Planet A

A heatwave across Greenland which raised temperatures 18° Celsius higher than average has resulted in the first recorded rain on the peak of its ice cap—more than 3,000 metres above sea level. This follows record high temperatures and a major melting event in July, making 2021 one of the worst years on record for mass melting.

Greenland’s ice is now melting at its fastest rate in 12,000 years, and that could contribute up to 33 centimetres to sea level rises by 2100.

Several climate research initiatives now focus on Greenland as an indicator of polar melting and future sea level rises. Research suggests Greenland’s ice sheet reached a climate tipping point earlier this year and is now ‘locked in’ to irreversible melting. NASA’s five-year Oceans Melting Greenland (OMG) project anticipates research on Greenland will also help anticipate the rate of melting in Antarctica, where events will have an even larger impact on sea levels and human life.

Democracy watch

Tunisia’s political crisis continues as President Kais Saied lengthens the suspension of parliament and legal immunity for MPs. That has sparked worry about the longevity of the country’s democratic constitution that was ratified following the 2011 Arab Spring protests. Citing concerns that the country was in peril, Saied shocked the world on 25 July by assuming emergency powers and removing the prime minister and cabinet.

Growing discontent with the political mismanagement of public services, the Covid-19 pandemic and the struggling economy saw thousands of demonstrators defying lockdown restrictions last month. Saied’s assumption of control has been welcomed by many Tunisians who have seen nine governments over 10 years. However, analysts warn that the country having multiple centres of power—the president, prime minister and parliament—enables political elites to exploit policy gridlocks to further their own ends.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia provided an example of a relatively successful democratic transition in the Arab world. The undoing of Tunisian democracy could vindicate authoritarian and extremist actors and demoralise democracy advocates across Muslim-majority countries.

Information operations

On 16 August, US telecommunications company T-Mobile confirmed it had suffered a cybersecurity breach shortly after VICE News reported hackers were attempting to sell customer data online. The company has since revealed that personal data of more than 50 million past, prospective and current T-Mobile customers, including names, birth dates, social security numbers and drivers’ licence information, had been leaked in a ‘highly sophisticated cyberattack’. A major data breach of this nature leaves affected consumers vulnerable to various types of identity theft and fraud.

Last Wednesday, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced that it had launched an investigation into the incident. This is the first high profile inquiry since President Joe Biden’s May executive order on cybersecurity which was prompted by the Colonial Pipeline hack. The findings of the FCC’s investigation, and any regulatory action against T-Mobile, may drive greater private-sector compliance with the US government’s voluntary cybersecurity guidelines.

Follow the money

On 20 August, the anniversary of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny’s poisoning, the US and the UK issued a joint statement announcing new sanctions on seven alleged Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) operatives believed to be directly responsible for the attack. The allies reiterated their calls for Russia to conduct a transparent investigation into Navalny’s poisoning to comply with international laws governing chemical weapons, and to respect democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the lead-up to Russia’s State Duma elections.

The sanctions follow measures imposed as part of Magnitsky-style legislation which allows for financial sanctions and travel restrictions to be placed on individuals. Australia has also agreed to implement similar legislation. While these new measures, like other sanctions on senior Kremlin officials including Alexander Bortnikov, are unlikely to change Russia’s behaviour, they demonstrate important resistance to Moscow’s abuse of human rights and chemical weapons norms by countries whose own democratic systems have been targeted by Russia.

Terror byte

Counterterrorism experts are concerned the Taliban’s sudden takeover of Afghanistan could revive Islamic militant attacks across the globe. Somalia is considered particularly vulnerable as it relies on international troops to check the growing military presence of the extremist group, al-Shabaab, in the country and across neighbouring borders.

Despite approximately 20,000 peacekeepers being deployed to protect the transitional government under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), al-Shabaab still exploits territories with poor governance systems and uses ongoing political leadership crises to its advantage.

It’s considered likely that the Somali transitional government could fall if AMISOM troops were removed. National security advisor to the Somali president, Abdi Said Ali, rejected any comparison with the situation in Afghanistan, saying Somali troops are responsible for security in most of the country.

Planet A  

Wars, political upheavals, locust plagues and cyclical droughts in Africa have often left starvation in their wake. But without that sort of instability, Madagascar is experiencing a catastrophic famine and concern has been voiced that climate change is to blame. Cyclones, earthquakes and floods have devastated agriculture supplies in the south of the major island nation and sparked widespread starvation.

Madagascar’s situation highlights the disproportionate burden of climate instability borne by low-income nations. Counties in the Sahel and the Southwest Pacific, which have done little to contribute to climate change, are experiencing cascading extreme weather events. Wealthy countries have so far committed US$100 billion a year to build climate resilience in the global south. However, key donors haven’t yet met their promised targets. Experts say greater resources are urgently needed to help countries across the globe become climate resilient.

Democracy watch

Protests in Australian cities against lockdowns, sluggish vaccine rollouts and governments’ handling of the pandemic mirror demonstrations seen in France, Italy, Greece and Germany. Covid-related protests have caused a democratic crisis in Tunisia. The Carnegie Endowment global protest tracker has logged over 25 politically motivated protests across authoritarian and democratic states.

Protests can be an indicator of the health of a democracy, but these persistent large-scale demonstrations raise difficult questions about the tensions between individual and collective rights in a pandemic when exercising those rights may endanger others. Australian governments and health experts have condemned the protests, and the NSW government is urging people to identify those who took part. One of those so named described that action as ‘un-Australian’.

Coalitions of alienated groups frustrated with the pandemic response are vulnerable to disinformation and manipulation, especially by far-right groups, further damaging social cohesion and trust in democratic government.

Information operations

A disinformation-for-hire campaign has been uncovered after two European social media ‘influencers’ revealed that they were offered payment to spread false information about the Pfizer–BioNTech vaccine. The influencers said the offer was made by what appeared to be a London-based public relations agency on behalf of an anonymous client. They were asked to present claims that there had been hundreds of vaccine-related deaths. While these influencers rejected the offer, others accepted. At the same time, social media accounts in Brazil and India posted videos spreading similar false information.

The PR agency was later found to be using a fake address. LinkedIn profiles associated with the firm described it as a subsidiary of a Russian advertising company, Adnow. These activities highlight a worrying trend in state-sponsored disinformation on social media platforms, with more nuanced campaigns that mirror advertising and PR strategies using social media influencers to target specific audiences. While the strategic impact of these influence-for-hire campaigns isn’t yet clear, this approach is likely to become a more prominent tool of state power.

Follow the money

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, is expanding overseas with the construction of plants in the US and Japan. TSMC has also opened preliminary discussions with Germany. While the company says it’s still too early to confirm plans for a German plant, the deal could provide strategic benefits for both parties.

The EU, like the US and others, hopes to ease its supply-chain vulnerabilities through sovereign semiconductor production. It formalised this goal last month through a joint declaration on processors and semiconductor technologies.

TSMC’s global expansion out of Taiwan is driven by the need to mitigate risks associated with having the company’s semiconductor production concentrated so close to neighboring China. Increasing global efforts to establish onshore chip production are driven by security concerns rather than by market opportunities, given semiconductors’ crucial importance across the automobile and technology sectors. Ernst & Young predicts that collective efforts to stabilise global supply chains will correct imbalances in semiconductor supply in the short term and that international demand will persist.

Terror byte

The first person to go to trial under Hong Kong’s new national security laws has been found guilty of terrorism and inciting secession. Twenty-four-year-old Tong Ying-kit was arrested last year for driving a motorcycle into three police officers while bearing a placard with the words ‘Liberate Hong Kong. Revolution of our times’, a slogan synonymous with the pro-democracy protests. Tong is awaiting sentencing and could be jailed for life.

Observers say the verdict and the coming sentencing are indications of how far Hong Kong authorities are willing to go in enforcing the Beijing-imposed laws to curtail Hong Kong’s independent judiciary and Hongkongers’ freedom of speech.

US government releases first report on WPS strategy

The Biden administration has released its first public report evaluating the implementation of the 2019 United States strategy on women, peace, and security in the departments of State, Defense and Homeland Security and the US Agency for International Development.

The report noted that a general lack of funding across government agencies for key WPS initiatives was the main challenge for implementation. It also found that many personnel didn’t have a deep understanding of WPS principles, and some lacked even basic knowledge.

The report identified opportunities for applying gender-disaggregated data and analysis to enhance the effectiveness of government initiatives, including overseas development assistance, conflict analysis, peacekeeping, police training, and programs relating gender-based violence.

In a recent article for the Council on Foreign Relations’ ‘Women around the world’ series, Valerie Hudson and Brenda Opperman highlighted the potential impact of incorporating this kind of gender-focused data analysis on the outcomes of military missions, and the untapped potential of WPS in US foreign and defence policy thinking.

Funding women in peacebuilding

On 30 June, representatives from governments, businesses and civil society assembled in Paris for the Generation Equality Forum and pledged to invest close to US$40 billion to accelerate gender parity by 2026. A portion of the funds may be used to bolster women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution.

Writing for Foreign Policy, Marlene Spoerri maps out the importance of women’s inclusion to achieving lasting results and breaking down barriers to women’s participation in peacebuilding processes. Although traditional avenues of funding for grassroots engagement are important, Spoerri argues that there’s a need to fund initiatives such as visa assistance to enable women to participate as political decision-makers. However, she cautions that financial resourcing is not a panacea for lack of women’s engagement and should be matched with conscious efforts to enable women to lead in policymaking.

UAE launches new WPS centre of excellence

The United Arab Emirates has launched a Women, Peace and Security Centre of Excellence to support its recent action plan on UN resolution 1325. The new centre is named after the UAE’s ‘Mother of the Nation’, Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak, who said the centre will enable international cooperation and best-practice exchanges to support women’s participation and leadership across defence and peacekeeping.

The centre will offer a range of security and peacekeeping training courses for women, including online courses designed to maximise the centre’s international reach. The UAE is the first Gulf Cooperation Council member country to adopt a WPS action plan, and while the centre is a significant symbol of the UAE administration’s commitment to raising the profile women in the security sector, it may also become a regional hub for aspiring women in other Gulf nations.

Women’s participation in countering violent extremism in Kenya

In an interview, Kenyan activist Rehema Zaid spoke with the Global Observatory’s Phoebe Donnelly about shortcomings in Kenya’s inclusion of women in preventing and countering violent extremism. Kenya’s permanent representative to the UN, Martin Kimani, cited addressing violent extremism as a top agenda item to combat insurrection attacks in the region, yet several policies supporting women’s participation in this sector have been stymied by implementation barriers.

A key barrier is a lack of funding for women’s programs, alongside practical pitfalls like poor feedback mechanisms and data collection. Persistent sexism and the perception that women are inferior to their male counterparts also hinder women’s participation in the field. The interview highlights that the challenges for women in African peacebuilding are similar to those faced in other parts of the world, raising questions about how systematic barriers can be tackled globally.

Establishing feminist foreign policy

In October 2000, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1325, recognising the links between gender equality and international peace and security. However, more than two decades later, feminist foreign policy—a framework for forming foreign policy that includes a more gender-sensitive perspective—has not been fully embraced internationally.

Sweden, Canada, France and Mexico have adopted feminist foreign policies, but many other countries have resisted. The global Covid-19 crisis has demonstrated the vulnerability of systems related to gender and exacerbated some of their effects. Nevertheless, the pandemic still provides a good opportunity for governments to reconsider their processes for policymaking. Governments need to be aware that adopting a feminist foreign policy isn’t just about including women on the agenda; the approach has to be coherent across multiple government sectors such as trade, defence and immigration.

Since the G7 last met in August 2019, Covid-19 has resulted in 3.5 million deaths and economic losses that are projected to reach US$22 trillion by 2025—an economic shock 80% greater than the one following the 2008 global financial crisis. Each of those cataclysmic events sparked bold, effective multilateralism that made the world safer and more prosperous thereafter. The G7 now has an opportunity to demonstrate the same kind of leadership at its summit in Cornwall this weekend.

As the current G7 president, the United Kingdom hopes to lead the global recovery from the Covid-19 recession in a way that strengthens the world’s resilience against future pandemics. Achieving that objective will require more money, but also further-reaching financing reforms. Today’s leaders must address the specific failings of past pandemic financing efforts by linking long-term investments in preparedness to early-stage rapid financing mechanisms.

The devastation caused by Covid-19 has underscored what experts have said for years: our national, regional and global systems are grossly inadequate for detecting and containing outbreaks. Investment of billions of dollars is needed to avoid trillions more in losses and untold human suffering in the future.

Proposals on how to finance pandemic preparedness abound. But unless preparedness plans and systems can be activated rapidly and at scale when an outbreak occurs, we will not have achieved the necessary level of resilience. In our work with the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, we reviewed the recent history of pandemic financing and found that the current system was too slow to mobilise in the critical first months of the COVID-19 response.

One month after the World Health Organization’s 30 January 2020 statement declaring Covid-19 to be a public health emergency of international concern, the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies and the United Nation’s Central Emergency Response Fund had allocated a total of just US$23.9 million.

Even three months later, only 5% of the UN’s (then) US$6.71-billion global humanitarian response plan had received financing. Moreover, it took three months from the WHO’s declaration for the World Bank’s insurance and capital-market instruments to kick into gear. By the time the initial US$196 million insurance payout was released in late April 2020, it had to be shared across 64 countries, 59 of which were already managing Covid-19 outbreaks. Although multilateral agencies eventually committed billions more to help low- and middle-income countries—often on concessional terms—it’s clear that more stopgap financing was needed to facilitate responses in the very first days and weeks of the pandemic.

And when significant financing did start to flow, much of it went towards rushed and fragmented strategies. Eligible countries hadn’t been required to define how response funds would be used prior to the emergency, owing not so much to an operational oversight as to a fundamental design flaw. The problem lay in the fragmentation between preparedness funds and ‘rapid response’ financing facilities, each of which had their own governance arrangements, planning frameworks and funding criteria.

This compound failing—underinvestment in preparedness, delayed financing for the response and discontinuity between the two—points to the need for an international financing facility for pandemic preparedness and response. As outlined in the independent panel’s final recommendations, this mechanism should have the capacity both to mobilise long-term (10–15-year) contributions of approximately US$5–10 billion annually to finance ongoing preparedness and to disburse up to US$100 billion at short notice by front-loading future commitments in the event of a pandemic declaration. Such financing can be provided by issuing a social bond against future commitments, much like the International Finance Facility for Immunization has done for vaccines.

We are not proposing a new implementing agency. Rather than creating a ‘Global Fund for Pandemics’ that would operate alongside the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, we envision an additional financing vehicle that could dedicate funds to existing institutions—like the Global Fund and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. The goal, ultimately, is to support global public goods related to preparedness: surveillance systems, research and development, and rapid-response protocols (to allow for surges in the health workforce, effective public communication and the pooled procurement of essential supplies).

To be sure, gaps in financing were not the only, or even the primary, failing that allowed a novel coronavirus outbreak to become a global catastrophe. If there’s a single factor to blame, it is a lack of political leadership at the highest levels of national government and the international system. But here, too, a dedicated financing facility is part of the solution.

The facility we propose would be overseen by a global health threats council, a multilateral, multisectoral body designed to elevate pandemic preparedness and response to the highest levels of the international system. Led by chairs from the UN General Assembly and the G20, the council would be charged with maintaining political support for preparedness and response, monitoring progress towards global targets and holding decision-makers accountable. With the authority to allocate significant funds from the financing facility, the council could wield both carrots and sticks to ensure national-level preparedness, and would hold a global credit card for responding to future health crises.

Central to this model is the combination of preparedness and rapid response—both of which would be governed by a unified global council, managed by an integrated facility, and financed through a single instrument. This structure ensures that as soon as an outbreak is detected, response financing can be deployed seamlessly by the same body that is responsible for planning, surveillance and otherwise maintaining readiness. Financing both efforts through a single instrument—a long-term forward funding contract—would minimise the amount of funds sitting idle and ensure ongoing political engagement between crises.

If G7 leaders hope to build resilience against future pandemic threats, they must first acknowledge the collective governance failures in the earliest days of the Covid-19 crisis, many of which stemmed from underinvestment in preparedness. Then they must earn their titles as world leaders by committing to a plan of unified governance, management and financing of pandemic preparedness and rapid response. Otherwise, they will not have done enough to contain future outbreaks before they, too, become catastrophic pandemics.

Next year, the Australian government will decide on whether to commit funding for a proposed year-round, paved aerodrome in the Vestfold Hills area, near the Australian Davis research station in East Antarctica. An all-weather, year-round, paved runway near Davis would have huge positive impacts on Antarctic science and logistics in East Antarctica, where there are no equivalent facilities. It would be the only paved runway in Antarctica.

The ice-free Vestfold Hills site is particularly attractive for an aerodrome development. The proposed site will allow for construction of a paved concrete runway on rock, at low elevation, close to the sea, in a place with a benign climate, and with a runway alignment naturally suited to the prevailing winds: all factors that make it uniquely suitable in Antarctica for all-season air access.

The proposal is for a 2.7-kilometre runway as well as aircraft hangars, a small terminal facility, storage buildings, fuel storage and other support services. The aerodrome and associated infrastructure would occupy 2 square kilometres, or less than 0.5% of the Vestfold Hills. The location of the proposed aerodrome is shown below.

Source: Australian Antarctic Program.

The idea for an aerodrome near Davis was part of the government’s 20-year action plan that set out to guide decisions on the future of Australia’s Antarctic program. In 2018, the Australian government announced that it intended to construct the runway, subject to necessary environmental and other approvals, but it didn’t commit to the funding at that time.

The Davis aerodrome will provide a step-change to the Australian Antarctic program through a significant upgrade in aviation capacity, which currently relies upon summer-only access to Australia’s Wilkins aerodrome near Casey Station.

In a new ASPI report released today, we argue that the new runway will be a gamechanger in Australia’s access to East Antarctica. It will increase our ability to collaborate with all countries active in that region. It will act as both a destination for intercontinental science and logistics flights from Australia and a hub for distributing personnel and equipment, via intracontinental flights, to Australian and various other national research bases in East Antarctica. The expected aviation routes for the Davis aerodrome are shown below.

Source: Australian Antarctic Program.

As with any major piece of infrastructure development, the construction and operation of the Davis aerodrome will have some inevitable environmental impacts. However, we believe that, with care, it should be possible to design, construct and operate a facility that satisfies both operational requirements and environmental obligations under the Madrid Protocol and relevant Australian legislation.

While we acknowledge that there are some valid concerns about the aerodrome proposal, there are also strong national interest grounds to proceed.

First, the Davis aerodrome will further demonstrate our maturity, leadership and influence in Antarctic science and diplomacy. It will provide Australia with a central role in Antarctic logistical supply chains for several national research bases in East Antarctic, such as the nearby Chinese, Russian and Indian bases. Australia will become the logistics country of choice for East Antarctica and a primary driver of scientific and logistical cooperation in the area immediately to Australia’s south, in the vicinity of our existing Antarctic research programs.

Second, if Australia doesn’t proceed with the aerodrome, another country may step into our shoes and take a similar proposal forward. It might be a country with lower standards of environmental assessment and a lesser track record of environmental protection in Antarctica. In that situation, access to the facilities would be controlled by another country and constructed to the environmental and operational standards of that state. Australia would be put in the position of having to negotiate, and possibly pay for, access to a facility adjacent to its own station.

Third, if an aerodrome proposal proceeds for the Vestfold Hills area, it’s in our interest, and the interest of all other Antarctic Treaty countries, that such major infrastructure be designed, constructed and operated so as to minimise the environmental impacts. We already have specific and longstanding domestic legislation that provides detailed rules for environmental assessment of all significant Australian activities in Antarctica, including inviting public submissions and heeding expert advice. Having Australia as the proponent for an aerodrome therefore has significant advantages in the level and quality of environmental assessment that can be expected and in compliance with any operating conditions imposed.

We would also be able to prevent inappropriate uses by other potential operators, such as using the aerodrome to support permanent tourist facilities in the region. Tourist use of the aerodrome has been ruled out by Australia.

Finally, the Davis aerodrome will boost the position of Hobart as a centre for Antarctic logistics and science. It will make Hobart the pre-eminent gateway city to East Antarctica. That will build and solidify Australia’s diplomatic and scientific influence in the region.

Even though it won’t become operational for more than a decade, the Davis aerodrome project should be a high priority for Australia. We should send the strongest message that this country is determined to maintain a credible long-term leadership role in Antarctica in a responsible way.

It would be easy to again put off a hard decision about strengthening our capacity in the region south of Australia. But as international interest in Antarctica increases, this is no time for complacency. The development of an all-weather, year-round, paved runway at Davis will be a gamechanger for the Australian Antarctic program and increase our strategic weight in the frozen continent.