In an address to the National Press Club this month, Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil expressed deep concern about the national security implications of climate change.

‘When Home Affairs was created, the discussion about climate change and national security was largely academic. Indeed, it was derided by the former government,’ O’Neil said. ‘Just five years on, climate change is a recognised, growing part of Australia’s national security picture.’

Such a grave threat requires a flexible, nuanced and comprehensive national response. It should recognise the complex risks associated with cascading natural disasters, and draw on the knowledge and experience of all Australians.

In her address, O’Neil said climate change posed a number of threats to the region. In particular, she said Australia and its neighbours were vulnerable to ‘massive movements of people that may become unmanageable’—especially if they occur alongside food and energy shortages.

The increased frequency of natural disasters was, O’Neil said, ‘a hugely consuming exercise for government and the community’ that, in itself, posed a national security risk.

The Albanese government has sought to better understand the security threats posed by the climate crisis. One of its first acts was to commission a climate risk assessment from the Office of National Intelligence. The findings are classified. But recent analyses, including by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, suggest the content is likely to be deeply confronting.

Assessing looming climate risks is important—but it won’t be enough. The government must urgently develop a comprehensive, well-informed and fair plan to reduce the risks by adapting to climate change.

Australia does have a national climate resilience and adaptation strategy, released by the Morrison government in October last year. But the strategy has several shortcomings.

For instance, it fails to take account of emerging complex risks such as important connections between international and domestic climate impacts. O’Neil recognised these risks in her address, saying:

Imagine a future January, where we see a Black Saturday–size bushfire in the southeast, a major flood in the north, then overlay a cyberattack on a major hospital system in the west. Our country would be fully absorbed in the management of domestic crises. Then consider how capable we would be of engaging with a security issue in our region.

A revised national adaptation strategy would recognise and prepare for these complex risks.

Australia’s current adaptation plan calls for a national assessment of climate impacts and progress on adaptation measures. But it doesn’t contain a mechanism to ensure this happens, nor does it state how often the assessments should occur. A well-designed evaluation plan would rectify this.

The Morrison government claimed its strategy was informed by public and expert engagement. But these discussions should not just be a one-off. The process should be ongoing, enabling us to improve as we go.

National security reports—such as the one the government commissioned on climate risk—should remain classified. But Australia’s overall climate responses will be less efficient, effective and equitable if they’re developed only behind closed doors in the conference rooms of government departments.

Climate change will increasingly affect every Australian. It will require a whole-of-society response, bringing to bear the knowledge and resources of all.

A major dialogue across Australia—under the banner of national action on climate adaptation—could be a game-changer. It should have three main objectives.

First, it should educate the public about climate challenges ahead. This includes sharing an unclassified version of the climate risk assessment. This authoritative document would counteract other dubious sources of information.

Second, the dialogue should collect examples of innovative climate adaptation from across the country. Many inspiring initiatives are underway in the private sector, civil society organisations and local government, as well as by individuals.

Every region in Queensland, for example, now has a locally led ‘resilience strategy’ outlining anticipated hazards and how they will be addressed.

Similarly, many farmers across Australia are using climate-smart practices that adapt farming systems to the changing climate. This reduces risk, increases crop and livestock production and cuts greenhouse gas emissions.

Third, the dialogue should engage the public in identifying responses to challenges set out in the risk assessment. The ‘wisdom of the crowd’ is generally overlooked and underappreciated by governments. But engaging the public can help identify important responses to climate risks that would otherwise be overlooked.

A project by the Australian National University is doing just that. It is partnering with stakeholders in river catchments around Australia to identify nature-based solutions to climate-related flooding.

The ANU is also co-leading an initiative around Lismore to develop citizen-based data collection and communication on rain and creek levels in upper catchment areas. This will provide timely information to communities downstream so they can respond when floods are imminent.

A national conversation on climate adaptation should involve diverse participants in structured dialogue, and be conducted with mutual respect.

Such an initiative would be world’s best practice, and further strengthen the Albanese government’s climate credentials as Australia seeks to host the United Nations’ global climate talks in 2026.

None of this takes away from the pressing need to rapidly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. If the earth’s climate warms by 2°C or more, the scale of the climate hazards—and the cascading harms to society—will far overwhelm any steps we take to adapt.

So, as well as adapting to climate change, the federal government must also increase its own emissions-reduction ambition and advocate for other nations to follow suit.

Tomorrow afternoon, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade will hold a public hearing for its inquiry into international armed conflict decision-making. In our submission (number 86) to the committee, made in a personal capacity in line with ASPI’s charter, we argue that decisions about the deployment of the Australian Defence Force should remain the prerogative of the government, acting in cabinet in accordance with the constitution and longstanding precedent. While precedents aren’t everything, this is one that is worth continuing.

Parliament has a crucial role to play in holding the government to account, and we encourage the strengthening of practices and conventions to facilitate that. But parliament should not compel the government to provide pre-notification of ADF deployments. Nor should parliament have decision-making power over the ADF’s engagement in conflict.

A nation’s defence force is a potent symbol of its sovereignty. In our political system, effective civil–military relationships for accountability and oversight are enshrined in Defence’s leadership diarchy at the departmental level, and in ministerial control and cabinet decision-making at the political level.

This inquiry is the latest stage in a long-running debate. Since 1985, there have been several legislative efforts, first by the Australian Democrats and then the Australian Greens, to revise the exclusive power of the government to commit Australia to war. The focus has been on revising the Defence Act 1903 to give parliament a vote over certain overseas deployments of the ADF. Parliament has consistently rejected these bills.

However, this inquiry is focused on a different set of issues to parliamentary approval. Fulfilling a pledge in the Labor Party’s national platform, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles asked the committee to focus its inquiry on four areas:

• the approach of similar Westminster system democracies around the world
• parliamentary processes and practices, including opportunities for debate to provide greater transparency and accountability on the deployment of the ADF
• the security implications of pre-notification of ADF deployment that may compromise the safety of ADF personnel, operational security [or] intelligence and/or have unintended consequences
• any related matters.

In his referral letter to the committee’s chair, Marles was clear that existing government decision-making prerogatives ‘are appropriate and should not be disturbed’. We agree with this. Defence’s submission (number 110) to the inquiry details why this is the case. In short, this inquiry is not intended to rehash old debates about parliamentary approval.

We accept that an understanding of processes in other democracies is important, but comparisons are fraught with the risk of misinterpretation and false equivalence. Other systems should be neither ignored nor copied. In this regard, we agree with the majority report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, issued at the conclusion of its related inquiry in 2020–21.

Debate in parliament on security matters is a vital part of Australia’s democratic system. As Marles and others, including Labor MP Josh Wilson, who is a member of the committee, have pointed out, such debate has parliamentary precedent. We are open to the case advanced by ASPI senior fellows Graeme Dobell (submission number 92) and Anthony Bergin (number 14), among others, that these precedents could be more clearly codified so the government understands parliament’s expectations for regular updates on ADF deployments. However, the government must retain discretion to withhold information where there is good reason, such as around the deployment of special forces, submarines and surveillance aircraft or to protect our international partnerships.

We oppose any change in the law that would require the government to pre-notify parliament about ADF deployments. That would put ADF personnel at risk and damage Australia’s national security, weaken our reliability in the eyes of our allies and partners, give advantages to our adversaries, and harm deterrence, which is an essential component of maintaining peace in the Indo-Pacific. Military strategy may depend for success and safety on the elements of strategic surprise and operational deception. Pre-notification requirements would undermine a central tenet of both strategy and operations.

Parliament has recognised these risks when it has looked at these issues previously. Because the security threats we face have only become more complex, including through advanced technology, espionage and foreign interference, the risks of pre-notification have only worsened.

Although the terms of reference for the inquiry do not include decision-making powers, given the scope to consider related matters, it is prudent to make clear our opposition to any change to the government’s exclusive power to decide whether and how to deploy the ADF. Such a requirement would either wholly debilitate Australia’s capacity to serve as a credible ally and partner or be rendered null and void by virtue of its impracticality.

Australia is facing the most challenging strategic circumstances since World War II. The Australian people must have confidence that parliament will play its role fully in the robust national debate about how to defend our country, but our national security depends on leaving government decision-making powers unchanged.

Last month, UN member states elected American candidate Doreen Bogdan-Martin as the next secretary-general of the International Telecommunications Union in a fiercely contested diplomatic battle against a Russian candidate (and former executive of Chinese technology giant Huawei).

Divided along geopolitical fault lines, the election received an unusual amount of attention because of its significance in potentially determining the future of internet-based communications and the values that underpin them. Away from the media glare, ITU member states also passed their first resolution directly addressing artificial intelligence, tasking the organisation to ‘foster information-sharing and build understanding about the challenges and opportunities of deploying AI technologies in support of telecommunications and ICTs [information and communication technologies]’.

Emerging technologies such as AI now take geopolitical centre stage, and therefore the global tug of war over their development, use and deployment is playing out at standard-setting organisations.

A good example is China’s push for dominance to influence standards in 5G technology. After failing to meaningfully influence the setting of standards for 3G and 4G, the Chinese government commenced a national and diplomatic effort, in partnership with Huawei, to export its 5G standards. This effort included making a domestic push to formulate technical proposals, filling in key leadership positions in international bodies and participating in a variety of standard-setting initiatives across the globe.

Standards are blueprints or protocols with requirements that ‘standardise’ products, ensuring that they are interoperable, safe and sustainable. For example, USBs and WiFi are technologies that can be used globally because they’re built on technical standards. Standards are developed domestically—by a body such as the Bureau of Indian Standards or Standards Australia—and negotiated internationally at global standards-development organisations such as the ITU and the International Organization for Standardization.

While international standards don’t tend to be binding, they have great coercive power. Not adhering to recognised standards means that products may not reach foreign markets because they’re not compatible with consumer requirements or can’t claim to meet health, safety or data-protection regulations.

The ability to shape global standards is of immense geopolitical and economic value to states and companies. Harmonisation of internationally recognised standards serves as the bedrock for global trade and commerce. States that can export their domestic technological standards internationally are giving their companies a massive competitive advantage. Also, companies draw huge revenues from holding patents to technologies that are essential for complying with a certain standard and licensing them to other players that want to enter the market.

It’s no surprise that Chinese companies now lead the way on 5G—Huawei owns more 5G patents and more 5G contracts than any other company, despite restrictions placed on it by the United States, Australia and other countries.

Now is the time for states in the Indo-Pacific to revamp their approach to engaging in standards-development initiatives. Given the value of being able to shape global technical standards and their reflection of normative principles, it’s imperative that Indo-Pacific partners such as India and Australia are strongly positioned to promote a democratic, inclusive and transparent environment for setting technical standards, and ensure adequate representation of the broader Indo-Pacific community.

This is why ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet & Society have partnered to produce a ‘techdiplomacy guide’ on negotiating technical standards in AI—a crucial but general-purpose technology that will affect all aspects of work, industry and warfare.

States have contemplated the regulation of AI but are unlikely to be able to keep pace with the rapidly evolving technology. Nonetheless, the European Commission has drafted a legal framework on AI to address various levels of risk. At the same time, global tech companies have announced self-declared initiatives focused on principles for ‘ethical AI’, but they tend to be too broad and can serve as avenues for tech companies to skirt legal restraints.

Technical standards offer a middle ground where diverse stakeholders can collaborate to devise uniform requirements in AI development, and follow a rigorous process of exchange, debate and negotiation on the basis of consensus. Standard-setting in AI is an emerging field that has had limited scholarly engagement from a strategic and diplomatic perspective.

China is a notable exception. Several groups and companies, including Huawei and Cloud Walk, contributed to China’s 2018 AI standardisation white paper, which was further revised and updated in 2021. The white paper maps the work of standard-setting organisations in the field of AI and outlines a number of recommendations on how Chinese actors can influence these organisations to boost their industrial competitiveness and promote ‘Chinese wisdom’. While there are cursory references to the role of standards in furthering ethics and privacy, the document doesn’t outline how China will look to promote these values in standard-setting.

Yet, these are the values that are at stake. An excessive focus on security, accuracy or quality of AI may legitimise applications that are fundamentally at odds with human rights, the protection of privacy and freedom of speech. China’s efforts at shaping standards for facial recognition technology at the ITU have been criticised for moving beyond mere technical specifications into the domain of policy recommendations, despite there being a lack of representation of experts on human rights, consumer protection and data protection at the ITU.

For the project, titled ‘Strengthening Indo-Pacific techdiplomacy in critical technologies’, ASPI and CIS will unpack the various processes for international standard-setting in AI and identify the main stakeholders driving these initiatives along with who would bear the responsibility for ensuring that AI technology standards are developed responsibly, bearing in mind the key strategic priorities of stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific. We will also explore requirements for diverse representation—in expertise, gender and nationality—and offer learning products to policymakers and technical delegates alike to enable Australian and Indian delegates to serve as ambassadors for our respective nations.

For more on this new and exciting project funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as part of the Australia–India Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership grants, visit www.aspi.org.au/techdiplomacy and www.internationalcybertech.gov.au.

Discussions during a trilogy of AUKUS-related events in Washington on the one-year anniversary of the deal’s announcement suggest the novel strategic partnership is about much more than submarines, the transfer of nuclear propulsion know-how and Anglosphere chumminess.

Political officials, scholars and practitioners gathered last week under the auspices of ASPI, the Center for New American Security and the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London to identify key successes and primary challenges for the partnership.

The political leadership in all three countries appears fully aboard with AUKUS—the deal has survived a change in government in Australia and a change in prime minister in the UK—and officials describe levels of cooperation not seen since World War II to streamline advanced technology sharing. Participating officials described AUKUS as a new paradigm of defence integration across a broad spectrum of advanced technologies to maintain scientific and engineering advantages while improving a collective defence posture among the three countries.

For the US, this project represents an overdue shift of attention to the Indo-Pacific and a determined effort to make good on longstanding promises of a geostrategic pivot to the region and the looming Chinese threat with the help of steadfast partners. It also portends a change in the American approach to alliance capability sharing. AUKUS helps to further anchor Australia in the American defence orbit and should make Beijing think hard about how to respond to a Canberra that’s increasingly willing to push back against Chinese aggression. In the UK, the AUKUS agreement is seen as necessary to show strength alongside allies with shared interests and values, but also as part of the UK’s new ‘global Britain’ strategy in the wake of its departure from the EU.

The much-publicised submarine component of the pact—so-called pillar 1—appears to be moving forward apace. All parties expect that a plan to provide Australia with nuclear-propelled submarines will be announced, as scheduled, in March. The details are being held close by officials, but a year into talks, confidence is growing that delivery may occur earlier than the parties expected at the beginning of discussions. Besides the actual capacity-enhancing propulsion technology transfer, AUKUS partners see pillar 1 as a ‘big bet’ signal that will demonstrate a capacity to meet the defence coordination challenges of the second pillar, relating to artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other emerging technologies.

The decision of the AUKUS partners to take their case for the sharing of nuclear-propulsion technology to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the interests of transparency, and the response from most of the international community to consider, accept or support the argument in good faith, portend success for pillar 1. Some allies and partners have expressed concerns about AUKUS’s effects on nuclear proliferation and possible further destabilisation of the Indo-Pacific, but the Chinese information campaign to discredit AUKUS has so far failed to gain much traction.

Despite widespread support for AUKUS and a desire for its success, three pressing issues were repeatedly raised throughout the discussions.

First, there is a lack of clarity around AUKUS’s strategic purpose and what each partner aims to achieve. The inability to define specific, shared goals beyond banalities of protecting the ‘rules-based order’ or technology sharing to ‘deter Chinese aggression’ may belie a failure to identify different threat perceptions and risk appetites, which, if accounted for, help determine how to rank the technologies that are critical to advancing specific interests for each partner.

Does AUKUS strengthen integrated deterrence against a common threat, namely China, or may some technology transfers—even discussion of them—trigger escalation in some scenarios? If power projection is itself a goal for one or more of the partners, pillar 2 activities need tailoring. It is understandable that more time is needed here given that the efforts under pillar 1 are the initial priority. Determining metrics for measuring AUKUS’s worth is necessary before making any further claims of success, however.

Second, the story of AUKUS—or lack of one—also poses a challenge. The narrative on the need for the deal in the first place hasn’t really registered beyond nuclear submarines meeting Australia’s defence needs, resulting in confusion from regional allies and partners, and giving rise to concerns that AUKUS could destabilise the Indo-Pacific region. Canberra, London and Washington need to have explicit and uncomplicated discussions with allies and partners about what they intend the deal to accomplish more broadly.

Is AUKUS a trial run for a similar, future initiative with Japan, France or other countries in the Indo-Pacific? The potential for Chinese disinformation to colour perceptions of the deal will grow the longer that the AUKUS members delay announcements and fail to fully explain its parameters and objectives. This effort will require the AUKUS partners to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why allies and friends may be sceptical, regardless of Chinese influence.

Finally, a major concern is the failure so far of AUKUS partners to assess the role of commercial industry, supply chains and broader society in enabling pillar 2 to succeed. Shared bureaucratic, legal and practical infrastructure is needed to support sustained advanced technology sharing across myriad critical technologies—all of which are at various stages of development. Each partner needs to conduct a comprehensive review of its supply chains and skills gaps to ensure shared technology is utilised and retained.

Pillar 2 is fundamentally different from pillar 1. A top-down approach needs grassroots support for AUKUS to succeed. Pillar 2 exceeds the scope of traditional defence capability sharing, and this alone will necessitate creative and uncomfortable changes at all levels to ensure its success. Long-term momentum may be difficult to sustain without greater industry and civil-society stakes in AUKUS’s development and a better understanding of its potential benefits. Domestic diplomacy will need the support of think tanks, educational institutions and ‘track 2’ planning to clarify and refine AUKUS over time.

On 31 August, minutes before the end of her four-year term, UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet released a much-anticipated report on abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwestern China. While the report was long overdue and lacked strength in certain areas, its release following a four-year investigation is a positive development celebrated by victims of Xinjiang’s human rights crisis, as well as scholars, journalists and advocates around the world who have for years sought to pour sunlight on the issue.

The investigation found that the Chinese party-state’s repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities ‘may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity’. ‘May’ is the strongest language the UN can use until the International Criminal Court is able to test whether the widespread human rights abuses, arbitrary detention and torture—which the report concludes have indeed taken place—constitute crimes against humanity. This is near impossible because China is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and therefore its alleged crimes don’t fall under the court’s jurisdiction.

The investigation established few new facts but focused on confirming the accounts of abuses already demonstrated to a very high level of certainty by others, including ASPI.

For years, ASPI researchers and others have gathered evidence of mass arbitrary detentions aggravated by torture and sexual violence; forced labour schemes; persecution based on ethnicity and religious beliefs; coercive birth-control policies; and pervasive surveillance and harassment of ordinary citizens.

Despite the relatively narrow scope of the research in Bachelet’s report, it strongly verifies the nature of human rights abuses in Xinjiang in relation to arbitrary detention since the 2017 crackdown and frames them within statements and admissions made by Chinese state sources. The heavy use of primary sources, and the legitimacy given to the report by the UN, make this report exceptionally hard to dispute. Ultimately, the value of an independent report by the most senior international human rights office lies in having the UN’s imprimatur on the now unassailable conclusions of industrial-scale human rights abuses, leaving no room for censorship and denial, and no excuses for a lack of concrete action.

The UN report cites Chinese government documents, statements and statistics, as well as scores of first-hand accounts. It also draws on extensive research by reputable organisations including ASPI’s Xinjiang Data Project, a three-year research project by a multidisciplinary team of scholars, journalists, cyber and satellite imagery experts. The Xinjiang Data Project includes a comprehensive imagery analysis on more than 300 detention sites, a ground-breaking report on systematic Uyghur forced labour and its reach into global supply chains, and an organisational chart that attributes responsibility to every government agency that has carried out abuse in Xinjiang. The project has also studied the Chinese government’s efforts to destroy Uyghur cultural heritage, its propaganda strategies and its coercive birth-control tactics.

In recent months, civil society groups had increasingly chastised Bachelet, particularly after she made what was widely derided as a Potemkin-style visit to Xinjiang in May that gave her nothing like the ‘unfettered’ access she had demanded. Bachelet later admitted feeling under ‘tremendous pressure’ from all sides over whether to publish her report. The Chinese government attempted to bury the report until the last moment, and scholars and rights groups feared that it would be sanitised to the point of inefficacy. After the report’s release, a retiring French diplomat who’s familiar with the issue reportedly said that a section on forced sterilisation was watered down in the final hours before publication.

While some members of the Uyghur diaspora appear to have found vindication and relief in the release of Bachelet’s report, others say it came too late and amounts to too little. The United States, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Lithuania have previously branded the Uyghur human rights crisis a ‘genocide’, though Australia has stopped short of using that label, judging it a matter for a court to determine. A comprehensive 2021 report by Human Rights Watch also demonstrated that ‘crimes against humanity’ were being committed in Xinjiang.

Australia has condemned the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs as ‘severe human rights abuses’ or crimes against humanity.

Late last year, the Uyghur Tribunal, an independent and non-binding panel of lawyers and academics in the UK, concluded that human rights abuses in Xinjiang amounted to genocide.

It is worth noting that Chinese government documents (discovered and authenticated by ASPI and German researcher Adrian Zenz separately) refer to state-sanctioned abuses in Xinjiang as being based on a five-year plan that began in 2017 and was consolidated by 2022. Given that the Chinese party-state has shown a tendency to alter behaviour following international condemnation—for instance, some detainees were released shortly after international media attention—earlier intervention from a UN body or governments could arguably have made a greater impact.

Nonetheless, civil groups and members of the Uyghur diaspora appear hopeful that Bachelet’s report will galvanise international organisations, individual states and the private sector.

One likely immediate impact the report could have is in its recommendation that nations not deport Uyghurs to China given the conditions of torture the report verifies.

Rights groups and legal scholars have renewed calls for major international bodies to follow up on Bachelet’s report. Human Rights Watch has suggested formally presenting Bachelet’s report to the UN Human Rights Council as a matter of priority.

The UN’s International Labour Organization might continue pushing for an advisory mission (which was dismissed by the Chinese government earlier this year). One of Bachelet’s specific recommendations is that China cooperate with the ILO and allow in a technical advisory mission.

Lawyers who accuse Beijing of crimes and genocide have continued to call for the International Criminal Court to investigate Xinjiang atrocities, most recently in June 2022, despite China not being a member of the court.

Bachelet’s report should serve as a stern reminder for businesses to improve the transparency and accountability of their own supply chains, and for governments to strengthen their regulatory environments to prevent copouts and workarounds. The report calls on businesses to enhance their due diligence on human rights and to report on their progress transparently. As of the end of 2021, more than a third of Australia’s largest listed companies failed at modern slavery disclosures, showing poor understanding of their own supply chains.

Earlier this year, the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act (legislation citing ASPI’s Uyghurs for sale report) took effect in the US, prohibiting the import of goods made with forced labour. This law is set to cause profound changes across the garment, manufacturing, energy and agriculture sectors at a time when supply chains are already experiencing frequent disruption.

While Australia doesn’t yet have comparable legislation, it will likely have to adopt a harder line against forced labour amid urging from the US and a global trend towards stricter measures against modern slavery.

Bachelet’s key recommendations for the Chinese government—that the party-state change its laws and practices to ensure abuses are not repeated, sign up to relevant international conventions and cooperate as necessary with international bodies—are unlikely to be met without continued international pressure and scrutiny.

It is up to the international community to keep the pressure on.