The world is different following adoption of the Paris Agreement on 12 December. We now have a new orientation for the global economy set by the ambition of governments to put a limit to climate change. Of course there is much to be done to realise this ambition but economic analysis and growing experience bring confidence that transformation of economic activity on the scale necessary is well within reach.

If any success has many fathers and mothers, this one has thousands—of politicians, negotiators, civil society representatives and researchers for whom the Paris Agreement was the outcome of great effort, in some cases over many years. But it would be churlish in the immediate aftermath of COP21 not to acknowledge that primary parentage belongs to the French government. For the last year they guided preparations strategically and cautiously, listening carefully for feedback. As in the case of Australia, they quietly nudged along promising developments. In the last hours of the COP though they moved boldly, raising the stakes for all participants and making it clear that any last minute troublemaking of the sort that scuttled previous COPs would bring global opprobrium.

The choreography worked well and those present witnessed a result the like of which most diplomats see only a few times in their careers. If there was a key to the French achievement it was their capacity to maintain vertical integration of diplomatic effort. French diplomats all around the world were kept in the loop and knew that if needed, the whole weight of French influence, including the President, could be brought to bear to resolve a problem. Even with the support they received from others, especially the US, few countries could have matched this coherence and studied calibration of pressure at global scale.

Summaries of the main aspects of the Agreement and its accompanying non-binding decision can now be found in many places. Two related elements justify the description of the deal as transformational: its level of ambition and its requirement for universal participation.

The ambition is almost disguised in a convoluted formulation in Article 4 of the Agreement which commits governments collectively to delivering net zero emissions before the end of the century. This supports the more visible recommitment in Article 2 to contain warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and the welcome new pledge to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5 degrees. The latter was the most controversial point of the package.

Saudi Arabia resisted it on behalf of fossil fuel producers whose interests were transparent. India argued that the goal was fanciful if rich countries did not commit to much greater financial support for developing countries to reduce their emissions. The Indians worried that such a goal would implicitly limit the atmospheric space for their development. In developed countries some scientists and policy people were concerned that setting a goal that was out of reach would play into the hands of deniers and other cynics. COP21 would be depicted as a failure if it did not set a trajectory to reach the agreed goal. In the event, a sufficient number of researchers attested that a 1.5 degrees goal was prudent and achievable for objections to be unsustainable. Australia’s support for the inclusion of the 1.5 degrees goal will have helped repair damaged relations with Pacific Island countries who were its most fervent supporters.

Universal participation in mitigation efforts has been a – perhaps the – major objective of Australian governments in the climate negotiations since before COP1. Even then it was obvious that the arithmetic of global emissions could not add up to success unless all major emitters were included. But until now, only developed countries have had specific legally-binding obligations to reduce emissions. This undermined policy development at home by amplifying competitiveness concerns and also fed the key divisions blocking progress in the UN process.

The Agreement confirms that all parties will have to make emissions mitigation commitments and report progress. But it does recognise that developing countries will rely on support from the developed world in their efforts and acknowledge that their accounting and reporting systems will take time to develop. This is an exquisitely delicate balance that reflected deft handling by France but also a moment in international relations when political will made such a result possible.

Indeed, with becoming modesty President Hollande acknowledged that COP21 was buoyed by political momentum not available at the time of the Copenhagen meeting of 2009. Certainly the agreement a year ago by Presidents Obama and Xi to collaborate in the negotiations was extremely important and US diplomacy played a continued strong supporting role including down to John Kerry’s presence in Paris.  But the seeds of the success of COP21 were sown in Copenhagen (and its preparation) and some critical ones by Australia.

Before COP21 opened, almost all countries had published commitments on climate action in so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. These up-front development plans provided participants with an enormous incentive for a positive outcome. They are a slightly modified version of the “schedules” that Australia proposed in advance of Copenhagen as a vehicle for universal participation. Inclusion of the 1.5 degrees aspiration among the purposes of the Agreement followed a compromise at Copenhagen on a 2015 review of the objective that was personally brokered by Kevin Rudd, one of the main authors of the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord can be seen in retrospect as a draft of the Agreement.

It fell to President Hollande at the high point of COP21 to point to the fundamental significance of climate action—peace. The impacts of climate change are magnifying pressures on vulnerable communities and countries and increasing the prospects of conflict. Although the national security community in Australia has been slow to appreciate the implications, climate change is not just a major challenge to the Australian economy but also to the most basic of national interests. Climate change policy has waxed and waned with singular amplitude in Australia but it must become a top priority while national interests remain in jeopardy.

The Australian delegation in Paris was talented and well-led. It advanced Australia’s interests and played a full role in the meeting’s success. The sense of relief from other delegations that Australia was back in the mainstream was palpable and became an asset for the delegation. The Government should ensure that Australia continues to provide its most effective people in departments at home and delegations abroad for furthering climate change policy, an issue that must become a top priority national endeavour.

The Japanese government has released a draft version of the country’s updated cyber strategy, due for release in June 2015 (PDF – Japanese only). The strategy, presented at a cyber security taskforce meeting on Monday which wasattended by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, is now open for public comment. When speaking about the new strategy during the meeting Abe commented, ‘we need to enhance our capabilities more than ever to cope with cyberattacks, which have no borders.’ Abe is said to be keen to get Japan’s online house in order well before Tokyo hosts the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic games. Included in the new draft strategy is an increased focus on cyber ‘guidelines’ for critical national infrastructure (CNI), closer public–private cooperation and a boost to investigation capabilities. The document also mentions the establishment of an Olympic Computer Security Incident Response Team, and makes reference to boosting intelligence gathering and pre-emptive forecasting by working with industry or through ‘counter cyber intelligence’. The language marks a shift from Japan’s previous cyber strategies, and is now more in line with what we have heard recently from the US government.

Following the big news last week that global telecommunications provider Pacnet suffered a major breach of its corporate network, Telstra is reportedly considering its legal options. Telstra acquired Pacnet in a US$697 million deal in April, but wasn’t informed of the Pacnet breach until after the paperwork was signed. DFAT, Austrade, the AFP and the NSW government are customers of Pacnet. Australian Cyber Security Centre head Major General Steve Day said in a statement, ‘The ACSC is working with Telstra to determine if any government customers have been affected [and] is aware of the issue regarding a Telstra subsidiary,’ but as yet ‘the ACSC has not received any reports of government data being breached as a result of this incident.’

Singaporean President Tony Tan Keng Yam has just wrapped up a week-long visit to France. Tan met with French President François Hollande and both leaders oversaw the signing of a MOU between their respective national cyber security agencies, the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) and the Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI). The cyber MOU is the first of its kind for Singapore and its CSA, which was created just last month when the functions carried out by Singapore Infocomm Technology Security Authority and the Infocomm Development Authority, were consolidated into one agency. The CSA, which sits organisationally within the Prime Minister’s Office, has the responsibility of coordinating and overseeing the nation’s cyber operations and policy.

Staying in Southeast Asia, Cambodia will receive a boost in its internet speeds as it’s connected to its first submarine cable. The cable, which will be constructed in partnership with Thailand and Malaysia, is estimated to cost around US$70 million and will be completed by the end of 2016. In a statement about the project, the partners explained that ‘the MCT cable system will connect Cambodia with its neighbors by undersea cable for the first time,’ and that ‘this link will usher in a new era of connectivity, with faster speeds and improved service leading to greater broadband penetration and better access to digital information and services for all’. The move will undoubtedly increase Cambodia’s download speeds from their current level—sitting around 8.92Mbps—in what will be a boon for the country’s global connectivity and economic growth.

As memories are lost it becomes the role of commemorations to shape our view of history.  The 40th anniversary commemorations of the Normandy landings in 1984 brought Ronald Reagan to Pointe du Hoc, where US Army Rangers had scaled a 130-foot cliff to capture German positions.  Reagan’s speech, regarded as one of the best of his presidency, turned American popular opinion in favour of the ageing actor, reversed a slide in support since the disastrous bombing of a Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and positioned Reagan for the fight of his political life to bring down the Soviet Union. The 50th anniversary commemorations in 1994 were heavily focussed on the old soldiers who attended in large numbers in their 70s along with Queen Elizabeth, Bill Clinton and Francois Mitterrand. The French declined to invite Germany’s Helmut Kohl that year, but Chancellor Gerhard Schroder attended the 60th anniversary, invited by Jacques Chirac. Time heals most things.

The political theatre of this year’s 70th anniversary commemorations will be somewhat lower-key than Reagan’s triumph.  Barack Obama will attend, fresh from the maudlin capitulations of his West Point speech on American foreign policy.  Vladimir Putin will be there, showing that populist militarism isn’t dead yet on Europe’s periphery.  Queen Elizabeth will be the only head of state to have attended the 40th, 50th, 60th and 70th anniversary commemorations.  In another mark of continuity, the British press are happily attacking French President François Hollande, for charging media outlets to broadcast the event. Regrettably few veterans are left to participate.

Australia’s direct role in the D Day landings was, on the scale of the operation, quite limited.  Around 3000 Australians were serving in RAAF squadrons and as individuals in British units.  In our own region, the last remaining Imperial Japanese Army and Navy Service combat aircraft were destroyed in dogfights in June 1944 over Papua New Guinea. Australia was gearing for the costly amphibious operations in Borneo.  Tony Abbott’s participation at the 70th commemoration is important though, to recognise the service of a generation who won’t be with us for the 80th anniversary.  As always happens at gatherings of international leaders, Abbott will also have the opportunity to build contacts and pursue current Australian interests.  What should be on the PM’s check-list of things to do at Normandy?

Abbott should promote the message that Australia is a consequential power with the GNP, large defence budget and activist foreign policy that well merits our temporary seat on the UN Security Council, membership of the G-20, and membership of the East Asia Summit, APEC and the rest.  Our military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and East Timor show we’re prepared to do heavy lifting on international security tasks.  The PM should dispel the notion that our strategic interests are limited to Asia and emphasise that we’re looking for substantive engagement with European countries as like-minded partners.

Second, Abbott should stress to his French hosts that this particular bilateral relationship has been underdone in recent years.  We should use the forthcoming hundredth anniversary commemorations of the First World War not just to remember our history but also to develop a modern Franco-Australian strategic relationship.  I argued for closer Australia-French defence relations back in February; the essence of the case is here:

In many respects French defence policy showcases what Australia would like more of: highly capable deployable forces and a willingness to use them; a shrinking but sustainable industry base; growing credibility and respect in Washington and bipartisan popular support for a strong military. France has more than its share of economic woes, but in terms of strategic policy settings it has a good hand. That’s a good basis to think about closer cooperation with Australia.

If he has the opportunity, Mr Abbott should pull François Hollande and Barack Obama into a huddle to ask if it’s really the case—or just a self-serving myth—that the US wouldn’t contemplate allowing its weapons systems to be fitted into a French-designed submarine hull.  France is currently the most effective of the major European defence powers; is a NATO ally in good standing; backed the US to the hilt in Libya; and is doing strategic heavy-lifting in Africa.  France and the UK can jointly operate aircraft off a carrier, but we’re supposed to believe that the ultimate no-go zone in alliance cooperation is to provide Australia with an effective submarine capability.  Come off it!  It’s time for the political leaders of the three countries to offer some adult supervision.

A French solution to Australia’s future submarine requirement is one of a limited number of possible ways forward for the Collins-replacement program. Given the money and risk involved, it’s in Australia’s interests to at least test the waters of that possibility.  Progress here could transform the Australia-France industrial relationship and provide a solid basis for defence cooperation into the future.  Seek and you may find, Prime Minister.

Peter Jennings is executive director of ASPI. Image courtesy of the Australian War Memorial.