Drugs, human trafficking, illegal gambling, cyber scams and money laundering are among the most prevalent criminal activities reported in Pacific islands, which were once almost free of organised crime. While these crime types have a devastating human-security impact on the region, organised crime groups are also undermining the rule of law through influencing political elites—a point highlighted in the Pacific Islands Forum’s Regional Transnational Organised Crime Disruption Strategy 2024–2028.

Substances such as cocaine from Latin America and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines from Southeast Asia have long transited through the Pacific Ocean from their countries of production, destined for Australia and New Zealand, which are two of the most lucrative narcotics markets in the world. Despite the existence of the transnational supply chains, Pacific islands had, in the main, remained untouched, acting as mere transit points for narcotics and effectively sparing the islands from the related law enforcement and public health repercussions.

Regrettably, for some Pacific islands, that’s only a description of the past. Large drug busts in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga and growing domestic consumption rates paint a darker picture—and it shows little sign of lightening. To no surprise, a multitude of organised criminal groups have been eager to acquire shares in these markets.

The protagonists in most cases are foreign criminals who dominate this scene, notwithstanding the presence of some local counterparts. They range from Asian syndicates to drug cartels from the Americas, from outlaw motorcycle gangs from Australia and New Zealand to criminal deportees and an array of less organised, more opportunistic groups and individuals from as far as the Middle East and Europe. Notably, while they are competing in the same market space, it is becoming more common for disparate groups to join forces for particular business ventures.

Drugs are big business and, unsurprisingly, the main focus of most organised crime groups. Despite dabbling in other illegal activities, such as racketeering, the groups derive most of their revenues from the narcotics trade.

Asian syndicates, such as Chinese triads, present a more complex problem. They tend to have more diversified business portfolios beyond drugs, including human trafficking and prostitution and the running of digital scams. Moreover, leaders of such criminal enterprises operate in both the criminal and legitimate business worlds. And (the cherry on top) they may also enjoy high-level political connections and support.

It’s difficult to rule out the possibility that some criminals promote agendas that influence the political scene in some Pacific countries. That was, for instance, the case with Wan Kuok-koi, a 14K triad leader turned ‘patriotic entrepreneur’. Wan was able to leverage the presence of a significant Chinese business diaspora in Palau to make inroads into the Micronesian country while befriending officials at the highest political level. Notably, his arrival coincided with the beginning of cyber scam operations run out of Palau and operated under duress by Chinese nationals.

The growing and detrimental presence of transnational organised crime groups, and the need to combat them, are acknowledged in the Pacific Islands Forum’s report this year on disrupting regional transnational organised crime. The document is driven by the ambitious vision of making ‘the Pacific Region … the hardest region in the world for organised criminal groups and networks to operate in’ and puts forward a multi-pronged whole-of-society approach that is prevention-focused, intelligence-led and determined to create a hostile regulatory environment to make it hard for criminal actors to exploit.

One of the many significant aspects of the strategy is that it proposes the first-ever regional definition of ‘transnational organised crime’ (TNOC).

Note that one globally accepted definition does not yet exist. Instead, countries worldwide and international organisations such as the United Nations have designed their own. Their common denominators include the involvement of individuals coming together over a period and planning serious criminal activities across borders for financial gain.

The proposed Pacific regional strategy is unique in that it expands the criteria for classification as TNOC. Specifically, it classifies TNOC as involving activities aimed at illegally gaining profit and those driven by illegally gaining power or influence.

The decision to draft the definition in a more encompassing way appears to reflect the new reality increasingly confronting the Pacific islands (and the world at large). The line between organised crime on the one hand and political influence and interference on the other is becoming more blurred. Here, the emerging concept of geocriminality, intended as a (state’s) use of criminal actors to achieve objectives in target countries, may be a valuable tool to understand this growing phenomenon.

Last month a whopping 450 kilograms of heroin being imported by ship was seized in Melbourne. That number sounds huge, but it does not convey the true gravity of the challenge faced by police and the criminal justice and health systems.

The impact is conveyed in new data from the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) on the amount of heroin used by Australians in 2020, new annual data from the Penington Institute on the number of accidental overdoses by heroin users, updated ACIC data on the year-on-year tracking of heroin seized at Australian borders, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2021 world drug report.

This combined data provides critical insights for the public, government and policing agencies about the importation and use of narcotics as Australia recovers from the Covid-19 pandemic, supply chains are restored and the nation seeks policy responses to combat this security and health issue.

Let’s unpack them.

First, 450 kilograms of heroin is a huge amount, even if it were a year’s total of border seizures, let alone just one.

Over the past decade, the annual total seized at Australian borders has fluctuated a lot according to ACIC data, but only twice has it topped 400 kilograms in a year. The previous maximum was just over 500 kilograms in the 2012–13 financial year. This single seizure will make the 2021–22 financial year the second highest total even if nothing else is seized in the next eight months, which is unlikely. Last year’s haul was the lowest in a decade, likely due to Covid-19-related interruptions to international supply chains through which wholesale drug imports are trafficked. This means trafficking has already bounced back from Covid-19 to the tune of a 265% increase from last year’s annual total. Even if we look back to the 2018–19 financial year, being the last total not affected by disrupted global supply chains, this seizure alone is a 160% increase from 2018–19 total.

Let’s compare data on annual consumption of heroin in Australia over the past four years to see if increased seizures translate to lower usage because there’s less product on the street.

This shows that intercepting less of the smuggled narcotics does not necessarily translate to more drugs being consumed. In 2018–19 more heroin was seized and more was also consumed, and in 2019–20 significantly less was seized and only slightly more was consumed. So, while border seizures are  important in combatting the use and effects of heroin, there is no direct causal relationship between the amount seized by police and the quantity used. That is likely to be because, even with large seizures, so much product makes it through the borders that the amount used is dictated mostly by demand, and price fluctuations even out any supply and demand issues.

The general upward trend of use and consistently significant seizures suggests that the ‘pie’ of annual imports is getting bigger, and police are seizing a relatively even percentage of it. This means police are keeping pace with increasing imports, but that the balance of quantities of imports, seizures and use is remaining stable enough for high profit margins to insulate high-level traffickers’ investments.

Let’s now compare that to the last decade of data on annual unintentional overdoses on heroin in Australia.

The steady and significant increase in unintentional deaths—about 200% over the decade—suggests that the volume of drugs seized by police does not translate into less available product than there is demand for in the Australian market. The fact that there were only 67 unintentional drug deaths reported in 2006 means such deaths increased by 500% up to 2019. Border seizures do not reduce use and they don’t correlate to reduced deaths.

So, what big insights stand out?

It’s clear that no matter how well police do their job, the problem of heroin importation, addiction and deaths cannot be solved simply by border seizures. There’s too much product coming in and profit margins are so high that traffickers can clearly afford to lose large quantities and still make sufficient money to keep operating, and even increase imports year on year. If we add annual consumption to annual seizures we see a steady increase in the overall quantity of heroin being imported.

This means that Australian governments will be fighting a losing battle against drug traffickers until a public-health approach is developed to address heroin addiction and related crimes. This requires policies that understand heroin addiction is an illness that compromises an individual’s capacity for agency, rather than a conscious decision people make to live a criminal life, and the implementation of services and pathways to support recovery.

These datasets show that the demand for illicit opioids is steadily increasing and new, synthetic versions are an imminent problem. The ACIC data also shows fentanyl is creeping into the Australian market, with use patterns suggesting it could be being imported on the east coast, mainly to Sydney and Hobart, and only just starting to crop up in other capital cities. The UNODC report details how the illicit use and market for synthetic opioids like fentanyl have overlapped with heroin and in some places entirely replaced it: the US is experiencing a dual epidemic; and Estonia and Finland are now completely synthetic markets. Sources of manufacture of synthetic opioids are much less limited than sources of heroin. Synthetics are also not limited by seasonal growth of raw opium, so the potential for production is likely greater than heroin.

Fentanyl and other similar synthetic opioids are stronger than heroin and can result in overdoses quicker and at much lower doses, making their use more volatile. They feature in the majority of overdose deaths in the US.

Synthetic opioids are clearly on the way into Australia and logic suggests this country will have been identified by transnational organised crime groups as a new market for them. With a fierce and growing demand for opioids in Australia, governments cannot afford to waste more time on an approach focused on policing and criminal justice. It’s not working, no matter how successful police are at seizing ever greater quantities at the border, and things are most definitely getting worse.

When the Australian law enforcement community continues to regularly break drug seizure records, it’s easy to assume that the supply of illicit drugs is being curtailed. Alarmingly, that’s not happening, and the government now needs to consider developing a new strategy for drug supply reduction.

Last month the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission released its eighth National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program report. This report revealed that between December 2018 and April 2019, the population-weighted average consumption of methylamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA and heroin increased.

Over the past two years, the program has tested wastewater sites across Australia using a scientifically modelled methodology to establish an evidence-based quantitative understanding of our national illicit drug use patterns.

On many occasions over those two years I’ve provided analysis and commentary on the program’s findings (see here, here, here and here). The challenge with commenting on this type of statistical reporting is two-fold. First, the data is often difficult for many to understand, and second, the numbers have a persuasive power that can capture our attention.

Following the release of the report, there was hardly a murmur about why—despite our best law enforcement efforts—the quantity of methamphetamine (ice) that Australians consume continues to rise. This isn’t surprising—as the ACIC’s media snapshot highlighted, comparisons between the quantity of drugs Australian law enforcement seizes and the amount that’s actually consumed are meaningless. But then all government departments are prone to promoting good news over bad.

When you start questioning current strategies for reducing illicit drug supplies, someone inevitably argues it would be so much worse if we weren’t seizing drugs. While I don’t necessarily disagree with the veracity of the argument that it could always be worse, the fact remains that ice consumption continues to increase.

Last year, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime world drug report noted that, despite record seizures, global wholesale prices of illicit drugs are decreasing. According to the UNODC, opium poppy and coca bush cultivation is increasing, and the data also suggests that the markets for drugs like cocaine, heroin and synthetics are being oversupplied. The implication here is that large seizures by law enforcement authorities will have even less impact on the availability of these drugs in our communities.

I have previously argued that the problem is one of law enforcement focus. There are, after all, some big disconnects between the use of seizure rates as a performance measure and the achievement of the government’s policy intent of harm minimisation. That observation was never a criticism of the good work of our border and enforcement agencies. Rather, it’s a reflection on whether the concentration on higher seizure rates, at the cost of other more innovative enforcement strategies and measures, is the best approach to reducing supply.

In the past, the narrow policy focus could well be blamed on a lack of drug-use data to support any hypothesis on the impacts of police strategy. But with eight cycles of wastewater monitoring now in the can, we have the data.

The problem isn’t just about police trying to reduce illicit drug supplies. The wastewater data illustrates that more still needs to be done to reduce the demand for illicit drugs.

There’s a continuing ferocious demand for illicit drugs in Australia, amid increasing global supply and declining wholesale prices. For criminal syndicates, the Australian drug trade, with its high profits and low barriers for market entry, is a dream come true. Under these conditions it becomes clear that the efficacy of police strategies—focused on increasing seizure rates and decapitating the leadership of criminal syndicates—is declining.

Resolving this problem is a difficult challenge. The first step for policymakers and government is to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation. As a starting point, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement needs to initiate an inquiry. It should draw upon Australian and international expertise from civil society, academia, law enforcement, education and health, and examine what isn’t working and how we can minimise illicit drug harm in Australian communities. Questions also need to be asked about why we don’t use the wastewater drug monitoring data as a police performance measure.

In the meantime, law enforcement, especially the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Border Force and the ACIC need to double down on their international disruption operations. The increased operational tempo should be appropriately funded and strategically controlled.

The ACIC Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program was initially funded for nine quarterly cycles: the last will be delivered in early 2020. The data that this program has provided to date is invaluable, if somewhat controversial.

There might be some in Canberra who subscribe to the old adage that no news is good news, but they are wrong. The ACIC wastewater monitoring program must become a permanent activity.

Earlier this month, I wrote in The Strategist that despite law enforcement’s operational successes in terms of the number and weight of drug seizures, little progress is being made in reducing the supply. The article painted a rather bleak picture of what isn’t working. Since then I’ve been asked by a number of people, ‘What is working?’

There seems to be more than enough empirical evidence that our overarching strategy for reducing the illicit drug supply is failing. If you read the many opinion pieces on the subject (see here, here and here for examples), you could easily conclude that there have been no successes. However, real successes are frequently overlooked or undermined, often because they’re inconvenient for the many advocates of decriminalisation (see here and here).

Forty years ago some 100,000 hectares of farmland in Thailand was being used to cultivate opium. By 2007, the country was declared opium-free by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. This was made possible by the Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who in 1969 established the Royal Project, which provided alternative livelihoods for those involved in growing and refining opium. The ambitious project was underpinned by rigorous research on alternative crops. The Thai government and international partners then developed critical infrastructure that gave farmers growing new crops access to markets.

To be sure, we can’t take that example as a cookie-cutter solution to opium production or the production of synthetic drugs. There were many factors, not present in other jurisdictions, that contributed to the Royal Project’s success. But we can take heart that some measures, especially those deeply rooted in community development, result in improved security conditions and reduced drug production.

During the 1990s, Australia faced a heroin epidemic that hit all levels of society, claiming the lives of an alarming number of teenagers and young adults. In 1997, the Australian government brought law enforcement, health and education policymakers together to develop an integrated drug strategy involving supply reduction, demand reduction and harm minimisation.

The AFP formed multidisciplinary (investigations, intelligence and forensics) ‘Avian’ strike teams to disrupt the importation of heroin. By early 2001, Australia had experienced a sudden and substantial reduction in heroin availability. While it’s not clear exactly why or how it worked, there’s at least some evidence that law enforcement had an effect on the heroin supply.

In May 2001, the New South Wales government established Australia’s first medically supervised injecting centre, and in its first six years of operation it managed 2,106 overdose-related events without any fatalities.

By most measures, Australia’s overarching drug strategy worked to halt the heroin epidemic. Again, these successes need to be understood in the context of the conditions of the day. Reducing the heroin supply was easier then than it is today because the market was dominated by a small number of key importers. It’s also certain that the injecting centres didn’t just minimise harm but saved many lives.

In April 2018, the ACT government and the AFP agreed to conduct a pill-testing trial at the Groovin the Moo music festival. On the day of the festival, 85 substances were tested on behalf of attendees. Two of the samples were found to contain highly toxic chemicals. The AFP agreed not to target people who used the testing service; instead, officers went after those selling and trafficking drugs, resulting in one arrest. Again, by most measures, this was a success.

My point here is that nations can be effective at illicit drug supply reduction and harm minimisation, and perhaps even demand reduction. Success requires an integrated and agile strategy that is bounded by a clear mission or scope. The approaches mentioned above met those criteria and were also underpinned by empirical evidence. The officials involved were also realistic about what could be achieved.

As I said earlier this month, ‘the high rate of seizures is masking the failure of … law enforcement strategies’. Any success in reducing supply and demand and minimising harm will be fleeting if governments don’t start engaging more closely with the real complexity of today’s illicit drug market.