In 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic swept across the globe, China faced international scrutiny over its draconian control measures and the nature and origin of the pandemic. The Chinese Communist Party saw an urgent need to push back as it scrambled to uphold its global standing.

The CCP’s propaganda machine sprang into action, launching campaigns through party-state media to underscore the effectiveness of the CCP’s leadership in navigating the crisis. ‘Wolf warrior’ diplomats and media workers, acting in accordance with Xi Jinping’s directives to boost propaganda work, took to global platforms like Twitter and Facebook, presenting a narrative of resilience, capability and control amid chaos. This portrayal emphasised the ‘advantages’ of China’s unique political and social system, turning scrutiny into an opportunity for praise.

Yet, it wasn’t merely the seasoned hands of party-state media or the fiery voices of diplomats that painted this rosy image. A relatively new set of players had stepped onto the stage: foreign influencers. This group of non-Chinese nationals residing in China and carefully nurtured by the CCP over the years has become an integral part of the choir, harmonising with the ‘main melody’ (主旋律)—the party’s term for themes or narratives that promote its values, policies and ideology. Our new ASPI report, Singing from the CCP’s songsheet: the role of foreign influencers in China’s propaganda system, explores how this process works.

In an era where digital content is king, the CCP has recognised the power that foreign influencers wield compared to more traditional communication channels. Boasting millions of followers in China and overseas, especially on platforms such as TikTok, YouTube and Twitter, the CCP has identified, harnessed and actively developed foreign influencers as unique propaganda assets. It’s become a symbiotic relationship—aligned influencers flourish under the CCP’s regulated social media ecosystem, while the party uses their popularity to bolster its legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

By leveraging the supreme control that it has over the information environment in China, the CCP can eliminate discordant foreign voices and establish a monoculture of foreigners who, when talking about matters of political importance to the party, adhere to the ‘main melody’. Instead of a cacophony of competing views and voices, the party hopes to corral foreign influencers with party-state media workers masquerading as influencers as well as state-approved ethnic-minority influencers into a harmonious choir.

This isn’t just about promoting Chinese culture or achievements; foreign influencers are being guided, both overtly and subtly, to defend the CCP’s stance on sensitive issues. From territorial disputes to human rights concerns, the narratives pushed by many of these influencers are increasingly aligned with the CCP’s ‘main melody’. The CCP’s tentacles of influence extend even to international students at Chinese universities, building them into a ready-made army of young, social-media-savvy influencers.

Taking a closer look, the CCP has used influencers to complement its geopolitical objectives. In particular, Russian influencers in China have been harnessed as part of the CCP’s strategic goal of strengthening bilateral relations with Russia to counter Western narratives. What’s more, foreign influencers’ content is being strategically funnelled into mainstream overseas media, subtly penetrating the viewer’s perspective.

Underlying all these efforts are the CCP’s innovative strategies to incentivise influencers to produce pro-CCP content. State-sponsored competitions with generous rewards and the establishment of multilingual influencer studios in China serve as creative means to that end. These tactics, combined with search engine algorithms that favour fresh, regularly posted content, help CCP-aligned narratives outperform more credible sources on global platforms such as YouTube.

However, it’s crucial to recognise that not all foreign influencers in China are pawns in the CCP’s game. While the party’s overarching control of the information ecosystem might pressure some influencers into compliance, others avoid political topics altogether. Nevertheless, the line between independent voices and those influenced by the party’s narratives is becoming increasingly blurred.

Looking ahead, the far-reaching implications of the CCP’s use of foreign influencers are crystallising. As the strategy evolves, discerning between genuine content and propaganda becomes a formidable challenge for social media platforms, foreign governments and global audiences. This could complicate efforts to counter disinformation and protect the integrity of public discourse.

In essence, the CCP’s strategy is clear: to ‘cultivate a group of “foreign mouths”, “foreign pens” and “foreign brains” who can stand up and speak for China at critical moments,’ as one scholar wrote in his treatise on the use of foreign influencers. The strategy presents a new dynamic in the global information landscape, one where ordinary content creators are enlisted to advance an authoritarian agenda.

Planet A

Australia has created a new mobility pathway for Tuvaluans facing the existential threat of climate change through the Falepili Union treaty announced on the sidelines of last week’s Pacific Islands Forum meeting in the Cook Islands.

The treaty has been hailed as the world’s first bilateral agreement specifically on climate mobility. Among its provisions is a commitment of $16.9 million from Australia for a land reclamation project in Tuvalu. However, Australia has been criticised for focusing on climate adaptation in Tuvalu rather than mitigation of its own greenhouse gas emissions.

The treaty provides a range of security assurances for Tuvalu and requires Australia’s agreement on any ‘partnership, arrangement or engagement’ relating to security or defence that Tuvalu proposes to enter into with other countries or entities. The treaty is therefore being seen as a counterbalance to China’s increasing regional role and could provide a model for other Pacific island countries that may wish to enter into similar climate mobility arrangements with Australia.

Democracy watch

Tens of thousands of people across Spain demonstrated on the weekend against acting prime minister Pedro Sanchez’s plan to secure another term in office by offering amnesty to those who took part in the illegal and failed bid for Catalan independence six years ago.

Last week, the government signed a controversial agreement with the Catalan separatist party Junts, which provided backing for Sanchez’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party to form a new government. The arrangement sent shockwaves across the country, with Sanchez’s conservative opponents accusing him of compromising the rule of law for his own political gain.

Protests took place in Spanish cities including Madrid, Barcelona, Granada and Seville. Many protestors held Spanish and EU flags, as well as banners bearing slogans such as ‘Respect the constitution’. The protests are the latest chapter in Spain’s political drama stemming from the inconclusive 23 July election, when Sanchez’s conservative opposition won the most seats in parliament but not enough to form a government.

Information operations

The organisers of the 2024 Olympic Games have called for vigilance after French authorities uncovered an Azerbaijan-linked disinformation campaign that sought to sow doubt about the city’s capacity to host the event. The campaign ran on social media platform X from 26 to 27 July and broadcast images showing clashes between French police and protesters to millions of people.

A report by Viginum, a French organisation fighting digital foreign interference, attributed the campaign to the work of 91 accounts—40 of which had been created in July 2023 alone—operated by actors with ties to the Azerbaijani presidential party.

The campaign followed a low point in relations between Paris and Baku, after France repeatedly criticised Azerbaijan for installing a checkpoint at the sole road linking Armenia to the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The impact of the campaign is difficult to quantify. However, findings from a recent poll indicate that almost half of Parisians believe hosting the 2024 Games is a ‘bad thing’ and some are considering leaving the area for the duration of the event.

Follow the money

The Australian government will introduce new laws requiring telecommunications companies to update their cybersecurity strategies every year or face harsh financial penalties. The new legislation will classify telecommunications as ‘critical infrastructure’ and impose minimum standards that apply to other essential service providers like energy companies and ports.

The announcement follows on the heels of a major cyberattack on ports operator DP World that interrupted flows at the ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Fremantle for several days, affecting 40% of Australia’s maritime trade.

These measures also precede the release of the government’s new cybersecurity strategy next week, which will focus on the growing threat of ransomware. In 2021–22, the Australian Cyber Security Centre assessed that ransomware represented less than 1% of total cybercrime but remained the most destructive cybercrime threat. Ransomware attacks reportedly cost the Australian economy $2.95 billion annually.

The new strategy should improve resilience across all scales of business in Australia and enable greater international alignment and coordination.

Terror byte

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on Wednesday calling for urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors throughout Gaza for rapid, safe and unhindered aid access. Drafted by Malta, the resolution also called for the immediate and unconditional release of hostages held by Hamas.

The US, Russia and the UK abstained from the vote, while the remaining 12 members voted in favour. The main point of contention was whether to call for a humanitarian pause or a ceasefire, with the US supporting pauses and Russia advocating a ceasefire. The US and UK, while expressing support for humanitarian access, voiced dissatisfaction with the resolution’s lack of condemnation for Hamas or recognition of Israel’s right to defend itself.

It was the Security Council’s fifth attempt to address the conflict since Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel 7 October. Despite states’ differing stances, the council highlighted compliance with international law, protection of civilians, and the necessity of essential services and humanitarian aid for Gaza’s survival.

In response, Israel’s ambassador to the UN dismissed the resolution, asserting that it had ‘no meaning’, and accused Hamas of deliberately exacerbating the humanitarian situation to prompt UN intervention.

Establishing a semiconductor-manufacturing capability in Australia is a once-in-a-generation challenge that could determine the country’s place in the world. For Canberra, it’s an endeavour of the same magnitude as America’s historic ‘moonshot’ during the 1960s and 1970s.

Such a massive undertaking requires an equally massive investment, but there will likely never be a more important time for Australia to commit to it. Supply-chain security and advanced technologies are at the centre of today’s great-power competition.

With a strong semiconductor-manufacturing industry, Australia would be able to make chips relevant to the energy, transport, health, information technology and defence sectors. It could better execute its long-term plans for critical technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence that are central to global strategic competition, and which the government has identified as vital for Australia. And it could reduce vulnerability to supply-chain disruptions from conflict or natural disasters, while sustaining highly skilled jobs.

Australian officials at the Quantum World Congress held in Washington in September acknowledged that encouraging advanced manufacturing, including semiconductor production, was in Australia’s strategic interest. To leverage this momentum, the government needs to formulate a clear strategy for growing Australia’s semiconductor-manufacturing industry, supported by a highly skilled talent pipeline.

The federal government’s commitment to AUKUS Pillar 2 acknowledges that allied collaboration is essential to ensure that like-minded nations maintain a technological edge. US export controls through the CHIPS and Science Act are driving China to rapidly develop its own advanced semiconductor-manufacturing capability. Its ambitious goals make it a strong competitor for a limited global pool of talent.

A new ASPI report, Australia’s semiconductor-manufacturing moonshot: securing semiconductor talent, outlines how Australia can step up its semiconductor device fabrication research and development to industry-compatible prototyping. With this capability and the support of government funding and incentives, Australia could attract the investment from a global semiconductor manufacturer it needs to eventually establish a mature-process-scale foundry in Australia, which can produce in the 90- to 130-nanometre node range. This generation of chip technology is still in high demand for defence applications, cars, household goods and medical devices, so there are significant economic and security benefits from producing in this range—and a comparatively low barrier to entry for Australia.

Access to human capital is a vital factor dictating whether Australia can achieve this goal.

The ability to grow and maintain a skilled workforce will be crucial in attracting investment and scaling the semiconductor manufacturing industry. Globally, by 2030 the industry will require at least a million more skilled workers than it had in 2021 to meet the forecast 80% growth in demand for chips.

For Australia, attracting investment from foreign semiconductor foundries is essential, and establishing public–private partnerships between government, industry and academia will be necessary to secure talent pipelines. Australia has a strong R&D base in semiconductor technologies and related fields but lacks the depth and scale in available talent to meet the moonshot requirements. How successful Australia is at positioning itself as an attractive place for investment from foreign foundries will be determined in part by the strength of government policy in signalling the industry’s growth as priority.

The talent required to support the semiconductor industry includes a wide range of STEM-related and professional skills, as well as specialised construction workers and engineers to build the facilities. Advanced manufacturing nations such as the US, Japan and Taiwan are already creating public–private partnerships, and partnerships between industry and academia, to address the acute global talent shortage in their fields.

Australia needs to learn from these countries’ experiences to determine best practice for establishing similar relationships between tertiary education providers and industry. A collaborative and iterative approach will ensure that industry experts are involved in curriculum development, students have access to cutting-edge facilities for training, and R&D and innovation ecosystems have a better chance of scaling into industry activities.

The partnership between US manufacturer SkyWater Technology and Purdue University in Indiana offers an example of scale and specialisation that ASPI’s report recommends Australia learn from. Supported by both state and federal government incentives, the partnership enables SkyWater Technology to leverage the R&D and innovation ecosystem at Purdue University to support its foundry activities.

State-level activities in New South Wales are already moving towards similar partnerships with an aim to advance semiconductor manufacturing and adjacent technology sectors, such as quantum, in which Australia has an outsized R&D and innovation capability.

The NSW government’s Semiconductor Sector Service Bureau is collaborating with leading Australian universities and actively engaging with the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to grow Australia’s sovereign semiconductor capability. This nascent talent pipeline complements the suitability of NSW and other states, notably Queensland, for investment through public–private partnerships to grow Australia’s semiconductor industry.

Australia has strong credentials across its advanced university and government agency semiconductor R&D facilities, enterprising start-up companies, infrastructure, and investment in critical technologies and talent pipelines by both federal and state governments.

The federal government must demonstrate to foreign industry the appeal of partnering with Australian industry, education providers and government. The first recommendation in ASPIs report is for increased signalling through a national semiconductor industry development strategy. It should include financial incentives and investment roadmaps that facilitate partnerships between domestic and foreign organisations. Australia should look to examples of such policies. The UK, for instance, published a national semiconductor strategy in May that outlines how the government will work closely with industry and build strong foundations in this vital technology.

Existing trusted alliance frameworks for technology collaboration, such as AUKUS, should be prioritised and, as ASPI’s report recommends, used to identify shared gaps in semiconductor manufacturing and talent supply chains and coordinate resource sharing to address them.

The US, a global leader in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, is an ideal source of investment. Such investment would have the benefit of diversifying US semiconductor supply chains with a trusted partner in a geostrategically important region. This would give the US access to Australia’s talent pipeline, helping develop it and connecting more directly with Australian innovation in critical technologies through industry-scale prototyping which is at the heart of AUKUS Pillar 2.

The cost of developing Australia’s semiconductor-manufacturing industry will be financially significant but the ramifications of failing to develop this capability will be greater.

Australia’s foreign policy and place in the world have long been considered the domain of diplomats, defence officials and national-security decision-makers in Canberra. There are no departments of foreign affairs or defence, or intelligence agencies, in Australia’s state and territory governments.

It is the federal government that is responsible for maintaining and developing the US–Australia alliance, including under difficult and unpredictable presidents like Donald Trump. Canberra determines how Australia deals with hostage-taking in Iran, responds to Chinese cyber intrusions and works with the Pacific on climate strategies. It also decides which foreign militaries we partner with to build capability and strengthen deterrence.

But the reality is that, in today’s interconnected and digital world, subnational governments are increasingly influencing the development of Australian foreign and security policies and the extent to which they are implemented. The power of the states and territories, and their diplomatic influence in places like Washington, are getting harder to ignore.

In parallel with the federal government, our states and territories are reaching out globally, seeking not just cultural and social ties, but substantive partnerships that can offer economic prosperity yet also result in security risks. Whether pursuing direct foreign investment or providing policy assurances to foreign investors and governments, state and territory officials have played a key role in Australia’s economic success. They’re often astute at building the kinds of people-to-people connections that deliver deals and projects quickly.

But not all of their interactions and decisions have been consistent with national-level policy. Some, like the Northern Territory’s 2015 decision to lease the Port of Darwin to Chinese company Landbridge for 99 years, revealed weaknesses in the system at both national and territory levels. Victoria’s signing of a memorandum of understanding on China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018 was a wake-up call for federal policymakers. In response, and more broadly due to the realisation that China was using subnational diplomacy to undermine Australia’s federal system and as a workaround to national policy it didn’t like, the federal government introduced the Foreign Relations Act 2020 to deal with such inconsistencies.

Covid-19, meanwhile, was a lesson in how powerful the states and territories can be in their own right. Today, our states and territories are increasingly on the international stage engaging in diplomacy, largely in search of trade deals and investment opportunities. Australia’s premiers and chief ministers are building their global presence and influence by meeting ambassadors, signing agreements with foreign governments and leading delegations overseas.

Scroll through the media of state and territory officials this year and you’ll find agreements with Indian states, trade deals with Vietnam and attendance at global dialogues. In September, Northern Territory Chief Minister Natasha Fyles visited Washington to ‘advance the territory’s role’ on issues such as the US Marine Corps’ rotational force in northern Australia and met with senior officials including Ely Ratner, the influential US assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific security affairs. Such subnational diplomacy seems clearly in the national interest.

But inconsistencies remain. Earlier this month, new Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan held a meeting with Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian at which she described the Victoria–China relationship as ‘a partnership built on respect, trust and friendship’. This is quite different from Australia’s recent experience, reflected in both public attitudes towards China (only 15% of Australians surveyed by the Lowy Institute in 2023 said they trusted China to act responsibly in the world) and the position of the federal government, which steers away from parroting Beijing’s language on mutual trust and is ‘seeking a stable relationship with China’.

State and territory international influence is particularly important in Australia’s alliance with the US and for realising the full potential of the AUKUS pact.

Both the alliance and AUKUS need the kind of grassroots, local-level support that subnational governments can help build and maintain. AUKUS in particular would benefit from a social licence that is still being constructed. For AUKUS to thrive, the building and sharing of economic activity, industrial bases, technological innovation, workforce education and skills development that’s needed will take place not only in Canberra and Washington, but in diverse locations spread throughout cities and remote areas across both large countries.

It would be wrong for policymakers in Canberra to view the states and territories as simply passengers in this journey or only impediments; they need to be partners. But, for such a partnership to work, the states and territories will need to focus not only on what is in their own interest, but what is the national interest—and for some that is a change.

Achieving AUKUS—the most ambitious defence-, security- and technology-focused endeavour Australia has forged—will require a level of strategic cooperation, collaboration and collegiality with the states and territories that Australia hasn’t had since World War II. Alignment of interests and effort will require collective and strategic statecraft that hasn’t always come naturally to Australia and our bureaucracy.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Washington next week provides the opportunity to further build this more integrated approach to statecraft, while also providing a moment for both governments to consider the respective and collective opportunities for their subnational partners to accelerate and prosper from AUKUS.

In a new ASPI report, released today, we recommend that the government work with the US to place subnational diplomacy on the AUSMIN agenda, consider a new branch and ambassador for subnational diplomacy in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, boost the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s capacity to support subnational AUKUS engagement and set up secondments into the states and territories. Australia’s intelligence community is already building subnational outreach and engagement, but it should use the 2024 independent intelligence review to explore whether new mechanisms are needed, for example, to support Australia’s preparedness in the face of a crisis. Finally, the prime minister–led intergovernmental National Cabinet should ensure it continuously scopes out more space on its agenda to focus on international affairs and security challenges.

The US and Australian federal governments should identify how to increase collaboration with subnational levels to harness the power of collective action for both economic prosperity and national security. This collaboration will also help Australia and the prime minister prosecute our national interests and global objectives in Washington, including keeping a US government that’s pulled in many directions focused on Australian priorities, from Indo-Pacific stability to implementing AUKUS. Encouraging and sharpening that focus is in the interests of Australia’s states and territories as well.

The relentless advance of new and more invasive surveillance technologies poses a growing threat to open societies and human rights. The need to understand their impact around the world has never been more pressing.

Freedom House’s Freedom on the net 2023 report underscores this urgency, highlighting an escalation of digital repression in many countries including Iran, Myanmar and the Philippines. The report has identified China as the nation with the most oppressive internet environment for the ninth consecutive year.

A new ASPI report, Surveillance, privacy and agency: insights from China, examines how, in addition to online repression and surveillance, the People’s Republic of China has become the world’s primary example of tech-enhanced social control with its society-wide system of ‘techno-authoritarianism’. Over the past year, ASPI and a non-government research partner worked on this project, which is designed to share detailed information on state surveillance in the PRC and engage thousands of PRC residents on the issue of surveillance technology. The decision has been made not to identify this partner to preserve its access to specific research techniques and data and to protect its staff.

The Chinese Communist Party is increasing its grip on power through an expanding and near-ubiquitous physical and digital surveillance system facilitated by a strict online censorship apparatus and internet-linked physical surveillance devices. China’s cities are covered by more CCTV surveillance cameras than any other cities in the world. Police agencies use facial recognition to monitor human behaviour; link people’s digital identities with their physical movements through specific devices; and collect DNA, voice prints and iris scans into vast databases.

The CCP is working on ways to centralise the data collected and analyse it in more detail.

We set out to develop a better understanding of how surveillance technologies impact PRC residents, and how they perceive such surveillance. The report shines a light on how the state communicates on issues related to surveillance and provides insights into how a subsection of PRC residents view state surveillance, data privacy, facial recognition, DNA collection and data-management technologies.

By looking at how Chinese citizens’ perceptions of surveillance relate to trust in government, one of the main findings offers a glimpse into a complex range of views that is far from a simple dichotomy. Project participants sit across a spectrum of varying degrees of trust and comfort with surveillance technologies. Analysis suggests that survey respondents fall into seven distinct groups, with several in-between categories ranging from dissenters to endorsers.

The project explored the reach and potential of an interactive digital platform as an alternative educational and awareness-raising tool designed to engage in environments where information is harshly restricted and controlled. Presenting an analysis of more than 1,700 PRC government procurement documents, the platform encouraged participants to engage with, critically evaluate and share their views on that information. The research platform engaged more than 55,000 PRC residents.

Insights from the platform indicate that most participants value privacy but hold mixed views on surveillance. Some participants expressed a preference for consent and active engagement on the issue of surveillance. More than 65% agreed that DNA samples should be collected from the general population only on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, participants were generally comfortable with the widespread use of certain types of surveillance that are seen to provide a ‘security dividend’, such as cameras.

In general, the project found that PRC state narratives about government surveillance and technology implementation appear to be at least partly effective. Our analysis of PRC state media identified four main narratives supporting the use of government surveillance: surveillance helps to fight crime; the PRC’s surveillance systems are some of the best in the world; surveillance is commonplace internationally; and surveillance is a ‘double-edged sword’ and people should be concerned for their personal privacy when surveillance is handled by private companies.

It’s apparent that public opinion often aligns with PRC state messaging tying surveillance technologies to personal safety and security. For example, when presented with information about the number of surveillance cameras in their community today, a significant proportion of research platform participants said they would prefer the same number of cameras (39%) or more of them (38%). In addition, PRC state narratives make a clear distinction between private and government surveillance, which suggests state efforts to ‘manage’ privacy concerns within acceptable political parameters.

Despite the widespread acceptance of surveillance technologies, most people who interacted with our research platform still preferred the option of consenting to surveillance rather than being passively subjected to it.

This type of research and approach can provide key insights and nuance to better support local and international advocacy efforts. It’s important for non-government organisations, governments and human rights advocates combating the misuse of surveillance technologies to assess people’s perceptions of those technologies, especially in the realms of privacy; freedom of expression, movement and assembly; and equal access to public services. Gauging the perceptions of populations living with such technologies can support local and international advocacy efforts to improve online and privacy rights by providing a better understanding of local views on privacy, security and governance. That can help shape effective messaging that raises awareness or resonates with existing concerns.