Sea state  

The UK Ministry of Defence has awarded a 10-year contract worth £270 million to British multinational BAE Systems to support the Royal Navy’s three main radar systems: Artisan, Sampson and Long Range Radar. Under the contract, BAE Systems engineers will upgrade and provide maintenance support for radars on navy ships. The minister for defence procurement said that the contract will boost investment in the UK’s supply chain and let adversaries know that the UK is ‘equipped, prepared and ready’.

Royal Australian Navy divers have assisted the Australian Border Force, Australian Federal Police and Western Australian Police Force in a joint operation to seize about 800 kilograms of cocaine from a merchant vessel off the WA coast. The divers found 29 packages of the drug submerged in a water-filled ballast tank while the ship was detained at a berth at Kwinana in Perth’s south. The Defence Department said that the operation showcased the navy’s ability to ‘enhance maritime security, deter illegal activity at sea and protect national interests’ through close cooperation with Australian partners.

Flight path

The Indonesian Air Force will receive a second-hand fleet of 12 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 fighters by January 2025. The French-made jets were bought by Qatar in 1997 and will be sold on to Indonesia in a $1.1 billion deal financed by foreign loans. The sale is intended to plug a capability gap ahead of the introduction of 42 Dassault Rafale fighters in 2026. The decision also marks a reduction in Indonesia’s historical reliance on Russian military equipment, following the imposition of sanctions on Moscow after the invasion of Ukraine last year.

French aerospace company Dassault Aviation will introduce two new key capabilities to its ‘Super Rafale’ F5 program under France’s 2024–2030 military budget bill. According to an amendment tabled in the French parliament, the Rafale F5 will be paired with loyal wingman combat drones from the nEUROn program. The sixth-generation fighter will also be equipped with joint jamming radars and self-defence systems in a bid to challenge the air superiority and market dominance of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II.

Rapid fire

Additional NATO troops have been deployed to northern Kosovo following a surge in unrest that left more than 30 NATO soldiers injured. Violence escalated this month after ethnic Albanians were appointed as mayors in Serb-majority areas through an election boycotted by Serbs. The NATO-led peacekeeping mission Kosovo Force, deployed since 1999, now consists of around 4,200 troops. The majority of the reinforcements come from the Turkish Army’s 65th Mechanised Infantry Brigade Command.

African Union officials and Somali authorities have announced that the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) will withdraw 2,000 soldiers by the end of this month, aiming to conclude the mission completely by December 2024. ATMIS was formed in 2022 to replace the African Union Mission to Somalia that started in 2007. Concerns have been raised that a withdrawal of African Union troops could lead to a collapse of state institutions and spark a remobilisation of the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab.

Final frontier

South Korea has recovered part of a rocket used in North Korea’s failed attempt to launch its first military satellite last month. Military personnel salvaged a large cylindrical object from the sea last week and are continuing the search for additional objects. South Korea is investigating the debris alongside the US. One question it is hoping to answer is North Korea’s proclaimed name for the rocket—an anomalous label on the top of the rocket is missing a syllable.

Russia has announced that it has enhanced its ability to track and detect foreign spacecraft. The Russian defence minister was briefed about the capability contained at a new military facility by the commander of the Russian Space Forces. Russia’s drive for stronger space surveillance capabilities reflects its growing emphasis on space as a domain for military activities. These latest advancements in tracking and identifying space objects will likely bolster Russia’s situational awareness in space.

Wired watchtower

Russia-linked ransomware gang BlackCat, also known as AlphV or AlphaSpider, has claimed responsibility for an attack on major Australian law firm HWL Ebsworth, whose clients include 40 Australian government departments and agencies. The hackers reportedly obtained files on the redevelopment of the secret Woomera missile testing site, the Australian navy’s attack helicopter replacement project, and Australia’s Indo-Pacific enhanced engagement strategy. The government has established a crisis group to investigate what Commonwealth information is among the 4 terabytes of stolen data.

The UK has pledged an additional $47 million in funding for Ukraine to help the embattled country shore up its cyber defences. The support builds on the foreign secretary’s prior commitment of $12 million for the UK’s Ukraine cyber program. The funds are intended to bolster Ukraine’s ability to detect and disable Russian malware targeting critical infrastructure. The announcement follows an uptick in Russian cyberattacks and Ukraine’s ascension to NATO’s Cyber Defense Center, a move Kyiv said was ‘a step on the way’ to NATO membership.

Planet A

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has urged countries to set a global renewable energy target to substantially limit emissions and keep global warming to 1.5° Celsius, terming the climate crisis the ‘greatest security challenge of our century’. Speaking at the 14th Petersberg Climate Dialogue, Baerbock referred to the International Energy Agency’s estimates that global renewable energy capacity needs to triple to successfully limit warming. The conference lays the groundwork for the UN Climate Change Conference, COP-28, in Dubai at the end of this year.

Baerbock underlined that while G7 countries have already pledged to accelerate their clean energy transitions and renewable energy capacities, the situation demands a global treaty. Codifying existing commitments in a treaty that binds states to their words is critical given that the G7’s commitment from April doesn’t set any new deadlines on phasing out coal power. Importantly, Germany’s ambitious but necessary call for action comes in the context of an altered regional energy landscape following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Democracy watch

Human Rights Watch released a 107-page report last week condemning the Peruvian government’s reaction to protests that erupted last December after the impeachment and arrest of then-president Pedro Castillo. The report stated that Peruvian security forces used ‘brutal, indiscriminate and disproportionate’ force to quash the protests by thousands of people and left nearly 70 dead between December 2022 and February 2023.

Mostly rural workers and Indigenous people in the south of Peru took to the streets in the largest protests in over a generation. The protestors’ demands included calls for a new election, the dissolution of Congress, and the resignation of current president Dina Boluarte, who was previously vice president. The protests come amid ongoing political turmoil and deepened concerns over the erosion of the rule of law and democratic institutions.

Information operations

Pervasive cyber threats from China are unlikely to subside according to FBI Director Christopher Wray, who told a Congressional committee Chinese hackers outnumber bureau agents by ‘at least 50 to one’. The claim highlights the scale of the challenge in cyberspace, particularly from China, and informs the agency’s request for nearly US$63 million to fund 192 new cyber specialist positions. Concerns about state-sponsored espionage pervade the US-Australia alliance, with a ‘significant increase’ recorded in Chinese cyberattacks against both countries after details emerged of the AUKUS nuclear submarine pact.

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review identified staff shortages in a similar context. The DSR found that the Chief Information Officer Group, one of the most complex ICT networks in Australia, is ‘too reliant on individual contractors’. This is a major limitation for cybersecurity. The review called for closer collaboration between the ADF and the Australian Signals Directorate and a rebalanced 60:40 staff-to-contractors ratio for both the ADF and the public service. This would support efforts to make Australia the ‘most cybersecure country’ in the world by 2030.

Follow the money

The European Commission has reached an in-principle agreement to allow the transit of Ukrainian grain to resume through Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria. The five eastern European neighbours unilaterally halted agrifood imports in April amid an oversupply of cheap Ukrainian grain they say puts local producers at a disadvantage. Fearing devastating financial and job losses, farmers took to the streets to demand assistance and the re-introduction of tariffs and other trade duties on Ukrainian cereals.

The bans forced the commission to intervene, promising ‘preventive measures’ to address the situation and a US$165 million package to compensate farmers. The temporary resolution comes as Russia threatens to withdraw from the Black Sea deal, which enables the export of grain from Ukrainian ports onto the world market, and members of the G7 pledge to intensify sanctions on Moscow. This dynamic raises questions over how long the commission can maintain solidarity with war-torn Ukraine while balancing the competing needs of its member states.

Terror byte

Iranian judges have retaliated against US courts’ findings that blame Iran for promoting terrorism by accusing US entities and officials, and former presidents Barack Obama and George W Bush, of ‘creating’ the Islamic State terror group.

The Iranian judgement calls on the US government to pay US$313 million as compensation for the 2017 attacks in Tehran by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This amount includes compensation for financial, ‘moral’, and ‘punitive’ damages. Other parties include US Central Command, the Central Intelligence Agency, and weapons manufacturer Lockheed Martin.

The judges said the ruling was a response to US findings on Iran’s role in terrorist attacks which include calls for Iran to pay billions of dollars in compensation. The judgement follows an International Court of Justice ruling on a 2016 attempt by Tehran to unfreeze Iranian assets held by US courts to pay compensation to victims of terrorist attacks. The ICJ found that some of these freezes were illegal and ordered the US to pay compensation. However, the Court stated it did not have jurisdiction to rule over the freezing of US$1.57 billion in assets owned by Iran’s central bank.

Sea state

The 2023 edition of Exercise Tasman Shield, held from 17 March to 3 April, brought together aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force and ships from the Royal Australian Navy to practise integrated air–maritime missions and enhance the interoperability of sea and air forces. The F-35A Lightning IIs, F/A-18F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growlers, E-7A Wedgetails, P-8A Poseidons, KC-30A tankers and Hawk 127 lead-in fighters tested their ability to work together and with air warfare destroyers HMAS Hobart and HMAS Sydney. Commodore Paul O’Grady noted that the exercise progressed the RAN’s ability to provide aid defence at sea.

The US has sent the submarine USS Florida, capable of carrying more than 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles, into the Red Sea in a show of force in response to attacks on American personnel by Iran-backed groups across the Middle East. The move is part of the broader US effort to increase its military presence in the region amid significant regional developments including rising tensions between Iran and Israel, a thaw in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the expanding Russian and Chinese footprint in the region.

Flight path

Israel has conducted air strikes against infrastructure it says is controlled by the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The strikes were a response to rockets being fired into Israel from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Most were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome defence system. The strikes and counterstrikes intensified after Israeli police raids on the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on the eve of Ramadan and Passover. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions with Tehran, Israel is reportedly investigating Iran’s involvement in the rocket attacks from Lebanon.

China has simulated precision strikes against Taiwan in an operation it’s calling ‘Joint Sword’. Beijing has described the drills as a ‘stern warning’ to Taiwan following its president’s visit to the US. Taiwan reported that up to 70 Chinese aircraft and 11 Chinese ships encircled the island and conducted simulated attacks on aircraft carrier groups as well as anti-submarine drills. More than 40 Chinese warplanes either crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone. The drills attracted strong condemnation from Taiwan and are being closely watched by the US, which simultaneously conducted a freedom-of-navigation operation in South China Sea waters claimed by China.

Rapid fire

The Australian Army’s 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) tested the Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle at last month’s Exercise Damascus. The live-fire and tactical training is intended to prepare the unit for exercises including Talisman Sabre later this year. The Boxer, being delivered by Rheinmetall Defence Australia, will replace the aging ASLAV light armoured vehicle.

Meanwhile, the army’s MRH-90 Taipan helicopter fleet has returned to normal flying operations. The fleet was grounded after an engine failure in March led to a Taipan crashing into Jervis Bay. The accident, which left two Australian Defence Force members with minor injuries, followed a series of groundings and other problems in the helicopter fleet since its acquisition in the mid-2000s.

Final frontier

Lockheed Martin Australia has been selected to build the Australian Defence Force’s next-generation satellite communications system. While a procurement contract is yet to be issued, the announcement means the company has moved to the next phase of negotiations with the government under Joint Project 9102, which aims to provide a sovereign-controlled satellite communication system over the Indo-Pacific ocean region.

Raytheon Australia has launched a program supporting the training of defence space industry workers in Exmouth, Western Australia. The program is designed to keep world-class talent in Exmouth as the strategic naval and space capabilities at the Harold E. Holt precinct become increasingly important. A pipeline of space careers in the region has been created since the relocation from New Mexico of the US-owned space surveillance telescope, which is operated by Australia and used to track debris in space.

Wired watchtower

Hackers from the Russian government and its affiliates are increasingly attacking Ukraine’s information technology systems as part of the war launched by Vladimir Putin. Targets include closed-circuit cameras that public and private entities installed for their own security. The hackers have gained access to webcams, including some mounted in coffee shops, to track the movement of convoys and trains delivering humanitarian aid. Russian operatives have also targeted US defence manufacturers and transport firms to acquire information on the arms supply chain supporting Ukraine.

Israeli agencies holding vital data on the country’s airlines, transport organisations, and postal and irrigation systems are grappling with a surge of cyberattacks. A recent incident resulted in water monitors malfunctioning and scheduled watering being suspended, directly impacting agricultural production. Hacktivist group GhostSec, known for its pro-Palestinian stance, claimed responsibility and said it had infiltrated Israel’s satellite system and water pumps, although its involvement is yet to be verified. Israel’s National Cyber Organisation has warned of impending attacks on Israeli infrastructure during the month Ramadan and in the lead-up to ‘Iranian Jerusalem Day’ on 14 April.

Officials from Australia, New Zealand and the United States are set to meet in Canberra this week for the fourth annual Trilateral Pacific Security Cooperation Dialogue. Their goal is to work out how to partner better and smarter in a region that is increasingly contested geopolitically. For the Pacific, the security challenges are stark. Pacific island countries are on the front lines of climate change and increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters.

As Vanuatu starts the long road to recovery from tropical cyclones Judy and Kevin, which hit in quick succession over the past week, it’s an opportune time for Australia, New Zealand and the US to discuss how to improve their collective response to disasters in the region.

Disaster diplomacy has already been on display in Vanuatu, with Australia, New Zealand, France and the UK quick to publicise their contributions. Australia sent its massive landing ship HMAS Canberra on Sunday, and New Zealand is flying in further relief supplies. It remains to be seen whether China, the US and Japan will send assistance, though if the response to the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Ha’apai volcanic eruption and tsunami in Tonga in January 2022 is an indication, they will. Within the broader context of strategic competition, disasters have come to be seen as opportunities to demonstrate capacity and commitment in the region.

As in the case of Tonga, the response to the Vanuatu cyclones raises key questions about how partners provide their assistance. These questions are pressing because there’s no regional mechanism to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

The first question relates to how partners coordinate their efforts. During the Tongan disaster, a HADR international coordination cell was established at Australia’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) to coordinate the contributions of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the US, France, the UK and Japan. Tonga, as the affected country, took part. Australia also coordinated with France and New Zealand under the 1992 FRANZ arrangement, which promotes trilateral cooperation in response to natural disasters and facilitates defence cooperation.

The notable absence from the coordination cell was China, which sought to make the presence of its humanitarian response felt, but without direct coordination with other partners. This resulted in competition for pier-side support, access to tarmacs and flight scheduling, and meant that the equipment donated was not quality-controlled. Today, 75 eight-tonne inappropriate and unwanted one-bedroom prefabricated homes donated by China sit gathering salt spray on the wharf in Nuku’alofa.

Prefabricated shelters donated by China to Tonga sit unused on the wharf in Nuku’alofa more than a year after the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Ha’apai volcanic eruption and tsunami. Image courtesy of Henrietta McNeill (2023).

The FRANZ arrangement is again being used to coordinate assistance to Vanuatu from Australia, New Zealand (as chair) and France. What’s not clear is whether the coordination cell mechanism will be reactivated to coordinate the wider range of partners seeking to assist.

And it’s unlikely that China, should it mount a response, will seek to coordinate with other partners—or that they would be receptive if it did. China highlighted its intention to have more involvement in HADR, which it included in its proposed but unsuccessful regional economic and security pact in 2022. The establishment of a disaster management cooperation mechanism for Pacific island countries, the launch of the China–Pacific Island Countries Center for Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation and the proposed China–Pacific Island Countries subcenter for marine disaster risk reduction cooperation all reflect Chinese interests in establishing alternative HADR mechanisms. This will further complicate multilateral HADR responses.

The second question relates to how well partners coordinate their responses with the Vanuatu government. As has long been known, and was again demonstrated in the Tongan response and the 2020 response to Cyclone Harold in Vanuatu, local leadership of HADR is critical. As Sione Taumoefolau, secretary general of the Tonga Red Cross Society, noted at a workshop we organised on security cooperation in the Pacific islands in November last year, it was Tongan civil-society organisations and local community groups that had the skills and knowledge to ensure that assistance reached where it was needed.

At the same workshop, Air Commodore David Hombsch, from HQJOC, who was involved in the first coordination cell, commented that the cell was vital to rapidly delivering a maximum amount of humanitarian assistance. He said he hoped that the next time the cell was activated it would be based in the affected country, if possible, rather than in Canberra.

The response to the Vanuatu cyclones seems like a good opportunity to implement this suggestion. Vanuatu has a well-developed and experienced National Disaster Management Office which is ideally placed to house the cell.

Looking beyond the immediate response, as Wallis and Powles argue in an upcoming ASPI special report, rather than leaving coordination of HADR to mechanisms created on an ad hoc basis, partner countries should offer to help the Pacific Islands Forum establish a permanent Pacific coordinating centre for HADR. Discussions are underway to develop this capability as part of the review of regional architecture.

It will be important that any Pacific coordinating centre doesn’t replicate the dynamics of the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative. That mechanism was launched by Australia, New Zealand, the US, Japan and the UK in June 2022 to coordinate their efforts in the region. Canada, Germany and South Korea joined later. But the initiative initially sidelined the Pacific Islands Forum and only belatedly sought to engage with forum senior officials and Pacific foreign ministers in September.

If Pacific island countries agree that a regional coordination centre is needed, it must be Pacific-led. To help facilitate this, it could sit within the Pacific Islands Forum, building on the success of the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on COVID-19, and represent the core of the regional disaster response system. One of its roles could be to coordinate multi-stakeholder HADR in response to acute natural disasters. It could also provide services to national governments between disasters to enhance their disaster preparedness and response capacities, including strengthening national disaster management offices and ensuring coherence and coordination between the national and regional levels.

A Pacific coordinating centre would require resources, and this is where partners such as Australia, New Zealand and others can play the most important role—providing funding and logistical support to the forum to establish and maintain these initiatives. Recognising that the most effective HADR responses are led and undertaken by the people affected by disasters, partners should focus on identifying ways to facilitate locally led HADR, including through logistical assistance and the forward-positioning of relief supplies throughout the region. As Wallis and Powles argue in their report, this could also mean formally expanding HADR mechanisms such as the FRANZ and Quad arrangements to include Pacific responders.

This week’s dialogue is an opportunity to take stock of how Australia, New Zealand and the US partner with—not for—the Pacific. The Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative offers several important and immediate lessons, not all of them positive.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to claim that a spy balloon breaching US territorial airspace and flying close enough to military sites to monitor them was ‘a civilian airship used for research, mainly meteorological, purposes’ that had accidentally wandered off course. Pentagon officials and the US intelligence community dismissed that claim and linked the balloon to a ‘vast surveillance program’ run by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, partly operating out of Hainan province on China’s south coast.

Beijing’s spy balloon is a clear example of an emerging technology developed for military and intelligence operations but that crucially evolved out of civilian and scientific programs. One company that is a strong candidate for contributing to the development of the balloon—and certainly works on similar technology that it supplies to the PLA—is a Shenzhen-based metamaterials company, Kuang-Chi, which has also been sanctioned by the US government for human rights abuses in China.

Open-source documents and media reports about China’s balloon-technology programs contain sober lessons about Beijing’s incremental acquisition of foreign intellectual property and its technology partnerships with Western research institutions. This in turn highlights the difficulty in assessing dual-use technologies and serves as a reminder that Western countries need to review their scientific and commercial collaborations to ensure that those arrangements don’t allow an adversary to deploy those capabilities against their interests.

To analyse the value that China’s military leadership attaches to balloons and the near-space region (between 20 and 100 kilometres above the earth’s surface), it’s important to understand Beijing’s strategic intent and the resources it has allocated to such capabilities. Various Chinese government documents indicate that meteorological balloons, and other stratospheric airships, are important to the PLA’s aerospace strategy.

China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 lists aerospace technology (空天科技) as a frontier area of research where Beijing is deepening military–civilian collaboration to improve China’s military and economic strength and ensure the nation achieves its ‘centennial military building goal’ by 2027. As an example, a project titled ‘The high-resolution earth observation system’ (中国高分辨率对地观测系统), which includes near-space systems, is one of China’s 16 primary science and technology projects. This highlights the strategic significance of unmanned aerial vessels for Beijing.

Only three major organisations in China have the capabilities to operate a balloon of the type and size spotted over North America. According to a US State Department official, one of those organisations, the PLA, likely uses balloons for military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The Financial Times has suggested, based on footage of the craft, that they could potentially carry warheads.

The other two organisations are the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which had an overall annual budget of US$24 billion in 2022—though only a few institutes within the organisation work directly on balloon research programs—and the China Meteorological Administration (CMA), which had an annual budget of US$5.8 billion in 2022.

Both of these civilian government departments are involved in ‘military-civil fusion’ projects and collaborate with the PLA. In October 2017, the CAS began a military–civilian project to build China’s first scientific experiment system to conduct astrobiological experiments, monitor the weather and measure electromagnetic radiation in the near-space region. According to the Project 2049 Institute, the CMA also has potential capabilities for military intelligence collection and surveillance. In 2019, the CMA implemented a 15-year plan for the development of meteorological observation technology, which states that the CMA will increase its military–civil fusion capabilities and develop systems such as a space-based global navigation satellite system reflected signal observer on long-distance, super-pressure balloons, low-orbit satellites and other airships.

The PLA, CAS and CMA have reportedly launched high-altitude balloons from at least four locations: the Da Qaidam region in Qinghai province; Urad Zhongqi Airport; a near-space aerostat experiment base in Inner Mongolia; and a base identified by The War Zone near Bosten Lake, the largest lake in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which lies next to the Malan atomic test base.

High-resolution images of the Chinese balloon crossing over the US suggest that it’s similar to balloons built by Kuang-Chi. Kuang-Chi was one of the first companies visited by Xi Jinping after he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. In 2020, the company was sanctioned by the US Commerce Department for enabling ‘wide-scale human rights abuses within China through abusive genetic collection and analysis or high-technology surveillance, and/or facilitat[ing] the export of items by China that aid repressive regimes around the world’.

If and when the US publicly reveals more details about the downed balloon, one question we can hope to see answered is whether Kuang-Chi has been using new metamaterials to develop military-use balloons for the PLA. Most scientific balloons, including the type used by CAS for research, remain afloat for between a couple of hours and a few days. The flight time for a journey from China to halfway around the globe and back suggests that the balloon over the US was a ‘super-pressure balloon’ (see table 1) made from new metamaterials that can withstand cosmic radiation and extreme conditions while being light enough to carry a heavy payload.

Table 1: Types of balloons

Type	Zero-pressure balloon	Zero-pressure, long-distance balloon	Super-pressure balloon
Travelling distance	Up to 1,000 km	Up to 2, 200 km	At least 36,000 km
Flying duration	2 hours to 3 days	4 to 6 days	100 days or more
Payload weight	Up to 3,000 kg	Up to 3,000 kg	Up to 1,000 kg
Flying altitude	20–40 km	36–38 km	Up to 34 km
Who has it in China	Chinese Academy of Sciences, China Meteorological Administration	Chinese Academy of Sciences, Kuang-Chi	Kuang-Chi

Source: ASPI analysis of NASA data.

Only a few civilian and military research teams have access to this technology in China. A search of patents shows that Harbin Institute of Technology, one of China’s top defence universities, has researched high-altitude balloons using new ‘aircraft skin materials’ to carry more weight and be more durable. Kuang-Chi also claims it was the first company in China to incorporate aircraft skin metamaterial (蒙皮超材料) as part of its balloon ‘Traveller‘ (旅行者) program. Traveller was highlighted by China’s national broadcaster, CCTV, as a critical, innovative Chinese project that was developing super-pressure balloons.

Even if these balloons are used for meteorological research, the type of data they collect has straightforward military applications. Indeed, a PLA policy document in 2016 called for the construction of meteorological infrastructure to be integrated and standardised within the military.

The helium blimps that Kuang-Chi builds can, it claims, capture high-definition images and navigational information such as a ship’s number, registry, latitude and longitude, course and speed. The company suggests its balloons have greater aerial surveillance capacity than traditional surveillance platforms. In 2015, the company’s ‘Cloud’ blimp acquired data from more than 2,000 ships from around 28 countries and regions in the South China Sea (see figure 1). This information would be valuable during a conflict to track an adversary’s warships and would be cheaper and quicker to deploy than satellites. On the other hand, this technology could plug the gap in many states’ maritime domain awareness.

Figure 1: Maritime surveillance data collected by Kuang-Chi ‘Cloud’ blimp in 2015 test flight

Source: Kuang-Chi, internet archive, 6 February 2015.

This evidence is consistent with documents that indicate Beijing’s aim is to militarise the use of high-altitude airships as part of a broader strategy for dominance in the near-space region. Due to the near-space region’s unique geographical advantages, the PLA perceives it as an essential part of the five-dimensional integrated battlefield of land, sea, air, space and electronic warfare. In a 2017 article, PLA researchers argued that the near-space region is becoming another geostrategic domain where other nation-states, including the US, are posturing. The science of military strategy 2020, a capstone document on the PLA’s military strategy, describes the PLA expanding the scope of aircraft to operate in near and deep space. PLA researchers have also argued that the near-space region is essential for integrated aerospace operations where long-duration balloons and uncrewed aerial vehicles play a major role in providing strategic intelligence support.

The PLA’s interest in near space was part of a transformation in its aerospace strategy. Since the 1990s, the PLA Air Force has primarily based its strategy on ‘territorial air defence’ (国土防空), focusing on the aerial defence of mainland China. As PLA warfare doctrine shifted to incorporate more information-warfare concepts, Xu Qiliang, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, proposed a doctrine of ‘integrated aerospace capabilities’ (空天一体) emphasising reconnaissance and early warning, air defence and strategic projection capabilities. In 2014, the Xi administration formally recognised ‘integrated aerospace capabilities’ as a core PLA strategy.

Research into airships in near-space is split between high-speed and low-speed flying objects. Research on high-speed aircraft includes orbital re-entry glider aircraft and hypersonic cruise aircraft. In 2016, the PLA successfully tested its DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle in northwestern China, a region quickly becoming popular for military near-space tests.

Research on low-speed aircraft includes ultra-long-endurance drones, stratospheric blimps and high-altitude balloons. In 2017, Kuang-Chi tested its Traveller 3 balloon, which has potential military uses such as data collection, space–ground communication, remote sensing and telemetry. According to the CCTV report, Traveller 3 can transmit real-time information such as GPS location, balloon flying status data, surveillance video and image data to a ground station and has other avionics and flight control equipment for navigation.

In addition to data collection and communication, research is being conducted on the use of near-space airships for PLA offensive operations and support. This includes intercepting near-space hypersonic flying objects, tracking moving targets, and conducting guidance and control of anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapon systems. In April 2022, the Institute of Atmospheric Physics at CAS and a space technology company, Beijing Xingjian Tianhang, were the first in China to successfully launch a rocket from a high-altitude, zero-pressure helium balloon in near space. The stated aim was physics research but the technology would also, in principle, allow other missile-like projectiles to be launched.

The balloon incident over the US serves as a reminder of the risks of international commercial collaboration with Chinese companies on dual-use technologies or  technologies with potential military applications and underscores the need to step up IP protection. The recent history of Kuang-Chi is a revealing case study. The firm was founded by Liu Ruopeng after he was accused of stealing IP from a US Department of Defense–funded laboratory at Duke University. Reportedly, Kuang-Chi has collaborated with companies in the US, Canada and New Zealand.

In 2014, Kuang-Chi signed a memorandum of understanding with a New Zealand aviation management company, Airways, to test near-space flying platforms in New Zealand. The signing was witnessed by Xi and New Zealand Prime Minister Sir John Key (see figure 2). As agreed in the memorandum and a later contract with Airways, Kuang-Chi successfully launched China’s first near-space balloon flight in June 2015 from a dairy farm in New Zealand owned by a Chinese company, Shanghai Pengxin Group.

An Airways spokesperson told ASPI that ‘the contract with Kuang-Chi Science Limited was to provide air traffic control services for the launch of one test balloon from New Zealand in June 2015’ and that it has done ‘no subsequent work with the company’. The spokesperson rejected any characterisation of the air traffic control service as ‘a collaboration with Chinese firms on dual-use technologies’. The testing of a launch capability for balloons is a necessary part of developing a balloon program. The data and experience collected from the New Zealand launch would have contributed in this sense to China’s military balloon program.

This underscores the need for governments, companies, research institutions and individuals to undertake due diligence when they are collaborating or contracting with foreign entities.

Figure 2: Kuang-Chi signed a memorandum with New Zealand Airways on 21 November 2014

Source: Kuang-Chi, internet archive, 18 March 2015. Chinese President Xi Jinping is pictured on the left, followed by New Zealand Prime Minister John Key. Second from the right is Liu Ruopeng, chair of the board of directors of Kuang-Chi.

According to Sinologist Anne-Marie Brady—who has previously highlighted Kuang-Chi’s use of New Zealand for space launches—New Zealand has been one of many targets of Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Pacific to increase its clout and drive a wedge in the Five Eyes alliance (UK, US, Australia, Canada and NZ), among other reasons. New Zealand’s airspace is also relatively uncongested and the established infrastructure makes it an ideal place to test and launch near-space airships.

Increasing our understanding of Beijing’s capabilities is a top priority, but we also need to continue improving our understanding of Beijing’s strategic intent and the risks of international collaborations in bolstering China’s defence and security capabilities. Kuang-Chi’s apparent civilian collaborations and role as a supplier for Beijing’s military balloon program demonstrate how difficult it can be to assess technologies with potential military applications. This issue has caught out many companies and government officials over the years, including in Australia, Japan and the US. Our public and private sectors need to adapt and ensure the default is not to assist Beijing (or other authoritarian regimes) with dual-use development in critical technologies that affect our national security.