Tag Archive for: Greece

In 2024, a global anti-incumbent election wave

In a year in which political incumbents around the world were either voted out of office or forcibly removed from power, one statement, repeated in various forms by Mohammad Al Gergawi, the United Arab Emirates’ minister of cabinet affairs, stands out: ‘The role of government is to design a future which gives citizens hope.’ Looking ahead to 2025, political leaders should take this message to heart and shift their focus from constant crisis management to crafting a bold, hopeful agenda.

The global anti-incumbent wave has been breathtaking. In March, Senegalese President Macky Sall was decisively defeated after trying and failing to postpone the presidential election. In June, the African National Congress, which had ruled South Africa since the end of apartheid, lost its majority for the first time in three decades, forcing the party to form a coalition government. The same month, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party also lost its parliamentary majority.

This trend continued through the summer and fall. In July, the Labour Party won Britain’s general election in a landslide, ending the Conservative Party’s 14-year rule. In October, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost its majority for the first time since 2009. Then, earlier this month, Michel Barnier became the first French prime minister to be ousted by a no-confidence vote since 1962. A few days later, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost a vote of confidence, paving the way for an early election, while Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau fired his finance minister, plunging his country into political uncertainty.

Other established leaders were ousted by popular uprisings. In August, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country aboard a military helicopter as protesters stormed her official residence. And Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was forced to flee to Russia after his regime collapsed in December.

Why are incumbents losing? One possible explanation is social media. Studies have shown that increased internet access often erodes trust in government and deepens political polarisation. In the United States, for example, Democratic and Republican-leaning voters have become increasingly polarised, with each side becoming more deeply entrenched in its partisanship.

Social media fosters connection between people who consume similar content, reinforcing their worldviews and amplifying the psychological effect known as ‘conformity’. Social media algorithms act as powerful megaphones for simple, emotionally charged messages, making these platforms fertile ground for conspiracy theories and fearmongering.

But while early evidence suggests that social media bolsters support for far-right populists, recent election results show that this is not always enough to gain power. In Mexico, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Britain, Japan and South Africa, incumbents or other mainstream parties won, albeit significantly weakened.

Consequently, one clear takeaway from this historic election year is that governments must learn to use social media more effectively. A good place to start is to engage directly with voters’ concerns. Earlier this year, two advisers to Prime Minister Sir Kier Starmer visited the town of Grimsby in northeastern England and asked residents to describe the government in one word. The responses they received mirror what I have heard in many other countries: ‘irrelevant’, ‘authoritarian’, ‘distant’, ‘elitist’, ‘inaccessible’, ‘self-serving’, ‘unambitious’, ‘untrustworthy’, a ‘joke’.

Another major takeaway is that to restore trust, leaders should focus on economic growth and citizens’ empowerment. A comprehensive 2022 study of the political economy of populism highlights strong evidence that economic conditions, such as rising unemployment and cuts to social spending, have a profound impact on people’s views of government.

This helps explain why voters in Spain and Greece in 2023 and in Ireland this year chose to re-elect incumbent leaders, while French voters rejected the ruling party. In 2022, Spain’s economy grew by 5.7 percent and Greece’s by 6.2 percent. By contrast, in Germany, which will hold an early election after the government lost a parliamentary no-confidence vote, the economy shrank by 0.3 percent in 2023 and is expected to contract by 0.1 percent in 2024. France fared slightly better, with GDP projected to grow by 1.1 percent this year, after growing by 0.9 percent in 2023.

Beyond boosting short-term economic growth, political leaders must consider the future they are offering their citizens. Too many politicians’ and policymakers’ plans are limited to annual budget cycles and focused largely on cuts. Meanwhile, voters—grappling with rising living costs, post-pandemic austerity and a pervasive sense that they have lost control over their lives—need leaders who give them reasons for hope.

Budgetary constraints should not be an excuse for failing to envision a better future. Some of the boldest government initiatives have been conceived during times of economic hardship. Notable examples include US President Franklin D Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, Britain’s postwar welfare state, Dubai’s post-1958 infrastructure boom and Singapore’s rapid development after 1959.

Political leaders must draw inspiration from these bold programs and be more ambitious in addressing the root causes of their citizens’ frustrations. The good news is that every country and community has creative individuals, in both the private and public sectors, whose work requires them to think ahead and plan for the future. Leaders must identify and reach out to such visionaries, who are rarely included in policy discussions, and leverage their expertise.

A politics of hope is essential to restoring faith in democratic institutions. In Grimsby, local residents said they longed for a politics that is ‘realistic’, ‘meaningful’, ‘passionate’, ‘hopeful’, and ‘empowering’. A government that can fulfill these aspirations will prove itself worthy of its citizens’ trust.

Greece’s regional play to contain Turkey

Greece’s naval modernisation program is another step in the nation’s attempts to secure strategic advantage in a region being shaken by shifting balances of power.

Its naval modernisation complements the government’s recent signing of defence cooperation agreements with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as the United States reduces its presence in the Middle East. This bloc aims to contain an aggressive Turkish republic.

Greece has spent the past summer reaching regional deals, including a US$1.65 billion defence contract with Israel and a defence agreement with the United Arab Emirates. A defence agreement with Saudi Arabia includes the loan of a US Patriot missile battery for Riyadh’s war in Yemen.

In February, Greece held the first Philia Forum with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Cyprus, the UAE and Bahrain, and it held the annual Iniochos 2021 military exercises with the US, Israel, the UAE and Cyprus in April.

Greece has united a coalition of states worried about what they see as Turkey’s neo-Ottoman expansionist agenda marked by ambitious maritime claims, incursions into Syria and constant plays for leadership of the Muslim world. With the emergence of this coalition, Libya and Qatar are among Turkey’s few regional allies.

But Greece’s deepening engagement with the Eastern Mediterranean may carry risks to both its reputation and its sovereignty.

Clientelist networks throughout the Middle East have deepened the dependence of weaker states on Eastern Mediterranean powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, through financial and diplomatic support. Ingrained patronage systems in the two states ensure that political and economic power remains centralised in their elites. Can Greece avoid undue foreign influence from these regional powers?

Saudi Arabia’s history of corruption and human rights abuses, epitomised by the brutal killing of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, has made many NATO countries think twice about engaging with Riyadh.

Internationally, Saudi Arabia has been criticised for its involvement in Yemen and human rights abuses domestically and abroad. This has led to the UK appeal court ruling that it’s illegal to grant licences to Saudi Arabia due to potential breaches of international humanitarian law. But that hasn’t stopped UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The US is reviewing its sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and has announced a review of its conventional arms transfer policy.

Saudi Arabia’s increasing reputational issues may sit uneasily with a nation that takes pride in being the birthplace of democracy, and whose electorate is sensitive to foreign interference.

Close engagement also raises questions about Greece’s apparent lack of engagement and leveraging of relationships with the EU, the UK and the US on its national security concerns.

Greece has strong relations with European nations, such as France and Italy, that share concerns about Turkish behaviour in the region, and it has a longstanding relationship with Europe through the EU and NATO. But this relationship has been strained by what Greece considers a lack of action against Turkish aggression. Greece believes Europe’s opting for diplomatic solutions to Turkey’s behaviour in the region has let it down.

According to some EU officials, Greece has lost faith in the EU’s will to deter Turkish aggression against Greek territory and in the region. And with a decreasing US presence in the Middle East, some argue that Greece has no option other than to turn to regional actors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. That they are apparently willing to bankroll Greece with finance, supplies and equipment in the event of increased conflict adds to the attractiveness of this option.

While there are legitimate concerns about Greece’s engagement with the Middle East, its pragmatic approach is reflected in a Greek saying, ‘From outside the dance circle, you sing a lot of songs’.

Greece’s relationships with Middle Eastern powers may be pragmatic, but they shouldn’t come at the expense of its long-term interests as a democratic country and its historical alliances with the US and EU.

New gas deposits rekindle old contest between Turkey and Greece

Covid-19 has not deterred regional actors and major powers from maintaining, and in some cases enhancing, their geostrategic competitions in many hotspots around the globe. An emerging flashpoint is that between two old rivals, Turkey and Greece, in the eastern Mediterranean. Their dispute over the discovery of gas deposits in waters off the shores of Crete and Cyprus have brought them to the brink. Unless they step back in favour of a compromise, the dispute is set to escalate towards a major conflict.

The Turkish and Greek conflicting claims over the gas deposits is new, but their mutual antagonism has its roots deep in history. In modern times, the protagonists fought a month-long war over Cyprus in July 1974 when Turkey launched an invasion of the island in support of its Turkish minority. Turkey’s victory and creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus over some 36% of the island’s territory divided the island, and seriously jeopardised the chances of good neighbourly relations between the two rivals. Northern Cyprus is only recognised, and largely maintained and secured, by Turkey.

Persistent United Nations mediation for a resolution has failed to produce any satisfactory results. Although both Greece and Turkey are NATO members, this has not enabled any bridge of reconciliation between them. Nor have the European Union’s efforts in this respect.

In fact, Turkey’s strongman and Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has grown disillusioned with the EU during the political ascendancy of his Justice and Development Party (AK) since 2002, for three important reasons. One is the EU’s rebuffing of Turkey’s longstanding desire to join the organisation, which has been partly at the behest of EU members Greece and Cyprus. Another is the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey has shouldered the main burden, but the EU has wanted it to hold back the outflow of Syrian refugees into Europe, albeit in return for what Ankara has claimed to be inadequate EU financial assistance. The third is Erdogan’s resentment of Turkey’s NATO allies for not having come on board with his harsh and widespread crackdown on those behind the failed 2016 coup.

While keeping Turkey’s membership of NATO, Erdogan has incrementally found it expedient to reorient Turkish foreign policy to the extent possible towards Russia, Iran and China, despite his differences with them in Syria, and to enlarge his country’s strategic role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. He backed Qatar over its blockade by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, and supported the UN-recognised government in Libya against the forces of the renegade General Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Egypt and its Arab allies.

He has also shown sympathy for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Gulf Arab states, and critically downgraded relations with Israel in favour of strengthening the Palestinian cause. Along with this reorientation, Erdogan has sought to beef up his Islamist credentials. One of his latest moves was the conversion of the Hagia Sofia museum into a mosque to the chagrin of Christian sources in the West.

The prospects of the discovery of large gas deposits have once again revived the potentially very dangerous antipathy between the two Mediterranean states. Both sides have conducted military exercises, with French participation in the Greek venture, and US involvement in Turkey’s.

Meanwhile, Greece has reached an agreement with Egypt and Libya to extend its maritime boundaries so it can lay claims over the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has decried the agreement as illegal, claiming that it overlaps with a continental shelf deal that Turkey signed with the Libyan government in 2019.

Turkey’s activities in the Middle East and North Africa have rattled the Egyptian autocratic President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and strengthened a regional Arab perception that Ankara wants to claim leadership of the Muslim world and revive the old Ottoman imperial ambitions.

The US and the EU have called on the two protagonists to restrain from any escalation. But Erdogan distrusts both, and seems determined to have different foreign policy options to suit his internal and external purposes. He has now steered Turkey sufficiently away from a firm alliance with the West and its regional allies to play his pro-Eastern cards, involving good relations with Russia, Iran and China, to stand tall at home and in the region.

Yet, the danger of another Turkish–Greek conflict, with wider implications for stability in the Mediterranean and beyond, cannot be underestimated. The EU has inclined to side with Greece in the current dispute, but it is imperative for the organisation to join forces with the UN and major powers to bring about a mediated settlement. The current troubled world cannot afford another potentially devastating conflict.