought a bulletless war for territory along their high-altitude border. Recently, though, China has become more assertive, underscoring the need for a new Indian containment strategy.

On average, China launches one stealth incursion into India every 24 hours. Kiren Rijiju, India’s Minister of State for Home Affairs, says the People’s Liberation Army is actively intruding into vacant border space with the objective of occupying it. And according to a former top official with India’s Intelligence Bureau, India has lost nearly 2,000 square kilometers to PLA encroachments over the last decade.

The strategy underlying China’s actions is more remarkable than their scope. On land, like at sea, China uses civilian resources—herders, farmers, and grazers—as the tip of the spear. Once civilians settle on contested land, army troops gain control of the disputed area, paving the way for the establishment of more permanent encampments or observation posts. Similarly, in the South China Sea, China’s naval forces follow fishermen to carve out space for the reclamation of rocks or reefs. In both theaters, China has deployed no missiles, drones, or bullets to advance its objectives.

China’s non-violent terrestrial aggression has garnered less opposition than its blue-water ambition, which has been challenged by the United States and under international law (albeit with little effect). Indian leaders have at times even seemed to condone China’s actions. During a recent panel discussion in Russia, for example, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that although China and India are at odds over borders, it was remarkable that ‘in the last 40 years, not a single bullet has been fired because of [it].’ The Chinese foreign ministry responded by praising Modi’s ‘positive remarks.’

Moreover, Modi’s predecessor, Manmohan Singh, used to claim that, in their 5,000-year history, India and China fought only one war, in 1962. What this rose-tinted history failed to acknowledge was that China and India became neighbors only after China annexed the buffer Tibet in 1951.

Given India’s accommodating rhetoric, it is easy to view the country as a paper tiger. While Modi has used the phrase ‘inch toward miles‘ as the motto of India-China cooperation, the PLA has continued its cynical territorial aggrandizement by translating that slogan into incremental advance. After spending so many years on the defensive, India must retake the narrative.

The first order of business is to abandon the platitudes. Modi’s calls for border peace and tranquility might be sincere, but his tone has made India look like a meek enabler.

China’s fast-growing trade surplus with India, which has doubled to almost $60 billion on Modi’s watch, has increased Chinese President Xi Jinping’s territorial assertiveness. The absence of clarity about the frontier—China reneged on a 2001 promise to exchange maps with India—serves as cover for the PLA’s aggression, with China denying all incursions and claiming that its troops are operating on ‘Chinese land.’ But, by acquiescing on bilateral trade—the dumping of Chinese-made steel on the Indian market is just one of many examples—India has inadvertently helped foot the bill for the PLA’s encirclement strategy.

China’s financial regional leverage has grown dramatically in the past decade, as it has become almost all Asian economies’ largest trade and investment partner. In turn, many of the region’s developing countries have moved toward China on matters of regional security and transport connectivity. But, as Modi himself has stressed, there remains plenty of room for India to engage in Asia’s economic development. A more regionally integrated Indian economy would, by default, serve as a counterweight to China’s territorial expansion.

India should also beef up its border security forces to become a more formidable barrier to the PLA. India’s under-resourced Indo-Tibetan Border Police, under the command of the home ministry, is little more than a doorman. Training and equipping these units properly, and placing them under the command of the army, would signal to China that the days of an open door are over.

If the tables were turned, and Indian forces were attempting to chip away at Chinese territory, the PLA would surely respond with more than words. But in many cases, Indian border police patrolling the area don’t even carry weapons. With such a docile response, China has been able to do as it pleases along India’s northern frontier. China’s support of the Pakistani military, whose forces often fire at Indian troops along the disputed Kashmir frontier, should be viewed in this light.

The PLA began honing its ‘salami tactics’ in the Himalayas in the 1950s, when it sliced off the Switzerland-size Aksai Chin plateau. Later, China inflicted a humiliating defeat on India in the 1962 border war, securing peace, as a state mouthpiece crowed in 2012, on its own terms. Today, China pursues a ‘cabbage’ approach to borders, cutting off access to an adversary’s previously controlled territory and gradually surrounding it with multiple civilian and security layers.

Against this backdrop, the true sign of Himalayan peace will not be the holstering of guns, but rather the end of border incursions. India’s accommodating approach has failed to deter China. To halt further encroachments, India will need to bare its own teeth.

Back in 1967, the Australian National University held a conference on the theme, India, Japan, Australia: Partners in Asia? It was an interesting time to host such a gathering. That year witnessed a series of events with long-lasting consequences. In the throes of the Cultural Revolution, China was stoking tension with the Soviets, upping aid to North Vietnam, and flexing muscle with a hydrogen bomb test. The United States was ratcheting up military action in Indochina. The United Kingdom began closing bases East of Suez and the Soviets were preparing for their first naval foray into the Indian Ocean. Japan replaced Britain as Australia’s biggest trading partner, Suharto came to power in Jakarta, and ASEAN was founded in Bangkok.

Back in Canberra, the conference delegates agreed on the challenges their countries faced. ‘Most participants’, their host J. D. B. Miller observed, thought ‘the future in would be determined by how China behaved, and how others behaved towards China’. They were also concerned about Washington’s actions in the region and about how to secure lasting economic growth.

The delegates differed, however, in their worldviews, which shaped their perceptions of how to tackle those challenges. Among the nonaligned Indians, suspicion of the West and sympathy for socialism was clear, distancing them from the Australians and Japanese. Among the Japanese, pacifism loomed large, as did the promise of using its growing economic power to pacify the region. And among the Australians, wrestling with the legacy of Menzies, shifting views were evident, as the groundwork was laid for the major changes to foreign and defence policy in the early 1970s.

Those differences made it hard for the participants to come to any firm conclusions about how to deepen trilateral ties. Miller noted that the most likely foundation for greater cooperation between the three was a ‘sense of common danger’ emanating from the People’s Republic. But he also observed that they had different views of China—Australians saw a distant, if subversive, threat; Indians a ‘sinister force bent on humiliating India’, as Miller put it; and Japanese a misguided power, but one that patient engagement might change. Those varying perceptions, Miller thought, would make it hard to establish any kind of lasting cooperative approach to Beijing and the wider problems of Asia, absent a major shift in Chinese behaviour or an American withdrawal from the region. And so it proved.

Fifty years on, however, the notion of enhanced cooperation between Australia, India and Japan is back, driven once more by the challenges posed by China. It surfaced in the ill-fated Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007–08, which elicited fury from Beijing. It returned again in June 2015 when foreign affairs and security officials from the three countries—including DFAT Secretary Peter Varghese, Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, and Japanese Vice-Minister Akitaka Saiki—held a trilateral meeting in New Delhi.

The agenda for that meeting was apparently dominated by maritime security, specifically freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, China’s island building activities, and the possibility of joint exercises. What was discussed at the next one, held in February 2016 in Tokyo, is less clear—in contrast to the earlier one, it passed almost unreported.

In 2017, it’s Australia’s turn to set the agenda and host the trilateral. Despite the times, this represents a significant opportunity. Key interests of Australia, India and Japan have converged, but—importantly—so too have perceptions of what’s at stake and what might be done. All three are concerned with three inter-linked challenges: managing China’s assertiveness across the region, dealing with the consequences of Donald Trump’s election and deepening regional economic integration. All have signed up—formally at least—to the idea that Beijing mustn’t be allowed to undermine the so-called “rules-based order”. And all are deeply concerned about Trump’s erratic pronouncements about the region and US allies, and committed—albeit in different ways—to pushing ahead with economic integration.

The third Australia–India–Japan trilateral meeting will present an opportunity to reinforce a coordinated message on maritime security, but also to widen the scope of cooperation to secure shared interests. The rules-based order should be upheld, but so should processes through which all get a say about how those rules are set. For that reason, the three need to collaborate to discourage a US–China “grand bargain” in the Indo–Pacific, which many in Beijing desire. They need to ensure the US remains engaged and to obviate the risk of missteps by an inexperienced administration. Moreover, they must work together to build the political, economic and military capacity of regional states to retain and exercise their autonomy, as well as defend their interests.

At the two year mark of Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s time in office, commentators have been quick to criticise the inward turn Indonesia’s foreign policy has taken under his administration. This for a President elected on a platform of ‘expanding Indonesia’s regional engagement in the Indo–Pacific’ (PDF). As President, Jokowi has shown himself to be overwhelmingly focused on a domestic archipelagic development agenda, part of his stated vision of developing Indonesia into a global maritime fulcrum (GMF). However, the gulf between rhetoric and action isn’t just a quirk of Jokowi’s leadership but rather a symptom of Jakarta’s long-standing ‘minimalist’ conception of the Indo-Pacific.

The first Indonesian policymaker to consider the strategic benefits of an Indo-Pacific outlook was Marty Natalegwa, Foreign Minister under the ‘internationalist’ President SBY. Natalegwa penned a response to the new regional construct in 2013, then being promoted by some Indo–Pacific Rim democracies (the United States, Japan, India and Australia). His proposal was for an ‘Indo–Pacific-wide treaty of friendship and cooperation,’ based on the East Asia Summit’s Bali Principles. Rather than undertaking a considerable revamp of Indonesian foreign policy, the Foreign Minister simply sought to apply his existing doctrine, that of a regional ‘dynamic equilibrium’—‘where not one country is preponderant’—to the expanded region. Marty called for an Indo–Pacific (PDF):

‘…marked by an absence of preponderant power not through the rigidity, rivalry and tensions common to the pursuit of a balance of power model. Instead, through the promotion of a sense of common responsibility in the endeavor to maintain the region’s peace and stability.’

For Natalegawa, Indonesia’s interest in the Indo–Pacific was limited to the extent that an expanded region supports its preferred model of an Asia–Pacific order. In that vein, adding a rising India—long seen by Jakarta as a benign power—supports both goals of forging a dynamic equilibrium of inclusive regionalism and a diversity of powers.

On the face of it, the Jokowi administration with its core GMF vision appears to be embracing a holistic conception of the Indo–Pacific. Rizal Sukma, one of the GMF’s key architects, argued that the vision:

‘…emphasises Indonesia’s geographic, geostrategic and geoeconomic realities upon which its future will depend, and simultaneously influences the dynamics in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.’

The GMF envisions Indonesia as a fulcrum: the ‘point of support where the burden of the two oceans actually rest’. It’s objective is for Indonesia to access the full benefits of its geostrategic position.

Two years in, however, there’s little evidence that Indonesia is acting beyond its traditional Asia–Pacific scope. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which Indonesia took chairmanship of in October 2015, appears to be the mechanism for a new grand strategy centred on the Indo–Pacific. Indeed, at the time of Indonesia becoming chair there was hope that its proposed IORA Concord might be the first step toward enhanced regionalism in the Indian Ocean.

However after a year of Indonesia’s chairmanship, concrete developments are hard to find. The IORA Concord being drafted for next year’s inaugural IORA Leaders’ Summit is likely to offer little more than ‘bland diplomatic statements that have little restraining force over signatories’ behaviours,’ according to Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto. Jakarta’s interests appear limited to a diplomatic victory for leading on the Concord. There’s no serious suggestion that Indonesia under Jokowi will try to take effective and active leadership over the diverse grouping, as it hasn’t with the more geopolitically pertinent ASEAN.

None of this is surprising, given that the Indian Ocean holds little strategic interest for Indonesia. A stronger position in the Indian Ocean would do nothing to support Jakarta in addressing the strategic challenges it faces. China has contested by force Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Exclusive Economic Zone, and even territorial waters, surrounding its northernmost territory, the Natuna Islands on three separate occasions this year. Beijing has also successfully fractured ASEAN unity—long the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy—under the leadership of Cambodia in 2012 and more recently Laos. Economically, Indonesia has limited interests to its west; its major trading partners remain overwhelmingly Asia–Pacific.

The relationship between Indian Ocean security and stability and Chinese assertiveness remains tenuous. For Indonesia, India is the only state outside the Asia–Pacific that has the potential to change the strategic balance in East Asia. As such, Indonesia has long welcomed greater Indian engagement in the Asia–Pacific; Jakarta was a key supporter of expanding the East Asia Summit to include India, Australia and New Zealand in 2005.

There’s little reason to think that under Jokowi, Indonesia’s Indian Ocean interests have developed beyond that perceived by Natalegawa and that the Indo–Pacific is perceived to be anything more than the Asia–Pacific + India.

Jokowi’s foreign policy interests are primarily about infrastructure development across the archipelago—key to his re-election bid in 2019—of which Beijing and Tokyo remain Indonesia’s main partners. Indeed Indonesia appears to be playing China and Japan off against each other as a way to maximize their investment potential. Continuing concerns about Chinese assertiveness keep the minimalist logic of the Indo–Pacific alive.

France and India have further deepened their military and economic relationship through India’s purchase of 36 French “Rafale” fighter jets at a cost of almost €8 billion. This order is France’s largest aeronautic contract ever signed overseas, and constitutes a victory for France’s diplomacy in India and for French company Dassault Aviation. The contract should also reinforce the strategic partnership between the two countries.

French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian went to New Delhi on 23 September to sign the contract. Clearly, tensions pertaining to DCNS’ leaks about India’s submarines haven’t weakened Indian stakeholders’ trust of French armament.

Rafales are usually 100% made in France. They are representative of France’s pride in its innovative industrial savoir-faire because they gather technology from its industrial leaders, such as Thales, Safran and obviously Dassault. The Indian government has accepted that its Rafales will be fully assembled in France because Dassault wants to protect its technology. However, the French aeronautic company has agreed to transfer the production of some parts of the motors and cabins to India, probably a political necessity as New Delhi is currently promoting ‘Make in India’ policies.

The 36 Rafales should enable the development of some technological partnerships between France and India. Dassault Aviation, which agreed to invest €4 billion in India, has constituted a local joint-company with Indian Reliance ADA. This cooperation will include technological transfers, with Dassault investing in the research and development programs of the Indian Ministry of Defence, and industrial partnerships which could lead to the creation of 1,500 jobs in India. Moreover, the Rafale package will see the aviation company also provide armament and training programs for pilots and maintenance workers.

Strategically, the French–Indian fighter jets contract goes along with the deepening of New Delhi’s and Paris’ dialogue for the security of the Indian Ocean.

As expressed in its last Defence White Paper in 2013, France intends to reinforce its presence in the Indian Ocean, which hosts several French overseas territories, especially Reunion Island and Mayotte. The economic stakes are high for France because most of its trade with Asia follows maritime routes in the Indian Ocean.

India is currently modernising its Navy and Air Forces in order to strengthen its regional presence. Prime Minister Modi has also asserted this strategic ambition by deepening its dialogue with his neighbours. For instance, India has reinforced its military and civilian assistance to Sri Lanka, the Seychelles and Mauritius, three states where China tries to invest heavily. Having watched China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea dispute, New Delhi is determined to assert its influence and power over the Indian Ocean.

China seems to consider the Rafales as a threatening symbol of India’s ambitions. In fact, the Rafales, which have the ability to carry nuclear weapons, will be positioned close to India’s borders with China and Pakistan. India’s Defence Minister even explained that the first Rafales could be delivered sooner than planned in case of renewed tensions with Pakistan.

During his visit to New Delhi on 23 September, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian explained that Paris understood this contract as a tool in order to strengthen its significant strategic partnership with India. France was the first country to elaborate such a partnership with New Delhi in 1998. French policy-makers share India’s fear regarding China military’s assertiveness. Le Drian explained that France perceives India as one of its main partners in maintaining the stability of the region. Selling Rafales to New Delhi enables France to empower its partner’s defence capabilities, as was previously the case with French exports to India of Scorpene submarines and Mirage 2000 fighter jets.

Paris doesn’t only rely on its partnership with India. It also wishes to increase its collaboration with Australia on these regional issues. French diplomats and policy-makers have regular dialogues with their Australian counterparts to help align their strategies in order to secure their interests in the Indian Ocean.

Economically, the French media also insist that the Rafale contract will enable France to reverse its trade deficit with India. In 2015, France imported €5.4 billion of Indian goods and services but its exports to New Delhi only reached €3.2 billion. This defence contract will reverse the trend and constitutes a positive outcome for the French economy, which relies on exports to support its fragile growth. Moreover, France and India keep increasing their economic links. India was France’s 15th trade partner in 2015, up significantly from 26th in 2014. The Rafale contract reinforces this dynamic.

The recent DCNS data leaks and the potential damage they could have impacted on the French–Indian relationship seem to belong to the past. After years of negotiations, India and France have, at last, agreed on a Rafale contract, corresponding to both countries’ strategy to secure their interests in the Indian Ocean.