Tag Archive for: Foreign Interference

What do Australia’s parliamentarians think about cybersecurity and critical technology?

Preface

In 2020, the then Director of ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, Fergus Hanson, approached me to research the views of the 46th Parliament on a range of cybersecurity and critical technology issues. The resulting data collection was then conducted in two parts across 2021 and 2022, with the results analysed and written up in 2022 and 2023. Those parliamentarians who ‘opted in’ completed and provided an initial quantitative study, which I then followed up on with an interview that explored an additional set of qualitative questions. The results, collated and analysed, form the basis of this report.

This research aims to provide a snapshot of what our nation’s policy shapers and policymakers are thinking when it comes to cybersecurity and critical technologies. What are they worried about? Where are their knowledge gaps and interests? What technologies do they think are important to Australia and where do they believe policy attention and investment should focus in the next five years?

This initial study establishes a baseline for future longitudinal assessments that could capture changes or shifts in parliamentarians’ thinking. Australia’s ongoing cybersecurity challenges, the fast-moving pace of artificial intelligence (AI), the creation of AUKUS and the ongoing development of AUKUS Pillar 2—with its focus on advanced capabilities and emerging technologies (including cybertechnologies)—are just a few reasons among many which highlight why it’s more important than ever that the Australian Parliament be both informed and active when engaging with cybersecurity and critical technologies.

We understand that this in-depth study may be a world first and extend our deep and heartfelt thanks to the 24 parliamentarians who took part in it. Parliamentarians are very busy people, and yet many devoted significant time to considering and completing this study.

This was a non-partisan study. Parliamentarians were speaking on condition of strict anonymity, without any identifiers apart from their gender, chamber, electorate profile and backbench or frontbench status. Because of that, the conversations were candid, upfront and insightful and, as a result, this study provides a rich and honest assessment of their views.

The influence environment

A survey of Chinese-language media in Australia

What’s the problem?

In the past two decades, Australia’s Chinese-language media landscape has undergone fundamental changes that have come at a cost to quality, freedom of speech, privacy and community representation. The diversity of Australia’s Chinese communities, which often trace their roots to Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and Taiwan as well as the People’s Republic of China, isn’t well reflected in the media sector.

Persistent efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to engage with and influence Chinese language media in Australia far outmatch the Australian Government’s work in the same space. A handful of outlets generally offer high-quality coverage of a range of issues. However, CCP influence affects all media. It targets individual outlets while also manipulating market incentives through advertising, coercion and WeChat. Four of the 24 Australian media companies studied in this report show evidence of CCP ownership or financial support.

WeChat, a Chinese social media app created by Tencent, may be driving the most substantial and harmful changes ever observed in Australia’s Chinese-language media sector. On the one hand, the app is particularly important to Chinese Australians and helps people stay connected to friends and family in China. It’s used by as many as 3 million users in Australia for a range of purposes including instant messaging.1 It’s also the most popular platform used by Chinese Australians to access news.2 However, WeChat raises concerns because of its record of censorship, information control and surveillance, which align with Beijing’s objectives. Media outlets on WeChat face tight restrictions that facilitate CCP influence by pushing the vast majority of news accounts targeting Australian audiences to register in China. Networks and information sharing within the app are opaque, contributing to the spread of disinformation.

Australian regulations are still evolving to meet the challenges identified in this report, which often mirror problems in the media industry more generally. They haven’t introduced sufficient transparency to the Chinese-language media sector and influence from the CCP. Few Australian Government policies effectively support Chinese-language media and balance or restrict CCP influence in it.

What’s the solution?

The Australian Government should protect Chinese-language media from foreign interference while introducing measures to support the growth of an independent and professional media sector. WeChat is a serious challenge to the health of the sector and to free and open public discourse in Chinese communities, and addressing it must be a core part of the solution.

The government should encourage the establishment and growth of independent media. It should consider expanding Chinese-language services through the ABC and SBS, while also reviewing conflicts of interest and foreign interference risks in each. Greater funding should be allocated to multicultural media, including for the creation of scholarships and training programs for Chinese-language journalists and editors. The government should subsidise syndication from professional, non-CCPcontrolled media outlets.

On WeChat, the government should hold all social media companies to the same set of rules, standards and norms, regardless of their country of origin or ownership. As it does with platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, the government should increase engagement with WeChat through relevant bodies such as the Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Cyber Security Centre, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the Australian Communications and Media Authority, the eSafety Commissioner, the Australian Electoral Commission and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications. The aim should be to ensure that WeChat is taking clear and measurable steps in 2021 to address concerns and meet the same sets of rules, standards and norms that US social media platforms are held to. This effort should be done in tandem with outreach to like-minded countries. If companies refuse to meet those standards, they shouldn’t be allowed to operate in Australia.3

The government should explore ways to amend or improve the enforcement of legislation such as the Broadcasting Services Act 1995 and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 to increase the transparency of foreign ownership of media in any language, regardless of platform.

Introduction

Australia’s Chinese‑language media sector is an important part of our democracy, yet its contours and its challenges are poorly understood.4 Australia is home to large and diverse Chinese communities. According to the 2016 Census, nearly 600,000 Australians spoke Mandarin at home, and more than 280,000 spoke Cantonese.5 Only a minority of Australians with Chinese heritage were born in mainland China—many were born in Australia, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Southeast Asia.6 However, individuals born in mainland China are probably the largest group of WeChat users. Migration from mainland China is likely to remain high, and Australia has been home to large numbers of visiting Chinese students and businesspeople.

It’s been claimed that most Chinese‑language media in Australia are controlled or influenced by Beijing.7 While that’s broadly accurate, past research hasn’t systematically examined the extent and mechanisms of CCP influence over Australian media.8 In particular, the pervasive effects of WeChat on the Chinese media sector haven’t been widely appreciated. Our research identified no significant influence in Australian Chinese‑language media from governments other than China’s.

Growing concerns about the lack of Chinese‑Australian representation in Australian politics, CCP interference in Australia and Australia–China relations highlight the need for policymakers to understand the Chinese‑language media environment. For example, Australian politicians and scholars have questioned WeChat’s role in elections, called out disinformation on the app and complained about the past absence of relevant security advice from the government.9 Marginal seats such as Chisholm and Reid have large Chinese communities, among which Chinese‑language media, particularly through WeChat, have been an important factor in some elections.10

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank John Fitzgerald, Danielle Cave, Louisa Lim, Michael Shoebridge, Peter Jennings and several anonymous peer reviewers who offered their feedback and insights. Audrey Fritz contributed research on media regulation and censorship.

Funding: The Department of Home Affairs provided ASPI with $230k in funding, which was used towards this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published December 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online),
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums

What’s the problem?

Over the past decade, state actors have taken advantage of the digitisation of election systems, election administration and election campaigns to interfere in foreign elections and referendums.1 Their activity can be divided into two attack vectors. First, they’ve used various cyber operations, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks and phishing attacks, to disrupt voting infrastructure and target electronic and online voting, including vote tabulation. Second, they’ve used online information operations to exploit the digital presence of election campaigns, politicians, journalists and voters.

Together, these two attack vectors (referred to collectively as ‘cyber-enabled foreign interference’ in this report because both are mediated through cyberspace) have been used to seek to influence voters and their turnout at elections, manipulate the information environment and diminish public trust in democratic processes.

This research identified 41 elections and seven referendums between January 2010 and October 2020 where cyber-enabled foreign interference was reported, and it finds that there’s been a significant uptick in such activity since 2017. This data collection shows that Russia is the most prolific state actor engaging in online interference, followed by China, whose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity has increased significantly over the past two years. As well as these two dominant actors, Iran and North Korea have also tried to influence foreign elections in 2019 and 2020. All four states have sought to interfere in the 2020 US presidential elections using differing cyber-enabled foreign interference tactics.

In many cases, these four actors use a combination of cyber operations and online information operations to reinforce their activities. There’s also often a clear geopolitical link between the interfering state and its target: these actors are targeting states they see as adversaries or useful to their geopolitical interests.

Democratic societies are yet to develop clear thresholds for responding to cyber-enabled interference, particularly when it’s combined with other levers of state power or layered with a veil of plausible deniability.2 Even when they’re able to detect it, often with the help of social media platforms, research institutes and the media, most states are failing to effectively deter such activity. The principles inherent in democratic societies—openness, freedom of speech and the free flow of ideas—have made them particularly vulnerable to online interference.

What’s the solution?

This research finds that not all states are being targeted by serious external threats to their electoral processes, so governments should consider scaled responses to specific challenges. However, the level of threat to all states will change over time, so there’s little room for complacency. For all stakeholders—in government, industry and civil society—learning from the experience of others will help nations minimise the chance of their own election vulnerabilities being exploited in the future.3

The integrity of elections and referendums is key to societal resilience. Therefore, these events must be better protected through greater international collaboration and stronger engagement between government, the private sector and civil society.

Policymakers must respond to these challenges without adopting undue regulatory measures that would undermine their political systems and create ‘the kind of rigidly controlled environment autocrats seek’.4 Those countries facing meaningful cyber-enabled interference need to adopt a multi-stakeholder approach that carefully balances democratic principles and involves governments, parliaments, internet platforms, cybersecurity companies, media, NGOs and research institutes. This report recommends that governments identify vulnerabilities and threats as a basis for developing an effective risk-mitigation framework for resisting cyber-enabled foreign interference.

The rapid adoption of social media and its integration into the fabric of political discourse has created an attack surface for malign actors to exploit. Global online platforms must take responsibility for taking appropriate action against actors attempting to manipulate their users, yet these companies are commercial entities whose interests aren’t always aligned with those of governments. They aren’t intelligence agencies so are sometimes limited in their capacity to attribute malign activities directly. To mitigate risk during election cycles, social media companies’ security teams should work closely with governments and civil society groups to ensure that there’s a shared understanding of the threat actors and of their tactics in order to ensure an effectively calibrated and collaborative security posture.

Policymakers must implement appropriate whole-of-government mechanisms which continuously engage key stakeholders in the private sector and civil society. Greater investments in capacity building must be made by both governments and businesses in the detection and deterrence of these. It’s vital that civil society groups are supported to build up capability that stimulates and informs international public discourse and policymaking. Threats to election integrity are persistent, and the number of actors willing to deploy these tactics is growing.

Background

Foreign states’ efforts to interfere in the elections and referendums of other states, and more broadly to undermine other political systems, are an enduring practice of statecraft.5 Yet the scale and methods through which such interference occurs has changed, with old and new techniques adapting to suit the cyber domain and the opportunities presented by a 24/7, always connected information environment.6

When much of the world moved online, political targets became more vulnerable to foreign interference, and millions of voters were suddenly exposed, ‘in a new, “neutral” medium, to the very old arts of persuasion or agitation’.7 The adoption of electronic and online voting, voter tabulation and voter registration,8 as well as the growth of online information sharing and communication, has made interference in elections easier, cheaper and more covert.9 This has lowered the entry costs for states seeking to engage in election interference.10

Elections and referendums are targeted by foreign adversaries because they are opportunities when significant political and policy change occurs and they are also the means through which elected governments derive their legitimacy.11 By targeting electoral events, foreign actors can attempt to influence political decisions and policymaking, shift political agendas, encourage social polarisation and undermine democracies. This enables them to achieve long-term strategic goals, such as strengthening their relative national and regional influence, subverting undesired candidates, and compromising international alliances that ‘pose a threat’ to their interests.12

Elections and referendums also involve diverse actors, such as politicians, campaign staffers, voters and social media platforms, all of which can be targeted to knowingly or unknowingly participate in, or assist with, interference orchestrated by a foreign state.13 There are also a number of cases where journalists and media outlets have unwittingly shared, amplified, and contributed to the online information operations of foreign state actors.14 The use of unknowing participants has proved to be a key feature of cyber-enabled foreign election interference.

This is a dangerous place for liberal democracies to be in. This report highlights that the same foreign state actors continue to pursue this type of interference, so much so that it is now becoming a global norm that’s an expected part of some countries’ election processes. On its own, this perceived threat has the potential to undermine the integrity of elections and referendums and trust in public and democratic institutions.

Methodology and definitions

This research is an extension and expansion of the International Cyber Policy Centre’s Hacking democracies: cataloguing cyber-enabled attacks on elections, which was published in May 2019. That project developed a database of reported cases of cyber-enabled foreign interference in national elections held between November 2016 and April 2019.15 This new research extends the scope of Hacking democracies by examining cases of cyber-enabled foreign interference between January 2010 and October 2020. This time frame was selected because information on the use of cyber-enabled techniques as a means of foreign interference started to emerge only in the early 2010s.16

This reports appendix includes a dataset that provides an inventory of case studies where foreign state actors have reportedly used cyber-enabled techniques to interfere in elections and referendums.

The cases have been categorised by:

  • target
  • type of political process
  • year
  • attack vector (method of interference)
  • alleged foreign state actor.

Also accompanying this report is an interactive online map which geo-codes and illustrates our dataset, allowing users to apply filters to search through the above categories.

This research relied on open-source information, predominantly in English, including media reports from local, national, and international outlets, policy papers, academic research, and public databases. It was desktop based and consisted of case selection, case categorisation and mixed-methods analysis.17 The research also benefited from a series of roundtable discussions and consultations with experts in the field,18 as well as a lengthy internal and external peer review process.

The accompanying dataset only includes cases where attribution was publicly reported by credible researchers, cybersecurity firms or journalists. The role of non-state actors and the use of cyber-enabled techniques by domestic governments and political parties to shape political discourse and public attitudes within their own societies weren’t considered as part of this research.19

This methodology has limitations. For example, the research is limited by the covert and ongoing nature of cyber-enabled foreign interference, which is not limited to the period of an election cycle or campaign. Case selection for the new dataset, in particular, was impeded by the lack of publicly available information and uncertainty about intent and attribution, which are common problems in work concerning cyber-enabled or other online activity. It likely results in the underreporting of cases and a skewing towards English-language and mainstream media sources. The inability to accurately assess the impact of interference campaigns also results in a dataset that doesn’t distinguish between major and minor campaigns and their outcomes. The methodology omitted cyber-enabled foreign interference that occurred outside the context of elections or referendums.20

In the context of this policy brief, the term ‘attack vector’ refers to the means by which foreign state actors carry out cyber-enabled interference. Accordingly, the dataset contains cases of interference that can broadly be divided into two categories:

• Cyber operations: covert activities carried out via digital infrastructure to gain access to a server or system in order to compromise its service, identify or introduce vulnerabilities, manipulate information or perform espionage21
• Online information operations: information operations carried out in the online information environment to covertly distort, confuse, mislead and manipulate targets through deceptive or inaccurate information.22

Cyber operations and online information operations are carried out via an ‘attack surface’, which is to be understood as the ‘environment where an attacker can try to enter, cause an effect on, or extract data from’.23
 

Key findings

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has identified 41 elections and seven referendums between January 2010 and October 2020 (Figure 1) that have been subject to cyber-enabled foreign interference in the form of cyber operations, online information operations or a combination of the two.24

Figure 1: Cases of cyber-enabled foreign interference, by year and type of political process

Figure 1 shows that reports of the use of cyber-enabled techniques to interfere in foreign elections and referendums has increased significantly over the past five years. Thirty-eight of the 41 elections in which foreign interference was identified, and six of the referendums, occurred between 2015 and 2020 (Figure 1). These figures are significant when we consider that elections take place only every couple of years and that referendums are typically held on an ad hoc basis, meaning that foreign state actors have limited opportunities to carry out this type of interference.

As a key feature of cyber-enabled interference is deniability, there are likely many more cases that remain publicly undetected or unattributed. Moreover, what might be perceived as a drop in recorded cases in 2020 can be attributed to a number of factors, including election delays caused by Covid-19 and that election interference is often identified and reported on only after an election period is over.

Figure 2: Targets of cyber-enabled foreign interference in an election or referendum

Note: The numbers in the map represent the number of reported cases of cyber-enabled foreign interference in an election or referendum. Access this interactive map here. Source: Maptive, map data © 2020 Google.

Figure 3: Number of political processes targeted (1–4), by state or region

Cyber-enabled interference occurred on six continents (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Australia and South America).The research identified 33 states that have experienced cyber-enabled foreign interference in at least one election cycle or referendum, the overwhelming majority of which are democracies.25 The EU has also been a target: several member states were targeted in the lead-up to the 2019 European Parliament election.26

Significantly, this research identified 11 states that were targeted in more than one election cycle or referendum (Figure 3). The repeated targeting of certain states is indicative of their (perceived) strategic value, the existence of candidates that are aligned with the foreign state actors’ interests,27 insufficient deterrence efforts, or past efforts that have delivered results.28 This research also identified five cases in which multiple foreign state actors targeted the same election or referendum (the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership, the 2018 Macedonian referendum, the 2019 Indonesian general election and the 2020 US presidential election). Rather than suggesting coordinated action, the targeting of a single election or referendum by multiple foreign state actors more likely reflects the strategic importance of the outcome to multiple states.

The attack vectors

The attack vectors are cyber operations and online information operations.29 Of the 48 political processes targeted, 26 were subjected to cyber operations and 34 were subjected to online information operations. Twelve were subjected to a combination of both (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Attacks on political processes, by attack vector

Cyber operations

This research identified 25 elections and one referendum over the past decade in which cyber operations were used for interference purposes. In the context of election interference, cyber operations fell into two broad classes: operations to directly disrupt (such as DoS attacks) or operations to gain unauthorised access (such as phishing). Unauthorised access could be used to enable subsequent disruption or to gather intelligence that could then enable online information operations, such as a hack-and-leak campaign.

Phishing attacks were the main technique used to gain unauthorised access to the personal online accounts and computer systems of individuals and organisations involved in managing and running election campaigns or infrastructure. They were used in 17 of the 25 elections, as well as the referendum, with political campaigns on the receiving end in most of the reported instances. Phishing involves misleading a target into downloading malware or disclosing personal information, such as login credentials, by sending a malicious link or file in an otherwise seemingly innocuous email or message (Figure 5).30 For example, Google revealed in 2020 that Chinese state-sponsored threat actors pretended to be from antivirus software firm McAfee in order to target US election campaigns and staffers with a phishing attack.31

Figure 5: The email Russian hackers used to compromise state voting systems ahead of the 2016 US presidential election

Source: Sam Biddle, ‘Here’s the email Russian hackers used to try to break into state voting systems’, The Intercept, 2 June 2018, online.

When threat actors gain unauthorised access to election infrastructure, they could potentially disrupt or even alter vote counts, as well as use information gathered from their access to distract public discourse and sow doubt about the validity and integrity of the process.

Then there are DoS attacks, in which a computer or online server is overwhelmed by connection requests, leaving it unable to provide service.32 In elections, they’re often used to compromise government and election-related websites, including those used for voter registration and vote tallying.

DoS attacks were used in six of the 25 elections, and one referendum, targeting vote-tallying websites, national electoral commissions and the websites of political campaigns and candidates. For example, in 2019, the website of Ukrainian presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelenskiy was subjected to a distributed DoS attack the day after he announced his intention to run for office. The website received 5 million requests within minutes of its launch and was quickly taken offline, preventing people from registering as supporters.33

Online information operations

This research identified 28 elections and six referendums over the past decade in which online information operations were used for interference purposes. In the context of election interference, online information operations should be understood as the actions taken online by foreign state actors to distort political sentiment in an election to achieve a strategic or geopolitical outcome.34

They can be difficult to distinguish from everyday online interactions and often seek to exploit existing divisions and tensions within the targeted society.35

Online information operations combine social media manipulation (‘inauthentic coordinated behaviour’), for example partisan media coverage and disinformation to distort political sentiment during an election and, more broadly, to alter the information environment. The operations are designed to target voters directly and often make use of social media and networking platforms to interact in real time and assimilate more readily with their targets.36

Online information operations tend to attract and include domestic actors.37 There have been several examples in which Russian operatives have successfully infiltrated and influenced legitimate activist groups in the US.38 This becomes even more prominent as foreign state actors align their online information operations with domestic disinformation and extremist campaigns, amplifying rather than creating disinformation.39 The strategic use of domestic disinformation means that governments and regulators may find it difficult to target them without also taking a stand against domestic misinformers and groups.

It is important to acknowledge the synergy of the two attack vectors, and also how they can converge and reinforce one another.40 This research identified three elections where cyber operations were used to compromise a system and obtain sensitive material, such as emails or documents, which were then strategically disclosed online and amplified.41 For example, according to Reuters, classified documents titled ‘UK-US Trade & Investment Working Group Full Readout’ were distributed online before the 2019 British general election as part of a Russian-backed strategic disclosure campaign.42

The main concern with the strategic use of both attack vectors is that it further complicates the target’s ability to detect, attribute and respond. This means that any meaningful response will need to consider both potential attack vectors when securing vulnerabilities.

State actors and targets

Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums between 2010 and 2020 has been publicly attributed to only a small number of states: Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. In most cases, a clear geopolitical link between the source of interference and the target can be identified; Russia, China, Iran and North Korea mainly target states in their respective regions, or states they regard as adversaries— such as the US.43

The increasing cohesion among foreign state actors, notably China and Iran learning and adopting various techniques from Russia, has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the different foreign state actors.44 This has been further complicated by the adoption of Russian tactics and techniques by domestic groups, in particular groups aligned with the far-right for example.45

Russia

Russia is the most prolific foreign actor in this space. This research identified 31 elections and seven referendums involving 26 states over the past decade in which Russia allegedly used cyber-enabled foreign interference tactics. Unlike the actions of many of the other state actors profiled here, Russia’s approach has been global and wide-ranging. Many of Russia’s efforts remain focused on Europe, where Moscow allegedly used cyber-enabled means to interfere in 20 elections, including the 2019 European Parliament election and seven referendums. Of the 16 European states affected, 12 are members of the EU and 13 are members of NATO.46 Another focus for Russia has been the US and while the actual impact on voters remains debatable, Russian interference has become an expected part of US elections.47 Moscow has also sought to interfere in the elections of several countries in South America and Africa, possibly in an attempt to undermine democratisation efforts and influence their foreign policy orientations.48

Russia appears to be motivated by the intent to signal its capacity to respond to perceived foreign interference in its internal affairs and anti-Russian sentiment.49 It also seeks to strengthen its regional power by weakening alliances that pose a threat. For instance, Russia used cyber operations and online information operations to interfere in both the 2016 Montenegrin parliamentary election and the 2018 Macedonian referendum. This campaign was part of its broader political strategy to block the two states from joining NATO and prevent the expansion of Western influence into the Balkan peninsula.50

Figure 6: States targeted by Russia between 2010 and 2020

Source: Maptive, map data © 2020 Google.

China

Over the past decade, it’s been reported that China has targeted 10 elections in seven states and regions. Taiwan, specifically Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party, has been the main target of China’s cyber-enabled election interference.51 Over the past three years, however, the Chinese state has expanded its efforts across the Indo-Pacific region.52 Beijing has also been linked to activity during the 2020 US presidential election. As reported by the New York Times and confirmed by both Google and Microsoft, state-backed hackers from China allegedly conducted unsuccessful spear-phishing attacks to gain access to the personal email accounts of campaign staff members working for the Democratic Party candidate Joseph Biden.53

China’s interference in foreign elections is part of its broader strategy to defend its ‘core’ national interests, both domestically and regionally, and apply pressure to political figures who challenge those interests. Those core interests, as defined by the Chinese Communist Party, include the preservation of domestic stability, economic development, territorial integrity and the advancement of China’s great-power status.54 Previously, China’s approach could be contrasted with Russia’s in that China attempted to deflect negativity and shape foreign perceptions to bolster its legitimacy, whereas Russia sought to destabilise the information environment, disrupt societies and weaken the target.55 More recently, however, China has adopted methods associated with Russian interference, such as blatantly destabilising the general information environment in targeted countries with obvious mistruths and conspiracy theories.56

Figure 7: States and regions targeted by China between 2010 and 2020

Source: Maptive, map data © 2020 Google.

Iran

This dataset shows that Iran engaged in alleged interference in two elections and two referendums in three states.57 Iranian interference in foreign elections appears to be similar to Russian interference in that it’s a defensive action against the target for meddling in Iran’s internal affairs and a reaction to perceived anti-Iran sentiment. A pertinent and current example of this is Iran’s recent efforts to interfere in the 2020 US presidential election by targeting President Trump’s campaign.58 As reported by the Washington Post, Microsoft discovered that the Iranian-backed hacker group Phosphorus had used phishing emails to target 241 email accounts belonging to government officials, journalists, prominent Iranian citizens and staff associated with Trump’s election campaign and successfully compromised four of those accounts.59

Figure 8: States targeted by Iran between 2010 and 2020

Source: Maptive, map data © 2020 Google.

North Korea

North Korea has been identified as a foreign threat actor behind activity targeting both the 2020 South Korean legislative election and the 2020 US presidential election.60 Somewhat similarly to China’s approach, North Korea’s interference appears to focus on silencing critics and discrediting narratives that undermine its national interests. For example, North Korea targeted North Korean citizens running in South Korea’s 2020 legislative election, including Thae Yong-ho, the former North Korean Deputy Ambassador to the UK and one of the highest-ranking North Korean officials to ever defect.61

Figure 9: States targeted by North Korea between 2010 and 2020

Source: Maptive, map data © 2020 Google.

Detection and attribution

Detection and attribution requires considerable time and resources, as those tasks require the technical ability to analyse and reverse engineer a cyber operation or online information operation.

Beyond attribution, understanding the strategic and geopolitical aims of each event is challenging and time-consuming.62 The covert and online nature of cyber-enabled interference, whether carried out as a cyber operation or an online information operation, inevitably complicates the detection and identification of interference. For example, a DoS attack can be difficult to distinguish from a legitimate rise in online traffic. Moreover, the nature of the digital infrastructure and the online information environment used to carry out interference enables foreign state actors to conceal or falsify their identities, locations, time zones and languages.

As detection and attribution capabilities improve, the tactics and techniques used by foreign states will adapt accordingly, further complicating efforts to detect and attribute interference promptly.63

There are already examples of foreign state actors adapting their techniques, such as using closed groups and encrypted communication platforms (such as WhatsApp, Telegram and LINE) to spread disinformation64 or using artificial intelligence to generate false content.65 It can also be difficult to determine whether an individual or group is acting on its own or on behalf of a state.66 This is further complicated by the use of non-state actors, such as hackers-for-hire, consultancy firms and unwitting individuals, as proxies. Ahead of the 2017 Catalan independence referendum, for example, the Russian-backed media outlets RT and Sputnik used Venezuelan and Chavista-linked social media accounts as part of an amplification campaign. The hashtag #VenezuelaSalutesCatalonia was amplified by the accounts to give the impression that Venezuela supported Catalonian independence.67 More recently, Russia outsourced part of its 2020 US presidential disinformation campaign to Ghanaian and Nigerian nationals who were employed to generate content and disseminate it on social media.68

The ‘bigger picture’

States vary in their vulnerability to cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums.

In particular, ‘highly polarised or divided’ democracies tend to be more vulnerable to such interference.69 The effectiveness of cyber-enabled interference in the lead-up to an election is overwhelmingly determined by the robustness and integrity of the information environment and the extent to which the electoral process has been digitised.70 Academics from the School of Politics and International Relations at the Australian National University found that local factors, such as the length of the election cycle and the target’s preparedness and response, also play a significant role. For example, Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche! campaign prepared for Russian interference by implementing strategies to respond to both cyber operations (specifically, phishing attacks) and online information operations. In the event that a phishing attack was detected, Macron’s IT team was instructed to ‘flood’ phishing emails with multiple login credentials to disrupt and distract the would-be attacker. To deal with online information operations, Macron’s team planted fake emails and documents that could be identified in the event of a strategic disclosure and undermine the adversary’s effort.71

Electronic and online voting, vote tabulation and voter registration systems are often presented as the main targets of cyber-enabled interference. It is important to recognise that the level of trust the public has in the integrity of electoral systems, democratic processes and the information environment is at stake. In Europe, a 2018 Eurobarometer survey on democracy and elections found that 68% of respondents were concerned about the potential for fraud or cyberattack in electronic voting, and 61% were concerned about ‘elections being manipulated through cyberattacks’.72 

That figure matched the result of a similar survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in the US, which found that 61% of respondents believed it was likely that cyberattacks would be used in the future to interfere in their country’s elections.73

However, not all states are equally vulnerable to this type of interference. Some, for example, opt to limit or restrict the use of information and communication technologies in the electoral process.74 The Netherlands even reverted to using paper ballots to minimise its vulnerability to a cyber operation, ensuring that there wouldn’t be doubts about the electoral outcome.75 Authoritarian states that control, suppress and censor their information environments are also less vulnerable to cyber-enabled foreign interference.76

The proliferation of actors involved in elections and the digitisation of election functions has dramatically widened the attack surface available to foreign state actors. This has in large part been facilitated by the pervasive and persistent growth of social media and networking platforms, which has made targeted populations more accessible than ever to foreign state actors. For example, Russian operatives at the Internet Research Agency were able to pose convincingly as Americans online to form groups and mobilise political rallies and protests.77 The scale of this operation wouldn’t have been possible without social media and networking platforms.

Figure 10: Number of people using social media platforms, July 2020 (million)

Source: ‘Most popular social networks worldwide as of July 2020, ranked by number of active users’, Statista, 2020, online.

While these platforms play an increasingly significant role in how people communicate about current affairs, politics and other social issues, they continue to be misused and exploited by foreign state actors.78 Moreover, they have fundamentally changed the way information is created, accessed and consumed, resulting in an online information environment ‘characterised by high volumes of information and limited levels of user attention’.79

In responding to accusations of election interference, foreign actors tend to deny their involvement and then deflect by indicating that the accusations are politically motivated. In 2017, following the release of the United States’ declassified assessment of Russian election interference,80 Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov compared the allegations of interference to a ‘witch-hunt’ and stated that they were unfounded and unsubstantiated, and that Russia was ‘growing rather tired’ of the accusations.81 Russian President Vladimir Putin even suggested that it could be Russian hackers with ‘patriotic leanings’ that have carried out cyber-enabled election interference rather than state-sponsored hackers.82

Plausible deniability is often cited in response to accusations of interference, with China’s Foreign Ministry noting that the ‘internet was full of theories that were hard to trace’.83 China has attempted to deter future allegations by threatening diplomatic relations, responding to the allegations that it was behind the sophisticated cyber attack on Australia’s parliament by issuing a warning that the ‘irresponsible’ and ‘baseless’ allegations could negatively impact China’s relationship with Australia.84

Recommendations

The threats posed by cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums will persist, and the range of state actors willing to deploy these tactics will continue to grow. Responding to the accelerating challenges in this space requires a multi-stakeholder approach that doesn’t impose an undue regulatory burden that could undermine democratic rights and freedoms. Responses should be calibrated according to the identified risks and vulnerabilities of each state. This report proposes recommendations categorised under four broad themes: identify, protect, detect and respond.

1. Identify

Identify vulnerabilities and threats as a basis for developing an effective risk-mitigation framework

  • Governments should develop and implement risk-mitigation frameworks for cyber-enabled foreign interference that incorporate comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessments. Each framework should include a component that is available to the public, provide an assessment of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election infrastructure, explain efforts to detect foreign interference, raise public awareness, outline engagement with key stakeholders, and provide a clearer threshold for response.85
  • The security of election infrastructure needs to be continuously assessed and audited, during and in between elections.
  • Key political players, including political campaigns, political parties and governments, should engage experts to develop and facilitate tabletop exercises to identify and develop mitigation strategies that consider the different potential attack vectors, threats and vulnerabilities.86

2. Protect

Improve societal resilience by raising public awareness

  • Governments need to develop communication and response plans for talking to the public about cyber-enabled foreign interference, particularly when it involves attempts to interfere in elections and referendums.
  • Government leaders should help to improve societal resilience and situational awareness by making clear and timely public statements about cyber-enabled foreign interference in political processes. This would help to eliminate ambiguity and restore community trust. Such statements should be backed by robust public reporting mechanisms from relevant public service agencies.
  • Governments should require that all major social media and internet companies regularly report on how they detect and respond to cyber-enabled foreign interference. Such reports, which should include positions on political advertising and further transparency on how algorithms amplify and suppress content, would be extremely useful in informing public discourse and also in shaping policy recommendations.

Facilitate cybersecurity training to limit the effect of cyber-enabled foreign interference

  • Cybersecurity, cyber hygiene and disinformation training sessions and briefings should be provided regularly for all politicians, political parties, campaign staff and electoral commission staff to reduce the possibility of a successful cyber operation, such as a phishing attack, that can be exploited by foreign state actors.87 This could include both technical guides and induction guides for new staff, focused on detecting phishing emails and responding to DoS attacks.

Establish clear and context-specific reporting guidelines to minimise the effect of online information operations

  • As possible targets of online information operations, researchers and reporters covering elections and referendums should adopt ‘responsible’ reporting guidelines to minimise the effect of online information operations and ensure that they don’t act as conduits.88 The guidelines should highlight the importance of context when covering possible strategic disclosures, social media manipulation and disinformation campaigns.89 Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center has developed a set of guidelines that provide a useful reference point for reporters and researchers covering elections and referendums.90

3. Detect

Improve cyber-enabled foreign interference detection capabilities

  • The computer systems of parliaments, governments and electoral agencies should be upgraded and regularly tested for vulnerabilities, particularly in the lead-up to elections and referendums.
  • Greater investments by both governments and the private sector must be made in the detection of interference activities through funding data-driven investigative journalism and research institutes so that key local and regional civil society groups can build capability that stimulates and informs public discourse and policymaking.
  • Governments and the private sector must invest in long-term research into how emerging technologies, such as ‘deep fake’ technologies,91 could be exploited by those engaging in foreign interference. Such research would also assist those involved in detecting and deterring that activity.

4. Respond

Assign a counter-foreign-interference taskforce to lead a whole-of-government approach

  • Global online platforms must take responsibility for enforcement actions against actors attempting to manipulate their online audiences. Their security teams should work closely with governments and civil society groups to ensure that there’s a shared understanding of the threat actors and their tactics in order to create an effectively calibrated and collaborative security posture.
  • Governments should look to build counter-foreign-interference taskforces that would help to coordinate national efforts to deal with many of the challenges discussed in this report. Australia’s National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator and the US’s Foreign Influence Task Force provide different templates that could prove useful. Such taskforces, involving policy, electoral, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, should engage globally and will need to regularly engage with industry and civil society. They should also carry out formal investigations into major electoral interference activities and publish the findings of such investigations in a timely and transparent manner.

Signal a willingness to impose costs on adversaries

  • As this research demonstrates that a small number of foreign state actors persistently carry out cyber-enabled election interference, governments should establish clear prevention and deterrence postures based on their most likely adversaries. For example, pre-emptive legislation that automatically imposes sanctions or other punishments if interference is detected has been proposed in the US Senate.92
  • Democratic governments should work more closely together to form coalitions that develop a collective and publicly defined deterrence posture. Clearly communicated costs could change the aggressor’s cost–benefit calculus.

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Readers are urged to download the full report to access the appendix and citations.


Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Danielle Cave, Dr Samantha Hoffman, Tom Uren and Dr Jacob Wallis for all of their work on this project. We would also like to thank Michael Shoebridge, anonymous peer reviewers, and external peer reviewers Katherine Mansted, Alicia Wanless and Dr Jacob Shapiro for their invaluable feedback on drafts of this report.

In 2019, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre was awarded a US$100,000 research grant from Twitter, which was used towards this project. The work of ASPI ICPC would not be possible without the support of our partners and sponsors across governments, industry and civil society.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published October 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online),
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)
Cover image: Produced by Rebecca Hendin, online.

Funding for this report was provided by Twitter.

  1. Fergus Hanson, Sarah O’Connor, Mali Walker, Luke Courtois, Hacking democracies: cataloguing cyber-enabled attacks on elections, ASPI, Canberra, 17 May 2019, online. ↩︎
  2. Katherine Mansted, ‘Engaging the public to counter foreign interference’, The Strategist, 9 December 2019, online. ↩︎
  3. Erik Brattberg, Tim Maurer, Russian election interference: Europe’s counter to fake news and cyber attacks, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2018, online. ↩︎
  4. Laura Rosenberger, ‘Making cyberspace safe for democracy: the new landscape of information competition’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2020, online. ↩︎
  5. For a comprehensive overview of foreign interference in elections, see David Shimer, Rigged: America, Russia, and one hundred years of covert electoral interference, Knopf Publishing Group, 2020; Casey Michel, ‘Russia’s long and mostly unsuccessful history of election interference’, Politico, 26 October 2019, online. ↩︎
  6. David M Howard, ‘Can democracy withstand the cyber age: 1984 in the 21st century’, Hastings Law Journal, 2018, 69:1365. ↩︎
  7. Philip Ewing, ‘In “Rigged,” a comprehensive account of decades of election interference’, NPR, 9 June 2020, online. ↩︎
  8. Eric Geller, ‘Some states have embraced online voting. It’s a huge risk’, Politico, 8 June 2020, online. For a comprehensive discussion on electronic voting, see NRC, Asking the right questions about electronic voting. ↩︎
  9. CSE, Cyber threats to Canada’s democratic process. ↩︎
  10. Samantha Bradshaw, Philip N Howard, The global disinformation order: 2019 global inventory of organised social media manipulation, Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, 2019, online. ↩︎
  11. National Research Council (NRC), ‘Public confidence in elections’, Asking the right questions about electronic voting, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2006, online. ↩︎
  12. Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Cyber threats to Canada’s democratic process, Canada, 7 June 2017, online. ↩︎
  13. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Craig Timberg, ‘Facebook takes down Russian operation that recruited U.S. journalists, amid rising concerns about election misinformation’, Washington Post, 1 September 2020, online. ↩︎
  14. See Alicia Wanless and Laura Walters, How Journalists Become an Unwitting Cog in the Influence Machine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, online, 1. ↩︎

The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy

What’s the problem?

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly deploying coercive diplomacy against foreign governments and companies. Coercive diplomacy isn’t well understood, and countries and companies have struggled to develop an effective toolkit to push back against and resist it.

This report tracks the CCP’s use of coercive diplomacy over the past 10 years, recording 152 cases of coercive diplomacy affecting 27 countries as well as the European Union. The data shows that there’s been a sharp escalation in these tactics since 2018. The regions and countries that recorded the most instances of coercive diplomacy over the last decade include Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and East Asia.

The CCP’s coercive tactics can include economic measures (such as trade sanctions, investment restrictions, tourism bans and popular boycotts) and non-economic measures (such as arbitrary detention, restrictions on official travel and state-issued threats). These efforts seek to punish undesired behaviour and focus on issues including securing territorial claims, deploying Huawei’s 5G technology, suppressing minorities in Xinjiang, blocking the reception of the Dalai Lama and obscuring the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.1

China is the largest trading partner for nearly two-thirds of the world’s countries, and its global economic importance gives it significant leverage.2 The impacts of coercive diplomacy are exacerbated by the growing dependency of foreign governments and companies on the Chinese market. The economic, business and security risks of that dependency are likely to increase if the CCP can continue to successfully use this form of coercion.

What’s the solution?

A coordinated and sustained international effort by foreign governments and companies is needed to counter this coercive diplomacy and uphold global stability. This can be achieved by the following means:

  • Increase global situational awareness about the widespread use of coercive diplomacy and the most effective strategies to counter it.
  • Respond via coordinated and joint pushback through multilateral forums and by building minilateral coalitions of states affected by the same coercive methods.
  • Five Eyes countries should consider adopting a collective economic security measure, analogous to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO. Using their collective intelligence arrangements and by pulling in other partners, authoritative joint attributions could be made of any coercive measures levied against any of the members with collective economic and diplomatic measures taken in response.
  • Factor in the heightened risk of doing business and building economic relations with China, particularly with regard to trade flows, supply chains and market share.
  • Develop economic, foreign and trade protocols in collaboration with the business community on how best to respond to coercive methods applied to business. In cases of coordinated action against companies, the dispute should be elevated to a state-level discussion to prevent individual companies being picked off and capitulating.

Introduction

First, as a responsible major country, China stands upright with honour. We never strong-arm others, never seek supremacy, never withdraw from commitments, never bully others, and never complain. The word ‘coercion’ has nothing to do with China.
— Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, October 2019.3

The past three years have seen an escalation in the CCP’s political and strategic use of coercive measures to defend what it defines as China’s ‘core’ national interests.4 Those interests include preserving domestic stability, stimulating economic development, upholding territorial integrity and securing great power status.5 The CCP has made it clear that these interests are ‘non-negotiable bottom lines of Chinese foreign policy’.6 Elizabeth Economy, the Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, explains that President Xi Jinping desires to ‘use China’s power to influence others and to establish the global rules of the game’ to protect and promote China’s national interests.7

Coercive diplomacy can be defined as ‘non-militarised coercion’ or ‘the use of threats of negative actions to force the target state to change behaviour’.8 This is in contrast with chequebook diplomacy, in which positive inducements and confidence-building measures in the forms of foreign assistance and promised investment are used by states, including the CCP, to reward countries.9 This carrot-and-stick approach reflects ‘a new level of assertiveness, confidence and ambition’ in the CCP’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy.10

Every country is concerned about protecting its interests and playing to its strengths. Larger states, such as the US and Russia, have applied pressure to smaller states to get what they want with varying levels of success.11 Nevertheless, the CCP’s approach is unique in that it rarely employs traditional methods of coercive diplomacy, which are regulated through the state’s official capacity.12 The CCP is instead arbitrarily imposing measures without officially acknowledging the link between the measures taken and the CCP’s interests, which allows for greater flexibility in escalating or de-escalating situations with less accountability and international oversight.13 This non-traditional type of coercive diplomacy therefore requires a very different set of policy tools and responses.

This research has documented 152 instances of CCP coercive diplomacy between 2010 and 2020 (Figure 1). Of those cases, 100 targeted foreign governments, while the remaining 52 cases targeted specific companies.

Figure 1: Cases of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP, by year, 2010 to 2019

Figure 1 shows a sharp increase in the number of recorded cases from 2018 onwards. Although it isn’t possible to show the full dataset for 2020, within the first eight months there were 34 recorded cases, which equates to more than half of the number recorded in 2019.

Coercive diplomacy from the CCP’s perspective

The CCP has been persistent in maintaining the narrative that its actions are proportionate to its pursuit of protecting core national interests. Most Chinese-language sources examined for this report indicate that, from the CCP’s perspective, coercive diplomacy is an instrument that’s either exclusively used by the West and to which the CCP objects,14 or is carried out by the general Chinese public and has nothing to do with the government.15

However, Chinese state-run think tanks and media organisations have explicitly encouraged the use of coercive diplomatic tactics against offending actors.16 Jian Jisong, an international law expert at the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, writes that ‘China should liberate its thinking, and fully utilise the important tool of unilateral sanctions’.17 That sentiment is also reflected by the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, a think tank closely associated with the Ministry of State Security, which states that ‘given the fact that our nation has increasing economic power, we should prudently use economic sanctions against those countries that … threaten our country’s national interests’.18

The CCP, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has made it increasingly clear that the party ‘leads everything’ and is in strict control of the country through its ‘ideology’ and ‘structural system’.19 This differs from liberal democracies in that China’s core national interests are closely centred on the CCP’s own self-defined political security. Any conduct by foreign states or companies perceived to breach these core national interests is therefore treated as a direct threat to the legitimacy and survival of the CCP (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Global Times tweet depicting Australia as a puppet of the US and issuing a warning against key Australian industries

Source: Global Times (@globaltimesnews), ‘Opinion: If #Australia provokes China more, China will fight it to the end to defend its core interests’, Twitter, 2:20 am, 9 July 2020, online.

Methodology

This report draws on English and Chinese open-source information from news articles, policy papers, academic research, company websites, social media posts, official government documents and statements made by politicians and business officials. This report attempted to gather as many examples of coercive diplomacy as could be identified through open-source materials over a 10-year period and the cases underwent external peer review by 27 experts from 16 different countries. However, various limitations in the methodology used and finite human and language resources mean that it’s certainly not exhaustive or comprehensive. The resulting database is a starting point and an indicator of practice rather than a complete record.

Coercive diplomacy, by design, is difficult to measure because it takes various forms, is defined differently across the literature and can represent different levels of state authoritativeness, particularly in cases involving nationalist responses. The underlying data for most of this report relies on direct or implied statements by senior CCP officials and authoritative Chinese state media, non-authoritative Chinese media, and perceptions of coercive diplomacy in foreign media reports (although in some circumstances non-Chinese sources may be restricted or controlled in part by governments to prevent any further deterioration in relations with the Chinese state). Where possible, this report supplements this data with analysis from academic sources and in-country experts during the peer review process. Those sources are used to connect the action that the CCP objects to and the resulting coercive measure, as the CCP doesn’t make the link explicit and tends to deny responsibility.

However, some examples are likely to have been missed in this dataset or incorrectly specified, as cases might be only partially reported, be reported in error or go entirely unreported. This report excluded some acts of coercion, such as coercion against civil society actors and individuals, unless there was a clear link to a state dispute. This report also excluded cases in which the measures were considered a normal or proportionate diplomatic response to state conduct and cases that amounted to ‘tit-for-tat’ measures. For example, coercive acts related to the US–China trade war and the diplomatic fallout from the India–China border clash aren’t counted in the dataset.

A single incident or dispute can generate multiple instances of coercive diplomacy, which affects the total number of cases recorded in this report. A single dispute might start with a verbal threat and be followed up by a tourist ban and then by some form of trade sanction. Because this report focuses on instances of coercion rather than individual disputes, the methodology used would count that as three different instances of coercion.

Categorising CCP coercion

Coercive diplomacy encompasses a broad range of tactics that can be applied either individually or collectively by the CCP against individual companies and governments. This report divides the methods of CCP coercive diplomacy into eight categories: arbitrary detention or execution, restrictions on official travel, investment restrictions, trade restrictions, tourism restrictions, popular boycotts, pressure on specific companies and state-issued threats.

Arbitrary detention or execution

The CCP has sought to use arbitrary indictments, detainments and executions of foreign nationals for coercive effect against governments ‘that are not willing to fall in line with [the CCP’s] narrative or to cooperate, according to its own terms’.20 Arbitrary detentions and executions often involve the imposition of enforced disappearances, unusual trial delays, harsh punishments, prolonged interrogations and lack of transparency to maximise the effects of coercion.21 The CCP is also known to reinstate Chinese citizenship to detainees to prevent them from being repatriated, placing even further pressure on the governments of their home countries.22

Restrictions on official travel

Restrictions on official travel involve exerting coercive leverage by downgrading bilateral relations, imposing sanctions on travel to China by foreign leaders and state delegations, or refusing to meet with foreign counterparts.23 Examples of restrictions on official travel that have previously been imposed by the CCP include refusals of entry into China and cancellations of high-level visits.24 This often subjects the targeted government to greater political pressure in its own country to repair or reset relations to the CCP’s advantage.

Investment restrictions

China’s emergence as a major global investor has enabled the CCP to impose restrictions on Chinese outbound and inbound investment activities, such as major trade deals, foreign direct investment, infrastructure projects and joint ventures.25 Those investment restrictions can lead to economic consequences unless the target state changes its stance to that demanded by the CCP.26 This method of coercive diplomacy is commonly used against developing countries in conjunction with chequebook diplomacy.

Trade restrictions

The CCP relies heavily on trade restrictions as a means of coercing states. This tactic involves concerted efforts to disrupt trade flows and restrict foreign access to the Chinese market through import and export restrictions.27 The restrictions can be facilitated through the selective use of international regulations, targeted customs inspections, licence denials, tariff increases or unofficial embargoes.28 Chinese authorities often give unrelated administrative or regulatory explanations for such moves, simply denying the punishment motive.

Tourism restrictions

With direct influence over the movements of its own citizens, the CCP has increasingly turned to tourism restrictions to coerce foreign governments. Given the size of China’s tourism market, the effects of Chinese tourism restrictions are often immediate and long-lasting. The CCP has blocked outbound tourism by issuing official travel warnings, suspending package tours organised through state-run travel agencies and banning permits for independent travellers.29 In other instances, the CCP has blocked inbound tourism by suspending visa waivers or limiting access to consular services.30

Popular boycotts

The CCP can retaliate against foreign governments without imposing direct legal or regulatory interventions by encouraging its citizens to engage in nationalistic popular boycott campaigns through state and social media (Figure 3).31 Popular boycotts can be distinguished from pressure on specific companies in that they focus on companies and industries from the target state more broadly as a means of punishing the state and influencing its public opinion. Popular boycotts aren’t always directly orchestrated by Chinese authorities but can still be encouraged through uncontrolled nationalist protests or negative coverage in state media.32 In the words of the Chinese Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, ‘Chinese people’s anger is not just verbal but will translate into action.’33

The centralisation and comprehensive government control of media in China make it easier for the CCP to mobilise its extensive consumer base and amplify existing boycott campaigns to coerce other countries.34 Pál Nyíri from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam explains that ‘in a country that so tightly controls its online spheres, we can assume some degree of at least tacit support simply by the fact that such actions are allowed to continue on the Chinese web.’35

Figure 3: Chinese demonstrators staging a protest to boycott South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group in March 2017 after the heightening of diplomatic tensions between China, South Korea and the US over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system

Source: AFP, ‘Chinese protest against South Korea’s Lotte’, The Straits Times, 5 March 2017, online.

Pressure on specific companies

Multiple foreign companies have been coerced by Chinese authorities and consumers into issuing public apologies and modifying business operations for supposedly ‘hurting the feelings of Chinese people’.36 Such objectionable actions include ‘mislabelling’ Chinese territories on marketing platforms, supporting pro-democracy movements and making references to politically sensitive issues, even if they weren’t originally targeted at the Chinese market.37 While this method of coercive diplomacy is similar to popular boycotts, the two methods can be distinguished in that individual companies are the target on these occasions, rather than foreign governments, although the effect can be to demonstrate strength to the country where the company is based. This method of coercive diplomacy leads to adverse economic impacts due to losses in sales, popular endorsement, brand reputation or market access to the mainland.38 For this research, cases were limited to those that had a geopolitical angle and were either explicitly encouraged by state media or were likely to have been tacitly supported (although discerning the latter category necessarily involved a degree of subjectivity).

State-issued threats

Chinese diplomats, embassies, and government ministries seek to use coercive diplomacy by releasing official statements threatening foreign governments.39 Most, if not all, such state-issued threats contain vague terminology such as ‘countermeasures’,40 ‘retaliation’,41 ‘inflict pain’,42 and ‘the right to further react’.43 Another source of state-issued threats is state-run media organisations. The Global Times, China Daily, Xinhua News and other outlets are often used as mouthpieces by the CCP to publish warnings through sensationalised English-language commentary aimed at the target state and the international community.44 Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin has implied on numerous occasions that the Global Times reflects the views of Chinese authorities, stating that ‘they can’t speak willfully, but I can’ (Figure 4).45 State-issued threats are often used as a prelude to tougher coercive measures.

Figure 4: Tweets by Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin sharing information about potential countermeasures by the CCP against the US

Key Findings

This research documents 152 instances of CCP coercive diplomacy between 2010 and 2020.

Of those cases, 100 targeted foreign governments (Figure 5), while the other 52 cases targeted foreign companies. Those two categories are analysed separately in this report.

Figure 5: Cases of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP against foreign governments, by category

The most common methods of coercive diplomacy against foreign governments

From the data gathered for this report, the most prominent and common methods of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP to target foreign governments are; state-issued threats (with 34 cases recorded between 2010 and 2020, over half of which were recorded in 2020 alone), trade restrictions (19 cases recorded) and tourism restrictions (17 cases recorded).

Of the 27 countries affected, Australia was subjected to the highest number of recorded cases (17 cases), followed by Canada (10 cases) and the United States (9 cases).

Geopolitical trends

The regions that recorded the most instances of coercive diplomacy were Europe; North America; Australia and New Zealand; and East Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan), while countries in Africa, South America, the Pacific islands and the remaining parts of Asia recorded the smallest number of cases (Figure 6). There were no recorded cases of coercive diplomacy in Central America, Central Asia, and Russia during the relevant period. This divide bears many similarities to the divide between high-income and middle/low-income countries, as defined by the World Bank.46 

Figure 6: Cases of coercive diplomacy, by region

The most likely reason for this is that the political backers of the CCP are predominantly in the developing world. The CCP has had no reason to subject those countries to coercive diplomatic measures in the past 10 years. The CCP maintains a non-alliance policy, and its supporters aren’t a formal block.47 However, the recent opposing joint statements to the UN on the CCP’s treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang provide a good demonstration of current affiliations.

As demonstrated in Figures 7 and 8, there’s no overlap between countries subjected to coercive diplomacy by the CCP and those supportive of the CCP’s persecution of minorities, with the exception of the Philippines. The CCP’s use of coercive diplomacy against the Philippines arose mainly from disputes over the South China Sea. However, since President Rodrigo Duterte publicly announced a foreign policy shift to China in 2016, no further coercive diplomacy cases against the Philippines have been recorded.48

Figure 7: Countries that have recorded cases of coercive diplomacy by the CCP between 2010 and 2020

Figure 8: Countries by their stance on the CCP’s treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang

Another geopolitical trend is the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the CCP’s coercive diplomacy. The pandemic caused a world-wide lockdown that inhibited key forms of diplomatic and economic leverage for the CCP, particularly tourism restrictions (which included foreign students). This likely contributed to the rise in state-issued threats, of which over half of the 34 recorded cases from the last decade occurred after the CCP implemented the 23 January 2020 lockdown in Wuhan (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Cases of state-issued threats recorded before and after the Wuhan lockdown commenced

Threats were also a timely way for the CCP to combat the rise in criticism against its handling of the outbreak. Criticisms came mainly from Western European and Anglosphere countries, but countries such as Brazil also expressed criticism and were accordingly subjected to threats of countermeasures. The increase in state-issued threats in 2020 can also be linked to the CCP’s crackdown in Hong Kong, which prompted states around the world to take positions and actions the CCP disliked at a time when they had limited options to use other forms of coercive diplomacy.

After China started easing its lockdown restrictions, another key form of diplomatic leverage became China’s exports of medical supplies. In line with the above geopolitical analysis, the CCP ‘rapidly escalated’ medical and financial relief efforts to many countries in the developing world, particularly in Africa.49 With the much-needed medical supplies as ‘carrots’, the CCP was able to offer them with the expectation that the recipient countries wouldn’t criticise the CCP’s mishandling of the outbreak. The trade in medical supplies could also be used coercively in an attempt to influence state behaviour.

For example, in April 2020, the Netherlands angered the CCP by renaming the country’s diplomatic mission in Taiwan as ‘Netherlands Office Taipei’. In response, the state-run Global Times published an article that cited ‘Chinese netizens’ who called for the export of medical supplies to the Netherlands to cease and quoted an analyst who raised this move as a means for the CCP to send a warning to the Netherlands. This also worked as a warning to other states about the CCP’s willingness to use coercive measures, even in critical areas such as health care and during a global pandemic.50

Divide-and-conquer tactics

Each of the 100 recorded cases of coercive diplomacy involved the CCP acting unilaterally against an individual country. Although the response of countries to the coercive measures wasn’t always clear, where it was possible to discern the reaction, most countries made re-establishing good relations the priority. For example, the CCP enacted multiple coercive measures against Norway in 2010 in retaliation to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. After those measures were enacted, UN voting patterns showed closer alignment between China and Norway, and the Norwegian Government supported the admission of China as an observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 and refused to meet with the Dalai Lama for the first time in 2014 (although Norway, like many other countries, may have ceased those meetings in response to China’s general growing global clout, without the fallout from the awarding of the prize).51 The CCP’s actions succeeded in influencing Norway’s foreign policy, as the concessions required to appease the party were relatively minor (the same level of success mightn’t have been achieved had the required concession been bigger).52

This type of result seems likely only to license further coercion by the CCP against others. The CCP intentionally isolates countries in this way to retain comparative strength and ensure the effectiveness of its coercive methods. The CCP’s comparative strength would be significantly diminished if countries that have been subjected to similar coercive diplomatic tactics joined forces to counter them. Remarkably, countries have so far failed to band together to counter CCP coercion, even when that’s been manifestly in their interests. This may be due to a lack of awareness of the widespread use by the CCP of coercive diplomacy, a lack of strategic analysis by foreign ministries of the best way to counter such coercion, or both.

A notable example of this failure involved Canada and Australia. Just days following the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Canada pursuant to the US–Canada extradition treaty, the CCP arbitrarily arrested Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. It took three weeks before Australia released a statement expressing its ‘concerns’ over the Canadians’ detention.53 The statement fell short of condemning the CCP’s actions and didn’t call for the immediate release of the Canadians, despite two Australian citizens having been subjected to arbitrary detention the previous year and both of them still being detained.54 Australia’s delay in issuing the statement meant that Australia and Canada (as well as the EU and US) weren’t unified in their response to the CCP’s actions and therefore had little impact.

Further analysis on the most common methods of coercive diplomacy against foreign governments

State-issued threats

In addition to the Covid-19 pandemic significantly limiting other forms of coercive diplomacy available to the CCP in 2020 (discussed above) a likely reason for the high rate of state-issued threats is because they are the quickest and most cost-effective form of coercive diplomacy and carry the lowest risk to the CCP’s interests. Our research has found these can be enough, on their own, to coerce the target state into changing course if the state places limited political value on the source of the dispute55 (although threats were not enough to change behaviour if the stakes were high enough, as the in-depth case studies on pages 18–21 illustrate).

Trade restrictions

This report recorded 19 cases of trade restrictions between 2010 and 2020, over half of which occurred since 2018. In all recorded cases, the CCP never officially implemented official sanctions against the target state; instead, an unrelated official reason was provided (such as non-compliance with sanitation or labelling requirements) or no reason was given at all. There are strong indicators for each recorded case that the CCP’s measures were designed to thinly disguise the use of trade to punish and change the behaviour of target states.

For some issues, to be effective, the target state needs to be aware that the trade measures are being levied as punishment for a given action, so, while direct causal relationships aren’t made explicit by the CCP, the trade restrictions are made in such a way as to make the connection clear to the target state. For other issues, it can be useful to maintain greater ambiguity to put the target state off balance, not knowing exactly why the restrictions are happening but only that the CCP is displeased and that concessions in some form are needed. Both approaches help the CCP maintain its official stance that coercive diplomacy is exclusively employed by the West.56 By providing an unrelated official reason to disguise coercive diplomatic measures, the CCP is able to maintain plausible deniability, which offers some protection against countries raising the issue through international channels, such as the World Trade Organization.57

The recorded cases of trade restrictions also demonstrate that the CCP is highly selective in the commodities it targets in order to send a powerful message to target states whilst minimising any harm to its own interests.58 For example, the CCP imposed restrictions on Canadian meat imports in June 2019 in retaliation against the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. 59 However, the CCP retracted these restrictions just 5 months later despite the tensions over this issue persisting, after the effects of a swine fever outbreak continued to drive domestic pork prices unsustainably high.60 With China’s domestic supply not being expected to recover for two or three years (especially with the risk of further outbreaks) and inflation rates nearing an 8 year high as a result,61 it was ultimately in the CCP’s interests to make this concession.62 This case illustrates some of the constraints on the CCP’s use of economic coercion.

The CCP’s recent trade restrictions against Australian barley (which are widely interpreted to be retaliation for Australia pushing for an inquiry into the origins and handling of the Covid-19 outbreak) further illustrate how these measures are often ‘aligned with—or constrained by—market trends and conditions’.63 Of all the trade restriction cases recorded, the CCP’s measures imposed on barley stand out as seemingly having the biggest effect on China’s own trade practices, as Australian barley accounted for up to 80% of China’s barley imports in recent years.64 However, this in fact aligns with the CCP’s goal of self-sufficiency and import diversification.65 Furthermore, the restrictions coincided with a significant decline in China’s domestic demand for barley.66 Though the sanctions were ‘triggered’ by Australia’s call for the Covid-19 inquiry, the CCP wanted to employ them anyway due to the benefit that would provide to the Chinese domestic market.67 As argued by Scott Waldron from the University of Queensland, it is significant that the CCP has not imposed restrictions in relation to wool, given China buys approximately 75% of Australia’s wool exports.68

The selective use of trade restrictions simultaneously minimises impacts on Chinese consumers and businesses, while maintaining leverage against the target state. Severe disruption to all trade with a target state would not only negatively affect Chinese consumers and businesses but would also exhaust all leverage against the target state in one go and completely undermine the CCP’s narrative of plausible deniability. To date, the CCP has aimed to find a balance between punishing a country enough to make it change its behaviour and running the risk of damaging relations to the point at which the state no longer sees value in appeasing the CCP or at which the Chinese economy would be damaged. As demonstrated by the case studies, the CCP selects only individual commodities or services to target with restrictions. While targeted restrictions were in place, it was common for other sectors within the same state to experience an increase in Chinese trade. This was the case in Canada in 2019; after Canadian canola imports were blocked in China, Canadian wheat exporters experienced a rise in wheat imports into China.69 Similarly, in August 2020, trade between China and Australia was 4% higher than in the previous year, despite the constraints of the Covid-19 pandemic and a deterioration in bilateral relations.70

Tourism restrictions

Tourism restrictions are the third most common form of coercive diplomacy used to target foreign governments identified through this research. This report recorded 17 cases between 2010 and 2020, half of which occurred after 2018. China is the world’s largest outbound tourism market. It accounts for more than 20% of global tourism, and 150 million Chinese tourists travelled abroad and spent a combined total of US$277 billion in 2018.71 Subject to the long-term impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on large-scale tourism, those figures are likely to continue to increase and further grow the importance of the Chinese tourist market, as only an estimated 10% of Chinese citizens hold passports.72

The CCP holds considerable influence over its outbound tourism market,73 which it has manipulated to promote foreign policy objectives. As demonstrated in the recorded cases, the CCP controls outbound tourism through issuing travel warnings and using its regulatory powers over travel agents to direct them to avoid selling package tours to a blacklisted country. The travel restrictions necessitated by the Covid-19 pandemic have not prevented the CCP from threatening tourism restrictions or issuing travel warnings. The lack of international travel at the time these warnings were issued highlights the fact that the measures are usually not in response to the reasons claimed by the CCP and are primarily used to coerce.

In-depth case studies

Norway, South Korea, Canada and Australia have each individually experienced the full spectrum of the CCP’s coercive diplomatic tactics. Despite obvious temporal and geographical differences among the following four case studies, the CCP’s actions followed a remarkably similar pattern.

In-Depth Case Study: Norway

In-Depth Case Study: South Korea

In-Depth Case Study: Canada

In-Depth Case Study: Australia

Coercive diplomacy against foreign companies

This report documents 52 cases of pressure applied by or at least encouraged by the CCP against foreign companies. In many of the recorded cases, the CCP applied pressure by inciting backlash from Chinese consumers, blocking websites or adding legal penalties. Even in cases in which the CCP can’t be directly linked to the backlash, it has arguably encouraged this consumer response by not censoring it. This is despite the backlash being overtly political and something that would ordinarily attract censorship in China if it were directed against anything contrary to the CCP’s interests.

The effectiveness of the CCP’s coercion against companies can be measured by the rate at which apologies were issued in response to the coercion. Of the cases recorded in this report, 82.7% of the companies issued apologies. Almost no companies had their own governments step up to help them respond (Figures 10, 11 and 12).

Figure 10: Percentages of companies that have issued apologies, complied with directions from Chinese state authorities, or both

Figure 11: An image portraying foreign brands being targeted by the Chinese social media platform Weibo

Source: Manya Koetse, ‘Hong Kong protests: Brand “witch hunt” takes over Chinese internet”’, BBC News, 15 August 2019, online.

Figure 12: An official apology by Italian luxury brand Versace was shared online after it received backlash for designing T-shirts that implied that Hong Kong and Macau are independent territories

Source: VERSACE (@Versace), ‘The Company apologizes for the design of its product and a recall of the t-shirt has been implemented in July’, Twitter, 7:36 pm, 11 August 2019, online.

The success of coercive measures against businesses largely stems from companies being profit-driven and having limited power relative to the world’s second largest economy. China’s consumer spending overtook the US’s for the first time in 2019,74 so companies are unlikely to risk losing access to that market. Targeting companies allows the CCP to achieve political ends while keeping the dispute at arm’s length from governments that would be better placed to push back. For example, in April 2018, the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration ordered 36 international airlines to remove all references from their websites that suggested Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau were separate regions or risk having the company’s ‘serious dishonesty’ recorded and facing ‘disciplinary actions’.75 By July 2018, all 36 airlines, including British Airways, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa and Qantas, had modified their websites and other promotional material to reflect the CCP’s views. Delta Airlines went further and apologised for its listing, stating ‘We are fully committed to China and to our Chinese customers.’76 If the governments of the countries where the airlines were headquartered had instead banded together to counter the threat, the outcome would likely have been very different.

The emergence of a counter-coercion strategy

A number of foreign governments, including those of Australia, Canada, Japan, India, the UK and the US, are starting to call out the CCP’s coercive diplomacy as it happens and are working on ways to develop an effective counter-coercion strategy.77 For example, Australia set the foundations for a counter-coercion strategy back in June 2017 during the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue when then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull stated that ‘a coercive China would find its neighbours resenting demands they cede their autonomy and strategic space, and look to counterweight Beijing’s power by bolstering alliances and partnerships.’78 The Australian Government then enacted new national security and foreign interference legislation, citing ‘disturbing reports about Chinese influence’.79

Three years later, in June 2020, Prime Minister Scott Morrison formally declared that Australia won’t be intimidated by threats from the CCP and won’t trade its values in response to ‘coercion’.80 In August 2020, Morrison affirmed that Australia wants to ‘see international engagement framed by agreed rules and norms, not crude economic or political coercion’ in reference to the CCP and ‘will call it as we see it’.81

Another example was in August 2020 when the Five Eyes intelligence alliance issued a joint statement demonstrating grave concern over the disqualification of pro-democracy candidates in the Hong Kong Legislative Council elections and condemning the suppression of Hong Kong citizens’ rights and freedoms following the imposition of a new national security law by the CCP.82 The joint statement came after the CCP threatened countermeasures against all five member states for suspending extradition treaties and providing assistance to Hong Kong citizens.83 While counter-coercion strategies remain unclear for the rest of the world, they’re likely to increase in the future as the CCP continues with its coercive tactics.

Future challenges and recommendations

Coercive diplomacy is an important tool of Chinese foreign policy that the CCP will continue to use against foreign governments and companies, particularly in democratic countries. The CCP’s practice of coercive diplomacy is very broad in its targets, intentions, methods and levels of retaliation. Therefore, this report seeks to offer flexible policy options that can be implemented across different levels of society.

Recommendation 1: Increase global situational awareness about coercive diplomacy

The current failure of countries and companies to effectively deter coercive diplomacy suggests that there’s limited appreciation of its prevalence and limited discussion of effective countermeasures. Governments could remedy this by tasking their foreign ministries to track coercive diplomacy and use that data to identify potential coalitions, particularly in the areas of economic cooperation, trade liberalisation and technological development. Research institutions could also be encouraged to systematically track instances of coercive diplomacy.

Recommendation 2: Respond via coordinated and joint pushback

Responding to coercive threats in an individual capacity, whether as a state or as a company, will only work for the US, given China’s current size and heft. To be effective, governments need to counter the CCP’s divide-and-conquer tactics by pursuing coordinated and joint pushback through multilateral forums such as the G7, G10 and European Union and by building minilateral coalitions of countries affected by the same coercive methods. Those coalitions could be used to publicly call out examples of coercion in the same way that’s currently used to attribute cyberattacks, and follow that up with countermeasures. In many cases, it would be unethical and against core values to reciprocate with like-for-like countermeasures (for example, arbitrary arrests and executions), so countermeasures will need to target alternative areas, such as through joint statements, economic sanctions or official travel restrictions.

Recommendation 3: Establish a 5 Eyes collective economic security pact

The Five Eyes countries should consider adopting a collective economic security measure, analogous to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO (“an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”). Using their collective intelligence arrangements, the Five Eyes countries could make authoritative joint attributions of any coercive measures levied against any of the five members and take collective economic and diplomatic measures in retaliation. Such an arrangement could also involve an agreement to abstain from taking advantage of any coercive trade measures imposed by the CCP (for example, refusing to fill the shortfall created by banning Canadian pork). While this approach may be less attractive to the current US Administration it may be of interest to future administrations and would be highly effective in deterring the use of coercive diplomatic measures.

Recommendation 4: Develop protocols in collaboration with the business community to counter coercive measures targeting companies

Affected governments should work more closely with business groups to develop protocols on how to best respond to economic coercive methods applied by the CCP. The increasing risk of economic coercion by the party should be assessed as a structural matter in economic and trade policies, not just as isolated or unexpected acts in response to particular decisions and events. In cases of coordinated action against companies, the dispute should be elevated to a state-level discussion to prevent individual companies from being picked off and being forced to capitulate. In the case involving 36 global airlines, a more effective approach would have involved governments assuming the lead in responding to the ultimatum, working to form a global coalition of countries and their airlines that refused to be pressured, and countering the coercion by threatening reciprocal bans on access to their markets.

Recommendation 5: Factor in the heightened risk of doing business and building economic relations with China

As the CCP uses economic coercion more often, and more overtly, foreign companies with business operations in China need to factor in the increasing risk to trade flows, supply chains and market share. That risk is significant enough to warrant board-level attention and will no doubt be a standing topic in audit committees because of its bottom-line impact. This requires board-level involvement to protect shareholder value and is also likely to require companies to work more closely with their home government policymakers.

Appendix

Readers are encouraged to download the report PDF to access the extensive dataset which details cases of CCP coercive diplomacy targeting foreign governments and companies.


Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Danielle Cave, John Garnaut, Darren Lim and Michael Shoebridge for their feedback on this report. We would also like to thank all the experts from around the world that peer-reviewed the cases in the Appendix: Dr Altay Atli, Aakriti Bachhawat, Alexandre Dayant, Andreas Bøje Forsby, Dr Rudolf Furst, Bonnie Glaser, Dr Xue Gong, Dr Samantha Hoffman, Edcel John A. Ibarra, Daria Impiombato, Alex Joske, Prof. Sharad K Soni, Dr Huong Le Thu, Dr John Lee, David McDonough, Anna Michalski, Yuma Osaki, Lucrezia Poggetti, Dr Frans-Paul van der Putten, Dr Shelley Rigger, Dr Uma Shankar Prasad, Dr. Ana Soliz Landivar de Stange, Dr Tim Summers and Yun Sun. No specific sponsorship was received to fund production of this report. The work of ICPC would not be possible without the financial support of our partners and sponsors across governments, industry and civil society.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on.

If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

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First published August 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online), ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

No specific sponsorship was received to fund production of this report

  1. See data in Appendix for more details. ↩︎
  2. Alyssa Leng, Roland Rajah, ‘Chart of the week: global trade through a US–China lens’, The Interpreter, 18 December 2019, online. ↩︎
  3. Hua Chunying, ‘Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on October 23, 2019’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, press conference, 23 October 2019, online. ↩︎
  4. Jinghao Zhou, ‘China’s core interests and dilemma in foreign policy practice’, Pacific Focus, 2019, 34(1):33. ↩︎
  5. Kathleen Hicks, Joseph Federici, Connor Akiyama, Hybrid CoE strategic analysis 18: China in the grey zone, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2019, 3. ↩︎
  6. Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, Shaun Breslin, ‘Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China’, International Affairs, 2015, 91(2):245. ↩︎
  7. Elizabeth Economy, The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state, Oxford University Press, New York, 2018, 187. ↩︎
  8. The origin of coercive diplomacy is deeply rooted in traditional security studies, in which earlier definitions involved the threat of future military force or the limited use of military force. See Alexander George, William Simons (eds), The limits of coercive diplomacy, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994; Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002. While a widely accepted definition of coercive diplomacy hasn’t been established, this report has adopted the definition used by Ketian Zhang to reflect recent shifts towards a diplomatic strategy that’s more political and economical. See Ketian Zhang, ‘Chinese non-military coercion—tactics and rationale’, Brookings, 22 January 2019, online. ↩︎
  9. Graeme Dobell, China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: diplomatic chess versus Pacific political rugby, Center for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, 2007, 10. ↩︎
  10. Anne-Marie Brady, ‘China’s foreign propaganda machine’, Journal of Democracy, October 2015, 26(4):51–59. ↩︎
  11. Global Agenda Council on Geo-economics, The age of economic coercion: how geo-politics is disrupting supply chains, financial systems, energy markets, trade and the internet, World Economic Forum, 2016, 7, online. ↩︎
  12. Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Edoardo Saravalle, China’s use of coercive economic measures, Center for a New American Security, 2018, 2. ↩︎
  13. Harrell et al., China’s use of coercive economic measures, 20. ↩︎

Hunting the phoenix

The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent

NOTE: 

In Policy Brief Report No. 35 ‘Hunting the Phoenix’ by Alex Joske and published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, reference was made to Professor Wenlong Cheng, Professor and Director of Research, Chemical Engineering at Monash University. The author and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute accept Professor Cheng’s indication that he did not accept nor derive any benefit from the Thousand Talents Plan, or been involved in or contributed to China’s defence development. Further, the author and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute did not intend to imply that Professor Cheng had engaged in any discreditable conduct and if any reader understood the publication in that way, any such suggestion is withdrawn. The author and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute apologise to Professor Cheng for any hurt caused to him.

What’s the problem?

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses talent-recruitment programs to gain technology from abroad through illegal or non-transparent means. According to official statistics, China’s talent-recruitment programs drew in almost 60,000 overseas professionals between 2008 and 2016. These efforts lack transparency; are widely associated with misconduct, intellectual property theft or espionage; contribute to the People’s Liberation Army’s modernisation; and facilitate human rights abuses.

They form a core part of the CCP’s efforts to build its own power by leveraging foreign technology and expertise. Over the long term, China’s recruitment of overseas talent could shift the balance of power between it and countries such as the US. Talent recruitment isn’t inherently problematic, but the scale, organisation and level of misconduct associated with CCP talent-recruitment programs sets them apart from efforts by other countries. These concerns underline the need for governments to do more to recognise and respond to CCP talent-recruitment activities.

The mechanisms of CCP talent recruitment are poorly understood. They’re much broader than the Thousand Talents Plan—the best known among more than 200 CCP talent-recruitment programs. Domestically, they involve creating favourable conditions for overseas scientists, regardless of ethnicity, to work in China.1 Those efforts are sometimes described by official sources as ‘building nests to attract phoenixes’.2

This report focuses on overseas talent-recruitment operations—how the CCP goes abroad to hunt or lure phoenixes. It studies, for the first time, 600 ‘overseas talent-recruitment stations’ that recruit and gather information on scientists. Overseas organisations, often linked to the CCP’s united front system and overlapping with its political influence efforts, are paid to run most of the stations.3
 

What’s the solution?

Responses to CCP talent-recruitment programs should increase awareness and the transparency of the programs.

Governments should coordinate with like-minded partners, study CCP talent-recruitment activity, increase transparency on external funding in universities and establish research integrity offices that monitor such activities. They should introduce greater funding to support the retention of talent and technology.

Security agencies should investigate illegal behaviour tied to foreign talent-recruitment activity.

Funding agencies should require grant recipients to fully disclose any participation in foreign talent-recruitment programs, investigate potential grant fraud and ensure compliance with funding agreements.

Research institutions should audit the extent of staff participation in foreign talent-recruitment programs. They should act on cases of misconduct, including undeclared external commitments, grant fraud and violations of intellectual property policies. They should examine and update policies as necessary. University staff should be briefed on foreign talent-recruitment programs and disclosure requirements.
 

Introduction

The party and the state respect the choices of those studying abroad. If you choose to return to China to work, we will open our arms to warmly welcome you. If you stay abroad, we will support you serving the country through various means.

—Xi Jinping, 2013 speech at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association, which is run by the United Front Work Department.4

The CCP views technological development as fundamental to its ambitions. Its goal isn’t to achieve parity with other countries, but dominance and primacy. In 2018, General Secretary Xi Jinping urged the country’s scientists and engineers to ‘actively seize the commanding heights of technological competition and future development’.5 The Made in China 2025 industrial plan drew attention to the party’s long-held aspiration for self-sufficiency and indigenous innovation in core industries, in contrast to the more open and collaborative approach to science practised by democratic nations.6

The CCP treats talent recruitment as a form of technology transfer.7 Its efforts to influence and attract professionals are active globally and cover all developed nations. The Chinese Government claims that its talent-recruitment programs recruited as many as 60,000 overseas scientists and entrepreneurs between 2008 and 2016.8 The Chinese Government runs more than 200 talent-recruitment programs, of which the Thousand Talents Plan is only one (see Appendix 1).

The US is the main country targeted by these efforts and has been described by Chinese state media as ‘the largest “treasure trove” of technological talent’.9 In addition to the US, it’s likely that more than a thousand individuals have been recruited from each of the UK, Germany, Singapore, Canada, Japan, France and Australia since 2008.10

Future ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre research will detail Chinese Government talent- recruitment efforts in Australia. Past reports have identified a handful of Australian participants in China’s talent-recruitment programs, including senior and well-funded scientists, and around a dozen CCP-linked organisations promoting talent-recruitment work and technology transfer to China.11 However, the scale of those activities is far greater than has been appreciated in Australia.

China’s prodigious recruitment of overseas scientists will be key to its ambition to dominate future technologies and modernise its military. Participants in talent-recruitment programs also appear to be disproportionately represented among overseas scientists collaborating with the Chinese military. Many recruits work on dual-use technologies at Chinese institutions that are closely linked to the People’s Liberation Army.

These activities often exploit the high-trust and open scientific communities of developed countries. In 2015, Xi Jinping told a gathering of overseas Chinese scholars that the party would ‘support you serving the country through various means’.12 As detailed in Bill Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna Puglisi’s 2013 book Chinese industrial espionage, those ‘various means’ have often included theft, espionage, fraud and dishonesty.13 The CCP hasn’t attempted to limit those behaviours. In fact, cases of misconduct associated with talent programs have ballooned in recent years. The secrecy of the programs has only been increasing.

The CCPs’ talent-recruitment efforts cover a spectrum of activity, from legal and overt activity to illegal and covert work (Figure 1). Like other countries, China often recruits scientists through fair means and standard recruitment practices. It gains technology and expertise from abroad through accepted channels such as research collaboration, joint laboratories and overseas training. However, overt forms of exchange may disguise misconduct and illegal activity. Collaboration and joint laboratories can be used to hide undeclared conflicts of commitment, and recruitment programs can encourage misconduct. Participants in talent-recruitment programs may also be obliged to influence engagement between their home institution and China. The Chinese Government appears to have rewarded some scientists caught stealing technology through talent-recruitment programs. In some cases, Chinese intelligence officers may have been involved in talent recruitment. Illustrating the covert side of talent recruitment, this report discusses cases of espionage or misconduct associated with talent recruitment and how the Chinese military benefits from it (Appendix 2).

Figure 1: The spectrum of the CCP’s technology transfer efforts

Talent-recruitment work has been emphasised by China’s central government since the 1980s and has greatly expanded during the past two decades.14 In 2003, the CCP established central bodies to oversee talent development, including the Central Coordinating Group on Talent Work ( 中 央 人才工作协调小组), which is administered by the Central Committee’s Organisation Department and includes representation from roughly two dozen agencies.15  In 2008, the party established the national Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group (海外高层次人才引进工作小组) to oversee the Thousand Talents Plan (see box).16 Local governments around China also regularly hold recruitment events at which overseas scientists are signed up to talent-recruitment schemes and funding initiatives.17 This demonstrates how talent-recruitment efforts are a high priority for the CCP, transcending any particular bureaucracy and carried out from the centre down to county governments.

The Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group

The Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group was established in 2008 to oversee the implementation of the Thousand Talents Plan. It’s administered by the Central Committee’s Organisation Department, which plays a coordinating role in talent recruitment work carried out by government and party agencies. Its members include the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the People’s Bank of China, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Central Committee of the CCP, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (now part of the UFWD), the Chinese Academy of Engineering, the National Natural Science Foundation, the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (now part of the Ministry of Science and Technology), the Communist Youth League of China and the China Association for Science and Technology.18

To illustrate the international reach of CCP talent recruitment, the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has created an original database of 600 overseas talent-recruitment stations. The operation of the stations is contracted out to organisations or individuals who are paid to recruit overseas scientists. They might not have a clear physical presence or might be co-located with the organisations contracted to run them (see box). This is a growing part of the CCP’s talent-recruitment infrastructure—providing on-the-ground support to the CCP’s efforts to identify and recruit experts from abroad—but it has never been analysed in detail before.

Features of overseas talent-recruitment stations

  • Overseas organisations or individuals contracted by the CCP to carry out talent-recruitment work
  • Often run by overseas united front groups
  • Tasked to collect information on and recruit overseas scientists
  • Promote scientific collaboration and exchanges with China
  • Organise trips by overseas scientists to China
  • Present across the developed world
  • May receive instructions to target individuals with access to particular technologies
  • Paid up to A$30,000 annually, plus bonus payments for each successful recruitment

The database was compiled using open-source online information from Chinese-language websites. Those sources included Chinese Government websites or media pages announcing the establishment of overseas recruitment stations and websites affiliated with overseas organisations running recruitment stations. We carried out keyword searches using various Chinese terms for talent-recruitment stations to identify their presence across the globe. An interactive version of the map of stations is in the online version of this report (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Overseas recruitment stations and their links back to China

Please click the map for the interactive database. Hover over data points for details on each recruitment station. Please note: stations are geo-located to City level (not street-level). 

Using examples and case studies of stations from around the world, this report also reveals the role of the united front system in talent-recruitment work. The united front system is a network of CCP-backed agencies and organisations working to expand the party’s United Front—a coalition of groups and individuals working towards the party’s goals. Many of those agencies and organisations run overseas recruitment stations. As detailed in the ASPI report The party speaks for you: foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party, the system is widely known for its involvement in political influence work, but its contributions to technology transfer have attracted little attention.

Why China’s talent-recruitment programs raise concerns

China’s talent-recruitment programs are unlike efforts by Western governments to attract scientific talent. As two scholars involved in advising the CCP on talent recruitment wrote in 2013, ‘The Chinese government has been the most assertive government in the world in introducing policies targeted at triggering a reverse brain drain.’19 The flow of talent from China is still largely in the direction of the US.20 However, research from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology found that the proportion of Chinese STEM PhD graduates of US universities intending to stay in the US has declined over the past two decades.21 In May 2020, the US Government announced new restrictions on visas for scientists linked to the Chinese military.22

The widespread misconduct associated with CCP talent-recruitment programs sets them apart from efforts by other nations. For example, an investigation by the Texas A&M University system found more than 100 staff linked to China’s talent programs, but only five disclosed it despite employees being required to do so.23 That level of misconduct hasn’t been reported in other countries’ talent-recruitment efforts. The absence of any serious attempt by the Chinese Government or its universities to discourage theft as part of its recruitment programs amounts to a tacit endorsement of the programs’ use to facilitate espionage, misconduct and non-transparent technology transfers.

The extent of misconduct by selectees suggests that this is enabled or encouraged by agencies overseeing the programs. Agencies at the centre of China’s talent recruitment efforts have themselves been directly involved in illegal activity. For example, an official from China’s State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs was involved in stealing US missile technology through the recruitment of a US scientist (see Noshir Gowadia case in Appendix 2).24

Talent recruitment programs have been used to incentivise and reward economic espionage. For example, in 2013, Zhao Huajun (赵华军), was imprisoned in the US after stealing vials of a cancer research compound, which he allegedly used to apply for sponsorship there.25 A month after Zhao was released from prison, he was recruited by the Zhejiang Chinese Medicine University through the Qianjiang Scholars (钱江学者) program.26 In another case, a Coca-Cola scientist allegedly conspired with a Chinese company to secure talent-recruitment program funding on the basis of stolen trade secrets.27

Talent-recruitment programs are also tied to research commercialisation. Applicants to the Thousand Talents Plan have the option to join as ‘entrepreneurs’ rather than as scientists, supporting companies they have established in China.28 The Thousand Talents Plan is supported by the Thousand Talents Plan Venture Capital Center (千人计划创投中心), which runs competitions to pair participants with start-up funding.29

Commercial activity by talent-recruitment program participants isn’t always disclosed, which often breaches university policies on intellectual property and commercialisation. One recruit from an Australian university set up a laboratory and an artificial intelligence (AI) company in China that later received funding linked to the Thousand Talents Plan Venture Capital Center, but reportedly didn’t disclose that to his Australian university, against existing university policies. The company later supplied surveillance technology to authorities in Xinjiang.30

US investigations of participants in talent-recruitment programs have led to an increase in the programs’ secrecy, rather than reforms to make them more transparent and accountable. In September 2018, the Chinese Government began removing references to the Thousand Talents Plan from the internet and ordering organisations to use more covert methods of recruitment.31 A leaked directive told those carrying out recruitment work for the plan to not use email when inviting potential recruits to China for interviews, and instead make contact by phone or fax under the guise of inviting them to a conference (Figure 3). ‘Written notices should not contain the words “Thousand Talents Plan”’, the document states. In 2018, the official website of the Thousand Talents Plan removed all news articles about the program, before going offline in 2020.32

Figure 3: A leaked notice from September 2018 ordering organisations to use more covert methods of recruiting Thousand Talents Plan participants

Highlighted text: ‘In order to further improve work guaranteeing the safety of overseas talent, work units should not use emails, and instead use phone or fax, when carrying out the interview process. [Candidates] should be notified under the name of inviting them to return to China to participate in an academic conference or forum. Written notices should not include the words “Thousand Talents Plan”.’

Source: ‘被美國盯上 傳中國引進人才不再提千人計畫’ [Targeted by the US, it’s rumoured that China will no longer mention the 1,000 Talent Plan], CNA.com, 5 October 2018, online.

CCP technology-transfer efforts are often flexible and encourage individuals to find ways to serve from overseas. Participants in the Thousand Talents Plan, for example, have the option to enter a ‘short-term’ version of the program that requires them to spend only two months in China each year.33 Some selectees establish joint laboratories between their home institutions and their Chinese employers, which could be a way to disguise conflicts of commitment where they have agreed to spend time working for both institutions.34 ‘This enables them to maintain multiple appointments at once, which may not be fully disclosed. This may mean that they’re effectively using time, resources and facilities paid for by their home institutions to benefit Chinese institutions.

Without residing in China, scientists can support collaboration with Chinese institutions, receive visiting Chinese scholars and students and align their research with China’s priorities. Steven X Ding (丁先春), a professor at the University of Duisburg in Germany who has also been affiliated with Tianjin University, was quoted describing this mentality when he worked as vice president of the University of Applied Science Lausitz:35

I manage scientific research at the university, which has more than 100 projects supervised by me—this is a ‘group advantage’. I can serve as a bridge between China and Germany for technological exchange … and I can make greater contributions than if I returned to China on my own. Foreign countries aren’t just advanced in their technologies, but also their management is more outstanding. Being in Germany I can introduce advanced technologies to China, assist communication, exchange and cooperation, and play a role as a window and a bridge [between China and Germany].36

The CCP’s talent-recruitment activities are also notable for their strategic implications. The deepening of ‘military–civil fusion’ (a CCP policy of leveraging the civilian sector to maximise military power) means that China’s research institutes and universities are increasingly involved in classified defence research, including the development of nuclear weapons.37 Chinese companies and universities are also working directly with public security agencies to support the oppression and surveillance of minorities through their development and production of surveillance technologies.38  Participants in talent-recruitment programs also appear to be disproportionately represented among overseas scientists collaborating with the Chinese military.39 Recruitment work by the People’s Liberation Army and state-owned defence conglomerates is described later in this report.

These structures behind talent-recruitment activity and their links to national initiatives show how it’s backed by the party’s leaders and high-level agencies and has clear objectives. This contradicts the theory that China employs a ‘thousand grains of sand’ approach to intelligence gathering or economic espionage, relying on uncoordinated waves of amateur ethnic-Chinese collectors to hoover up technology.40 Indeed, what may be one of the most egregious charges of misconduct related to a talent-recruitment program involves Harvard Professor Charles Lieber, a nanotechnologist with no Chinese heritage, who was arrested in 2020 for allegedly failing to disclose a US$50,000 monthly salary he received from a Chinese university as part of the Thousand Talents Plan.41 As shown by the case of Zheng Xiaoqing, who allegedly stole jet turbine technology from GE Aviation while joining the Thousand Talents Plan as part of a Jiangsu State Security Department operation, talent recruitment can at times involve professional intelligence officers (see Appendix 2).

In 2012, Peter Mattis, an expert on CCP intelligence activity, wrote that ‘The “grains of sand” concept focuses analytic attention on the [counter-intelligence] risk individuals pose rather than on government intelligence services.’42 In the case of talent-recruitment programs, interpreting them through the lens of a ‘grains of sand’ model would place greater emphasis on individuals involved in the programs while neglecting the mechanisms of talent recruitment activity used by the CCP. Talent-recruitment efforts are carried out with heavy involvement from the united front system and dedicated agencies such as the Ministry of Science and Technology’s State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs.43

It isn’t an ethnic program with individual actors at its core—it’s a CCP program leveraging incentives as well as organised recruitment activity—yet it’s often framed by the party as serving the country’s ethno-nationalist rejuvenation.44

Recognising these features of CCP technology-transfer activity—such as its central and strategic guidance, implementation across various levels of the Chinese Government, high-rate of misconduct and reliance on overseas recruitment mechanisms—should be fundamental to any responses to the activity.45 Poorly executed, and sometimes misguided, attempts at investigating and prosecuting suspected cases of industrial espionage have helped build an image of both the problem and enforcement actions as being driven by racial factors rather than state direction.46

Talent-recruitment stations

Chinese Government and Party agencies from the national to the district level have established hundreds of ‘overseas talent recruitment workstations’ in countries with high-quality talent, cutting-edge industries and advanced technology.47 The stations are established in alignment with central guidance on talent-recruitment work and also adapt to the needs of the various Chinese Government organs establishing them. They’re run by overseas organisations, such as community associations, and are a key part of the CCP’s little-understood talent-recruitment infrastructure.

The stations work on behalf of the Chinese Government to spot and pursue talent abroad. Their importance is reflected in the fact that research for this report has uncovered 600 stations spread across technologically advanced countries (Figure 4).48 The increasingly covert nature of talent recruitment efforts means on-the-ground measures such as talent-recruitment stations should become more important.

The highest number of stations (146) was found in the United States. However, Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France and Singapore also each had many stations. This underscores the global reach of China’s talent-recruitment efforts and the high level of recruitment activity in those countries.

Figure 4: The top 10 countries hosting identified talent-recruitment stations

The stations often don’t have dedicated offices or staff. Instead, they’re contracted to local professional, community, student and business organisations, such as the Federation of Chinese Professionals in Europe.49 Such organisations already have established links inside Chinese communities and receive payments in return for spotting and recruiting talent, promoting research collaboration and hosting official delegations from China. The organisations are often linked to the CCP’s united front system and may be involved in mobilising their members to serve the party’s goals—whether cultural, political or technological. In at least two cases, talent-recruitment stations have been linked to alleged economic espionage.

Talent-recruitment stations have been established since at least 2006, and the number has grown substantially since 2015.50 The recent expansion may be related to policies associated with the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) that advocated strengthening talent-recruitment work ‘centred on important national needs’.51 Of the 600 stations identified in this report, more than 115 were established in 2018 alone (Figure 5).52

Figure 5: Talent recruitment stations established each year, 2008 to 2018

Note: Only stations with verified establishment dates are included.

Politics and talent recruitment intersecting in Canada

In July 2016, the Fujian Provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, part of the united front system, sent representatives, including its director (pictured first from left in Figure 6), around the world to establish talent-recruitment stations.53 Four were established in Canada. John McCallum, a Canadian politician who resigned as ambassador to China in 2019 after urging the government to release Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, was pictured (second from right) at the opening of a station run by the Min Business Association of Canada (加拿大闽商总会).54 The association’s chairman, Wei Chengyi (魏成义, first from right), is a member of several organisations run by the UFWD in China and has been accused of running a lobbying group for the Chinese Consulate in Toronto.55

Figure 6: The opening ceremony

Source: ‘Fujian Overseas Chinese Affairs Office’s first batch of four overseas talent recruitment sites landed in Canada’, fjsen.com, 21 July 2016, online.

We obtained several talent-recruitment station contracts, contract templates and regulations that shine a light on the stations’ operations (Figure 7). They reveal that organisations hosting stations are paid an operating fee, receive bonuses for every individual they recruit and are often required to recruit a minimum number of people each year. Those organisations are also collecting data on foreign scientists and research projects. They organise talent-recruitment events, host and arrange visiting Chinese Government delegations and prepare trips to China for prospective recruits.56

Figure 7: A talent recruitment contract signed between the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Qingrong District in Chengdu and a Sino-German talent-exchange association

Source: ‘About this overseas talent workstation’, German-Chinese Senior Talent Exchange and Economic and Trade Cooperation Promotion Association, 12 July 2017, online.

Organisations running recruitment stations can receive as much as ¥200,000 (A$40,000) for each individual they recruit. In addition, they’re paid as much as ¥150,000 (A$30,000) a year for general operating costs.57

CCP talent-recruitment agencies gather large amounts of data on overseas scientists, and overseas talent-recruitment stations may be involved in this information-gathering work. Domestically, the Thousand Talents Think Tank (千人智库), which is affiliated with the UFWD, claims to hold data on 12 million overseas scientists, including 2.2 million ethnic Chinese scientists and engineers.58 In 2017, a Chinese think tank produced a database of 6.5 million scientists around the world, including 440,000 AI scientists, as a ‘treasure map’ for China’s development of AI technology and a resource for talent recruitment.59 Abroad, recruitment stations set up by Tianjin City are instructed to ‘grasp information on over 100 high-level talents and an equivalent amount of innovation projects’.60 Qingdao City’s overseas stations are required to collect and annually update data on at least 50 individuals at the level of ‘associate professor, researcher or company manager’ or higher.61 The Zhuhai City Association for Science and Technology tasks its overseas stations with ‘collecting information on overseas science and technology talents, technologies and projects through various channels’.62

Information about overseas technologies and scientists is used for targeted recruitment work that reflects the technological needs of Chinese institutions. For example, Shandong University’s overseas recruitment stations recommend experts ‘on the basis of the university’s needs for development, gradually building a talent database and recommending high-level talents or teams to the university in targeted way’.63 The Guangzhou Development Zone ‘fully takes advantage of talent databases held by their overseas talent workstations … attracting talents to the zone for innovation and entrepreneurship through exchange events and talks’.64

However, the 600 stations identified in this report are probably only a portion of the total number of stations established by the CCP. The real number may be several hundred greater. For example, we identified 90 stations established by the Jiangsu Provincial Government or local governments in the province, yet in 2017 the province’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office—only one of many agencies in the province establishing overseas recruitment stations—stated that it had already established 121 stations.65

One hundred and seventy-one identified stations were established by united front agencies such as overseas Chinese affairs offices. For many other stations, it’s unclear which part of the bureaucracy established them, so the real number of stations established by the united front system is probably much greater. Similarly, the Qingdao UFWD describes how the city’s Organisation Department produced regulations on overseas talent-recruitment stations and the UFWD advised on their implementation and encouraged united front system agencies to carry them out.66 Universities, party organisation departments, state human resources and social affairs bureaus, state-backed scientific associations and foreign experts affairs bureaus also establish overseas-recruitment stations. None of them is an intelligence agency, but the networks and collection requirements of stations mean they could benefit China’s intelligence agencies.

Overseas talent-recruitment stations are typically run by local organisations, which are contracted to operate them for a period of several years. The local groups include hometown associations, business associations, professional organisations, alumni associations, technology-transfer and education companies and Chinese students and scholars associations (CSSAs) (see box). Local host organisations have often been established with support from, or built close relationships with, agencies such as China’s State Administration for Foreign Experts Affairs and the UFWD.67 Overseas operations of Chinese companies reportedly also host talent-recruitment stations.68 In one case, a station was reportedly established in the University College Dublin Confucius Institute.69

Chinese students and scholars associations involved in running talent recruitment stations

  • US: Greater New York Fujian Students and Scholars Association, University of Washington CSSA, North American Chinese Student Association, UC Davis CSSA
  • Australia: Victoria CSSA, Western Australia CSSA, New South Wales CSSA
  • UK: United Kingdom CSSA
  • Switzerland: Geneva CSSA
  • Italy: Chinese Students and Scholars Union in Italy
  • Czech Republic: Czech CSSA
  • Ireland: CSSA Ireland
  • Hungary: All-Hungary CSSA

Provincial, municipal and district governments are responsible for most talent recruitment, yet their activities are rarely discussed. Qingdao city alone claims that it recruited 1,500 people through its recruitment stations between 2009 and 2014.70 Out of 600 recruitment stations identified in this research, only 20 were established by national organisations, such as the UFWD’s Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA) and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.

Similarly, over 80% of talent-recruitment programs are run at the subnational level and may attract as many as seven times as many scientists as the national programs. Between 2008 and 2016, China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security determined that roughly 53,900 scholars had been recruited from abroad by local governments. More than 7,000 scholars were recruited through the Thousand Talents Plan and Hundred Talents Plan (another national talent-recruitment program) over the same period.71

Case study: Zhejiang’s recruitment work in the United Kingdom

A 2018 CCP report on Zhejiang Province’s overseas talent-recruitment work mentioned that it had established 31 overseas recruitment stations. According to the report, Brunel University Professor Zhao Hua (赵华) from the UK is one of the scientists recruited through their efforts.72 Zhao is an expert in internal combustion engines who was recruited to Zhejiang Painier Technology (浙江 派尼尔科技公司), which produces ‘military and civilian-use high-powered outboard engines’.73

The partnership between Zhao and Zhejiang Painier Technology was formed with the help of a talent-recruitment station and reportedly attracted Ұ300 million (A$60 million) in investment.74 The Zhejiang UK Association (英国浙江联谊会) runs as many as four talent-recruitment stations and has recruited more than 100 experts for Zhejiang Province or cities in the province.75 They include a station for Jinhua, the city where Zhejiang Painier Technology is based, so it could have been the organisation that recruited Professor Zhao.76

The Zhejiang UK Association’s founding president is Lady Bates (or Li Xuelin, 李雪琳), the wife of Lord Bates, Minister of State for International Development from 2016 until January 2019.77 Accompanied by her husband, Lady Bates represented the association at the establishment of a recruitment station for Zhejiang Province’s Jinhua city in 2013 (Figure 8).78 She was a non-voting delegate to the peak meeting place of the CCP-led United Front—the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—and is a member of the UFWD-run China Overseas Friendship Association.79

Figure 8: Lord (first row, second from right) and Lady Bates (first row, centre)

Source: ‘英国浙江联谊会再次携手浙江——与金华市政府签署设立金华英国工作站协议’ [British Zhejiang Friendship Association joins hands with Zhejiang again—Signed an agreement with Jinhua Municipal Government for the establishment of Jinhua UK Workstation], ZJUKA, no date, online.

Counsellor Li Hui (李辉), a senior united front official from the Chinese Embassy in London, praised the association at the station’s founding.80 In particular, he noted Lady Bates’s use of her personal connections to arrange for the signing ceremony to be held in the Palace of Westminster.81

Talent-recruitment stations help arrange visits by Chinese delegations. For example, the Australian alumni association of Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU) became a recruitment station for the university and Xi’an City, where the university is located, in 2018.82 It arranged meetings between NWPU representatives and leading Australian-Chinese scientists and helped the university sign partnerships with them. Within a month, it claimed to have introduced five professors from universities in Melbourne to NWPU, although it’s unclear how many of them were eventually recruited by the university.83 NWPU specialises in aviation, space and naval technology as one of China’s ‘Seven Sons of National Defence’—the country’s leading defence universities.84 It’s been implicated in an effort to illegally export equipment for antisubmarine warfare from the US.85

Overseas talent-recruitment organisations also run competitions and recruitment events for the Chinese Government. For example, in 2017, the UFWD’s WRSA held competitions around the world, including in Paris, Sydney, London and San Francisco, in which scientists pitched projects in the hope of receiving funding from and appointments in China. The events were held with the help of 29 European, Singaporean, Japanese, Australian and North American united front groups for scientists.86 Organisations including the University of Technology Sydney CSSA and the Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia (全澳华人专家学者联合会)—a peak body for Chinese-Australian professional associations that was set up under the Chinese Embassy’s guidance—have partnered with the Chinese Government to hold recruitment competitions tied to the Thousand Talents Plan.87 As described below, CSSAs have run recruitment events for Chinese military institutions and state-owned defence companies.

Talent recruitment in Japan

The All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals (中国留日同学会) is the leading united front group for ethnic Chinese scientists and engineers in Japan. It describes itself as having been established in 1998 under the direction of the UFWD and the UFWD’s WRSA, which is a dedicated body used by the department to interact with and influence scholars with overseas connections.88

Every president of the federation has also served as a council member of the WRSA or the China Overseas Friendship Association, which is another UFWD-run body.89 It runs at least eight talent-recruitment stations—organising talent-recruitment events in Japan and bringing scientists to talent-recruitment expos in China—and reportedly recruited 30 scientists for Fujian Province alone.90 Despite its involvement in the CCP’s technology-transfer efforts, it has partnered with the Japan Science and Technology Agency to run events.91 Former prime minister Hatoyama Yukio (鸠山由纪夫) attended the opening of a WRSA overseas liaison workstation run by the group—the first established by the WRSA (Figure 9).92

Figure 9: Former Japanese prime minister Hatoyama Yukio at the opening of a WRSA workstation

While raw numbers of recruited scientists are occasionally published, specific examples of scientists recruited by individual stations are difficult to find. In 2018, Weihai, a city in Shandong Province, released the names of 25 scientists recruited through stations in Japan and Eastern Europe.93 Among the recruits were medical researchers and AI specialists, including a Ukrainian scientist specialising in unmanned aerial vehicles who was recruited by Harbin Institute of Technology—one of China’s leading defence research universities.94

Case study: The Changzhou UFWD’s overseas network

The UFWD of Changzhou, a city between Shanghai and Nanjing, has established talent-recruitment stations around the world. The UFWD set up the stations alongside its establishment of hometown associations for ethnic Chinese in foreign countries. This illustrates the united front system’s integration of technology-transfer efforts and political and community influence work.

In October 2014, a delegation led by the Changzhou UFWD head Zhang Yue (张跃) travelled to Birmingham to oversee the founding of the UK Changzhou Association (英国常州联谊会). Zhang and the president of the UK Promotion of China Re-unification Society (全英华人华侨中国统一促进会) were appointed as the association’s honorary presidents.95 A united front official posted to the PRC Embassy in London also attended the event.96

The association immediately became an overseas talent-recruitment station for Changzhou and a branch of the Changzhou Overseas Friendship Association, which is headed by a leader of the Changzhou UFWD.97 According to a CCP media outlet, the association ‘is a window for external propaganda for Changzhou and a platform for talent recruitment’ (Figure 10).98

Figure 10: A plaque awarded by the Changzhou City Talent Work Leading Small Group Office to its ‘UK talent recruitment and knowledge introduction workstation’ in 2014

Three days later, the Changzhou UFWD delegation appeared in Paris for the founding of the France Changzhou Association (法国常州联谊会). Again, the Changzhou UFWD head was made honorary president and the association became a talent-recruitment station and a branch of the Changzhou Overseas Friendship Association. CCP media described it as ‘the second overseas work platform established by Changzhou’ under the leadership of Changzhou’s Overseas Chinese Federation, which is a united front agency.99

As detailed in a report published by the province’s overseas Chinese federation, these activities were part of the Changzhou united front system’s strategy of ‘actively guiding the construction of foreign overseas Chinese associations’.100 By 2018, when the report was published, the city had established associations in Australia, Canada, Singapore, the US and Hong Kong and was in the middle of establishing one in Macau. The founding of the Australian association was attended by a senior Changzhou UFWD official, Victorian Legislative Assembly member Hong Lim and Australian Chinese-language media mogul Tommy Jiang (姜兆庆).101

Economic espionage

The following two case studies demonstrate how talent-recruitment stations and their hosting organisations have been implicated in economic espionage and are often closely linked to the CCP’s united front system.

Case study: Cao Guangzhi

In March 2019, Tesla sued its former employee Cao Guangzhi (曹光植, Figure 11), alleging that he stole source code for its Autopilot features before taking it to a rival start-up, China’s Xiaopeng Motors.102

In July, he admitted to uploading the source code to his iCloud account but denies stealing any information.103 Tesla calls Autopilot the ‘crown jewel’ of its intellectual property portfolio and claims to have spent hundreds of millions of dollars over five years to develop it.104 Additional research on the subject of this ongoing legal case shows a pattern of cooperation between Cao and the CCP’s united front system on talent-recruitment work dating back to nearly a decade before the lawsuit.

Figure 11: Cao Guangzhi (far left) with other co-founders of the Association of Wenzhou PhDs USA

Source: ‘全美温州博士协会 “藏龙卧虎”,有古根海姆奖得主、苹果谷歌工程师···’ [The ‘Hidden Dragon and Crouching Tiger’ of the Wenzhou Doctors Association of the US; there are Guggenheim Award winners, Apple Google engineers…], WZRB, 14 April 2017, online.

When Cao submitted his doctoral thesis to Purdue University in 2009, he and three friends established the Association of Wenzhou PhDs USA (全美温州博士协会).105 All four hail from Wenzhou, a city south of Shanghai known for the hundreds of renowned mathematicians who were born there.106 From its inception, the association has worked closely with the PRC Government. A report from Wenzhou’s local newspaper claims that the Wenzhou Science and Technology Bureau, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and Overseas Chinese Federation gave the group a list of US-based PhD students and graduates from the town, whom they then recruited as members.107 The head of the Wenzhou UFWD praised the association during a 2010 trip to America as ‘the first of its kind and highly significant’.108

The Association of Wenzhou PhDs USA carries out talent recruitment on behalf of the CCP. The year after its establishment, it signed an agreement with the UFWD of a county in Wenzhou to run a talent-recruitment station that gathers information on overseas scientists and carries out recruitment work.109 That year, it also arranged for 13 of its members to visit Wenzhou for meetings with talent-recruitment officials from organisations such as the local foreign experts affairs bureau 110 and with representatives of local companies. Several of the members also brought their research with them, presenting technologies such as a multispectral imaging tool.111

Within a few years of its founding, the association had built up a small but elite group of more than 100 members. By 2017, its members reportedly included Lin Jianhai (林建海), the Wenzhou-born secretary of the International Monetary Fund; engineers from Google, Apple, Amazon, Motorola and IBM; scholars at Harvard and Yale; and six US government employees.112 At least one of its members became a Zhejiang Province Thousand Talents Plan scholar through the group’s recommendation.113 It also helped Wenzhou University recruit a materials scientist from the US Government’s Argonne National Laboratory.114

Case study: Yang Chunlai

The case of Yang Chunlai (杨春来) offers a window into the overlap of the united front system and economic espionage. Yang was a computer programmer at CME Group, which manages derivatives and futures exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Employed at CME Group since 2000, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in July 2011.115 In 2015, he pleaded guilty to trade secrets theft for stealing CME Group source code in a scheme to set up a futures exchange company in China. He was sentenced to four years’ probation.116

Before his arrest, Yang played a central role in a united front group that promotes talent recruitment by, and technology transfer to, China: the Association of Chinese-American Scientists and Engineers (ACSE, 旅美中国科学家工程师专业人士协会). From 2005 to 2007 he was the group’s president, and then its chairman to 2009.117

ACSE is one of several hundred groups for ethnic Chinese professionals that are closely linked to the CCP.118 ACSE and its leaders frequently met with PRC officials, particularly those from united front agencies such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO),119 the CPPCC and the All-Chinese Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. At one event, the future director of the OCAO, Xu Yousheng (许又声), told ACSE:

There are many ways to serve the nation; you don’t have to return to China and start an enterprise. You can also return to China to teach or introduce advanced foreign technology and experience—this is a very good way to serve China.120

Yang was appointed to the OCAO’s expert advisory committee in 2008.121 In 2010, he also spoke about ACSE’s close relationship with the UFWD-run WRSA.122

Further illustrating these linkages, Yang visited Beijing for a ‘young overseas Chinese leaders’ training course run by the OCAO in May 2006. Speaking to the People’s Daily during the course, Yang said, ‘It’s not that those who stay abroad don’t love China; it’s the opposite. The longer one stays in foreign lands, the greater one’s understanding of the depth of homesickness.’123 Yang also spoke of the sensitivity of source code used by companies, work on which doesn’t get outsourced. However, he hinted at his eventual theft of code by saying: ‘Of course, even with things the way they are, everyone is still looking for suitable entrepreneurial opportunities to return to China’.124

In 2009, an ‘entrepreneurial opportunity’ may have presented itself when ACSE hosted a talent-recruitment event by a delegation from the city of Zhangjiagang (张家港).125 At the event, which Yang attended (Figure 12), ACSE signed a cooperation agreement with Zhangjiagang to ‘jointly build a Sino-US exchange platform and contribute to the development of the homeland’—potentially indicating the establishment of a talent-recruitment station or a similar arrangement.126

Figure 12: Yang Chunlai (rear, second from right) at the signing ceremony for ACSE’s partnership with Zhangjiagang

Yang later wrote a letter to the OCAO proposing the establishment of an electronic trading company led by him in Zhangjiagang and asking for the office’s support.127 In mid-2010, he emailed CME Group trade secrets to officials in Zhangjiagang and started setting up a company in China. By December, he began surreptitiously downloading source code from CME Group onto a removable hard drive.128 

Yang’s relationship with the OCAO probably facilitated and encouraged his attempt to steal trade secrets in order to establish a Chinese company that, according to his plea deal, would have become ‘a transfer station to China for advanced technologies companies around the world’.129

Yang’s activities appeared to go beyond promoting technology transfer; there are indications that he was also involved in political influence work. This reflects the united front system’s involvement in both technology transfer and political interference. At a 2007 OCAO-organised conference in Beijing, Yang said that he had been encouraged by CPPCC Vice Chairman and Zhi Gong Party Chairman Luo Haocai to actively participate in politics, which he described as ‘a whip telling overseas Chinese to integrate into mainstream society’. He added, ‘I estimate that [ACSE] can influence 500 votes’ in the 2008 US presidential election.130 Yang also befriended politicians, including one senator, who wrote a letter to the judge testifying to Yang’s good character.131 In his OCAO conference speech, he highlighted the appointment of Elaine Chao as US Secretary of Labor and her attendance at ACSE events.132

Talent recruitment and the Chinese military

Talent recruitment is also being directly carried out by the Chinese military. For example, the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT, the People’s Liberation Army’s premier science and technology university) has recruited at least four professors from abroad, including one University of New South Wales supercomputer expert, using the Thousand Talents Plan.133

Outside of formal talent-recruitment programs, NUDT has given guest professorships to numerous overseas scientists, For instance, Gao Wei (高唯), an expert in materials science at New Zealand’s University of Auckland, was awarded a distinguished guest professorship at NUDT in May 2014.134

Gao is closely involved in CCP talent-recruitment efforts. In 2016, he joined Chengdu University as a selectee of the Sichuan Provincial Thousand Talents Plan.135 Just a month before joining NUDT, he signed a partnership with the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs as president of the New Zealand Chinese Scientists Association (新西兰华人科学家协会).136 In 2018, the association agreed to run a talent-recruitment station for an industrial park in Shenzhen.137 He has reportedly served as a member of the overseas expert advisory committee to the united front system’s OCAO.138 In 2017, at one of the OCAO’s events, Gao expressed his desire to commercialise his research in China and said that ‘even though our bodies are overseas, we really wish to make our own contributions to [China’s] development’.139

The military’s recruitment of scientists is supported by the same network of overseas recruitment stations and CCP-linked organisations that are active in talent-recruitment work more generally.

Chinese military recruitment delegations have travelled around the world and worked with local united front groups to hold recruitment sessions. In 2014, the New South Wales Chinese Students and Scholars Association (NSW-CSSA, 新南威尔士州中国学生学者联谊会) held an overseas talent-recruitment event for NUDT and several military-linked civilian universities.140 The NSW-CSSA is a peak body for CSSAs and holds its annual general meetings in the Chinese Consulate in the presence of Chinese diplomats.141 In 2013, NUDT held a recruitment session in Zürich organised by the Chinese Association of Science and Technology in Switzerland (瑞士中国学人科技协会).142 A similar event was held in Madrid in 2016.143

The Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), which runs the military’s nuclear weapons program, is particularly active in recruiting overseas experts. By 2014, CAEP had recruited 57 scientists through the Thousand Talents Plan.144 It runs the Center for High Pressure Science and Technology Advanced Research in Beijing in part as a platform for recruiting overseas talent. The institute doesn’t mention its affiliation with CAEP on its English-language website, yet it’s run by a Taiwanese-American scientist who joined CAEP through the Thousand Talents Plan.145 So many scientists from the US’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (a nuclear weapons research facility) have been recruited to Chinese institutions that they’re reportedly known as the ‘Los Alamos club’.146

CAEP also holds overseas recruitment events. At a 2018 event in the UK, a CAEP representative noted the organisation’s intention to gain technology through talent recruitment, saying ‘our academy hopes that overseas students will bring some advanced technologies back, and join us to carry out research projects.’147

Chinese state-owned defence conglomerates are engaged in the same activities. China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), which specialises in developing military electronics, has been building its presence in Austria, where it opened the company’s European headquarters in 2016 and runs a joint laboratory with Graz University of Technology.148 As part of its expansion, it held a meeting of the European Overseas High-level Talent Association (欧洲海外高层次人才联谊会) in 2017 that was attended by dozens of scientists from across Europe. Later that year, CETC reportedly held similar meetings and recruitment sessions in Silicon Valley and Boston.149 In 2013, the head of CETC’s 38th Research Institute, which specialises in military-use electronics such as radar systems, visited Australia and met with a local united front group for scientists.150 Several members of the group from the University of Technology Sydney attended the meeting, and two years later the university signed a controversial $10 million partnership with CETC on technologies such as AI and big data.151

The Chinese Government’s primary manufacturer of ballistic missiles and satellites, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, has held recruitment sessions in the US and UK through the help of local CSSAs.152

In addition to traditional defence institutions (military institutes and defence companies), China’s civilian universities are increasingly involved in defence research and have also recruited large numbers of overseas scientists. ASPI ICPC’s China Defence Universities Tracker has catalogued and analysed the implementation of military–civil fusion in the university sector.153 The policy of military–civil fusion has led to the establishment of more than 160 defence laboratories in Chinese universities, and such defence links are particularly common among leading Chinese universities that attract the greatest share of talent-recruitment program participants.154 Many recruits end up working in defence laboratories or on defence projects.155

Recommendations

The CCP’s use of talent-recruitment activity as a conduit for non-transparent technology transfer presents a substantial challenge to governments and research institutions. Many of those activities fly under the radar of traditional counterintelligence work, yet they can develop into espionage, interference and illegal or unethical behaviour.

While this phenomenon may still be poorly understood by many governments and universities, it can often be addressed by better enforcement of existing regulations. Much of the misconduct associated with talent-recruitment programs breaches existing laws, contracts and institutional policies. The fact that it nonetheless occurs at high levels points to a failure of compliance and enforcement mechanisms across research institutions and relevant government agencies. Governments and research institutions should therefore emphasise the need to build an understanding of CCP talent-recruitment work. They must also ensure that they enforce existing policies, while updating them as necessary. This report recommends the introduction of new policies to promote transparency and accountability and help manage conflicts of interest.

For governments

We recommend that governments around the world pursue the following measures:

  1. Task appropriate agencies to carry out a study of the extent and mechanisms of CCP talent-recruitment work, including any related misconduct, in their country.
  2. Ensure that law enforcement and security agencies are resourced and encouraged to investigate and act on related cases of theft, fraud and espionage.
  3. Explicitly prohibit government employees from joining foreign talent-recruitment programs.
  4. Introduce clear disclosure requirements for foreign funding and appointments of recipients of government-funded grants and assessors of grant applications.
  5. Ensure that funding agencies have effective mechanisms and resources to investigate compliance with grant agreements.
  6. Ensure that recipients of government research funding are required to disclose relevant staff participation in foreign talent-recruitment programs.
  7. Establish a public online database of all external funding received by public universities and their employees and require universities to submit and update data.
  8. Establish a national research integrity office that oversees publicly funded research institutions, produces reports for the government and public on research integrity issues, manages the public database of external funding in universities, and carries out investigations into research integrity.
  9. Brief universities and other research institutions about CCP talent-recruitment programs and any relevant government policies.
  10. Develop recommendations for universities and other research institutions to tackle talent-recruitment activity. This can draw on the Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector developed by a joint government and university sector taskforce on foreign interference.156
  11. Create an annual meeting of education, science and industry ministers from like-minded countries to deepen research collaboration within alliances, beyond existing military and intelligence research partnerships, and coordinate on issues such as technology and research security.
  12. Increase funding for the university sector and priority research areas, such as artificial intelligence, quantum science and energy storage, perhaps as part of the cooperation proposed above.
  13. Develop national strategies to commercialise research and build talent.

For research institutions

We recommend that research institutions such as universities pursue the following measures:

  1. Carry out a comprehensive and independent audit of participation in CCP talent-recruitment programs by staff.
  2. Ensure that there’s sufficient resourcing to implement and ensure compliance with policies on conflicts of interest, commercialisation, integrity and intellectual property.
  3. Fully investigate cases of fraud, misconduct or nondisclosure. These investigations should determine why existing systems failed to prevent misconduct and then discuss the findings with relevant government agencies.
  4. In conjunction with the government, brief staff on relevant policies on and precautions against CCP talent-recruitment programs.
  5. Strengthen existing staff travel databases to automatically flag conflicts with grant commitments and contracts.
  6. Update policies on intellectual property, commercialisation, research integrity, conflicts of interest and external appointments where necessary.

Participants in CCP talent-recruitment programs should be required to submit their contracts with the foreign institution (both English and Chinese versions) and fully disclose any remuneration.

Appendix

Two appendices accompany this report:

  • Appendix 1: Selected Chinese government talent-recruitment programs
  • Appendix 2: Cases and alleged cases of espionage, fraud and misconduct

Readers are encouraged to download the report to access the appendices.


Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jichang Lulu, Lin Li, Elsa Kania, John Garnaut, Danielle Cave, Fergus Hanson, Michael Shoebridge and Peter Jennings for their support and feedback on this report. Lin Li helped compile the database of talent-recruitment stations. Alexandra Pascoe provided substantial help in researching and writing the case summaries in Appendix 2. Audrey Fritz and Emily Weinstein contributed valuable research on talent-recruitment programs. I would also like to thank anonymous peer reviewers who provided useful feedback on drafts of the report. The US Department of State provided ASPI with US$145.6k in funding, which was used towards this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber and emerging technologies and their impact on broader strategic policy. The ICPC informs public debate and supports sound public policy by producing original empirical research, bringing together researchers with diverse expertise, often working together in teams. To develop capability in Australia and our region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises both in Australia and overseas for both the public and private sectors. The ICPC enriches the national debate on cyber and strategic policy by running an international visits program that brings leading experts to Australia.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

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First published August 2020. ISSN 2209-9689 (online)
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

  1. Those conditions include lucrative wages, the creation of tailored venture capital firms and dedicated technology parks. For an influential and detailed study of the domestic infrastructure of PRC technology-transfer efforts, as well as much of its overseas activities through the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, in particular, see Bill Hannas, James Mulvenon, Anna Puglisi, Chinese industrial espionage: technology acquisition and military modernisation, Routledge, London and New York, 2013. ↩︎
  2. See, for example, ‘致公党江苏省委首届“引凤工程”成果丰硕’ [Zhigong Party Jiangsu Committee’s first ‘Attracting Phoenixes Project’ has bountiful results], Jiangsu Committee of the Zhigong Party, 2 January 2011, online; Tang Jingli [唐景莉], ‘筑巢引凤聚才智 国际协同谋创新’ [Building nests to attract phoenixes and gather talents and knowledge, international collaboration for innovation], Ministry of Education, 5 April 2012, online; ‘“筑巢引凤”聚人才 浙江举行 “人才强企”推介会’ [Building nests to attract phoenixes and gather talents, Zhejiang holds the ‘strong talent enterprises’ promotional event], Zhejiang Online, 18 July 2019, online. ↩︎
  3. See Alex Joske, The party speaks for you: foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system, ASPI, Canberra, June 2020, online. ↩︎
  4. Xi Jinping [习近平], ‘习 近平:在欧 美同学会成立100周年庆祝大会上的讲话’ [Xi Jinping: Speech at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association], Chinese Communist Party News, 21 October 2013, online. ↩︎
  5. ‘习近平:瞄准世界科技前沿引领科技发展方向抢占先机迎难而上建设世界科技强国’ [Xi Jinping: Set sights on the cutting-edge of world science and technology and guide the direction of technological development; seize this strategic opportunity and meet the challenge of building a strong country in terms of science and technology], Xinhua, 28 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  6. Elsa Kania, ‘Made in China 2025, explained’, The Diplomat, 2 February 2019, online; PRC State Council, ‘中国制造2025’ [Made in China 2025], www.gov.cn, 8 May 2015, online; China’s National Medium-Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020) highlighted the goal of indigenous innovation: online . ↩︎
  7. China’s 2017 State Council Plan on Building a National Technology Transfer System describes talent recruitment as a form of technology transfer. See State Council, ‘国家技术转移体系建设方案’ [Plan on Building a National Technology Transfer System], www.gov.cn, 15 September 2017, online. ↩︎
  8. ‘我国留学回国人员已达265.11万人’ [The number of Chinese returning from studying abroad has reached 2,651,100], Economic Daily, 12 April 2017, online. ↩︎
  9. ‘中国驻外使领馆:万流归海引人才 不遗余力架桥梁’ [PRC overseas mission: amid the flow of tens of thousands of talents returning to China, we do not spare energy in building bridges], www.gov.cn, 4 June 2014, online. ↩︎
  10. These estimates are based on the conservative assumption that 60,000 individuals have been recruited from abroad through CCP talent-recruitment programs since 2008. Data on 3,500 participants in the Thousand Talents Plan was used to estimate the proportion recruited from each country. ↩︎
  11. Clive Hamilton, Alex Joske, ‘United Front activities in Australia’, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 2018, online; Ben Packham, ‘Security experts warn of military threat from Chinese marine project’, The Australian, 10 February 2020, online; Alex Joske, ‘The company with Aussie roots that’s helping build China’s surveillance state’, The Strategist, 26 August 2019, online; Ben Packham, ‘Professor, Chinese generals co-authored defence research’, The Australian, 31 July 2019, online; Geoff Wade, Twitter, 25 February 2020, online. ↩︎
  12. Xi Jinping [习近平], ‘习近平:在欧美同学会成立100周年庆祝大会上的讲话’ [Xi Jinping: Speech at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association]. ↩︎
  13. Hannas et al., Chinese industrial espionage: technology acquisition and military modernization. ↩︎
  14. ‘中央引进国外智力领导小组始末’ [The beginning and end of the Central Leading Small Group for Introducing Foreign Expertise], Baicheng County Party Building Online, 30 September 2019, online. ↩︎
  15. ‘中国人才工作的新进展’ [New progress in China’s talent work], China Online, 28 June 2005, online. ↩︎
  16. ‘中共中央办公厅转发《中央人才工作协调小组关于实施海外高层次人才引进计划的意见》的通知’ [Notice on the CCP General Office circulating ‘Recommendations of the Central Talent Work Coordination Small Group on implementing the overseas high-level talent recruitment plan’], China Talent Online, 20 June 2012, online. ↩︎
  17. ‘2003年全国人才工作会议以来我国人才发展纪实’ [Recording the country’s talent development since the 2003 National Talent Work Conference], People’s Daily. Many of these events, such as Liaoning Province’s China Overseas Scholar Innovation Summit (中国海外学子创业周) and Guangzhou’s Convention on Exchange of Overseas Talents and Guangzhou, were first held before 2003. ‘2018中国海外人才交流大会开幕’ [2018 Convention on Exchange of Overseas Talents], Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA), 24 December 2018, online ; ‘海外学子创业周凸显品牌效应’ [The Overseas Scholar Entrepreneurship Week has a clear brand effect], Sina, 26 May 2010, online. ↩︎

The party speaks for you

Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system

What’s the problem?

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is strengthening its influence by co-opting representatives of ethnic minority groups, religious movements, and business, science and political groups. It claims the right to speak on behalf of those groups and uses them to claim legitimacy.

These efforts are carried out by the united front system, which is a network of party and state agencies responsible for influencing groups outside the party, particularly those claiming to represent civil society. It manages and expands the United Front, a coalition of entities working towards the party’s goals.1 The CCP’s role in this system’s activities, known as united front work, is often covert or deceptive.2

The united front system’s reach beyond the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—such as into foreign political parties, diaspora communities and multinational corporations—is an exportation of the CCP’s political system.3 This undermines social cohesion, exacerbates racial tension, influences politics, harms media integrity, facilitates espionage, and increases unsupervised technology transfer.

General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reinvigoration of this system underlines the need for stronger responses to CCP influence and technology-transfer operations around the world. However, governments are still struggling to manage it effectively and there is little publicly available analysis of the united front system. This lack of information can cause Western observers to underestimate the significance of the united front system and to reduce its methods into familiar categories. For example, diplomats might see united front work as ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘propaganda’ but fail to appreciate the extent of related covert activities. Security officials may be alert to criminal activity or espionage while underestimating the significance of open activities that facilitate it. Analysts risk overlooking the interrelated facets of CCP influence that combine to make it effective.4

What’s the solution?

Governments should disrupt the CCP’s capacity to use united front figures and groups as vehicles for covert influence and technology transfer. They should begin by developing analytical capacity for understanding foreign interference. On that basis, they should issue declaratory policy statements that frame efforts to counter it. Countermeasures should involve law enforcement, legislative reform, deterrence and capacity building across relevant areas of government. Governments should mitigate the divisive effect united front work can have on communities through engagement and careful use of language.

Law enforcement, while critically important, shouldn’t be all or even most of the solution. Foreign interference often takes place in a grey area that’s difficult to address through law enforcement actions. Strengthening civil society and media must be a fundamental part of protecting against interference. Policymakers should make measures to raise the transparency of foreign influence a key part of the response.

Introduction

The United Front … is an important magic weapon for strengthening the party’s ruling position … and an important magic weapon for realising the China Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.

—Xi Jinping, at the 2015 Central United Front Work Meeting5

In recent years, groups and individuals linked to the CCP’s United Front have attracted an unprecedented level of scrutiny for their links to political interference, economic espionage and influence on university campuses. In Australia, businessmen who were members of organisations with close ties to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have been accused of interfering in Australian politics. In the US, at least two senior members of united front groups for scientists have been taken to court over alleged technology theft. Confucius Institutes, which are overseen with heavy involvement from the UFWD, have generated controversy for more than a decade for their effects on academic freedom and influence on universities. Numerous Chinese students and scholars associations, which are united front groups for Chinese international students, have been involved in suppressing academic freedom and mobilising students for nationalistic activities.

The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has also highlighted overseas united front networks. In Australia, Canada, the UK, the US, Argentina, Japan and the Czech Republic, groups mobilised to gather increasingly scarce medical supplies from around the world and send them to China.6 Those efforts appear linked to directives from the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, a united front agency.7 The party’s Central Committee has described the federation as ‘a bridge and a bond for the party and government to connect with overseas Chinese compatriots’.8 After the virus spread globally, united front groups began working with the CCP to donate supplies to the rest of the world and promote the party’s narratives about the pandemic.

Regardless of whether those activities harmed efforts to control the virus, they appeared to take governments by surprise and demonstrate the effectiveness of united front work. The CCP’s attempts to interfere in diaspora communities, influence political systems and covertly access valuable and sensitive technology will only grow as tensions between China and countries around the world develop. As governments begin to confront the CCP’s overseas interference and espionage, understanding the united front system will be crucially important.

This paper dissects the CCP’s united front system and its role in foreign interference. It describes the broad range of agencies and goals of the united front system, rather than focusing only on the UFWD. 

It examines how the system is structured, how it operates, and what it seeks to achieve. It reveals how dozens of agencies play a role in the united front system’s efforts to transfer technology, promote propaganda, interfere in political systems and even influence executives of multinational companies.9

The united front system has nearly always been a core system of the CCP.10 For most of its history it’s been led by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee—the party’s top leadership body.

However, Xi has emphasised united front work more than previous leaders, pushing it closer to the position of importance that it occupied in the party’s revolutionary era by elevating its status since 2015. That year, he established high-level bodies and regulations that signalled a greater emphasis on and centralisation of united front work. Later, the Central Committee’s UFWD was expanded by giving it authority over religious, ethnic and Chinese diaspora affairs.11 The united front system and the UFWD in particular have also been given a central role in coordinating policy on Xinjiang, where the darkest side of the party’s political security efforts are on full display.

The CCP originated as a chapter of the Soviet Comintern in 1921. It is itself a product of Lenin’s international united front efforts. In 1922, it began carrying out its own united front work by proposing a united front of supporters of democracy.12

The party credits China’s victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) to the ‘favourable conditions’ created through its united front with the Kuomintang. This arguably prevented the CCP’s annihilation by shifting the focus of the Kuomintang military from the CCP to Japan.13 It also enabled the party to infiltrate the Kuomintang and subvert it from inside. In the lead-up to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the party successfully co-opted influential religious figures, intellectuals, engineers and political leaders. Many of them were organised into party-led civil society groups and eight political parties (often referred to as China’s ‘minor parties’ or ‘satellite parties’) that were promised a say in a post-liberation democratic China. Those parties officially accept the leadership of the CCP as a precondition for participation in China’s ‘multiparty cooperation and political consultative system’.

They now serve as platforms for united front work.14

During the ‘reform and opening period’, the United Front played an important role in supporting China’s economic development. Businesspersons, including those from the Chinese diaspora, were encouraged to invest in China and integrated into the United Front through platforms such as the UFWD-run All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (中华全国工商业联合会).15 According to united front expert Gerry Groot, ‘economic construction required vast numbers of technicians, scientists and administrators’, and groups in the United Front helped reform China’s education system and attract foreign experts and technology.16

To this day, the united front system helps the CCP claim legitimacy, mobilise its supporters and manage perceived threats. It plays a central role in developing policy on highly sensitive issues such as Xinjiang, Tibet, religion and ethnic affairs. It also oversees the CCP-led political model of ‘multiparty cooperation and political consultation’ that’s been in place since 1949.17 This consultation takes place through the annual Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC, 中国人民政治协商 会议), which is chaired by the Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for the united front system and attended by more than 2,000 party-approved representatives from different sectors of PRC society.18

The CCP claims that its system of political consultation and multiparty cooperation is a democratic model.19 However, it operates as a way for the CCP to falsely claim that it represents the full breadth of Chinese society. The CCP serves as China’s ruling party while other groups, such as the eight minor political parties (officially known as ‘democratic parties’) that accept the CCP’s leadership, offer advice to it through the CPPCC. Organisations that claim to speak for different interest groups—the China Association for Science and Technology and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, for example—are official components of the CPPCC.20 In practice, those organisations are controlled by the CCP. Their leaders are often party members, and, historically, some have been manipulated through inducement and coercion, including blackmail.21

In recent years, Xi Jinping has been promoting the United Front’s ‘multiparty cooperation and political consultative system’ as a ‘new type of party system’. It also serves as an inspiration for the CCP’s engagement with political parties around the world.22 A 2018 foreign policy editorial by the People’s Daily claimed that Xi Jinping’s ‘systematic elaboration on the super advantages of China’s party system has enlightened the whole world.’23 The chaos of Western societies shows that the CCP ‘is providing the world with … a China solution on how to seek a better political system’, the piece concluded. This point is echoed in training material for united front cadres, which warns that ‘Western hostile forces’ seek to overthrow the CCP and that their influence on overseas ethnic Chinese must be undone.24

The fact that the United Front is a political model and a way for the party to control political representation—the voices of groups targeted by united front work—means its overseas expansion is an exportation of the CCP’s political system. Overseas united front work taken to its conclusion would give the CCP undue influence over political representation and expression in foreign political systems.

Key terminology

The United Front (统一战线) is a coalition of groups and individuals working towards the CCP’s goals.

United front work (统一战线工作) refers to the CCP’s efforts to strengthen and expand the United Front by influencing and co-opting targets.

The United Front Work Department (中央统一战线工作部) is a CCP Central Committee department that coordinates and carries out united front work.

The united front system (统一战线系统 or 统一战线工作系统) is the grouping of agencies, social organisations, businesses, universities, research institutes and individuals carrying out united front work.

United front work is political work

In the words of the UFWD’s director:

The United Front is a political alliance, and united front work is political work. It must maintain the party’s leadership throughout, having the party’s flag as its flag, the party’s direction as its direction, and the party’s will as its will, uniting and gathering members of each part of the United Front around the party.25

It’s designed to bring a diverse range of groups, and their representatives in particular, under the party’s leadership.26

These activities focus on building relationships. Xi Jinping has emphasised that ‘the United Front is about working on people.’27 Co-opting and manipulating elites, influential individuals and organisations is a way to shape discourse and decision-making.

United front work encompasses a broad spectrum of activity, from espionage to foreign interference, influence and engagement (see box). There’s no clear distinction between overseas and domestic work. Premier Zhou Enlai, one of the PRC’s founding revolutionaries and a pioneer of the CCP’s United Front, advocated ‘using the legal to mask the illegal; deftly integrating the legal and the illegal’ (利用合法掩护非法,合法与非法巧妙结合), ‘nestling intelligence within the United Front’ (寓情报于统战中) and ‘using the United Front to push forth intelligence’ (以统战带动情报).28

The scope of united front work is constantly evolving to reflect the CCP’s global ambitions, assessments of internal threats to its security, and the evolution of Chinese society. Today, the overseas functions of united front work include increasing the CCP’s political influence, interfering in the Chinese diaspora, suppressing dissident movements, building a permissive international environment for a takeover of Taiwan, intelligence gathering, encouraging investment in China, and facilitating technology transfer.

Key united front groups and events linked to foreign interference

The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is the peak united front forum, bringing together CCP officials and Chinese elites.

The China Overseas Friendship Association is a group run by the UFWD that recently subsumed the China Overseas Exchange Association.

The China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification is an organ of the UFWD with numerous overseas branches.

The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese is a peak united front body for ethnic Chinese with overseas links.

The Western Returned Scholars Association is the UFWD’s primary body for interacting with ethnic Chinese scholars and scientists.

The Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media is a biennial meeting of overseas Chinese-language media outlets convened by the UFWD.

Chinese students and scholars associations are overseen by Ministry of Education officials and often seek to speak for, influence and monitor Chinese students abroad.

Local equivalents, such as the provincial Guangdong Overseas Friendship Association, exist for most major united front groups.

To those ends, united front work draws on hundreds of thousands of united front figures and thousands of groups, most of which are inside China. This report refers to members of united front groups—organisations guided or controlled by parts of the united front system—as ‘united front figures’. The most readily identifiable united front groups are China-based organisations officially supervised by united front agencies. For example, the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification—which has chapters in at least 91 countries or territories around the world—and the China Overseas Friendship Association are both directed by the UFWD.29 Members of China-based united front groups often run united front groups abroad. Many China-based united front groups have overseas branches.

Citations and Notes

Readers are urged to download the report PDF for the full list of citations and notes. 

United front work: a Xi family business

United front work runs deep through Xi Jinping’s life and family history. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a central figure carrying out united front work directed at Tibet, seeking to influence the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. As a Politburo member in the 1980s, he continued to spend most of his time supervising united front work. He was reportedly seen still wearing a watch given to him by the Dalai Lama three decades earlier.30 Two of Xi Jinping’s siblings were involved in political warfare work for the Chinese military.31

Xi Jinping himself spent 15 years climbing the CCP ranks in Fujian Province—a hotbed of united front and intelligence work targeting Taiwan and the Hokkien-speaking diaspora. In 1995, as a municipal party secretary, he penned a paper on united front work on the Chinese diaspora.32

Two decades later, in 2015, Xi moved to implement many of the ideas he advocated in the paper— greater emphasis on united front work by the party’s leadership and the integration of efforts across the party and bureaucracy. That year, at the Central United Front Work Conference, he repeated Mao Zedong’s famous 1939 description of the United Front as one of three ‘magic weapons’ (法宝) for achieving victory in the communist revolution.33 This was nothing new. Party leaders since the founding of the PRC have consistently run united front conferences and emphasised the United Front as a ‘magic weapon’, with the exception of the Cultural Revolution period.34 But, unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the United Front by launching the greatest reforms of the united front system in at least a generation.

The December 2014 purge of Ling Jihua (令计划), who headed the UFWD and was a close ally of former president Hu Jintao, set the scene for Xi Jinping’s reform of the united front system.35 After positioning Ling as a scapegoat for the department’s problems, Xi began pursuing the ‘Great United Front’ (大统战)—a program for ensuring that united front work is carried out by the entire party and with greater centralisation, coordination and direction.36 He established a ‘leading small group’ for united front work that brought together dozens of agencies to inspect and improve united front work across the country, formally raised the status of the Central United Front Work Conference, reorganised the UFWD, and introduced the first regulations for united front work.37

In his report to the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping referred to the United Front as being about drawing the largest concentric circle around the party.38 Under the direction of the united front system’s leaders, agencies of the united front system seek to co-opt influential individuals and groups in a range of areas, including business, politics and science. Party committees, whether in multinational companies, research institutes or embassies, have been directed by Xi to follow the Central Committee’s directions and regulations on united front work.39 Figure 1 shows the system.

Figure 1: The united front system

* Asterisks denote agencies subordinate to the UFWD.

Leadership and agencies

Figure 2: Wang Yang

The united front system’s leader is Wang Yang (汪洋), the fourth-ranked member of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top leadership body. Wang chairs the most important united front forum: the CPPCC. He also heads the Central United Front Work Leading Small Group.

Sun Chunlan (孙春兰), a Politburo member and vice premier who holds culture, health, sport, religion and education portfolios, may also be involved in supervising the government’s (as opposed to the party’s) contributions to united front work.40 Sun was previously head of the UFWD and currently chairs the council of Confucius Institute Headquarters, overseeing the global Confucius Institute program.41

The presence of State Council Secretary-General Xiao Jie (肖捷) at a recent leading small group event indicates that he may now be responsible for government agencies’ involvement in united front work.42

The status of the UFWD’s director, a key member of the system’s leadership, has been elevated in recent years. You Quan, the current head of the UFWD, is one of seven members of the Central Secretariat, which carries out the Politburo’s day-to-day work.43 His predecessor sat on the Politburo while heading the department.

Leaders of the united front system and representatives of relevant agencies sit in the Central United Front Work Leading Small Group.44 At least 26 agencies were represented in the leading small group’s activities in 2017.45 Agencies involved in united front work include the Propaganda Department, the Organisation Department, the Ministry of Education, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and the Ministry of State Security, which is the PRC’s civilian intelligence agency.46

The United Front Work Department

‘With everyone doing [united front work] together, there must be division of labour’, a senior UFWD official wrote in 2016.47 The UFWD acts as a coordinating agency for united front work. In practice, China’s bureaucracy is famously stovepiped and it’s difficult to determine how successful the UFWD’s coordination efforts are.

The CCP Central Committee has authorised the department to manage all overseas Chinese affairs, religious affairs and ethnic affairs work. Nominally, it oversees actions by other departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in those areas. Since March 2018, it has controlled three relevant government agencies: the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the State Administration for Religious Affairs.48

Together with the Taiwan Affairs Office, the UFWD and 11 of its subordinate agencies had more than 600 officials at the level of bureau chief or above in 2016 (Figure 3). Bureau chiefs are ranked just under vice ministers and deputy heads of provincial governments. They’re roughly equivalent to first assistant secretaries in the Australian Public Service or assistant secretaries in the US Government.49

Figure 3: The UFWD’s 12 bureaus

*Asterisks denote unofficially named bureaus. Note: Bureaus 6 and 8–12 were all created after 2015.

The UFWD runs the offices of the central coordination groups on Tibet and Xinjiang affairs and coordinates policy on the two regions.50 The establishment of the UFWD’s Xinjiang Bureau, which doubles as the office of the Central Coordination Group on Xinjiang Work (中央新疆工作协调小组), coincided with the rapid expansion of re-education and detention camps there in 2016. United front work departments are found at lower levels of government across China. Provincial, city and even district party committees typically oversee their own UFWDs.

Internally, the department has 10 leaders, at least six of whom hold ministerial rank or higher (see Appendix 1 for further information about the department’s leaders). It has 12 bureaus, half of which were created after 2015. Bureaucratic changes in 2018 that brought overseas Chinese affairs under the UFWD’s ‘unified management’ also injected dozens if not hundreds of officials with substantial overseas experience into the department.51 Jinan University, Huaqiao University and the Central Institute of Socialism in Beijing are all subordinate to the UFWD and carry out research and training to support its efforts.52 Additionally, the UFWD runs dedicated training facilities, such as the Jixian Mountain Estate (集贤山庄), which is a complex in the outskirts of Beijing used for training China Overseas Friendship Association cadres.53

The department supervises more than 80 ‘civil groups’ at the national level, and more than 3,000 organisations are overseen by local UFWDs (see Appendix 2). Many of them, such as the China Overseas Friendship Association, are officially described as ‘united front system work units’ and operate like bureau-level organs of the UFWD.54 At least two of them have held special consultative status as NGOs in the UN Economic and Social Council.55 In 2014, an official from one of them, the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (中国西藏文化保护与发展 协会), was barred from a UN human rights hearing after he intimidated a woman testifying about her father, political prisoner Wang Bingzhang.56

Propaganda work by the United Front Work Department

The UFWD commands substantial resources for propaganda efforts targeting the Chinese diaspora. It runs China News Service (中国新闻社), one of the CCP’s largest media networks, which has dozens of overseas bureaus.57

Several overseas Chinese-language media outlets are owned or controlled by the UFWD through China News Service, including Qiaobao (侨报) in the US and Australia’s Pacific Media Group (大洋传 媒集团).58 At least 26 WeChat accounts run by nine Chinese media outlets are in fact registered to a subsidiary of China News Service.59 The accounts operate in all Five Eyes countries, the European Union, Russia, Japan and Brazil. They include accounts registered to Qiaobao and Pacific Media Group, indicating that they may all belong to companies supervised by the UFWD. Many of the accounts appear to have tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of followers.

Figure 4: At least 26 overseas Chinese-language media WeChat accounts are registered to a company that’s ultimately owned by the UFWD

China News Service engages with foreign media through its biennial Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media (世界华文媒体论坛). The event has drawn hundreds of overseas media representatives, including some from Australia’s national broadcaster.60 Training classes on topics such as ‘How to tell the Belt and Road Initiative’s story well’ are held on the sidelines of the forum.61
 

Agencies carrying out united front work

Party committees at all levels must place united front work in an important position.

—Xi Jinping, speaking at the 2015 Central United Front Work Conference62

Party members are expected to play a role in the ‘Great United Front’ by carrying out work in their relevant areas.63 Dozens of party and government agencies are involved in united front work. More and more party committees in state and private companies, universities and research institutes are engaging in united front work. Representatives of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also attended the 2015 Central United Front Work Conference, indicating that the military is involved in united front work.64

Education

The Ministry of Education and party committees in Chinese universities lead united front work on campuses.65 The ministry works with the UFWD to hold regular conferences on ‘university united front work’ and maintains its own database of united front work targets, including relatives of overseas Chinese.66 Education officials also study official guidance on united front work and describe the education system as ‘an important battlefield’ for that work.67

Most Chinese universities have UFWDs responsible for the full breadth of united front work.68 For example, Xiamen University’s UFWD oversees religious affairs work at the university, which includes building a database of religious believers, managing student informants and monitoring students’ phones.69 Dalian University of Foreign Languages’ UFWD establishes alumni associations around the world and runs a database of overseas students and alumni as ‘a basis for overseas united front work’.70

Foreign affairs

United front work targeting the Chinese diaspora involves several agencies. Major ‘overseas Chinese affairs’ events are usually presided over by representatives of:

  • the UFWD (or the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office that it subsumed in 2018)
  • the National People’s Congress Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee
  • the CPPCC Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and Overseas Chinese Committee
  • the China Zhi Gong Party (致公党)
  • the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
  • the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.71

The first five of those organisations are often called the ‘five Overseas Chinese’ (五侨).72 Most, if not all, of China’s embassies have several diplomats tasked with interfering in the diaspora— a kind of activity that’s officially under the ‘unified management’ of the UFWD.73 The decision to place diaspora affairs under the UFWD’s leadership came in March 2018 and ‘effectively resolved the problem of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UFWD’s overlapping responsibilities’, according to the People’s Daily.74 Embassies hold meetings with local united front leaders where the leaders receive directions to influence public opinion, such as by coordinating rallies in support of Chinese Government policy or visiting officials.75

Increasing numbers of diplomats responsible for diaspora work now come from the UFWD rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, China’s ambassador to Sri Lanka has a background not in the foreign affairs system but as a united front official.76

Indeed, the UFWD was an important foundation for China’s foreign affairs bureaucracy. The International Liaison Department (the party agency managing party-to-party relations) was formed on the basis of a UFWD bureau in 1951.77 The International Liaison Department still has united front characteristics, although it isn’t known whether any of its activities are guided by the united front system.78 A former head of the department from the 1990s stated that he views its work as an international version of united front work. In an interview, he compared its interactions with foreign political parties to the CPPCC—the primary platform for the United Front’s so-called ‘system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by the CCP’.79

Intelligence and political warfare

Intelligence agencies carry out and take advantage of united front work. The networks, status and relationships built through united front work, as well as information gathered through it, facilitate intelligence activity. The integration of intelligence and united front work runs deep through the party’s history: at a 1939 Politburo meeting, CCP leader Zhou Enlai advocated ‘nestling intelligence in the United Front’ and ‘using the United Front to push forth intelligence’.80

The Ministry of State Security (MSS), which is China’s civilian intelligence agency, is involved in and benefits from united front work. Official accounts state that the MSS was created in 1983 by combining parts of four agencies, including the UFWD.81 One of its fronts, the China International Cultural Exchange Center (中国国际文化交流中心), carries out united front work. In 2004, a committee member at the centre said that the scope of its ‘domestic and overseas united front work activities is extremely broad’.82 At the time, its nominal director was a former UFWD minister.83

The China International Cultural Exchange Center may have been an important part of the MSS’s overseas operations. It’s linked to the MSS’s Social Affairs Bureau (社会联络局 or 社会调查局), also known as the 12th bureau. In their book Chinese communist espionage, Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil describe the bureau as handling ‘MSS contributions to the CCP’s united front work system’.84 One of the bureau’s former chiefs, Mao Guohua (毛国华), was double-hatted as the centre’s secretary-general (Figure 5).85 Mao was the handler of Katrina Leung, a triple agent who successfully gained the trust of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation in the 1980s and 1990s.86

Figure 5: Retired MSS officer Mao Guohua in 2018

Source: ‘前国安部社会调查局局长说, “奉化的长处的短板是。。。。。。”’ [The former chief of the Social Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of State Security said, ‘The shortcomings of Fenghua’s strengths are …’], Sohu, 15 October 2018, online.

Similarly, the political warfare arm of the PLA—the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau (政治工 作部联络局), formerly the Liaison Department of the General Political Department (总参谋政治部联 络部)—has been described by experts as ‘most closely aligned with the united front system’.87 Like the International Liaison Department, this agency uses united front tactics (such as the use of prominent front groups, an emphasis on co-opting influential individuals, and efforts to discredit those who aren’t aligned with the CCP’s goals) but it’s unlikely that it’s part of the institutionalised united front system. The China Association for International Friendly Contact (中国国际友好联络会) is a united-front-style group run by the Liaison Bureau that seeks to build ties with foreign groups and individuals. Those it has interacted with include an Australian mining magnate, a former Australian ambassador to China, a new-age religious movement in Japan, and retired generals and bureaucrats from the US.88

Intelligence officers have used united front positions as cover. The overseas Chinese affairs consul in San Francisco during the 2008 Olympic torch relay was a suspected MSS officer, according to former US intelligence officials.89 Guangdong State Security Bureau Director Zhou Yingshi (周颖石) may have claimed to be a Guangdong UFWD vice minister as a form of cover in the past.90 An officer from the PLA’s Liaison Bureau was concurrently serving as a division head in Guangzhou city’s UFWD.91

There’s also evidence that the UFWD itself has recently carried out clandestine operations involving the handling of people covertly reporting to it. The Taiwanese Government is currently prosecuting a father–son pair who were allegedly recruited by an official from the Fujian Province UFWD.92 The father heads a united-front-linked political party in Taiwan, while his son is a retired lieutenant colonel.

Unverified reports have claimed that, like China’s intelligence agencies, the department is allowed to recruit Taiwanese as agents.93

Groups targeted by united front work

CCP regulations on united front work define 12 broad groups to be targeted:

  1. members of China’s eight minor parties
  2. individuals without party affiliations
  3. non-CCP intellectuals
  4. ethnic minorities
  5. religious individuals
  6. non-public-economy individuals (private businesses)
  7. new social strata individuals (urban professionals)
  8. overseas and returned overseas students
  9. people in Hong Kong and Macau
  10. Taiwanese people and their relatives in the PRC
  11. overseas ethnic Chinese and their relatives in the PRC
  12. any other individuals who need uniting and liaising.94

Work on the targeted groups is designed to bring them under the party’s leadership not merely to neutralise any opposition they may pose, but also to have them serve as platforms for further efforts.

Once groups or individuals have been integrated into the united front system, they can be used to co-opt and influence others. They’re also used to support the party’s claim that it represents and consults various constituencies not just in China but increasingly beyond China’s borders.

There’s no clear distinction between domestic and overseas united front work: all bureaus of the UFWD and all areas of united front work involve overseas activities. This is because the key distinction underlying the United Front is not between domestic and overseas groups, but between the CCP and everyone else.95 For example, the UFWD’s Xinjiang Bureau plays a central role in policy on Xinjiang but is also involved in worldwide efforts to whitewash the CCP’s internment of an estimated 1.5 million people in Xinjiang, primarily ethnic Uyghur Muslims, as an anti-terrorism and vocational training effort.96

State-owned enterprises and research institutions often have mature united front work departments.

For example, Baowu Steel (宝武钢铁), one of the world’s largest steel producers, has an internal UFWD and has established united front organisations for Taiwanese people and ethnic Chinese who have lived abroad.97 The company’s united front work evidently earned it praise—its CEO from 2007 to 2016 has been a UFWD vice minister since 2017.98

Large numbers of leading Chinese scientists were educated abroad and are members of China’s eight minor parties or have no party affiliation, making them another priority of united front work.99 The Chinese Academy of Sciences—one of the world’s largest research organisations, with more than 60,000 researchers—has a UFWD and a united front work leading small group that provides oversight of the academy’s united front work.100

Both Chinese and foreign private enterprises are increasingly targeted by united front work. In 2015, ‘new social strata individuals’—a category covering urban professionals such as managerial staff and NGO workers—became a new focus of united front work because of their growing influence in Chinese society and strong links to the West.101 For example, JD.com, one of the world’s largest e-commerce companies, is an official pilot site for united front work in private companies. In 2018, CEO Richard Liu announced the establishment of two united front groups within JD.com (Figure 6).102

Figure 6: Richard Liu (right) unveiling a plaque for JD.com’s united front work pilot site

‘Multinational companies such as the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms are also targets of united front work.103 Deloitte China established a united front association for young and middle-aged employees in 2016, headed by its CEO.104 At the association’s founding, a Deloitte partner thanked the UFWD for its support and promised: ‘The Deloitte Young and Middle-aged Intellectuals Association will comply with the Trial Regulations on United Front Work’.105

According to a government website, the Shanghai UFWD ‘took a liking’ (看上了) to a Deloitte partner, Jiang Ying, during its visits to Deloitte’s office.106 Senior members of China-based united front organisations are typically selected by local UFWDs. Jiang is now deputy CEO of Deloitte China, is a delegate to the CPPCC and was recently awarded a commendation from the Shanghai UFWD.107

In total, at least eight Deloitte China executives are delegates to the CPPCC or its local equivalents.108

United front structures within multinational companies provide additional channels for influencing the companies beyond party committees. United front groups often target people who aren’t members of the CCP, especially those who have spent time abroad. Under the ‘Trial regulations on united front work’, the UFWD is supposed to direct ‘relevant civil organisations’, such as Deloitte’s united front group, ‘to play a role in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and overseas united front work’.109 After anonymous employees of the Big Four paid for a Hong Kong newspaper ad supporting protests there, all four companies released statements in support of the Chinese Government’s actions and were pressured to fire those responsible for the ad.110

In 2017, Deloitte partnered with the Australian Financial Review for an infrastructure forum in Melbourne, at which a Deloitte China executive who is also a delegate to the Shandong Committee of the CPPCC warned that Australia’s refusal to sign up to the Belt and Road Initiative was hurting business.111 His role in the united front group doesn’t seem to have been disclosed in the conference agenda.

Figure 7: Deloitte China Deputy CEO Jiang Ying at the CPPCC.

Source: ‘德勤声音——全国政协委员蒋颖在两会上踊跃谏言 多份提案吸引媒体高度关注’ [Deloitte’s voice—CPPCC member Vivian Jiang enthusiastically offers advice at the two sessions], Deloitte, no date, online.

Foreign interference and the united front system

This section of the report describes several aspects of united front work abroad, and particularly efforts to influence politics and think tanks, collect data and transfer technology. United front work generally involves covert activity and is a form of interference that aids the CCP’s rise and reduces resistance to its encroachment on sovereignty.112

It will be important for future studies to examine overseas united front work in Asia, North America and Europe. Efforts targeting scientific communities, religious groups and Chinese-language education remain understudied. Outside of Australia, New Zealand and the Czech Republic, there are very few detailed country-specific studies of influence and technology-transfer efforts linked to the united front system.113

Many CCP agencies, such as the International Liaison Department, the MSS, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the PLA, engage in their own foreign interference efforts. Those activities often overlap with or take advantage of those of the united front system, and draw on the tradition of united front work, but they’re probably carried out independently.

Political influence

When it seeks to build political influence, united front work primarily targets political actors rather than political systems. Democracies subjected to united front work might retain democratic structures and processes, while representation and political participation are ultimately manipulated by the CCP.

Independent researcher Jichang Lulu has referred to this as a process of ‘repurposing democracy’ (see box).114

Understanding CCP influence, a prerequisite to any sound policy formulation, thus necessitates the analysis of the foreign activities of China’s entire political system, rather than decontextualised aspects of the work of its more familiar agencies. Such analysis would be vitiated by an a priori compartmentalisation guided by, e.g., distinctions between ‘influence’ and ‘interference’, ‘benign’ and ‘malign’, or ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’. While relevant to target-country policy responses, such categories may not be useful in the actors’ Leninist context. A narrow focus on the hostile leaves much influence work unaccounted for. Influence work as described in this study does not seek to disrupt democratic structures, but to repurpose them as tools facilitating the advancement of the policies of a totalitarian, expansionist régime.

—Jichang Lulu, Repurposing democracy: The European Parliament China Friendship Cluster, Sinopsis, 26 November 2019, online.

The role of the CCP in these activities is often covert. United front figures typically deny any links to the united front system. Australian-Chinese businessman and political donor Chau Chak Wing, for example, claimed he had never heard of the UFWD, despite mentioning it in a speech and being pictured meeting with its officials.115

Ethnic Chinese communities are a focus of united front work.116 In activities directed at diaspora communities, the CCP seeks to co-opt, control and install community leaders, community groups, business associations and media. It seeks to collapse the diversity of Chinese communities into a fictional homogeneous and ‘patriotic’ group united under the party’s leadership.117 Successful united front work wedges the party between ethnic Chinese communities and the societies they live in, expanding the party’s control of those communities’ channels for representation and mobilisation.

Members of Chinese communities who want to participate in community activities may unwittingly become associated with united front groups. Combined with the party’s surveillance and censorship of the Chinese social media app WeChat, this has smothered independent Chinese media outlets and community groups.118

Interference in Chinese communities harms genuine and independent political participation in politics by ethnic Chinese. In countries such as Australia, where united front work is quite mature, it’s proven difficult for politicians to avoid associating with united front groups and implicitly legitimising them as representatives of the broader Chinese community.119 For example, both major party candidates for a seat in parliament during the 2019 Australian federal election had reportedly either been members of united front groups or had travelled on united-front-sponsored trips to China.120 Both contenders for leadership of the NSW Labor Party in 2019 had attended events run by united-front-linked groups.121

Case study: Huang Xiangmo

Huang Xiangmo (黄向墨) is one of the most informative cases of united-front-linked influence efforts.

Ironically, his active efforts to influence Australian politics became a catalyst for the Australian Government’s introduction of counter foreign interference legislation and his own expulsion from the country.

Huang, also known by his legal name, Huang Changran (黄畅然), was born in 1969 in a small village in the Chaoshan region of Guangdong Province. According to a hagiographic account of his life published in 2012, he grew up in poverty and left school at an early age.122 Despite that, he worked hard and read widely. In 1998, he was working for the state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation.123 He soon founded a property development company named after his home village, Yuhu, and prospered amid rapid economic growth in the province.124

By 2012, Huang was ranked as China’s 420th richest person, worth an estimated Ұ4.5 billion (roughly A$700 million at the time).125 He also donated generously to public projects—specifically, those favoured by the Jieyang Party Secretary, Chen Hongping (陈弘平), such as the massive Han dynasty-inspired Jieyang Tower in the city’s central square.126 Huang also gained social standing, reflected in his appointment to the Jieyang People’s Political Consultative Conference—the city’s peak united front forum.127

In July 2012, Huang’s allies ran up against the CCP’s anticorruption machine. Party Secretary Chen was taken into the extralegal ‘shuanggui’ investigation process.128 Five years later, Chen received a suspended death sentence for corruption.129 He took down at least six associates, including the Guangzhou Party Secretary, with him.130 Among his sins, the People’s Daily reported, was his obsession with grand cultural and spiritual projects, including the Jieyang Tower and a lavish personal mausoleum.131 The next year, 17 police officials in Jieyang were fired, under suspicion of tipping off suspects about investigations.132

Shortly before the scandal erupted, Huang Xiangmo began relocating to Australia, building an investment portfolio in Sydney and purchasing a $12.8 million mansion. It’s reported that several business associates followed him, buying nearby properties provided they were cheaper and lower down the hill than his. Huang denies being involved in the Jieyang corruption case.133

It would be nearly a decade before Huang was next spotted in the Chinese mainland. However, his connections to Chinese authorities didn’t end with the corruption case and his arrival in Australia.

As early as February 2012, Huang became an honorary president of the Australian Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC, 澳洲中国和平统一促进会), despite having no known substantial links to Australia before then.134 The reunification council is closely linked to the UFWD-run China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, which promotes the PRC’s annexation of Taiwan.135 Huang eventually became president of the Australian reunification council and a senior director of the UFWD-run China Council.136 The China Council’s president is Wang Yang, the Politburo Standing Committee member who oversees the united front system. Its senior vice president is the UFWD minister.137

As Philip Wen and Lucy Macken wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald in 2016, ‘Huang arrived in Australia in near-total obscurity. But big spending and relentless networking behind closed doors has seen him swiftly ingratiate himself with Australia’s most powerful politicians’.138

After arriving in Australia, Huang hired long-time ACPPRC member Eng Joo Ang (洪永裕) as an adviser to his company. Ang accompanied Huang as he met with former prime minister Kevin Rudd in December 2012 (Figure 8).

Sam Dastyari, then general secretary of the New South Wales Labor Party, also appeared at the meeting.139 Dastyari was known as a prolific fundraiser, and his relationship with and patronage from Huang Xiangmo led to the downfall of both. As Dastyari later said, ‘There is an arms race for donations between the parties. And when you’ve got individuals like Huang who are prepared to fork out millions of dollars they get listened to.’140

Figure 8: Eng Joo Ang, Kevin Rudd, Huang Xiangmo and Sam Dastyari, December 2012

Huang and his companies, associates and employees donated a total of over $3 million to both sides of politics.141 He also stepped in to pay a legal bill for Sam Dastyari, by then a senator.142 Another businessman—a CPPCC delegate and member of the UFWD’s China Overseas Friendship Association— helped Dastyari settle the difference when the senator overspent his parliamentary travel budget.143 Huang also partnered with CCP agencies, including the International Liaison Department, to organise and sponsor parliamentarians to travel to China.144

Former prime minister Rudd was only one in a long list of political figures with whom Huang networked. Huang secured meetings with the prime minister and opposition leader. At least four political figures—a former New South Wales Labor general secretary, a former New South Wales Labor treasurer, a former federal Liberal minister, and a former media adviser to a different federal Liberal minister—were hired by Huang and helped him build influence.145 Senior representatives of both major parties attended his daughter’s wedding in 2016.146

It seems that politicians treated Huang Xiangmo as a wealthy Chinese community leader and didn’t think too much about the political objectives contained in the very name of the reunification council he ran. Rather than alerting politicians to his links to the CCP, Huang’s leadership of united front groups was misinterpreted as a marker of his influence among Chinese-Australians. When Huang took over leadership of the reunification council when its original president died in 2015, senior Liberal Party politician Philip Ruddock appeared to gloss over the council’s founding purpose, remarking that it ‘has a rather strange name … Some people are very interested in the title. My emphasis is always on “peaceful”’.147

Roughly a dozen reunification council members have stood for election or gained jobs as political staffers. Chief among them was Ernest Wong (王国忠), whose predecessor in the New South Wales Legislative Council house was hired by Huang’s company.148 In a 2014 article attributed to him, he copied, word for word, advice on political participation from the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office—a core united front system agency that’s since been absorbed by the UFWD.149 In a line that also appears verbatim in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office document, the article recommends: ‘[one of the ways for Chinese to participate in politics is] by pushing changes in policy and influencing government positions by working on politicians and elites.’150 Wong held positions in several united front bodies in both China and Australia and was reportedly a target of cultivation by Chinese intelligence officers.151

Consistent with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office’s guidance, Wong and Huang sought to mentor young Chinese-Australians with political aspirations.152 The pair organised the Australia Young Leadership Forum for Chinese university students, which worked to train future political talent.153

Huang also engaged in philanthropic activities and gave generously to universities. He established centres in two Australian universities: the Australia–China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney and the Australia–China Institute for Arts and Culture at Western Sydney University. Huang claimed to have personally selected a former Australian foreign minister as director of ACRI, which has attracted controversy since its founding in 2014.154 ACRI hosted a senior united front official in 2016 and also organised trips to China, supported by the Propaganda Department, for Australian journalists.155

Figure 9: Huang Xiangmo, surrounded by leaders of the reunification council and the Australia China Economics, Trade and Culture Association, shakes hands with Politburo member and former UFWD director Liu Yandong in 2012

Source: ‘Liu Yandong, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, meets with Australian overseas Chinese’, news release, Yuhu Group, 19 December 2012, online.

Huang caught the Australia Security Intelligence Organisation’s attention by 2015. That year, the agency’s director-general reportedly warned about Huang’s potential links to the CCP in briefings to Australian political parties.156

As investigative journalists began scrutinising Huang’s activities, his transactional dealings with political parties became clearer. In 2016, Huang reportedly withdrew a promised $400,000 donation to the Labor Party after its defence spokesman criticised China’s militarisation of the South China Sea.157

The next week, Senator Dastyari stood beside Huang at a press conference for Chinese-language media and urged Australia to remain neutral in the territorial dispute, which he described as ‘China’s own affair’.158

Dastyari eventually quit politics after it emerged that he’d warned Huang that Huang’s phone was probably bugged.159 Dastyari admitted in 2019 that Huang may have been an ‘agent of influence’ for the Chinese Government.160

Public figures began distancing themselves from Huang and his reunification council as controversy surrounding him grew. Several members had their names removed from the group’s public membership list.161 A Victorian state politician who had previously been a member of the council said, ‘I know what this organisation is about so I keep 100 miles from them.’162 Tim Xu, a former assistant to Huang, testified in 2019 that the reunification council is a front for the CCP.163

According to media reporting, some of Huang’s associates may have been involved in organised criminal activity. In July 2019, it was reported that two of Huang’s reunification council members were running illegal gambling junkets for Crown Casino and involved in money laundering. Huang himself gambled $800 million in one year with Crown Casino.164 In October, the Australian Taxation Office accused him of underpaying tax by $140 million, ordering his assets to be frozen.165

The growing scrutiny of Huang’s activities culminated in his residency in Australia being canceled while he was in Hong Kong. His citizenship application was denied and his residency rescinded after the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation reportedly concluded that he was ‘amenable to conducting acts of foreign interference’.166 Huang later complained to the state-owned Global Times that Australia has ‘the innate characteristics of a giant baby’.167

Huang’s story, however, hasn’t ended. His political donations, some of which were allegedly disguised through proxies, are being investigated by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption.168 In May 2019, Huang reappeared in mainland China for the first time in years—as a delegate to a united front meeting attended by Xi Jinping.169 In November 2019, Wang Liqiang, a Chinese defector to Australia, alleged that Huang had met with a PLA intelligence officer.170 Wang is now being sued by a former reunification council member.171 Huang’s networks, and united front networks more generally, are still active in Australia, and more than 120 organisations protested his expulsion.172

Recognising united front groups

There’s no foolproof way to identify a united front group, but the following activities may indicate that an organisation is associated with the united front system:

  • Its executives hold positions in China-based united front groups.
  • It advocates for the ‘reunification’ of China.
  • It associates frequently with the local PRC diplomatic mission.
  • It participates in pro-PRC political rallies.
  • It hosts visiting CCP officials from the united front system.
  • It issues statements or holds events in coordination with known united front groups.

Asking a knowledgeable friend in the Chinese community for advice can also be helpful.

Because of the opacity of some aspects of united front work, it’s difficult to know the degree of direction party officials exercise over united front figures. Even within each overseas united front group there appears to be variation in the relationships that members and executives have with PRC officials. To the extent that they’re directed, many of their united front activities are likely to be supervised by provincial or even municipal UFWDs, some of which have a greater overseas focus than the central UFWD.

It’s also possible that a small number of united front figures are ultimately directed by the MSS or PLA as intelligence assets, using united front work as a platform for intelligence activity. The two organisations are better resourced for and more experienced in serious political interference work than the UFWD.173 Both have records of using united front roles as cover. They may also be better positioned to wield leverage over individuals who are wanted for crimes in China.

Nonetheless, many united front figures aren’t acting spontaneously out of patriotic sentiments and an independent desire to please Beijing. Overseas united front figures frequently meet with united front system officials, receive directions and study relevant guidance. A Sydney man reportedly set up the Australian Jiangsu China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification (澳洲江苏中国和平统一 促进会) at the direction of a senior UFWD official.174 The Australian Guangxi Business Association (澳洲 广西总商会) was reportedly founded in 2011 under the ‘coordination’ of a provincial UFWD.175

When the PLA Navy made a visit to Sydney Harbour on 3 June 2019, a day before the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, it was met by a welcoming crowd from the Sydney Beijing Association (悉尼北京会) bearing a custom-made banner.176 The visit hadn’t been publicly announced, indicating that the group had been notified beforehand by the Chinese Government.

In July 2015, the president of a Sydney-based association said his group ‘will strengthen its use of Xi Jinping’s spirit at the Central United Front Work Conference to go further in demonstrating our special characteristics’.177

In Australia and Taiwan, the CCP has used organised crime groups to carry out united front work.178

Several cases suggest that criminal activity may be tolerated by the Chinese Government and even used as leverage in exchange for participation in political influence operations.179 For example, media have reported that a prolific gambling junket operator involved in money laundering also runs three prominent united front groups in Melbourne, one of which is officially endorsed by the UFWD, and served as an honorary president of the ACPPRC.180 At the same time, he was a business partner of a former adviser to the Victorian Premier.181

In 2008, Sydney man Frank Hu (胡扬) was charged with importing 250 kilograms of cocaine.182

However, Hu was known to the public as a ‘Chinese community leader’ who was close to the PRC Consulate and ran a cultural association that took parliamentarians on tours of China.183 Similarly, Chang An-lo (张安乐), a Taiwanese gangster also known as ‘White Wolf’, is the founder of the Chinese Unification Promotion Party. The party has been raided by the Taiwan Government as part of investigations into political parties illegally accepting money from the Chinese Government.184

The lack of any clear distinction between domestic and overseas united front work means that changes in how that work is carried out in China could have important implications for foreign interference. While the UFWD has long worked with Chinese security agencies, links between those worlds appear to be deepening.185 In 2018, Ministry of Public Security Vice Minister Shi Jun was reassigned as a UFWD vice minister and now oversees the department’s work on Xinjiang.186 The UFWD plays a central role in the securitisation of Xinjiang, including the disappearance of approximately 1.5 million Uyghurs and other minorities into concentration camps.187 It has worked with the National Counter-Terrorism Office on security in the lead-up to major political meetings and runs campaigns with the MSS and the Ministry of Public Security to crack down on Christianity.188 This may foreshadow an increase in the brazenness, intolerance and intensity of united front work abroad, helped by the party’s increased ability to coordinate and direct that work.189

Case study: The British Chinese Project

The kinds of united front work observed in Australia, the US190 and New Zealand191 can be clearly seen in other Five Eyes countries and across Europe. In the UK, for example, the British Chinese Project (BC Project, 英国华人参政计划) is a group that says it seeks to foster the political participation of ethnic Chinese and build their influence on policy.192 It provides advice to, and acts as the secretariat for, the All-Party Parliamentary Chinese in Britain Group. The parliamentary group had six members in 2018.193

However, the BC Project’s close links to the united front system call into question its independence and ability to genuinely represent ethnic Chinese. Its chair and founder, Christine Lee (李贞驹), is an executive member of the China Overseas Friendship Association and a committee member of the CPPCC, which are both run by the UFWD (Figure 10).194 Lee is also a legal adviser to several Chinese Government organs, including the Chinese Embassy in London, the UFWD’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.195 Her law firm claims to be the only British one authorised by the Chinese Government to practise as a foreign law firm in China.196

Figure 10: Christine Lee at a 2019 united front meeting for overseas Chinese. United front system leader Wang Yang is seated directly in front of her.

Source: ‘Xi Jinping meets with representatives of the Ninth Conference for Friendship of Overseas Chinese Associations and the Fifth Council of China Overseas Friendship Association’, YouTube, 28 May 2019, online.

Since 2009, Lee has donated hundreds of thousands of pounds to Labour Party shadow secretary of state for international trade Barry Gardiner.197 Reports by The Times in February 2017 scrutinised Lee and Gardiner’s relationship, but appeared to have little effect on their activities.198 Lee’s son, Daniel Wilkes, has worked for Gardiner since 2015.199 Gardiner has been the chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Chinese in Britain Group since its inception in 2011.200

As shadow energy secretary, Gardiner was an outspoken advocate of a controversial proposal for Chinese Government involvement in the Hinkley Point nuclear reactor project. He argued that it was important to sign the agreement to show the UK’s acceptance of Chinese investment, even if it was a bad deal in financial terms.201 The Chinese partner on Hinkley Point, China General Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC), is a state-owned nuclear company that’s been involved in espionage and is subject to a US Government export ban because of its history of diverting nuclear technology to the Chinese military.202 The US Government has warned that CGNPC uses nuclear technology to aid the Chinese military, including through the development of floating nuclear reactors and reactors for submarines.

Technology transfer

The united front system is a central component of the PRC’s legal and illicit technology-transfer efforts.

United front technology-transfer efforts seek to establish or co-opt professional associations with members in universities, governments and private companies. The groups then help recruit overseas scientists and promote technology transfer to China.203 Some of them are also tasked with building databases on overseas scientists.204 The role of the united front system in technology transfer will be detailed in a forthcoming report by the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre.

Exemplifying the united front system’s involvement in technology-transfer efforts, the UFWD’s Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA, 欧美同学会) runs the official association for participants in the Thousand Talents Plan (千人计划专家联谊会), which is a flagship CCP talent recruitment program for foreign scientists.205 China’s Minister of Science and Technology from 2007 to 2018 was also a senior united front official and chair of the Zhi Gong Party (致公党), which is a minor party supervised by the UFWD that draws its membership from Chinese who have returned from abroad.206

The party and country respect the choices of overseas students. If you return to China to work, we will open our arms to warmly welcome you. If you stay abroad, we will support you to serve the country through various means. Everyone must remember: no matter where you are, you are sons and daughters of China.

—Xi Jinping, in his speech to the Western Returned Scholars Association, 2013

Some united-front-linked overseas professional associations have been implicated in economic espionage. For example, Yang Chunlai (杨春来), a programmer at a US mercantile exchange company, was convicted in 2015 of trade secret theft after stealing source code to set up a business in China. Yang had been president of the USA Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers, which frequently meets with united front officials, and served on an advisory committee to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.207

In 2006, Yang visited Beijing for a ‘young overseas Chinese leaders’ united front training course.208

During the course, he said that his employer would never outsource work on its proprietary source code, but that ‘everyone is still looking for a suitable entrepreneurial opportunity to return to China.’ Three years after the training course, an opportunity may have presented itself when he met an investment and talent recruitment delegation from a Chinese county government. The source code he later stole, some of which he sent to the county government, was meant to help grow the business he established in the county’s free trade zone.209

More than a dozen groups in Australia are involved in technology transfer and talent recruitment work for the Chinese Government.210 For example, the Federation of Chinese Scholars in Australia (全澳华人专家学者联合会) was established in 2004 to promote scientific exchange between Australia and China. Its organising meeting was held in the PRC Embassy’s Education Office. Speaking at its founding, the Chinese Ambassador expressed her hope that its ‘experts and scholars would be able to transfer advanced technology achievements to China.’211 The federation and many of its members are associated with united front system organs, such as the WRSA.212 Its hundreds of members include several senior university officials and professors, most of whom have joined Chinese government talent recruitment programs.

Data collection

United front work is supported by the united front system’s growing use of information technology.

United front groups can build databases that may support the CCP’s political influence and technology-transfer efforts. For example, the Melbourne Huaxing Arts Group (墨尔本华兴艺术团) writes biannual reports back to the UFWD, keeps a database of political figures, public figures, and community groups, and has internal ‘secrecy regulations’.213 One part of the united front system even claims to hold data on 2.2 million ethnic Chinese scientists abroad.214 The Chinese Government has also provided overseas united front groups with lists of possible members, such as Chinese PhD students in America who have the same home town, to help their expansion.215

United front agencies are encouraged to take advantage of the internet and big data in their work.216

In November 2019, the UFWD partnered with the Central Cyberspace Administration to hold the first-ever meeting for united front work on ‘online figures’ such as social media influencers and live-streamers.217

Think tanks

The UFWD seeks to engage with foreign think tanks through the WRSA, which is the primary united front group for Chinese scientists and scholars who have lived abroad. The association’s secretary-general is a UFWD official, and it’s described as a ‘united front system work unit’.218 The association is active in both influence and technology-transfer efforts. It holds international think tank forums while also playing a key role in the Thousand Talents Plan—a CCP recruitment scheme for overseas scientists that’s been linked to economic espionage.219

One of the WRSA’s most successful activities has been the establishment of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG, 中国与全球化智库), which claims to be an independent think tank.220 The centre is headed by Wang Huiyao (王辉耀), a prominent international commentator who is also an adviser to the UFWD, a member of several united front groups and an important figure in the development of China’s talent recruitment strategy.221

Wang’s united front links first attracted widespread attention when he was scheduled to speak at a May 2018 Wilson Center panel on CCP influence. The event’s description didn’t mention his position in the united front system and claimed that discussions on CCP influence were ‘often poorly defined, exaggerated, and abused.’222 After Senator Marco Rubio wrote a letter to the Wilson Center asking it to disclose Wang’s united front links, Wang pulled out of the panel.223

But, since then, several Australian politicians have been taken to visit the CCG. In both 2018 and 2019, Australian NGO China Matters took several Australian politicians on trips to China, where they met with people from the centre.224 Australia’s then shadow treasurer repeated the CCG’s claim of being China’s largest independent think tank in a press release about the trip.225 On one of these trips, participants were also taken to meet the assistant president of the MSS’s University of International Relations.226 In 2019, Australia’s Trade Minister also gave a speech at the think tank.227

Aside from using the WRSA to engage with think tanks and scholars, united front figures have established and funded overseas think tanks. Thai united front figure Dhanin Chearavanont (谢国民), who is regularly given the seat of honour at major united front events, established Georgetown University’s Initiative for US–China Dialogue on Global Issues.228 A foundation run by Tung Chee-hwa (董建华), a vice chair of the CPPCC and former chief executive of Hong Kong, has funded research at several prominent American think tanks, including the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.229 The University of Texas turned down funding from the foundation after commentators highlighted Tung’s united front links.230

Chinese students and scholars associations

Overseas Chinese students, as well as returnees from abroad, have long been a target of united front work. This was reiterated in 2015 when Xi Jinping designated them a ‘new focus of united front work’.231 These efforts seek to maintain the CCP’s influence over Chinese students even when they are overseas and ensure that some can be mobilised when needed.

Chinese students and scholars associations (CSSAs) are the primary platform for united front work on overseas students. Most CSSAs operate under the guidance of Chinese embassies and consulates.232

A 2013 People’s Daily article describes Australian CSSAs as ‘completing their missions … under the direct guidance of the Embassy’s Education Office’.233 Globally, they have become the dominant bodies claiming to represent Chinese students at universities. At the same time as they provide useful services to students, CSSA executives have also been found reporting on dissident students, organising rallies and promotional events in coordination with the Chinese Government and its talent recruitment programs, and enforcing censorship.234

CSSAs primarily interact with Chinese Ministry of Education officials, but there’s evidence that this is a form of united front work carried out by the Ministry of Education. For example, Korea University’s CSSA claims on its website that the UFWD is responsible for ‘overall guidance on overseas student associations’.235 This is supported by a 2013 statement made by China’s Ambassador to Australia, who urged ‘outstanding CSSA cadres’ to study Xi Jinping’s remarks on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the UFWD-run WRSA.236 A UFWD deputy bureau chief was posted as the education attaché in Chicago between 2013 and 2016, indicating substantial overlap between the work of Chinese education officials abroad and UFWD cadres.237 In 2011, the UFWD led a delegation of Ministry of Education and university officials to the UK to study the establishment of associations for Chinese students, meeting with the chairman of the CSSA-UK.238 The CSSA-UK, a peak body for Chinese students in the UK, is a member organisation of the WRSA.239

Recommendations

Responses to united front work must engage governments, civil society and ethnic Chinese communities. They should seek to couple punitive measures for agents of interference with a positive agenda of support for and engagement with communities affected by united front work. Effective efforts to counter foreign interference are essential to protect genuine participation in politics by ethnic Chinese citizens. Counter-interference work can complement engagement with the PRC when carried out properly by helping to ensure that it aligns with national interests and isn’t used as a platform for interference.

This report recommends that governments pursue the following measures.

1. Recognise and understand the problem

  • Carry out detailed studies of united front work across the country as well as in specific sectors or regions.
  • Develop analytical capacity in government and the private sector for tracking and responding to foreign interference.

2. Develop high-level guidance and policy on countering foreign interference, issuing statements, policy documents and funding to establish it as a priority across relevant parts of the bureaucracy

3. Raise awareness of united front work and foreign interference

  • Effectively implement transparency-building measures such as the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme.
  • Political leaders should improve how they frame efforts to counter foreign interference, making clear that they are not targeting minority communities, and seek to publicly attribute major cases of foreign interference.
  • Intelligence agencies should produce regular case studies and public reports on political interference threats, naming and describing the activities of major actors.
  • Intelligence agencies should increase their outreach to influential figures, such as retired politicians.
  • Expand intergovernmental channels for discussing foreign interference.

4. Ensure that legislation, resourcing and political will exist to build transparency and prosecute agents of interference

  • Existing laws and policies on espionage, foreign agents, external employment, conflicts of interest and foreign interference must be enforced.
  • Laws that introduce criminal offences for foreign interference and seek to expand transparency, such as registers of foreign agents, should be introduced and refined.
  • Ban foreign political donations where they are currently permitted.
  • Introduce real-time reporting of political donations.

Agencies responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases of interference must be sufficiently resourced.

  • Ban accepting support from or providing material support to foreign interference agencies (in addition to intelligence and security agencies).
  • Australia should reform its defamation laws, such as by introducing a national security defence.
  • The Australian Public Service should introduce and enforce a unified conflict of interest and external employment policy.

5. Protect those exposing interference

  • Police should be trained to handle and respond to politically motivated stalking and harassment.
  • Establish and promote reporting mechanisms for foreign interference.

6. Engage with universities to develop responses to related issues, such as monitoring and mobilisation by Chinese Government-backed student associations, technology transfer, economic coercion and censorship

7. Support and engage Chinese diaspora communities

  • Politicians and public officials should seek to engage with independent Chinese community groups and avoid legitimising united front groups and figures.
  • Politicians and public officials should ensure that they use precise language that distinguishes between ethnic Chinese communities, Chinese citizens and the Chinese Communist Party, as explained in John Fitzgerald’s report for ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, Mind your tongue.240
  • Support new and independent Chinese community groups.
    • Emerging independent Chinese civil society groups must be priorities for protection from interference.
  • Security, migration and homeland affairs agencies should hold workshops and produce targeted, multilingual informational materials on interference.
  • Support independent Chinese-language media.
    • Ensure the independence of government Chinese-language media, such as Australia’s SBS Mandarin.
    • Award grants to independent Chinese-language media.
    • Place government notices in independent Chinese-language media outlets as a way to provide advertising funding to them.
    • Pay for local outlets to have the right to republish articles from independent Chinese-language media outlets in Hong Kong or Taiwan.
    • Establish scholarships for Chinese students to study journalism.
  • Explore ways to ensure freedom of speech and freedom from surveillance on WeChat, including through legislation.

8. Build expertise on China, Chinese people, the CCP and foreign interference

  • Commission and sponsor research on foreign interference and the CCP.
  • Fund research institutions to establish courses and workshops on foreign interference and the CCP.
  • Invest in greater Chinese-language training in schools, universities and government.

9. Deny visas for or expel agents of foreign interference

  • Visa applications by united front system officials and united front figures should be approached with a presumption of denial.
  • Foreign nationals, including diplomats, shown to have been involved in foreign interference should be expelled.

Appendix 1: Leaders of the United Front Work Department

You Quan (尤权)

Member of the Central Secretariat and UFWD minister (2017 – present); probably deputy head of the Central United Front Work Leading Small Group

  • Born in Hebei Province in January 1954
  • Party Secretary of Fujian Province (2012–2017)
  • Deputy secretary-general of the State Council (2008–2012)
  • Chairman of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (2006–2008)

Ba Te’er (巴特尔)

UFWD deputy minister; vice chairman of the CPPCC; director of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (2016 – present); member of the Central Committee

  • Born in Liaoning Province in 1955
  • Ethnic Mongolian
  • Deputy Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia (2009–2016)

Zhang Yijiong (张裔炯)

UFWD senior deputy minister (2012 – present), overseeing the day-to-day operation of the department; member of the Central Committee

  • Born in Shanghai in 1955
  • Worked in Qinghai Province from 1972 to 2006
  • Deputy Party Secretary of Tibet (2006–2010)
  • Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of Tibet (2010)

Xu Yousheng (许又声)

UFWD deputy minister; director of the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (2018 – present); member of the Central Committee

  • Born in Fujian Province in 1957
  • Apart from a period in the Party Committee of Hunan Province (2012–2017), has worked mostly in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office since 1982

Xu Lejiang (徐乐江)

UFWD deputy minister; party secretary and senior deputy chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (2017 – present); member of the Central Committee

  • Born in Shandong Province in 1959
  • Worked in China Baowu Steel Group, one of the world’s largest steel manufacturers from 1982 to 2016; chairman and party secretary from 2014 to 2016
  • Ministry of Industry and Information Technology vice minister (2016–2017)

Wang Zuo’an (王作安)

UFWD deputy minister (2018 – present); director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs

  • Born in Jiangsu Province in 1958
  • UFWD policy researcher (1983–1987)
  • State Administration for Religious Affairs official (1987–present)
  • Author of China’s religious issues and policies (中国的宗教问题和宗教政策) (2002

Tan Tianxing (谭天星)

UFWD deputy minister (2018 – present), responsible for international united front work.

  • Born in Hunan Province in 1963
  • Worked in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese from 1991 to 2018
  • Attaché at the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC (1998–2002)
  • PhD in history from Peking University (1991)
  • Author of Reflections on history (历史的思考) (2015)

Shi Jun (侍俊)

UFWD deputy minister (2018 – present); director of the Office of the Central Coordinating Small Group on Xinjiang Work (中央新疆工 作协调小组).

  • Born in Jiangsu Province in 1962
  • Worked in Sichuan Province from 1978 to 2016
  • Party Secretary of Ngaba County (2007–2012); oversaw a crackdown on Tibetan Buddhism that led to a wave of self-immolations
  • Sichuan Province Public Security Bureau chief (2013–2015)
  • Central Political and Legal Commission deputy secretary-general (2016–2017)
  • Ministry of Public Security vice minister (2017–2018)

Zhou Xiaoying (周小莹)

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection representative in the UFWD (2018 – present); member of the Central Committee

  • Born in Yunnan Province in 1960
  • Worked in Qinghai Province (1975–2008)
  • Central Commission for Discipline Inspection representative in the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (2016–2018)

Zou Xiaodong (邹晓东)

UFWD vice minister (2018 – present); National People’s Congress delegate; responsible for united front work on intellectuals, scientists and universities

  • Born in Shandong Province in 1967
  • Worked and studied at Zhejiang University (1984–2018), apart from a period as deputy director of the Zhejiang Provincial Organisation Department (2016–2017)
  • Party Secretary of Zhejiang University (2017–2018)

Sources: All information and images taken from the UFWD’s website, online or Joske, The Central United Front Work Leading Small Group: institutionalising united front work, Sinopsis, 23 July 2019, online.

Appendix 2: National-level social organisations run by the UFWD or its subordinate agencies

The Ministry of Civil Affairs’ database of officially registered social organisations recorded the groups listed here in August 2019.241 These groups claim to be NGOs but are registered under various united front agencies.

On 11 August 2019, in addition to the organisations listed here, the Ministry of Civil Affairs database also recorded 5,432 organisations registered to local religious affairs bureaus, 3,089 registered to local UFWDs, 324 registered to local returned overseas Chinese federations (归国华侨联合会 )and 288 registered to local overseas Chinese affairs offices (侨务办公室).

Registered under the United Front Work Department

  • China Warmth Project Foundation (中华同心温暖工程基金会)
  • Elion Green Foundation (亿利公益基金会)
  • Oceanwide Foundation (泛海公益基金会)
  • China Overseas Study Talent Development Foundation (中国留学人才发展基金会)
  • Across the Strait Taiwanese Exchange Association (两岸台胞民间交流促进会)
  • China Foundation for Guangcai Program (中国光彩事业基金会)
  • China Glory Society (中国光彩事业促进会)
  • China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (中国西藏文化保护与发展协会)
  • China Sun Yat-sen Cultural Exchange Association (中华中山文化交流协会)
  • China Civil Chamber of Commerce (中国民间商会)
  • Wu Zuoren International Foundation of Fine Arts (吴作人国际美术基金会)
  • China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (中国和平统一促进会)
  • Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy (黄埔军校同学会)
  • China Overseas Friendship Association (中华海外联谊会)
  • China Association of Zen Tea (中国茶禅学会)
  • China Research Association of the 1911 Revolution (中国辛亥革命研究会)
  • Chinese Private Economy Research Association (中国民营经济研究会)
  • Chou Pei-yuan Foundation (周培源基金会)
  • China United Front Theory Research Association (中国统一战线理论研究会)
  • Taiwan Scholar Association (台湾同学会)
  • Western Returned Scholars Association / Overseas-educated Scholars Association of China (欧美同学会/中国留学人员联谊会)
  • China Siyuan Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (中华思源工程扶贫基金会)

The UFWD also runs the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (中华全国工商业联合会), the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (中华全国台湾同胞联谊会), the China Soong Ching Ling Foundation (中国宋庆龄基金会) and the China Vocational Education Association (中华职业教育 社); however, these are referred to as ‘united front system work units’ and are not social organisations registered under the Ministry of Civil Affairs.242

Registered under the State Administration for Religious Affairs

  • Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation (慈济慈善事业基金会)
  • China Religious Culture Communication Association (中华宗教文化交流协会)
  • Buddhist Association of China (中国佛教协会)
  • Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church in China (中国天主教主教团)
  • National Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China (中国基督教三自爱国运动委员会)
  • China Christian Council (中国基督教协会)
  • China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会)
  • Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (中国天主教爱国会)
  • Taoist Association of China (中国道教协会)
  • Young Men’s Christian Association of China(中华基督教青年会全国协会 )
  • Young Women’s Christian Association of China (中华基督教女青年会全国协会)

Registered under the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce

  • China Cultural Chamber of Commerce for the Private Sector (中国民营文化产业商会)
  • National Federation of Industry and Agriculture Industry Chamber of Commerce (全联农业产业商会)
  • China Chamber of Commerce for Metallurgical Enterprises (全联冶金商会)
  • China Environment Service Industry Association (全联环境服务业商会)
  • China Real Estate Chamber of Commerce (全联房地产商会)
  • China Education Investors Chamber of Commerce (全联民办教育出资者商会)
  • China International Chamber of Commerce for the Private Sector (中国民营经济国际合作商会)
  • China Science and Technology Equipment Industry Chamber of Commerce (全联科技装备业商会)
  • China Mergers and Acquisitions Association (全联并购公会)
  • Chamber of Folk Culture Artefacts and Artworks (全联民间文物艺术品商会)
  • China Book Trade Chamber of Commerce (全联书业商会)
  • China New Energy Chamber of Commerce (全联新能源商会)
  • China Chamber of Tourism (全联旅游业商会)
  • China Urban Infrastructure Chamber of Commerce (全联城市基础设施商会)
  • China–Africa Business Council (中非民间商会)

Registered under the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

  • Silk Road Planning Research Center (丝路规划研究中心)
  • China Institute of Theory on the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中国人民政协理论研究会)
  • China Economic and Social Council (中国经济社会理事会)
  • China Committee on Religion and Peace (中国宗教界和平委员会)

Registered under the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office

  • China Overseas Exchange Association (中国海外交流协会)—now merged with China Overseas Friendship Association
  • China World Association for Chinese Literatures (中国世界华文文学学会)
  • Alumni Association of Huaqiao University (华侨大学校友会)
  • Heren Foundation (河仁慈善基金会)
  • China Language Education Foundation (中国华文教育基金会)

Registered under the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese

  • Overseas Chinese History Society of China (中国华侨历史学会)
  • Jinlongyu Charity Foundation (金龙鱼慈善公益基金会)
  • Silijiren Foundation (思利及人公益基金会)
  • Huang Yicong Charity Foundation (黄奕聪慈善基金会)
  • China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs (中国侨商联合会)
  • Overseas Chinese Charity Foundation of China (中国华侨公益基金会)
  • Overseas Chinese Literature and Art Association (中国华侨文学艺术家协会)
  • China Society of Overseas Chinese Photographers (中国华侨摄影学会)
  • China Association for International Cultural Exchanges with Overseas Chinese (中国华侨国际文化交流促进会)

Registered under the State Ethnic Affairs Commission

  • Alumni Association of the High School Affiliated to Minzu University of China (中央民族大学附中校友会)
  • Minzu University of China Alumni Association (中央民族大学校友会)
  • Chinese Association for Mongolian Studies (中国蒙古学学会)
  • China Ethnic Medicine Association (中国民族医药协会)
  • China Promoting Minority Culture & Art Association (中国少数民族文化艺术促进会)
  • Nationalities Unity and Progress Association of China (中华民族团结进步协会)
  • National Architecture Institute of China (中国民族建筑研究会)
  • Association for Promotion of West China Research and Development (中国西部研究与发展促进会)
  • China Ethnic Minorities’ Association for External Exchanges (中国少数民族对外交流协会)
  • Chinese Association for Ethnic Policy (中国民族政策研究会)
  • Korean-Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association (中国朝鲜族科技工作者协会 / 중국조선족과학기술자협회)
  • China Korean Language Society (中国朝鲜语学会)
  • Taiwanese Ethnic Minorities Research Association (台湾少数民族研究会)
  • China Association for Preservation of Ethnic Minorities’ Relics (中国少数民族文物保护协会)
  • China Korean Minority History Association (中国朝鲜民族史学会)
  • Academic Society of the History of Philosophical and Social Ideas in Chinese Minorities (中国少数民族哲学及社会思想史学会)
  • China Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (中国人类学民族学研究会)
  • China Mongolian Studies Association (中国蒙古语文学会)
  • Economic Promotion Association of Longhai & Lanxin Railway (陇海兰新经济促进会)
  • Research Association of Bilingual Education for Chinese Minorities (中国少数民族双语教学研究会)
  • China Association of Ethnic Economy (中国少数民族经济研究会)

Citations and Notes

Readers are urged to download the report PDF for the full list of citations and notes.


Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Peter Mattis, John Garnaut, Lin Li, Jichang Lulu, Clive Hamilton, Robert Suettinger, Danielle Cave, Michael Shoebridge, Peter Jennings, Fergus Hanson, Fergus Ryan, Matt Schrader and Gerry Groot for their feedback and insights. In particular, Peter Mattis helped formulate the concept for this paper and I benefited enormously from related discussions with him. I would also like to thank Nathan Ruser for creating the map in Figure 4.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands provided ASPI with AUD80,000 of funding, which was used towards this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber and emerging technologies and their impact on broader strategic policy. The ICPC informs public debate and supports sound public policy by producing original empirical research, bringing together researchers with diverse expertise, often working together in teams. To develop capability in Australia and our region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises both in Australia and overseas for both the public and private sectors. The ICPC enriches the national debate on cyber and strategic policy by running an international visits program that brings leading experts to Australia.

The work of ICPC would be impossible without the financial support of our partners and sponsors across government, industry and civil society.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published June 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online), ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

  1. In 2019, I studied and discussed the concept of the united front system together with Peter Mattis, then a visiting fellow at ASPI, and am deeply indebted to him for his analysis and insight on this issue. ↩︎
  2. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (online) defines acts of foreign interference as activities taken on behalf of or in collaboration with a foreign power that involve a threat to any person or are clandestine or deceptive and carried out for intelligence purposes, for influencing government or political processes, or are otherwise detrimental to Australia’s interests. ↩︎
  3. Xi Jinping, ‘Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’, speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the CCP, 18  October 2017, online; See, for example, a former head of the CCP International Liaison Department’s comparison between domestic united front work and the CCP’s interactions with political parties around the world, discussed in Martin Hala, Jichang Lulu, The CCP’s model of social control goes global, Sinopsis, 20 December 2018, online. Julia Bowie and Nathanael Callan of the Center for Advanced China Research have also argued that China is offering the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the primary platform for the United Front, as a political model for other countries. See Julia Bowie, Nathanael Callan, China’s ‘new type of party system’: a ‘multiparty’ system for foreign consumption, Center for Advanced China Research, 21 August 2018, online. ↩︎
  4. This point has also been made by independent researcher Jichang Lulu. See Jichang Lulu, Repurposing democracy: The European Parliament China Friendship Cluster, Sinopsis, 26 November 2019, online. ↩︎
  5. Guo Lunde [郭伦德], ‘习近平引领统战工作进入新时代’ [Xi Jinping leads united front work into the new era], www.tibet.cn, 12 December 2017, online. ↩︎
  6. ‘海 外 华媒为战“疫”加油!’ [Overseas Chinese media cheers us on in the battle against the virus], ACFROC, 10 March 2020, online; ‘旅日侨团及华商华企侧援祖国疫情阻击战’ [Overseas Chinese groups in Japan as well as Chinese businesspersons and companies help the Fatherland’s battle against the virus], ACFROC, 7 February 2020, online; ‘悉尼华星艺术团团长余俊武:把抗疫之爱讲给世界听’ [Sydney Huaxing Arts Troupe leader Yu Junwu: Let the whole world hear our love in fighting the virus], ACFROC, 7 May 2020, online. ↩︎
  7. ‘中国侨联关于号召海内外侨胞为打赢“新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎”防控阻击战捐赠款物的倡议书’ [Proposal from the All‑China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese on rallying overseas and domestic Chinese compatriots for donations to achieve victory in the battle to prevent and stop the pneumonia spread by a novel coronavirus], Consulate‑General of the People’s Republic of China in Melbourne, 26 January 2020, online; ↩︎
  8. ‘中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改革方案》’ [The CCP Central Committee issues ‘plan for deepening the party and state’s institutional reform’], Xinhua, 21 March 2018, online. ↩︎
  9. Other forms of influence work carried out by the CCP, such as that carried out by the International Liaison Department, might not sit within the united front system, but can be described as using ‘united front tactics’ when they draw on the doctrines and principles of united front work. For example, united front tactics could involve the heavy use of front organisations and proxies, an emphasis on claiming representative power, and an emphasis on building interpersonal relationships with key representatives of targeted groups. Most Chinese party and state agencies run united front‑style groups that serve to co‑opt civil society and act as proxies for the CCP. For example, the International Liaison Department runs the Chinese Association for International Understanding (中国国际交流协会). ↩︎
  10. The Cultural Revolution may have been the only extended period in which the party’s united front work largely stopped. ↩︎
  11. ‘中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改革方案》’ [The CCP Central Committee issues ‘plan for deepening the party and state’s institutional reform’], Xinhua. ↩︎
  12. ‘关于“民主的联合战线”的议决案’ [About the ‘democratic united front’ decision], 中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库 [Database of the CCP’s congresses], n.d., online. ↩︎
  13. ‘西安事变的由来’ [Origins of the Xi’an Incident], 中国统一战线新闻网[China United Front Online], 8 May 2014, online; 党政干部统一战线知识读本 [Party and government cadre: united front knowledge reader], 华文出版社 [Huawen Press], 2014, 35. ↩︎
  14. China’s eight minor parties were formed in the years before 1949, but are all socialist and have ‘accepted the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’. For a detailed study of these parties and the United Front, see Gerry Groot’s Managing transitions, 2004. The eight minor parties are the Jiusan Society, the China Democratic League, the China National Democratic Construction Association, the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party, the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, the China Zhi Gong Party, and the Taiwan Democratic Self‑Government League. These parties have different constituencies; for example, the China Zhi Gong Party was established in San Francisco as an alliance of overseas secret societies, and its members are overseas and returned overseas Chinese. See ‘中国共产党领导的多党合作是我国政治制度的一个特点和优点’ [Our country’s political system of multiparty cooperation under the CCP’s leadership is a special characteristic and advantage], 中央统战部网站[Central United Front Work Department], 8 January 2009, online; ‘中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度’ [The system of political consultation and multiparty cooperation under the leadership of the CCP], 中国政府网综合 [PRC Government Online], 27 July 2017, online. ↩︎
  15. Gerry Groot, ‘Managing transitions: the Chinese Communist Party’s united front work, minor parties and groups, hegemony and corporatism’, PhD thesis, December 1997, online, 332–334. ↩︎
  16. Groot, ‘Managing transitions: the Chinese Communist Party’s united front work, minor parties and groups, hegemony and corporatism’, 329, 340–341. ↩︎
  17. 党政干部统一战线知识读本 [Party and government cadre: united front knowledge reader], Huawen chubanshe, 2014, 80–104. ↩︎
  18. See Groot, ‘Managing transitions: the Chinese Communist Party’s united front work, minor parties and groups, hegemony and corporatism’, 156–163, for a discussion of the CPPCC’s creation in 1948. ↩︎
  19. Officially, the consultative system is ‘a democratic form and an institutional channel through which many things can be discussed and negotiated in a proper way’. See ‘What is a “new type of party system”?’, China.org.cn, 23 March 2018, online; In 2012, an American united front group specialising in educational exchanges even held what it claimed to be the world’s first ‘model CPPCC’ event: ‘Recap: The Ameson Foundation holds world’s first model CPPCC event’, Ameson, 2 August 2012, online. ↩︎
  20. ‘人民政协的组成和性质’ [The CPPCC’s make‑up and character], CPPCC, 14 September 2011, online. ↩︎
  21. Hu Zhi’an [胡治安], ‘知名民主人士的中共党籍问题’ [The issue of CCP membership of well‑known democratic figures], Yanhuang chunqiu, online; Xiao Yu [萧雨], ‘解密时刻: 统战内幕—前中共干部亲述’ [Declassified moment: inside the United Front—a former CCP cadre’s own account], Voice of America, 23 June 2017, online. ↩︎
  22. ‘中国共产党的对外交往——访中联部原部长朱良’ [The CCP’s external engagement—interview with former International Liaison Department minister Zhu Liang], China National Radio, n.d., online; European scholars Martin Hála and Jichang Lulu have called the International Liaison Department a ‘new comintern’, expanding its activities to foreign ‘bourgeois’ parties: Martin Hála, Jichang Lulu, A new Comintern for the new era: the CCP International Department from Bucharest to Reykjavik, Sinopsis, 16 August 2018, online. ↩︎
  23. Zhong Sheng, [钟声], ‘Op‑ed: China’s new type of party system enlightens world’, People’s Daily, 12 March 2018, online. ↩︎
  24. Toshi Yoshihara, A profile of China’s United Front Work Department, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2018, 46–48, online. ↩︎

Hacking democracies

Cataloguing cyber-enabled attacks on elections

Foreword

One of the great hopes for the internet was that it would herald a new era in the democratisation of information. To a large extent, it’s been successful. So successful, in fact, that global platforms, technology diffusion and mobility have brought some unintended consequences by enabling the rapid dissemination of disinformation and fake news.

We live in a time when trust in our democratic and other key institutions has declined, and this is compounded by new capabilities of adversaries seeking to interfere in our elections and to undermine people’s trust in those institutions.

In this policy brief, the writers explore areas where interference has been detected across the world and consider key learnings from those examples in order to develop policy responses for countering each type of interference.

Technology has the power to transform lives by reducing barriers to entry and creating greater equity so that all our citizens can participate in education and the economy. We want to live in a world where friction is removed and technology enhances our experience, where all citizens have access to the internet, and where we can vote electronically in elections. However, our interconnection needs to be safe and trusted, protecting and enhancing our democracies.

This brief starts an important national conversation, generating awareness of the approaches commonly taken by adversaries to spread disinformation, misinformation and fake news. It lays out a series of measures for managing risk, and serves as an educational resource for our citizens on what to keep an eye out for, and how to better distinguish reputable information from disinformation in real time.

Yohan Ramasundara
President, Australian Computer Society

What’s the problem?

Analysis of publicly known examples of cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections reveals key challenges. First, while perceptions of interference are widespread, the actors are few—Russia and China—and the effort is highly targeted. Russia is targeting the US and Europe (with a few forays into South America), while China targets its region (having, for the moment, reached as far as Australia).

Second, the methods used can be hard to pick up and democracies seem poorly equipped to detect intrusions, being traditionally focused on external intelligence collection. Adversaries are able to enter public debates, infiltrate legitimate activist networks and even enter the mainstream media as trusted commentators. Significant activity may be being missed. Finally, while opinion polling shows concerning levels of dissatisfaction with democracy and weakening trust in public institutions, it’s very difficult to assess the impact of election interference on those phenomena. It’s likely to have some impact but be outweighed by larger societal factors.

What’s the solution?

First, the response from democracies should be calibrated to the likely risk and adversary. The US and European states are clear targets of Russia; Indo-Pacific nations are targets of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Second, more effort is needed to detect foreign interference, including offline and non-state efforts. Because democracies have a natural aversion to government surveillance, a better answer than simply stepped-up government monitoring may be supporting non-profit, non-government initiatives and independent media.

Third, effort is needed to develop better ways to measure the impact of foreign interference to allow for a more informed decision on resourcing efforts to counter it. Notwithstanding the lack of current empirical data on impact, opinion polling points to a perception that foreign interference will occur and, in places such as the US, a view by many that the 2016 presidential election was swayed by it (a credible view, given the narrowness of the outcome). Research is needed to measure the effectiveness of different education and awareness efforts to address these concerns.

Fourth, public funding may be needed to better secure political parties and politicians from cyber intrusions. Finally, democracies need to impose costs on the two primary state actors: they should consider joint or regional action to make future or continued interference sufficiently costly to those states that they will no longer pursue it. Legislation may also be needed to make it more difficult for foreign adversaries to operate (being mindful of the differing objectives of the two main actors); this may be a second best for countries that find it too difficult to call out adversaries.

Introduction

In 2016, Russia comprehensively and innovatively interfered in the US presidential election, offering a template for how democracies around the world could be manipulated.1 Since then there have been 194 national-level elections in 124 countries and an additional 31 referendums.2 This report seeks to catalogue examples of foreign interference in those polls and group them into three ‘buckets’:

  • interference targeting voting infrastructure and voter turnout
  • interference in the information environment (to make the scope manageable, we have focused on interference surrounding elections, but it’s apparent that such efforts continue outside election periods as part of longer term efforts to manipulate societies)
  • longer term efforts to erode public trust in governments, political leadership and public institutions.

This research focused on cyber-enabled interference (including, for example, information operations that harness social media and breaches of email and data storage systems), but excluded offline methods (for example, the financing of political parties and the suborning of prominent individuals). 

The yardstick for counting an activity as interference was that proposed by former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who put it this way when introducing counter-foreign-interference laws in Australia in 2017: ‘we will not tolerate foreign influence activities that are in any way covert, coercive or corrupt.

That’s the line that separates legitimate influence from unacceptable interference.’3 A major issue has become the public perception that results may have been swayed, with consequences for the direction of these states’ policies and actions, together with a loss of public trust in democratic institutions and processes.

Multi-country Pew Research Center polling shows that there’s an increasing expectation among global publics that elections will suffer interference: majorities (including 65% of Australians) in 23 of 26 countries surveyed in 2018 said it was very or somewhat likely that a cyberattack would result in their elections being tampered with.4

In some cases, such as the 2016 US presidential election, polling shows that a large proportion of people (39% of US adults) feel that Russian meddling swung the election,5 which is probably the most valuable outcome Russia could have hoped for, given that it’s seeking to undermine confidence in US global leadership and the US public’s faith in the nation’s democratic process.6

Since that election, reports of foreign interference in democratic elections have continued to surface. This suggests a belief among adversary states that interference is serving their interests and that the costs of action are not sufficiently high to deter this behaviour.

Of course, foreign governments interfering in elections is nothing new.7 While the objectives might be similar to those of Cold War style efforts, the means are different. Today, a state such a Russia is able to reach more than a hundred million Americans through a single platform such as Facebook without sending a single operative into US territory.8 Or, as nearly happened in Ukraine, the official election results can be remotely altered to show a candidate who received just 1% of the vote as winning.9

And, significantly, a little effort goes a long way: in 2016, Russian operatives were able to organise two opposing groups to engage in a protest in front of the Islamic Da’wah Centre of Houston for ‘the bargain price of $200’.10 Having a big impact is now much easier, cheaper and less risky. For democratic governments, responding can be extremely difficult. The methods used by adversaries typically exploit treasured democratic principles such as free speech, trust and openness. Detection can be hard both because the methods are difficult to identify and because democracies avoid surveillance of their own domestic populations and debates (outside niche areas such as traditional criminal and terrorist activity). Typically, the bulk of intelligence resources is directed towards external collection, and domestic populations are rightly wary of increased government monitoring.

Democratic governments themselves can be obstacles: if the winning party believes it benefited from the foreign interference or would be delegitimised by admitting its scale, it can even mean the newly elected government will play down or ignore the interference. Tensions in the US in the wake of Russian interference in the 2016 election point to the potential for these sorts of issues to arise.11

Measuring levels of interference and adversary’s objectives is another challenge. Given the difficulty of detection and the variance in methods employed, it’s hard to compare relative levels of interference across elections. Objectives are also not always straightforward. Most efforts to interfere in elections are not about directly altering the vote count. Instead, many appear aimed at disrupting societies or undermining trust in important institutions. There also appear to be different overarching aims depending on the adversary involved.

Project overview and methodology

This research was generously supported by the Australian Computer Society and stemmed from a series of engagements with policymakers on countering election interference. Desk research and interviews focused on developing a database of cyber-enabled foreign interference in democratic elections. It was informed by a full-day workshop in London involving several electoral commissioner equivalents from around the world as well as the President of the Australian Computer Society. A key focus of the workshop was the development of a framework for mapping election interference with a view to improving the policy response.

The start date for the research was the 2016 US presidential election and the end date was April 2019. During that period, this research identified 194 national-level elections in 124 countries and an additional 31 referendums.

Using Freedom House’s Freedom in the world report,12 of the 124 states that have held national elections since November 2016, 53 are considered ‘free’, 45 ‘partly free’ and 26 ‘not free’. Given the focus of this report on democracies, we limited the research scope to the 97 countries that held elections and that were deemed free or partly free.

As noted above, examples of foreign interference were grouped into three buckets. This built off and expands on a framework in the International Cyber Policy Centre’s Securing democracy in the Digital Age report.13

Categorising incidents was an inexact science. Often there was a lack of publicly available information about the case (many media reports described ‘hacks’ without elaborating), or it might easily straddle more than one category. Consider the intrusion into Australia’s parliament and three political parties reported by Prime Minister Scott Morrison on 18 February 2019,14 suspected to have been carried out by Chinese state-sponsored actors. The intent behind this incident is still unclear.

Was it solely espionage or an act of foreign interference?15 The sophisticated state actor has not seemed to use any material obtained to interfere in the current election. That may be because of the discovery of the intrusions, or because the information obtained is being used for a different purpose (as suggested by ASPI’s Michael Shoebridge16). For the purposes of this report, it was classified as ‘long-term erosion of public trust’, given that the public reporting highlighted inadequate security
among core Australian institutions.

This report captures examples of interference that were executed (for example, Russian online disinformation campaigns that ran on social media during the 2016 US presidential election) and those that were discovered but not executed (such as Russians’ accessing of US voter rolls during that election without manipulating or using them).
 

Findings

Of the 97 national elections in free or partly free countries reviewed for this report during the period from 8 November 2016 to 30 April 2019, a fifth (20 countries) showed clear examples of foreign interference, and several countries had multiple examples (see the appendix to this report).17 It’s worth noting that confidence in attributions to foreign actors varied widely. In ideal circumstances, a government source made the attribution, but often the attribution was more informal. Our intention was not to provide an exhaustive list of every alleged case of foreign interference but instead to capture the spread of states experiencing the phenomenon and illustrative examples of different methods. Details on all examples identified through this research are set out in the appendix.

Country analysis

Of the 97 elections and 31 referendums reviewed, foreign interference was identified in 20 countries: Australia, Brazil, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Ukraine and the US.

Of those 20 states, 14 were deemed ‘free’ and 6 ‘partly free’. Just over half (12 of 20) of the states were in Europe, which is unsurprising given Russia’s leading role in this area (Table 1).

Table 1: Regional spread (alleged actor)

Table 1 shows the strong geographical link between the target and actor. With the exception of one anomalous case involving the UK (which was alleged to have supported a Yes campaign in a Montenegrin referendum), Russia was the only state interfering in European elections. Similarly, in the Indo-Pacific, China was the only actor (except for Indonesia, where Russia was also involved). Iran’s interference in Israel has a clear connection to its adversarial relationship. In the Americas, there’s more diversity among the actors, but Russia remains the dominant player.

China’s versus Russia’s motivations

Russia’s and China’s interference reflect different national approaches. For Russia, a key objective is to erode public trust in democracies and to undermine the idea that democracy is a superior system.18 This might be driven by President Putin’s personal drive to make the West ‘pay’ for its destruction of the Soviet bloc and by the desire to mount a case inside Russia that democracies are flawed and therefore not a model that Russians should aspire to. As a consequence, Russian interference is inherently destructive to democratic systems, even at the same time as Moscow may seek to promote a party or a candidate thought to be more sympathetic to its interests.19

Chinese interference seems more strategically focused on ensuring that its interests are promoted across all party lines. Unlike the Russian stance, one party’s interests don’t appear to be favoured at the expense of others (with the exception, perhaps, of Taiwan20). Instead, all consequential parties are in its crosshairs with a view to making them more sensitive to core CCP interests. China also seems to pursue a broader front of influencing activities (many of which aren’t captured by this report’s focus on cyber-enabled methods), which can include financial donations,21 aligning the policy interests and public comments of party figures to CCP political goals and suborning prominent individuals to advocate for Beijing’s interests. China doesn’t seem to be as openly intent on doing damage to the credibility of foreign political systems so much as aligning those systems to its strategic objectives.22

Methods

A review of the dataset reveals considerable repetition in methods. There are multiple examples of social media platforms being exploited to reach target populations, often used in concert with state-sponsored media outlets. There is, however, considerable variation in the way social media are exploited. This ranges from organising rallies and amplifying the voices of favoured groups to suppressing voter turnout and exacerbating existing divisions.23 There are also several examples of system breaches, again to pursue different ends, including stealing and leaking emails and accessing voter rolls.

Given the lack of detail in many media reports on foreign interference, it’s difficult to provide a list of the most common methods. Frequency of use also does not translate into impact. For example, the breach of one person’s email account (such as the account of Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair, John Podesta) can have much greater impact than any single social media post or perhaps all of them.

Types of interference

This section examines our three defined buckets of interference.

Targeting of voting infrastructure and voter turnout

Direct tampering with election results is perhaps the most affronting form of foreign interference because it most directly overturns the will of the people. 

Ukraine has long been one of the main targets of Russian election interference efforts and has also suffered the most egregious effort to alter the technical results of an election. As Mark Clayton reported back in 2014 (a date outside the scope of the mapping period covered by this report):

Only 40 minutes before election results were to go live on television at 8 p.m., Sunday, May 25, a team of government cyber experts removed a ‘virus’ covertly installed on Central Election Commission computers, Ukrainian security officials said later.

If it had not been discovered and removed, the malicious software would have portrayed ultra-nationalist Right Sector party leader Dmytro Yarosh as the winner with 37 percent of the vote (instead of the 1 percent he actually received) and Petro Poroshenko (the actually [sic] winner with a majority of the vote) with just 29 percent, Ukraine officials told reporters the next morning.24

There are multiple means by which adversary states could interfere with the technical results of elections. Various methods could be used to prevent citizens from being able to vote (for example, by rendering electronic voting booths unusable or corrupting the voter roll so eligible voters are removed and turned away from voting booths25) or reducing the turnout of certain voter groups with known dominant voting behaviours (for example, via online campaigns that encourage a boycott26 or targeted misinformation that has the effect of deterring certain voter groups27).

The result itself could be altered via various means. Electronic voting booths could be maliciously programmed to record a vote for Candidate A as a vote for Candidate B instead, the transmission of votes tallied at individual voting booths could be intercepted and altered, affecting the final tally, votes in the central tally room or system could be altered remotely or, as was attempted in Ukraine, the release of the vote outcome could be tampered with (a tactic unlikely to go unnoticed, but likely to cast doubt among some about the integrity of the poll and of the national electoral system).

Research for this report identified six countries that had experienced interference targeted at voting infrastructure and voter turnout: Colombia, Finland, Indonesia, North Macedonia, Ukraine and the US (Table 2).

Table 2: Targeting of voting infrastructure and voter turnout

Examples included the targeting of voter registration rolls in Colombia,28 Indonesia29 and 21 US states,30 a denial of service (DoS) attack on a Finnish web service used to publish vote tallies,31 a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Ukraine’s Central Election Commission,32 and the use of social media to suppress voter turnout in North Macedonia33 and in the US.34 In the US, an Oxford University report noted that Russian operatives tried to suppress the vote of African-Americans by pushing the narrative that ‘the best way to advance the cause of the African American community was to boycott the election and focus on other issues instead’.35 While it’s difficult to determine the effect of the disinformation campaign by Russia’s Internet Research Agency, the Pew Research Centre reported that the voter turnout of African-Americans fell in 2016 (see appendix, page 19).36

The attackers identified in public reports (sometimes speculatively) were Russia (in one instance, combined with Venezuela) and China. Russia was by far the dominant actor. 

Interference in the information environment around elections

It’s difficult to detect foreign interference during elections with high confidence in a timely manner.

Consider this example from Bret Schafer, which fooled multiple media outlets: Have you met Luisa Haynes? She was a prolific force in the #BlackLivesMatter community on Twitter. In just over a year, she amassed more than 50,000 followers; and her outspoken, viral takes on everything from Beyoncé to police brutality earned her hundreds of thousands of retweets and media coverage in more than two dozen prominent news outlets.

She was, on the surface, a symbol of a new generation of Black activists: young, female, and digitally savvy—except—she was fake.37

At the International Cyber Policy Centre, journalists periodically approach us about websites and social media accounts they suspect are run by foreign agents or trolls. Mostly, investigations lead to dead ends, or to apparently real people who are hard to definitively classify as foreign trolls rather than colourful citizens.

Now that the traditional media have lost their old gatekeeper role and control over the information environment, it’s far easier for foreign adversaries to inject themselves into national debates and much harder to trust what you’re reading and seeing. When Australians were asked in 2018 ‘Do you feel like the news you read or watch gives you balanced and neutral information?’, 54% said ‘never’ or ‘rarely’. There were similar results in democracies around the world38 (in historical terms, in the US the proportion of people reporting ‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in newspapers has dropped from a high of 39% in 1990 to 23% in 201839).

While avenues for altering the technical results of elections are limited, opportunities to manipulate the information environment are limited only by creativity. Methods might include amplifying a party’s existing narrative using social media accounts that have assiduously built up followers over lengthy periods,40 or creating and spreading disinformation to undermine a candidate (for example, the state-owned Russian news agency Sputnik calling French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron an agent of ‘the big American banking system’).41 It might involve infiltrating genuine activist groups and attempting to increase polarisation,42 or it could involve the creation of fake personas who provide inflammatory commentary on divisive issues, as with Luisa Haynes. Often such campaigns seek to prey on and exacerbate existing social cleavages with a view to exploiting them to manipulate the information environment in the desired direction.

While the impact of this manipulation isn’t as direct as interfering with key election infrastructure, its ease and cheapness, combined with the difficulty of timely detection, make it a preferred method. Foreign interference in the information environment was identified in 10 states: France, Israel, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Spain, Taiwan, Ukraine and the US (Table 3).

Table 3: Interference in the information environment

Examples included information disruption campaigns targeting French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron (such as the theft and release of 21,000 emails just before the final vote in the election—a technique likely to be of enduring utility for adversaries)43 and the spreading of disinformation by Russian media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik in Catalonia44 and Italy with headlines like ‘Migrant chaos, the beginning of a social war’45 or claiming in the Macedonian referendum that, depending on who won, Google would remove Macedonian from its list of recognised languages.46 Chinese-backed disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan were reported as using zombie accounts and China’s so-called ‘50 Cent Army’ of online trolls and commentators to amplify the dissemination of disinformation.47 In Ukraine, Russia sought to buy or rent Ukrainian Facebook accounts to disseminate disinformation.48 There was also an unusual case of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office being accused of funding British PR agency Stratagem International to help the Macedonian Government with its ‘Yes’ campaign on the changing of the country’s name, thereby opening up the opportunity for Macedonia to join the EU and NATO.49

Research identified four alleged actors: Russia (the most dominant by far), China, Iran and the UK.

Long-term erosion of public trust in public institutions

Perhaps the most pernicious aspect of foreign interference is the longer term corrosion of public trust in the institutions that underpin democracy.

For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Defending Democratic Institutions Project has looked at Russian efforts to weaken trust in the rule of law as administered by the justice systems in both the US and Europe.50 In Australia, China is alleged to have attacked the Australian Parliament in 2011 and 2019, as well as three political parties in 2019.51 And in several countries attacks on electoral commissions responsible for impartially conducting elections have been reported.52

If foreign adversaries can destroy trust in these pillar institutions and related organs of democracy, democracy quickly unwinds.

Making this phenomenon even harder to confront, it’s often not immediately clear whether a campaign is being run by a nation-state or by conspiracy-oriented individuals. During the Brexit vote in the UK, what appeared to be a conspiracy theory (that had first surfaced during the 2014 Scottish referendum) spread online, urging voters to use pens, not pencils, to complete their ballot papers.53

The not-so-subtle inference was that government officials were rubbing out ballots completed in pencil and changing people’s votes (figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1: ‘I voted in pencil’

Source: Professor Brian Cox, Twitter, 23 June 2016.

Figure 2: ‘Use pens plea’

Source: BBC News, 22 June 2016.

It’s difficult to know how damaging these sorts of campaigns are for public trust in critical democratic institutions or whether they’re state-backed. What’s apparent is that polling has picked up distrust in key electoral institutions. The Australian voter experience report revealed that just 42% of Australians have a great deal of confidence in the Australian Electoral Commission’s ability to conduct an election, while a further 43% have ‘some’ confidence.54 In the UK, just 21% reported that they were ‘very confident’ and 48% said they were ‘fairly confident’ that the 2015 election was well run.55 While electoral commissions are generally off voters’ radars, trust in democracy collapses if people lose trust in those organisations’ ability to conduct elections impartially.

More significantly, there’s also been a dramatic drop in levels of satisfaction with democracy in Australia. Although once again it’s hard to track a causal relationship, it seems likely that democracies experiencing rising dissatisfaction with democracy would be more vulnerable to interference. The Australian voter experience report noted that just 55% of Australians “are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country nowadays. This places Australia on the lower end of established democracies, which typically have rates of satisfaction that exceed two-thirds. Historical data indicates that there’s been a dramatic fall in satisfaction. Data from the Australian Election Study in 2007 indicated that 86% reported being satisfied with democracy, falling to 72% in 2013”.56 Surveys such as the Lowy Institute Poll have tracked this dissatisfaction with democracy and speculated about its causes, but with no definitive answers.57

The Democracy Perceptions Index 2018 provides hints to the growing levels of public distrust in democracies around the world. It found that 64% of the public in ‘free’ countries (as defined by Freedom House) said their government ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ acts in their interest, compared to 41% in ‘not free’ countries. In Australia, a third of Australian adults say the government ‘mostly’, ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ acts in their interest (67% say it does so ‘never’ or ‘rarely’).58 While this is a large proportion of the population, it hasn’t yet resulted in French-style yellow vest protestors.59

In Australia and elsewhere, it’s highly unlikely that this dissatisfaction is driven entirely by foreign interference. Anxiety about large economic and social changes brought about by globalisation and technological development could all be in play.60 Longitudinal Gallup surveys have also picked up a long downwards trend in average trust in public institutions (Figure 3).61

Figure 3: Americans’ average confidence in public institutions over time

Quantifying examples of the long-term erosion of public trust is perhaps the trickiest of tasks, as in many cases more immediate efforts to shape public opinion (such as spreading disinformation) also have the longer term impact of eroding public trust in the media and other institutions. Efforts to erode public trust also typically exploit existing societal cleavages,62 making detection difficult and any additional impact from interference on pre-existing divisions hard to measure. However, for the purposes of this research, 10 states were identified as having experienced efforts to create long-term erosion of public trust: Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Germany, Montenegro, Norway, the Netherlands, Singapore, Ukraine and the US (Table 4).

Table 4: Long-term erosion of public trust

Examples have included the use of social media bots in Brazil to question the democratic model,63 amplification by Russia using Twitter bots of far-right Alternative für Deutschland’s warnings about election fraud,64 and systematic efforts by Russia to weaken ‘faith in the rule of law as administrated by the justice system’ in the US through the use of disinformation and the exploitation of ‘legitimate criticisms of the justice system’.65

The two identified actors in this category were Russia and China.

Limitations

There are several notable limitations to this research.

First, we focused on states and therefore missed private actors that are distorting democratic debates in similar ways. For example, there have been several cases of the commercialisation of Russian-like disinformation campaigns. Consider the group in the Balkans that built up popular Facebook pages with titles such as ‘Australians against Sharia’ and ‘Aussie infidels’ that targeted Australians to generate ad revenue.66 Future research could usefully explore the impact that these groups are having and how to counter them.

Second, our focus was on public cases, which perhaps tends to favour the identification of Russian efforts, given Moscow’s more overt and detectable methods and the media’s growing familiarity with its approach. Parallel research on CCP methods that the International Cyber Policy Centre is preparing suggests that Beijing often uses techniques that are harder to detect and longer term and so may be underreported. A broader methodology is probably needed to capture difficult-to-spot influence activities such as subverting policy positions and decision-making as well as long-term campaigns to cultivate supportive political figures and voices and silence, pressure or sideline critics.67

Third, the focus on foreign state actors has, of course, excluded domestic efforts to harness these same techniques, for example by political parties and local activists that may also be contributing to voter dissatisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions.

Fourth, there has been a tendency to favour English-language sources.

Finally, the increasing ability to micro-target voters and the difficulty of detecting many of the types of interference reported here mean that many examples could be being missed in the online information arena. Consider the case of a Russian-operated fake Black Lives Matter Facebook page that was only reported as suspicious because it used the phrase ‘Don’t shoot’—an expression that genuine activists had stopped using.68 The shift by major platforms such as Facebook to move from public broadcasting to private messaging will only accentuate this challenge.69

Findings and recommendations

The motivation behind this research is that, by better understanding the methods being used and the targets of high-activity adversary states, democracies will be able to better assess their existing response and mitigation capabilities and adjust as necessary.

We make the following recommendations.

1. Targets are limited: respond accordingly

Despite the enormous amount of media coverage that’s been devoted to state-backed election interference, the phenomenon isn’t universal. From public accounts, there are two primary actors and they focus judiciously on states that matter to them. Democracies should calibrate their policy responses to the likely risk, methods and adversary. The US and European states are clear targets of the Russian Government; Indo-Pacific nations are targets of the CCP.

2. Build up detection capabilities

More effort is needed to detect foreign interference, including offline and non-state efforts (such as by for-profit groups that misuse social media platforms to stir up hate). Because democracies have a natural aversion to government surveillance, a better answer than simply stepped-up government monitoring may be supporting non-profit, non-government initiatives and independent media. These groups can more credibly monitor for interference and more easily engage at the community level. In smaller states, where local media outlets are disappearing, government subsidies may be needed to ensure sufficient scrutiny of local and state political groups (which are often feeder groups for national politics).

3. Fund research to measure impact and measure the effectiveness of education campaigns to address public concerns

Governments should fund research to develop better ways to measure the impact of foreign interference to allow for a more informed decision on resourcing efforts to counter it. Notwithstanding the lack of current empirical data on impact, opinion polling points to a perception that foreign interference will occur, and in places such as the US to widely held views that elections have been swayed. Various efforts have been made to respond, including fact-checking services,70 opening up social media data streams to election-oriented academic research,71 and legislation to counter fake news.72 Research is needed to understand which efforts are most effective, after which those tougher measures should be twinned with public awareness campaigns to address these concerns.

4. Publicly fund the defence of political parties

Political parties and politicians are clear targets of foreign adversaries. With their shoestring budgets and the requirement to scale up dramatically during election campaigns, they’re no match for the resources of sophisticated state actors. Politicians are also vulnerable, including through the use of their personal devices. There’s a strong public interest in preventing foreign states from being able to exploit breaches of both parties and individual politicians to undermine domestic political processes. Democratic governments should consider public funding to better protect all major political parties and to step up cybersecurity support to politicians.

5. Impose costs 

Democracies need to look at better ways of imposing costs on adversaries. Because of spikes in interference activity around elections, they can be prone to being picked off or to discounting interference if the party that won benefited from it. Democracies should consider concerted joint global or regional action that looks beyond their own particular cases as well as more traditional approaches such as retaliatory sanctions. Legislation may also be needed to make it more difficult for foreign adversaries to operate (being mindful of the differing objectives of the two main actors)—this may be a second best for countries that find it too difficult to call out adversaries. 

6. Look beyond the digital

Russian interference is detectable, if not immediately, then often after the event. This has generated a natural focus on Moscow’s methods and activities. However, there are many more subtle ways to interfere in democracies. Research like this that focuses on digital attack mechanisms also misses more traditional and potentially more corrosive tactics, such as the provision of funding to political parties by foreign states and their proxies and the long-term cultivation of political influence by foreign state actors. Australia has recently passed legislation to counter more subtle forms of foreign interference73 that were starting to be detected.74 States, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific, should be attuned to these types of interference and make preparations to prevent, counter and expose them.

7. Look beyond states

Troubling public perceptions of democracy are unlikely to be explained by foreign interference alone. Foreign interference may, however, magnify or exploit underlying sources of tension and grievance in particular societies. A thorough response by government and civil society needs to consider a wider set of issues and threat actors, including trolls working for profit, and the health of the political and media environment (including by ensuring that local and regional media remain viable or are adequately funded).
 

Appendix

Examples of foreign interference (November 2016 to April 2019)

Sources for all examples can be found in Table 5 of the accompanying report.


ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

The ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre’s mission is to shape debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues, informed by original research and close consultation with government, business and civil society.
It seeks to improve debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues by:

  1. conducting applied, original empirical research
  2. linking government, business and civil society
  3. leading debates and influencing policy in Australia and the Asia–Pacific.

The work of ICPC would be impossible without the financial support of our partners and sponsors across government, industry and civil society. This research was made possible thanks to the generous support of the Australian Computer Society (ACS).

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  1. This has been comprehensively documented; see, for example, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Background to ‘Assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent US elections’: the analytic process and cyber incident attribution, US Government, 6 January 2017, online; PN Howard, B Ganesh, D Liotsiou, J Kelly, The IRA, social media and political polarization in the United States, 2012–2018, Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford University, 2018, online. ↩︎
  2. ElectionGuide: democracy assistance and elections news, online. ↩︎
  3. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Speech introducing the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017’, 7 December 2017, online. ↩︎
  4. Jacob Poushter, Janell Fetterolf, International publics brace for cyberattacks on elections, infrastructure, national security, Pew Research Center, 9 January 2019, online. ↩︎
  5. ‘Americans’ views on Russia, the 2016 election, and US–Russian relations (trends)’, news release, Gallup, August 2018, online. ↩︎
  6. Matthew Cole, Richard Esposito, Sam Biddle, Ryan Grim, ‘Top-secret NSA report details Russian hacking effort days before 2016 election’, The Intercept, 6 June 2017, online; Zeynep Tufekci, ‘The election has already been hacked’, New York Times, 3 November 2018, online. ↩︎
  7. Ishaan Tharoor, ‘The long history of the US interfering with elections elsewhere’, Washington Post, 13 October 2016, online. ↩︎
  8. ‘As many as 146 million people on Facebook may have received information from Russian agency, Zuckerberg says’, PBS News Hour, 9 April 2018, online. ↩︎
  9. Mark Clayton, ‘Ukraine election narrowly avoided “wanton destruction” from hackers’, Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 2014, online. ↩︎
  10. Claire Allbright, ‘A Russian Facebook page organized a protest in Texas. A different Russian page launched the counterprotest’, Texas Tribune, 1 November 2017, online. ↩︎
  11. Karen Yourish, Troy Griggs, ‘8 US intelligence groups blame Russia for meddling, but Trump keeps clouding the picture’, New York Times, 2 August 2018, online. ↩︎

Picking flowers, making honey

The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities.

What’s the problem?

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is expanding its research collaboration with universities outside of China. Since 2007, the PLA has sponsored more than 2,500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad and has developed relationships with researchers and institutions across the globe.1

This collaboration is highest in the Five Eyes countries, Germany and Singapore, and is often unintentionally supported by taxpayer funds.2 Australia has been engaged in the highest level of PLA collaboration among Five Eyes countries per capita, at six times the level in the US. Nearly all PLA scientists sent abroad are Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members who return to China on time.

Dozens of PLA scientists have obscured their military affiliations to travel to Five Eyes countries and the European Union, including at least 17 to Australia, where they work in areas such as hypersonic missiles and navigation technology. Those countries don’t count China as a security ally but rather treat it as one of their main intelligence adversaries.3

The activities discussed in this paper, described by the PLA as a process of ‘picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’ (异国采花,中华酿蜜), risk harming the West’s strategic advantage.4

Helping a rival military develop its expertise and technology isn’t in the national interest, yet it’s not clear that Western universities and governments are fully aware of this phenomenon.5 Some universities have failed to respond to legitimate security concerns in their engagement with China. Current policies by governments and universities have not fully addressed issues like the transfer of knowledge and technology through collaboration with the PLA. Clear government policy towards universities working with the PLA is also lacking.6

What’s the solution?

Understanding and responding to PLA collaboration will require closer engagement between governments and universities. While universities haven’t self-regulated on this issue and haven’t controlled the associated security risks, universities and researchers will not effectively limit the risks of PLA collaboration on their own until governments develop clear policies on it.

Governments need to explore a wider range of tools for limiting technology transfer, including better scrutiny of visa applications by Chinese military scientists and further legislation targeting military end users.

Governments should also consider increasing funding to strategic science and technology fields, while actively limiting problematic foreign investment in those fields. Universities must recognise the risks of such collaboration and seek to learn the extent and nature of their collaboration with the PLA by actively working with government, civil society and security professionals.

Introduction

In 2017, the head of the American Association for the Advancement of Science said that ‘Scientific progress depends on openness, transparency and the free flow of ideas.’7 This collaborative and open spirit, including collaboration with Chinese scientists, has led to some of the great scientific achievements of recent times.8

While countries such as Australia and the US pride themselves on their scientific achievements, their universities and research institutes face limited or declining domestic funding.9 To address these issues, many universities have turned to China—an emerging scientific powerhouse that has sought to build ties to scientific communities around the world.10 This collaboration has generally been a productive and welcome part of the Australia–China relationship. 

The Chinese military has also ridden this wave of research collaboration, sponsoring more than 2,500 scientists to travel to universities in technologically advanced countries such as Australia as students or visiting scholars over the past decade.11 The volume of peer-reviewed literature produced by PLA scientists in collaboration with foreign scientists each year has grown steadily since 2008, following increases in the number of PLA scientists sent abroad (Figure 1).12 Those scientists work in strategic and emerging technology sectors such as quantum physics, signal processing, cryptography, navigation technology and autonomous vehicles.

The PLA’s program of sending scientists abroad is different from standard military exchanges, in which military officers visit each other’s institutions. Those open exchanges build understanding, communication and relationships between militaries.

Figure 1: PLA collaboration, as measured by the number of peer-reviewed articles co-authored by PLA scientists with overseas scientists, 2006 to 2017

In contrast, the PLA National University of Defense Technology (NUDT, 解放军国防科学技术大学) appears to conceive of its military exchanges separately from its international research ties, which are concentrated in foreign universities and not military institutions.13 Scientists sent abroad by the PLA have minimal or no interaction with military personnel in their host countries. Some of those travelling overseas have actively used cover to disguise their military affiliations, claiming to be from non-existent academic institutions.

Around half of those sent abroad are PhD scholars who either complete their doctorates overseas or spend up to two years as visiting PhD scholars and who can usually be identified by searching peer-reviewed literature. While most come from NUDT, the Army Engineering University is another major source.14 The remaining half are sent overseas for short-term trips, spending up to a year as visiting scholars. Few of those scientists have left online traces of their time overseas.

While foreign universities’ ties with the PLA have grown, it isn’t clear that universities have developed an understanding of the PLA and how their collaboration with it differs from familiar forms of scientific collaboration. To date, there’s been no significant public discussion on why universities should be directly contributing to the technology of a non-allied military. Importantly, there’s also little evidence that universities are making any meaningful distinction between collaboration with the Chinese military and the rest of their collaboration with China.

A handful of universities have strongly defended their collaboration with the PLA. Among universities in Five Eyes countries, the University of New South Wales (UNSW) has published the most peer-reviewed literature in collaboration with PLA scientists. After attracting scrutiny for this collaboration, the university’s deputy vice-chancellor wrote, ‘Any fears that our intellectual property or security is undermined through our work with international partners are entirely unfounded.’15

Australia’s Curtin University has described its collaboration with the PLA in similar terms, insisting that work by its scientists with PLA experts on explosions and projectiles doesn’t violate any laws and is civilian research.16

Government research agencies have also engaged in collaboration with the PLA. For example, researchers at the Australian Government’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) have collaborated with NUDT scientists on cloud computing technology.

Those same NUDT scientists were using cloud computing technology for combat simulations.17 Large sums of government funds have been used for collaboration with PLA scientists. One professor at UNSW, for instance, worked with PLA scientists using Australian Research Council grants worth $2.3 million.18 Internationally, defence funding has also been used for research with PLA scientists; for example, a paper written by University of Manchester scientists with a visiting student from NUDT lists US Air Force and Navy grants as funding sources.19

International military–civil fusion

In China, the PLA’s overseas research collaboration is described in frank terms. The PLA Daily uses the saying ‘Picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’ to explain how it seeks to leverage overseas expertise, research and training to develop better military technology.20

This is one aspect of what China calls ‘military–civil fusion’ (军民融合). The term refers to China’s efforts to improve its military’s ability to take advantage of the creativity of the civilian sector and develop its own indigenous military–industrial complex. Described by PLA experts as a ‘cornerstone of PRC national defense reform’, military–civil fusion is helping to drive the modernisation of the PLA.21

So important is military–civil fusion to President Xi Jinping’s military reforms that he described it earlier this year as a prerequisite for building strategic capabilities and a strong military.22

Illustrating the benefits that the PLA obtains from its overseas research collaboration, a publication run by China’s Ministry of Education stated that NUDT’s collaboration with the University of Cambridge to train visiting PLA students will ‘greatly raise the nation’s power in the fields of national defence, communications, anti-jamming for imaging and high-precision navigation’.23 Likewise, before travelling to Sweden for doctoral studies in quantum physics, an NUDT scientist was told by his supervisor, ‘Without breakthroughs in physics, how can there be rapid developments in weaponry?’24

Figure 2: Lieutenant General Yang Xuejun (2nd from right) and Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission, in July 2017

Lieutenant-General Yang Xuejun (杨学军, Figure 2), who oversaw a substantial rise in NUDT’s overseas links when he was its president from 2011 to 2017, appears to be one of the key figures behind this phenomenon. NUDT, as the Chinese military’s largest science and technology university, can be seen as representative of broader initiatives in this area. The university is the main source of PLA scientists studying abroad and by 2013 had reportedly sent more than 1,600 scientists overseas as students or visiting scholars, including roughly a third of its PhD scholars.25 An article written by NUDT scholars claims that the university received 300m renminbi ($A60m) from the Chinese government to send 765 graduate students to study abroad.26 According to General Yang, who has implied that NUDT’s overseas ties are a form of military–civil fusion, the university ‘has already reaped great benefits from going down the open university path and the military–civil fusion road’.27

General Yang’s recent promotion to membership of the 205-member 19th CCP Central Committee and to leadership of the Academy of Military Sciences, the PLA’s premier research institution, reflects Xi Jinping’s emphasis on ‘rejuvenating the military with science and technology’.28 It was probably also a recognition of the success with which Yang developed NUDT’s international ties.

Yang, himself a supercomputer expert, has collaborated extensively with UNSW and ran the program to develop the Tianhe-1A supercomputer, once ranked as the world’s fastest supercomputer.29 The NUDT supercomputer program’s role in nuclear weapons testing led to NUDT being placed on the US Government’s Entity List in 2015, meaning that the university faces stricter export controls, yet substantial numbers of NUDT scientists continue to train outside China, including in the US, the UK and Australia.30

The PLA encourages scientists to work on areas of interest to the military while they’re overseas. For example, a 2016 article by NUDT specialists in graduate student education recommends that, in choosing where to study overseas, students’ first priority should be the relevance of the research direction of an overseas institution to their work in China, as they ‘must comprehensively consider the continuity of their research work when in China with that when they are studying overseas’.31 When students are overseas, the report adds, they should ‘fully take advantage of the cutting-edge research conditions and environment abroad’ and ‘map out the arrangements of their overseas research and their plans for research after returning to China’. This alignment of domestic and overseas work indicates that the cases of PLA scientists gaining skills while in Australia that they then use for military projects aren’t outliers; they’re representative examples.32

Sources of and destinations for PLA scientists

PLA scientists come from a wide range of institutions and disciplines within the Chinese military. Analysing peer-reviewed publications co-authored by PLA scientists and overseas scientists indicates that the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Germany were, in that order, the top five countries engaged in research collaboration with the PLA in 2017 (Figure 3). Those countries appear to be the primary destinations for PLA scientists sent abroad.

Figure 3: The top 10 countries for PLA collaboration, as measured by peer-reviewed literature co-authored by PLA scientists, 2006 to 2017

PLA scientists sent abroad as visiting scholars came from institutions such as:

  • the Northwestern Institute of Nuclear Technology (西北核技术研究所), which works on nuclear and high-power microwave weapons
  • the Chemical Defense Institute of the Academy of Military Sciences (军事科学院防化研究院), which specialises in chemical weapons research and has sent a sarin gas expert overseas
  • the Navy Submarine Academy (海军潜艇学院) in Qingdao
  • the Armored Forces Engineering Academy (装甲兵工程学院) in Beijing, which works on tank technology
  • the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center (中国空气动力研究与发展中心), which has sent scramjet researchers to study overseas
  • the Rocket Force Engineering University (火箭军工程大学), which conducts research for China’s missile programs
  • the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology (装备指挥技术学院), which in 2007 sent a specialist in antisatellite weaponry to the University of Michigan using civilian cover.33

The volume of peer-reviewed literature co-authored by PLA researchers and overseas researchers is a rough indicator of the level of PLA collaboration at each university. Figure 3 shows that the leading countries for PLA collaboration by this measure for 2017 were, in order, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Germany, indicating that they’re likely to be the main destinations for PLA scientists studying abroad. Singapore, Sweden and the Netherlands are other major destinations for PLA scientists. Over the past decade, Australia has been engaged in the highest level of this collaboration among the Five Eyes countries per capita, at six times the level in the US.

It’s also possible to estimate the number of PLA scientists sent to each country since 2007, based on the above findings.34 Approximately 500 Chinese military scientists were sent to each of the UK and the US, roughly 300 each to Australia and Canada and more than 100 each to Germany and Singapore. Hundreds more have been sent to other countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and France.

Figure 4, using the same dataset, shows the top 10 universities outside China for PLA collaboration. Nanyang Technological University in Singapore has the highest level of PLA collaboration, followed closely by UNSW in Australia. Other universities in Canada, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands also engage in high levels of collaboration with the PLA.35

Figure 4: The top 10 universities outside of China for PLA collaboration, as measured by the number of peer-reviewed publications, 2006 to 2017

The PLA’s links to universities across the world go beyond student admissions. The Chinese military, through its own universities and research institutions, has worked to build relationships with overseas universities and leading overseas researchers. A 2014 document published by NUDT claimed that the university had recruited 20 foreign nationals as teachers and ‘established academic relationships with over 100 universities and research units in over 50 countries and regions’.36

Scientists from Australia, the UK and the US are listed as potential doctoral supervisors for NUDT students in 2018.37

NUDT has also built ties with overseas universities at the institutional level. For example, NUDT’s Quantum Information Interdisciplinary Talent Training Program cooperates with the University of Cambridge’s Cavendish Laboratory.38 The People’s Daily claimed that, in addition to agreements with Oxford and Cambridge, NUDT has established ‘overseas study bases’ at institutions including Harvard University.39 New Zealand’s Massey University also signed a memorandum of understanding with NUDT in 2008.40

Maintaining loyalty to the CCP

The PLA, as the armed wing of the CCP, insists that all overseas party members strictly abide by ‘external exchange discipline standards’.41 According to the PLA Daily, ‘the openness of internationally expanding talent cultivation does not represent a “relaxation”, and we certainly cannot “let go”.’42 General Yang Xuejun has also specifically warned of the need to carefully manage military secrets while increasing the university’s openness.43

Those permitted to study overseas go through intensive training prior to their departure and are ‘all budding shoots with good grades and strong potential for innovation’.44 Alongside academic credentials, political credentials are also of key importance for military scientists hoping to study abroad. The PLA Daily warns that, if students sent overseas ‘develop issues with their politics and ideology, the consequences would be inconceivable (后果不堪设想)’.45 NUDT therefore appears to sponsor only CCP members for overseas study and works hard to maintain their loyalty to the party and negate ‘all kinds of harmful ideologies’.46 Reportedly, all 200 students and researchers from NUDT who were studying or visiting overseas in 2013 were party members.47

The People’s Daily claimed in 2013 that students sent overseas by NUDT had established eight party branches overseas and organised events for party members, so that ‘personnel studying abroad would keep their convictions rock-solid’ (坚守信念如磐).48 Another report from 2015 claimed that NUDT’s College of Optoelectric Science and Engineering alone had established 10 overseas party branches.49 More recent reports hint that such branches are still being established. For example, party media reported in October 2017 that students from one of NUDT’s colleges had established a WeChat group for the college’s more than 30 students overseas to study the 19th Party Congress.50 ‘Their red hearts,’ the report concluded, ‘look to the party.’

Party branches have also been used to coerce overseas Chinese scholars. An investigation by Foreign Policy found that some visiting students from Chinese universities who formed party branches abroad were asked to report on any subversive opinions held by their classmates.51 It’s probable that similar kinds of pressure are exerted on overseas PLA researchers.

Online communication forms an important part of PLA efforts to maintain discipline among overseas personnel and is complemented by in-person contact. One report stated that students from NUDT’s College of Optoelectric Science and Engineering ‘regularly chat with College leaders by video call and exchange emails with NUDT academic supervisors and student cadres to discuss their thoughts, exchange ideas on academic matters, and clarify points of interest’.52 Regulations on the political education of overseas students by the same NUDT college include provisions for ‘overseas inspection’ and for students to return to China in the middle of their study for ‘remedial education’.

One NUDT professor used a trip to an overseas conference as an opportunity to meet eight NUDT scientists studying in the region to ‘pass on the greetings and requests of party organisations’. The regulations also include provisions for ‘joint education and interaction with families’, which may imply that pressure on the family members of overseas PLA scientists is used to maintain discipline.53

The close watch that the PLA keeps on its overseas scientists helps ensure that all those sent abroad return to the Chinese military. NUDT, for example, requires that those applying to study abroad show their intent to return to ‘serve the construction of the nation, national defence and the military’.54

The PLA Daily claimed in 2013 that all the students whom NUDT had sent abroad in recent years returned on time to ‘become key forces in their work units’.55

Institutes that don’t exist: deception by PLA scientists

While most scientists sent abroad by the PLA appear to be open about which institutions they come from, this report has identified two dozen new cases of PLA scientists travelling abroad using cover to obscure their military affiliations. In at least 17 of these cases, PLA scientists used cover to travel to Australia. These scientists use various kinds of cover, ranging from the use of misleading historical names for their institutions to the use of names of non-existent institutions.

Features of deception by the PLA

An article from 2002 on the website of a Chinese overseas study agency offers insights into the use of cover. In response to a question asking whether having graduated from a military institution would affect one’s ability to get an overseas visa, the company responded: 

Many military colleges and military units externally have common names (民间称呼) that don’t reveal their military characteristics. NUDT, for example, is externally known as Changsha Institute of Technology. This is the best way [to avoid having your visa application rejected].56

The Changsha Institute of Technology was a PLA institution subsumed by NUDT in 1975.57 While the quote above doesn’t come from an official source, it at least indicates how these unsophisticated but nonetheless effective covers are understood as tools for hiding one’s military background.

Besides using non-existent institutions with innocuous-sounding names as cover, PLA members also claim to be from real civilian institutions in the same regions as their military units. New Zealand MP Yang Jian, for example, who taught intelligence officers at the PLA Foreign Languages Institute in Luoyang, claimed in his New Zealand residency application to have worked at Luoyang University.58 Before moving to New Zealand in 1999, Yang received an Australian Government aid scholarship to study at the Australian National University, earning a master’s degree and doctorate in international relations. During that period, he interned at the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, and headed the Canberra Chinese Students and Scholars Association, which retains intimate ties to the Chinese Embassy to this day.59 Yang told media, ‘the system asked me to use the partner university,’ referring to Luoyang University.60

A number of PLA scientists using cover to travel abroad have created LinkedIn profiles using their cover institutions, which may have been used to shore up their claimed affiliations while overseas.61

The use of cover appears to be managed differently by each institution, some of which use cover far more often than others.62 Cover is also not used consistently within each institution. As described below, PLA Information Engineering University (PLAIEU) researchers have both used cover and openly stated their affiliation at the same conferences. It’s unclear whether this indicates that the use of cover is up to the discretion of each researcher or perhaps that it relates to the sensitivity of a researcher’s work or position in the PLA.

NUDT appears to no longer use the ‘Changsha Institute of Technology’ as cover, but it engages in a different kind of deception. A document published by NUDT for students hoping to study abroad advises them that, when providing documentation in their applications to foreign institutions, ‘military and political courses can be excluded’ from their academic records.63 This appears designed to mislead overseas authorities, universities and researchers by downplaying the extent to which NUDT is a military institution and to which these students are military scientists.

The Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology

Scientists from the PLA Rocket Force Engineering University (RFEU, 火箭军工程大学)64, a key research base for the PLA Rocket Force, claim to be from the ‘Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology’ (西安高技术研究所), which appears to only exist on paper.

At least five RFEU scientists claiming to be from the Xi’an Research Institute have travelled overseas as visiting scholars, including one of the PLA’s leading missile experts, Major General Hu Changhua (胡昌华), and three of his close associates at RFEU. General Hu (Figure 5), who heads RFEU’s Missile Testing and Control Simulation Experimental Teaching Centre, visited the University of Duisburg–Essen in Germany for four months in 2008.65 It’s unclear what he worked on in Germany, as he didn’t publish any papers while there, but his work for the PLA focuses on flight control systems and fault diagnosis for missiles.66

Two RFEU scientists who frequently publish with Hu, Zhou Zhijie (周志杰)67 and Wang Zhaoqiang (王兆强),68 were visiting scholars at universities in England; they claim in their English publications to be from the Xi’an Research Institute.69

Figure 5: Major General Hu Changhua, profiled by China Central Television’s military affairs channel in 2016:

‘Right now I’m a professor at RFEU and head of the Military Key Lab on Missile Testing and Control Technology.’ 

Figure 5: Major General Hu Changhua, profiled by China Central Television’s military affairs channel in 2016: ‘Right now I’m a professor at RFEU and head of the Military Key Lab on Missile Testing and Control Technology.’


Source: CCTV, 28 October 2016, YouTube.

Hu Xiaoxiang: a case study

Identifying the Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology as a cover institute helps shed light on the January 2015 expulsion from Norway of a Chinese scientist and his supervisor, a dual citizen of Germany and Iran. The expulsion came after Norwegian authorities determined that the work of the Chinese scientist, later named in court as Hu Xiaoxiang (扈晓翔), could be used to develop hypersonic cruise missiles (Figure 6).70

Figure 6: Hu Xiaoxiang

Hu wrote five papers with his supervisor at the University of Agder, all of which listed the Xi’an Research Institute as his affiliation. The papers focused on air-breathing hypersonic vehicles, which travel at over five times the speed of sound and ‘can carry more payload than ordinary flight vehicles’.71 Hu’s work was supported by a Norwegian Government grant for offshore wind energy research.72

Besides his affiliation with the Xi’an Research Institute, there’s a large body of evidence tying Hu to RFEU. The website of RFEU’s missile research centre states that Hu Xiaoxiang won an award in 2014 for his PhD thesis on hypersonic aircraft, supervised by General Hu Changhua.73 The website also says that in 2014 he received 250,000 renminbi (A$50,000) from the Chinese Government for a three-year research project on hypersonic aircraft (Figure 7).74 In 2016, he was described as a lecturer at the centre, which received 14 awards for missile research between 2010 and 2014.75 In some publications, Hu also listed the Harbin Institute of Technology, a civilian university heavily engaged in military research, as a second affiliation.76

Relations between China and Norway were put on ice when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010, and the Chinese Government was quick to attack Norway for Hu’s expulsion.77 Only in December 2016 did the two countries ‘normalise’ diplomatic relations. Public statements by Norwegian authorities didn’t explain the Chinese scientist’s military affiliation or mention the Xi’an Research Institute, as the information was likely classified.

Figure 7: A paper published by Hu Xiaoxiang shortly after his expulsion from Norway, stating an affiliation with RFEU in the Chinese version of the abstract but the Xi’an Research Institute in the English version.

A few months later, in September 2015, a court overturned the expulsions. Hu’s lawyer stated after the trial that ‘there is no evidence in the case that my client is part of research collaboration on missiles and weapons with China.’78 The University of Agder lauded the decision as a win for academic freedom.

The Norwegian Government later successfully appealed the overturning of Hu’s supervisor’s expulsion. However, it’s unclear whether any appeal was made in Hu’s own case, which hasn’t been made publicly available.79 Neither the Xi’an Research Institute, Hu Changhua nor RFEU was mentioned in the judge’s ruling on the German-Iranian supervisor’s case or any coverage of the expulsions.

The Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping

Among the 40 Chinese military scientists listed as presenting papers at the 9th International Symposium on Mobile Mapping Technology, nine claimed to be from an institution with no apparent military affiliation.80 Most of the other 30 military scientists at the conference, hosted by UNSW in December 2015, were openly from NUDT and a research institute of China North Industries Group Corporation (also known as Norinco Group), China’s largest arms manufacturer; the rest came mainly from the PLA Information Engineering University.

The nine claimed to be from the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping. This institute, which was officially known as the PLA Institute of Surveying and Mapping, no longer exists, having been subsumed in 1999 by PLAIEU—itself a major player in cyber operations and a key training ground for signals intelligence officers.81 The Zhengzhou Institute appears to live on as cover for PLA scientists interacting with foreigners. Nearly 300 peer-reviewed papers have been published by authors claiming to be from the institute.82

The use of the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping as cover doesn’t stop at international conferences. Numerous examples of visiting scholars claiming to be from there have been uncovered for this report. They include Zhu Xinhui (朱新慧), a lecturer at PLAIEU specialising in navigation technology, who visited UNSW from 2015 to 2016.83 In numerous journal articles and in the program of the mobile mapping conference mentioned above, however, she is described as being from the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping.84

Guo Jianfeng (郭建锋), an associate professor at PLAIEU, visited Curtin University for a year in 2014. A specialist on navigation system data processing, Guo was described on the website of Curtin University’s Global Navigation Satellite Systems Research Centre as being on ‘sabbatical leave from the Department of Geodesy of the Institute of Surveying and Mapping, Zhengzhou, China’.85

The Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute

Another cover institute, the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute (ZISTI), which appears to exist only on paper, has also been widely used by PLAIEU scientists to publish research and travel overseas. More than 1,300 pieces of peer-reviewed literature have been authored by individuals claiming to be from ZISTI.86

One paper in a Chinese-language journal by a PLAIEU researcher, which includes an English version of the abstract and author information, clearly shows that ZISTI is a cover institute (Figure 8). The paper’s Chinese text describes the first author as affiliated with PLAIEU, but the English version describes the
same author as affiliated with ZISTI.87 Nearly all of the authors sampled who claimed an affiliation with ZISTI could be shown to be working at PLAIEU.

Figure 8: Chinese and English versions of a paper published by a PLAIEU scientist, demonstrating the use of the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute as cover.

Scientists claiming to be from ZISTI have attended international conferences both inside and outside China. For example, seven researchers affiliated with ZISTI are listed in the program of a conference on signal processing at the Gold Coast in Australia in 2014. Experts from American, Australian and Korean
defence research agencies were also in attendance.88

As with the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping, ZISTI has been used as cover for PLA scientists travelling overseas as visiting scholars. For example, Zhu Yijun (朱义君) is an associate professor at PLAIEU specialising in signals engineering.89 Claiming to be from ZISTI, in 2011 he visited Canada’s McMaster University, where he worked on wireless communications technology with wide-ranging military applications.90

PLAIEU scientists claiming to be from ZISTI have also travelled to the US as visiting scholars and for conferences.91

Espionage and intellectual property theft

In addition to their overt activities, PLA researchers, especially those who haven’t been forthcoming about their military affiliations, may engage in espionage or steal intellectual property while overseas. The PLA engages in such high levels of espionage that in 2014 the US Government took the unusual step of publicly indicting five Chinese military hackers.92 Military scientists abroad who regularly communicate with superiors in China, receive visits by superiors while overseas and return home in the middle of their time abroad for ‘remedial education’, as described in the examples outlined above, offer safe and convenient channels for Chinese intelligence agencies to access sensitive information from overseas.93

Amateur collectors with STEM expertise have been implicated in a high proportion of intellectual property theft and espionage cases involving China.94 Scientists and engineers involved in military research projects, while they might not have received formal training as spies, are uniquely qualified to identify and exfiltrate valuable information to overcome specific hurdles in the development of new technologies.

Should universities collaborate with the PLA?

Assessing the costs and benefits of research collaboration with the PLA shows that it comes with significant security risks while offering unclear benefits. It isn’t in the national interest of most of the countries examined in this report to help build the capabilities of a rival military. Other forms of cooperation with the Chinese military, such as joint exercises and exchanges that build understanding and communication, are largely beneficial but distinct from the kinds of research collaboration addressed in this report.

The benefits of research collaboration with the Chinese military are difficult to measure, but could include the following:

  • Training PLA scientists and working with them leads to scientific developments and published research while attracting some funding. 
  • A small proportion of collaboration with the PLA appears sufficiently transparent and falls into areas of fundamental research such that the benefits may outweigh security risks. One possible example is cooperation between the American and Chinese governments on the multinational Daya Bay Reactor Neutrino Experiment, which involves NUDT.

A number of benefits usually associated with research collaboration with militaries and foreign countries haven’t been observed in PLA collaboration:

  • PLA collaboration doesn’t lead to long-term improvement in the talent of institutions and countries accepting PLA scientists, as the PLA claims that 100 per cent of scientists sent abroad by NUDT in the years before 2013 returned to China on time.95 
  • The forms of PLA collaboration studied in this report don’t promote understanding and relationships between militaries, as they aren’t military exchanges and often aren’t overt.
  • While overseas, PLA scientists remain under the close watch of the CCP, which works to ensure that they remain loyal and aren’t influenced by their experience living in free societies. 
  • It’s improbable that PLA scientists working with overseas civilian researchers would share with or disclose to those researchers any significant research breakthroughs of military value.

There are many risks and costs associated with current approaches to training and collaborating with PLA scientists:

  • Training PLA scientists improves the scientific talent and knowledge of a military treated by many as a strategic competitor.96
  • PLA scientists often engage in deception in their interactions with foreign institutions and their staff, making it difficult for those collaborating with them to take appropriate security precautions.
  • PLA scientists could gather intelligence and steal technology while they’re overseas, especially if they’re hiding their military affiliations.
  • Failures to address concerns about PLA collaboration and to develop policies differentiating it from wider engagement with China risk tarring all research ties with China with the same brush.
  • Research collaboration with the PLA contributes to technology that may be used against Australia and its partners in a conflict or for intelligence collection.
  • Universities with ties to the PLA risk eroding trust between themselves and funders of research, such as defence research agencies, scientific agencies and industry.
  • Universities risk reputational damage by collaborating with a non-allied military.
  • Public funding worth millions of dollars is being used for collaboration with a non-allied military, with little to no input from taxpayers.

Current policy and legislation are inadequate

Export controls are the primary mechanism by which countries seek to manage the supply of sensitive technology and goods to overseas entities. However, the ability of export control laws to effectively manage the risks posed by PLA research collaboration is limited. In Australia, few cases of research or cooperation contrary to our national interests are believed to have been prevented through the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012.97 The current review of the Act offers an opportunity to address some of these limitations.

There are a few reasons for these difficulties. First, intangible transfer of technology—the primary form of technology transfer taking place through the kinds of collaboration studied in this paper— is extremely difficult to control in practice because it doesn’t involve the export of physical goods.98 Second, the Act doesn’t regulate the supply of controlled technology, which includes instruction and training, to individuals in Australia even if they’re PLA members. Third, some of this collaboration covers emerging technologies, such as quantum physics, that are important but not included in the Defence and Strategic Goods List, as their applications aren’t yet fully known. Export control lists tend to be slow to incorporate emerging technologies, so regulatory power can come well after issues become apparent. Fourth, the Act doesn’t regulate the supply of controlled technology by Australians when they’re outside of Australia, such as training given to PLA members by Australian academics visiting China.
 

Recommendations

The PLA’s collaboration with foreign universities is growing and the expansion of international ties remains one of NUDT’s priorities.99 The developments outlined in this report warrant more attention and different approaches from those currently employed by most governments and universities. Responses to PLA collaboration need to be informed by clear government policies and move beyond export controls, using the full range of tools available to governments and universities. The Australian Government, for example, can do more to work in partnership with our research sector to advance scientific progress while protecting national security and ensuring that relevant research doesn’t advance the Chinese military’s capabilities.

Based on the findings of this report, it is recommended that governments pursue the following measures:

Deepen discussions within government on PLA collaboration to determine how it relates to the national interest

  • Determine what kinds of collaboration with the PLA should be further controlled or even prohibited and establish clear policy on engagement with PLA research organisations and personnel.
  • Foster international discussions on PLA collaboration to develop multilateral responses.
  • Develop interagency responses to PLA collaboration to ensure better integration of efforts by defence and export control agencies, intelligence agencies and immigration agencies.
  • Share information about cases and trends in PLA collaboration, particularly cases of deception by PLA scientists, with partners across the globe.

Increase communication and outreach to universities, companies and publics

  • Establish a committee bringing together members of the national security community and university leaders. This committee could serve as a forum to share key information and foster a more cooperative working environment while also providing a space for the university sector and national security community to better understand each other’s perspectives. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Security Higher Education Advisory Board is a useful model to emulate.100
  • Ensure that companies funding research at universities are aware of any PLA collaboration and understand future measures to control such collaboration.
  • Politicians and senior public servants should better articulate what’s in the national interest and publicly explain why advancing China’s military capabilities isn’t in the national interest.101

Improve the scrutiny of visa applications by foreign military personnel

  • Enhance and better coordinate efforts by government agencies such as Australia’s Department of Home Affairs, Department of Defence and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to ensure that military scientists applying for visas are identified and properly vetted.102
  • Create a list of Chinese and other non-allied military and military-linked research institutions, including civilian universities heavily engaged in military research, for use by immigration officials.

Re-examine export controls

  • The Australian Government should consider further controlling technology transfer to certain end users. Transfers of controlled technology to PLA members and civilians heavily engaged in military research should be restricted regardless of their geographical location.
  • The Australian Government should create a list of entities posing national security risks that are subject to special export licence requirements, modelled on the US’s Entity List.
  • The government should help universities train and provide resources for staff with export control compliance duties.
  • Work continuously with experienced scientists in emerging technology fields to determine whether and how emerging technologies should be controlled.
  • Ensure that universities are fully complying with controls relating to the intangible transfer of technology in their collaboration with the PLA.

Regulate scientific training given to foreign military personnel

  • Introduce legislation that draws on the US Code of Federal Regulations’ rules on defence services, which require those offering training to foreign military personnel to first receive a waiver from the US Department of Defense.103 This could take the form of an expansion of the Defence Trade Controls Act that restricts technology transfer to members of certain governments and organisations.

Regulate the use of government resources in collaboration with the Chinese military and other non-allied militaries

  • Update internal policies in government research institutions such as CSIRO to limit or ban collaboration with non-allied militaries, particularly in dual-use areas.
  • Funding bodies such as the Australian Research Council should prohibit funding in some areas from being used in collaboration with non-allied militaries.
  • Carefully evaluate any collaboration with PLA scientists on government-funded projects, particularly defence projects.

Increase government and other funding for research in strategic research areas

  • Fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum physics should receive more government funding to ensure that talent and ideas stay in Australia.
  • Universities working in strategic research areas should be encouraged to collaborate with allied military and defence countries rather than non-allied militaries.

Limit problematic forms of foreign investment in strategic research areas

  • Investment by Chinese defence companies such as China Electronics Technology Group Corporation into strategically important fields should be prohibited.104

Universities should also pursue the following measures:

Build understanding of PLA collaboration

  • Produce credible and thorough assessments of the extent of PLA collaboration on campuses.
  • Develop processes for managing PLA collaboration so that security risks can be identified and resolved

Raise awareness among employees

  • Ensure that those interacting with members of non-allied militaries take appropriate security precautions.

Exercise greater oversight of visiting scholar and student application

Develop internal policies on collaboration with foreign military personnel

  • Require employees to receive approval before collaborating with or training members of non-allied militaries.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.


© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2018

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published October 2018

  1. This estimate has sought to exclude PLA medical scientists and doctors by not counting those affiliated with PLA medical institutions. Media reports, many of which are cited in this report, were one important source for determining the number of PLA scientists sent abroad. Feng Chunmei 冯春梅, Cai Weibin 蔡渭滨, Li Zhi 李治, ‘Guofang keji daxue shixiang weilai zhanzheng de rencai hangmu’ 国防科技大学 驶向未来 战争的人才航母 [NUDT—An aircraft carrier of talent steering towards future wars], Renmin Ribao 人民日报, 8 August 2013, online, claims that NUDT had sent 1,600 scientists overseas as students or visiting scholars ‘in recent years’. Assuming the 1,600 figure describes the number of NUDT scientists sent abroad between 2007, when the PLA substantially increased the number of scientists it sent overseas, and 2013, this gives roughly 230 NUDT scientists sent overseas each year. Conservatively, this indicates that well over 2,000 NUDT scientists have been sent abroad since 2007. Accounting for the fact that NUDT is responsible for approximately 80% of publications written by PLA scientists with overseas scientists and assuming that represents the proportion of PLA scientists overseas who are from NUDT, this means that more than 2,500 PLA scientists have been sent overseas since 2007. This estimate was also supported by a second set of open-source data which, to prevent the information from being removed, has not been revealed. ↩︎
  2. New Zealand is not counted here, despite being a Five Eyes country. It has high levels of PLA collaboration, especially relative to its population, but is not among the top countries for collaboration more generally. ↩︎
  3. C Uhlmann, ‘China an “extreme” threat to Australia: ASIO’, 9 News, 31 January 2018, online; Bill Gertz, ‘FBI director warns China is America’s most significant intelligence threat’, The Washington Free Beacon, 19 July 2018, online; ‘German intelligence unmasks alleged covert Chinese social media profiles’, Reuters, 10 December 2017. For a discussion of the case of Huang Jing in Singapore, see John Garnaut, ‘Australia’s China reset’, The Monthly, August 2018. ↩︎
  4. Wang Wowen 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’, 走出国门,党组织生活’不掉线’ [Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party organisations], Jiefangjunbao 解放军报, 1 July 2015, online. ↩︎
  5. One of the only papers to address research collaboration with the PLA is Elsa Kania, Technological entanglement, ASPI, Canberra, 28 June 2018, online. ↩︎
  6. Section 1286 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 offers an important starting point for policies on scientific engagement with China and the PLA, seeking to protect scientists from undue foreign influence, safeguard important information and support the growth of domestic talent. ↩︎
  7. Richard Holt, AAAS statement on White House proclamation on immigration and visas, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 25 September 2017, online. ↩︎
  8. See Yangyang Cheng, ‘The future of particle physics will live and die in China’, Foreign Policy, 2 November 2017, for an eye-opening discussion of the level of political involvement in China’s scientific research, even research into particle physics, online. ↩︎
  9. DJ Howard, FN Laird, ‘The new normal in funding university science’, Issues in Science and Technology, 2013, 30(1), online; M Clarke, ‘Federal government university budget leaves 10,000 places unfunded, Universities Australia says’, ABC News, 18 January 2018, online; N Whigham, ‘Medical and scientific research at a crossroads in Australia as funding stagnates’, News.com.au, 7 November 2016. ↩︎
  10. UNSW, for example, has partnered with the Chinese Government’s Torch Program, attracting tens of millions of dollars in R&D funding from Chinese companies. See ‘UNSW celebrates first anniversary of Torch partnership with China’, UNSW Media, 28 March 2017, online. ↩︎
  11. It appears that most of those sent abroad are PLA ‘civilian cadres’ (文职干部), rather than ranking military officers. While they’re counted as members of the PLA, civilian cadres aren’t combat personnel and often work in technical areas, such as scientific research. See information about civilian cadres at the following link. ↩︎
  12. Peer-reviewed literature is the most accessible but not the only measure of PLA collaboration. Other facets of PLA collaboration include visiting and lecturing at PLA institutions, supervising PLA students and visiting scholars, which are correlated with but distinct from the level of peer-reviewed literature. Findings on peer-reviewed literature by PLA scientists with foreign researchers are based on searches in Scopus, the largest database of peer-reviewed literature, covering 16 PLA institutions and aliases. Hong Kong wasn’t counted together with the PRC mainland. Note that publications by PLA scientists from medical institutions have been excluded. The following institutions and aliases were included in the search: National University of Defense Technology, National Key Laboratory for Parallel and Distributed Processing, PLA University of Science and Technology, PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping, Air Force Engineering University, Second Artillery Engineering College, Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology, Academy of Armored Force Engineering, Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, National Digital Switching System Engineering and Technological Research Center, Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, Naval University of Engineering and PLA Electronic Engineering Institute. ↩︎
  13. See the section on international ties, which discusses sending students abroad and building academic ties separately from military exchanges, in Liu Hang (ed.), 2015 National University of Defence Technology admissions guide, online. ↩︎
  14. The Army Engineering University was formed in August 2017 through the merger of the PLA University of Science and Technology and a number of other army colleges. See Anonymous, ‘Lujun gongcheng daxue jiepai, you gongchengbing xueyuan deng 5 suo yuanxiao heping zujian’ 陆军工程大学揭牌,由工程兵学院等5所院校合并组建 [The Army Engineering University is unveiled, formed by the merger of the Engineering College and five other institutions], Pengpai 澎湃, 3 August 2017, online. ↩︎
  15. Brian Boyle, ‘Chinese partnerships are vital for universities and global research’, Financial Review, 29 October 2017, online. ↩︎
  16. Clive Hamilton, Alex Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass the United States’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 2017, online. ↩︎
  17. Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion, Hardy Grant Books, 2018, 190–193. ↩︎
  18. Hamilton & Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass the United States’. ↩︎
  19. Mengjian Zhu, Moshe Ben Shalom, Artem Mishchsenko, Vladimir Falko, Kostya Novoselov, Andre Geim, ‘Supercurrent and multiple Andreev reflections in micrometer-long ballistic graphene Josephson junctions’, Nanoscale, 2018, issue 6, online. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: Foreign Interference

Countering foreign interference: the government should name names

It didn’t receive much publicity amid summertime’s distractions, but Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke unveiled on 14 January what’s been described as the ‘first ever analysis of foreign interference and espionage threats’. It’s safer to say the first publicly released by the Australian government. It’s a step towards what we need: political leaders explaining these threats and naming the sources of these dangers. But it’s only a step, because the document still doesn’t name names.

Since 2020, Australia’s Director-General of Security, Mike Burgess, has raised public awareness through annual threat assessments. In 2024, Burgess said that if we had a threat level for espionage and foreign interference it would be at ‘certain’—the highest level. The threat was ‘deeper and broader’ than we might think, he added.

Burgess’ ground-breaking assessments have been a vital source of information. They have raised public awareness and built confidence in Australia’s operational response through the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, which is headed by an officer from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The taskforce combines ASIO’s and the Australian Federal Police’s sophisticated capabilities, along with those from other National Intelligence Community agencies.

The government’s new guide is called ‘Countering Foreign Interference in Australia: Working together towards a more secure Australia’. It covers the basics of what foreign interference is, how it manifests and how it adapts. The document also identifies contact points for reporting suspected interference. The guide borrows heavily from the earlier threat assessments.

So, what is foreign interference? The guide defines it as activities carried out by, on behalf of, directed or subsidised by, or undertaken in active collaboration with, a foreign power and involving either a threat to a person or being clandestine or deceptive and detrimental to Australia’s interests. Espionage is relegated to a subsidiary activity in this regard.

Like previous official statements, the guide distinguishes foreign interference from foreign influence, which refers to activities conducted by foreign governments openly and transparently.

This distinction matters in a society and economy as open as Australia. Assertions that Elon Musk has engaged in foreign interference demonstrate how the concept is misunderstood: Musk’s comments are far from clandestine, so they’re not foreign interference.

The guide also describes typical warning signs of foreign interference for those who might be at risk: communities (especially foreign diasporas), democratic institutions, the higher education and research sector, industry, and media and communications.

The highlighting of media and communications as targets (and vectors) for foreign interference is important. In this regard, it’s important to distinguish misinformation from disinformation. The source of misinformation is just mistaken; the source of disinformation aims to deceive. Disinformation then becomes foreign interference when foreign powers seek to exploit societal divisions or amplify false narratives to manipulate public opinion, destabilise societies or influence decision-making processes.

The guide fails to consider that foreign interference isn’t a temporary or new aberration. In fact, it’s an intensifying threat that we’ve faced for decades. We just thought we were exempt from this foreign interference.

Precisely because it is pervasive and sophisticated, foreign interference requires our political leaders—not just senior intelligence leaders, who have long been active in this regard—to explain the threat and how we should adapt to what’s coming.

We say we live in the most dangerous time since World War II. In such times, history tells us we need to prepare ourselves—as political representatives such as Winston Churchill and Franklin D Roosevelt explained to their people in the lead-up to WWII and successive leaders did through the Cold War.

While the guide commendably seeks to do just that, it does not identify perpetrators. This is a problem. While senior intelligence and departmental officials must be circumspect, we need elected governments to speak plainly and directly to their publics.

Unfortunately, Western governments, including Australia’s, are increasingly reluctant to come clean publicly about who, in Burke’s own words, is threatening ‘our most valuable national assets—our social cohesion, our trusted democracy, our security and prosperity and our freedom of thought and expression’. It’s been almost a decade since Malcolm Turnbull explicitly cited Chinese activities when introducing Australia’s foundational counter-interference laws. Marco Rubio’s testimony in his nomination hearing for the position of US secretary of state bucked the trend of avoidance: he identified espionage and interference as key enablers of Chinese ascendency.

Australian government responses to the threat, as comprehensively as they’re outlined in the guide, will ultimately be sub-optimal unless the government finds the courage to publicly name those who are interfering. Having established an attribution framework, Australia has only used it once: to call out Iran, a safely egregious pariah. On the worst offenders—China and Russia— the government remains silent.

Rest assured: actual, attributable threats underpin security decision-making within the government, in high policy but also in personnel matters and issues such as procurement. Attribution informs policy stances behind closed doors. The concern is that few Western governments similarly take ordinary citizens into their confidence.

This returns us to the consideration that foreign interference is in fact the new normal—not an aberration, not temporary, and not something that can be solved once and then ignored thereafter. In these circumstances the current agnostic approach across Western governments to publicly countering foreign interference is unsustainable. It will continue to confuse the community, shield bad actors, divert resources and undermine compliance—as ASPI research has explained in relation to the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme.

Tiptoeing around China: Australia’s framework for technology vendor review

Australia has a new framework for dealing with high-risk technology vendors, though the government isn’t brave enough to call them that.

Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke says the framework ‘will ensure the government strikes the right balance in managing security risks while ensuring Australia continues to take advantage of economic opportunities’.

An alternative reading would be that it’s an opaque, toothless framework that gives the government wiggle room to minimise risk to the China relationship by increasing risk to our digital sovereignty.

The framework was announced on 20 December but not published. It’s a set of guidelines for assessing national security risks posed by foreign technology products and services sold in Australia. The timing was so unlikely to attract attention that it looked deliberate. Information on the Department of Home Affairs website, striking an unsatisfying balance between brevity and circumlocution, reinforces the impression that the government would be pleased if few people noticed the policy.

The framework establishes a ‘proactive process to consider foreign ownership, control or influence risks associated with technology vendors’. That will enable the government to ‘provide guidance on technology vendor risks to inform public and private sector procurement decisions about the security of technology products and services’. Risks will be assessed and mitigations considered where these risks are unacceptable.

The government’s factsheet provides a few more details. The security reviews will be led by Home Affairs in consultation with relevant agencies, presumably including technical experts in our security agencies. Assessments will be prioritised based on preliminary risk analysis of such factors as where the product or service is deployed, its prevalence and access to sensitive systems or data.

We don’t know what technologies the reviews will focus on or who will make the final decisions on which risks need mitigating. Review findings will apparently inform future government policies or support technical guidance to help organisations mitigate identified risks. The framework itself will not be released publicly to ‘ensure the integrity of the framework’s processes and protect information relating to national security’.

What’s clear is the focus on mitigating risk. Bans or restrictions on vendor access are off the table, even though, as we discovered with 5G, it is sometimes impossible to mitigate technology products and services that are one update away from being remotely manipulated by the vendor who supplies and maintains them.

But who would seek to manipulate or disrupt the critical technologies on which Australians rely?

Well, the government says the framework was not established to ‘target vendors from specific nations.’ The majority of foreign vendors ‘do not present a threat to Australia’s interests. However, in some cases, the application, market prevalence or nature of certain technologies, coupled with foreign influence, could present unacceptable risks to the Australian economy. This is particularly true if the vendor is owned, controlled or influenced by foreign governments with interests which conflict with Australia’s.’

The document steers clear of the more zingy phrase ‘high-risk vendors’, which was associated with Australia’s 2018 ban on Chinese 5G suppliers Huawei and ZTE.

It’s a tricky balance. Reluctance to point the finger at our largest trading partner is understandable, even though everyone knows we wouldn’t need a framework without our growing reliance on Chinese vendors who are indeed owned, controlled or influenced by the Chinese government. But, unsettled by China’s reaction to its predecessor singling out Chinese 5G vendors, this government seems more concerned with anticipating Chinese concerns than explaining to the public what technologies it should be worried about.

For example, will the government target electric cars and solar inverter technologies, where China’s dominant position has raised concerns? Perhaps not, since we are reminded that foreign technology companies ‘are essential’ for Australia’s net zero transition.

Businesses weighing the merits of buying cost-competitive Chinese tech will be reassured that the framework won’t introduce new legislated authorities or regulation. The focus seems to be on consultation with business so the government can ‘understand the risks introduced by a product or service, and the availability of mitigations’.

But mitigations reduce efficiency and add cost, and selecting pricier gear from alternative trusted vendors adds even more. Businesses may feel that avoiding these extra costs is worth the risk.

How might this play out? One way is we never hear about the framework again, aside from occasional technical security guidance. Low public awareness of the risks will mean inquiries can be batted back with assurances that the government has been making progress but can’t talk about it for national security reasons.

Then, one morning in the middle of an Indo-Pacific crisis, we might wake up to find the power and water don’t work.

As Mike Tyson might have said, everyone has a secret technology vendor review framework until they get punched in the mouth.

China takes aim at Philippine democracy

In April 2024, a spokesperson for former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte suggested that the Philippines and China had entered into an undisclosed ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between 2016 and 2022. China would not challenge the status quo in the West Philippine Sea, and the Philippines would send only basic supplies to its personnel and facilities on the Ayungin Shoal. But now, the Philippines is emerging as an essential player in resisting China’s strategic ambitions in the region, with President Ferdinand Marcos’s administration asserting Philippine maritime claims through naval confrontations and new legislation.

This comes at a time when the country is facing a quieter, but equally serious, threat at home. The recent, high-profile case of Alice Guo—a former mayor accused of graft, money laundering, and espionage—shows how domestic corruption leaves the Philippines vulnerable to Chinese infiltration and subterfuge. How the Philippines navigates this challenge could shape not only its future but also the broader stability of Southeast Asia.

In addition to conducting aggressive military manoeuvres in the surrounding seas, China is also pursuing strategic investments and subtler forms of manipulation to push Philippine leaders (at all levels of government) into a more China-friendly stance. This is in keeping with its global strategy of building influence through clandestine business alliances, economic incentives, and investments targeting other countries’ elites. As the Philippines approaches critical elections in 2025 and 2028, China will try to befriend or otherwise gain sway over anyone who is open to its overtures.

Given these efforts, one cannot rule out a future Philippine government that adopts China’s own model of governance, state control and mass surveillance. Such a government might not only consult China’s authoritarian playbook to quash dissent; it could also leverage China’s resources and international political support to evade scrutiny and accountability. Institutions meant to serve the Philippine people would become tools for monitoring and restricting opponents and critics, and China will have secured itself a valuable foothold in Southeast Asia.

China has been stepping up its information operations globally, using the Philippines as a testing ground for tactics designed to propagate anti-American narratives and build pro-Chinese sentiment. Through platforms such as Facebook and TikTok, which many Filipinos rely on for news, Chinese accounts amplify content that casts doubt on Philippine-US relations and erodes social trust within Philippine society.

By exploiting internal instability, Chinese influence operations aim to distract Philippine authorities from China’s own aggression in the surrounding seas. One potential source of disruption is the lead-up to the elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Should an ongoing peace process there falter, the region would inevitably demand much more of the national government’s attention and resources.

What can be done? Even if US investments do not match the scale of China’s infrastructure projects in the Philippines, Western strategic aid can help by presenting a clear alternative to China’s debt-driven model. Such a strategy would not only support Philippine sovereignty but also strengthen America’s network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

Specifically, to counter Chinese interference, the US and its allies should direct investments and support to advance five priorities. First, since corruption is a national security threat, they should fund programs to ensure disclosures of beneficial ownership (who ultimately owns private businesses), debt transparency, and the integrity of public procurement and tendering processes. This would not only create a level playing field for all businesses; it would also help safeguard Philippine institutions and political processes from covert foreign manipulation.

Second, the integrity of elections must be strengthened. Long-term election monitoring can help expose and counter covert foreign influence efforts and misuses of resources, ensuring transparency beyond election day. If sufficiently supported, citizen-led observation efforts can reinforce the sense that the process is fair, making electoral institutions more resilient against external pressures.

Third, the Philippines’ allies need to protect the BARMM peace process, such as by funding initiatives that strengthen local governance and security institutions in the region.

The peace process, and the country more broadly, would also benefit from enhanced information security, including targeted support for local initiatives to improve the public’s digital news literacy.

Lastly, the Philippines needs help countering Chinese surveillance of its citizens and officials. US support for cybersecurity and programs to protect digital rights can frustrate Chinese influence tactics and provide more transparency on major digital platforms.

A stable, democratic Philippines is vital to US interests and regional security. America and its Indo-Pacific partners and allies must do more to help the country build resilience against Chinese aggression not only in its territorial waters, but also in its politics.

Security clearance overhaul needed to build Australia’s high-tech workforce

The Australian government recently published its updated guidelines to counter foreign interference  in the university sector, declaring that ‘All universities are subject to foreign interference risks’. And last month, at ASPI’s inaugural Sydney Dialogue, Prime Minister Scott Morrison released the government’s Blueprint for critical technologies, which identified a number of technology categories deemed essential to Australia’s long-term prosperity and security, including biotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics and quantum computing.

Taken together, these documents tell us that Australia’s technology-driven future will be heavily reliant on a specialist research workforce that our national security leaders believe is being aggressively targeted by foreign powers.

Rapid and transformative technological innovation generated by non-government institutions is now at the core of Australia’s domestic economic vision and is also central to how Western nations intend to remain the dominant grouping in world affairs, as the tech-centric AUKUS and Quad partnerships show.

However, Australia’s ability to realise its technological potential and contribute to Western tech dominance relies on having a research and corporate sector resilient to foreign interference—with intellectual property theft and coercion by the Chinese Communist Party the most pressing threats. To achieve this resilience, more needs to be done to help non-government organisations become self-reliant in their security with trusted workforces that are resistant to interference.

In line with this, the government should consider taking two measures to improve the capacity of universities, businesses and other non-government organisations to build trusted workforces and work environments in which exposure to foreign interference is made transparent and can be mitigated.

The first measure is to establish a national security vetting framework for the non-government sector under which nationally significant research institutions and businesses pay to have staff appropriately vetted. The aim would be not just to protect sensitive work with government, as is currently the case, but to provide assurance to the institution or business that its intellectual property and corporate integrity are being protected.

At the moment, businesses looking to work on sensitive government projects often have to obtain standardised security clearances for their staff. But the need for security vetting now arguably extends well beyond government contracts. Even if they’re not working on government projects, more and more businesses and their investors want to be assured that they have hardened themselves to the risk of foreign interference and corporate espionage. Yet the options available to Australian organisations to conduct background checks on their staff in an effective, ethical way are limited and inconsistent.

Establishing such a clearance capability alongside the public service’s existing security vetting system would be an enormous task for already strained government vetting agencies. Currently, processing high-level security clearances can take months or years and can cost tens of thousands of dollars.

That brings us to the second measure, which will support the establishment of this new security vetting capability for the non-government sector.

The government should establish a scheme to allow relevant students to apply for security clearances at the beginning of their degrees and to transfer the costs onto the low-interest HECS-style loans most Australians use to cover their university or vocational education fees.

This will mean essential technology specialists won’t have to wait for lengthy clearance processes before they can start their jobs.

As the Blueprint for critical technologies indicates, there’s an obvious range of tertiary and vocational programs that will be vital to achieving the national uplift required for Australia to meet its economic potential and security needs.

Australia’s burgeoning digital businesses demand new technology workforces to seize the opportunities of AI and new quantum information processing. So too will the AUKUS pact and Australia’s technology partnerships with the Quad countries demand an influx of new high-tech specialists into Australia’s growing national security community.

Allowing vocational, undergraduate and postgraduate students in these key areas to commence security vetting while studying will mean they can be cleared and job ready at the conclusion of their degrees. Importantly, such a scheme should involve agencies reimbursing students for their clearance upon commencing employment, since it’s a cost these agencies already cover.

A new HECS-funded vetting capability would also allow private businesses and universities themselves to provide security clearance scholarships and create their own pipeline of vetted research and professional staff.

Importantly, the influx of cash from HECS-funded vetting applications could be used to fund desperately needed innovation in Australia’s approach to security vetting; the adoption of new open-source intelligence methodologies is an obvious area for improvement. An even healthier innovation fund could be generated if universities and relevant businesses can opt to pay more for faster clearances.

Establishing a new security vetting capability for the non-government sector is also urgently required to address a perverse shadow employment market that has arisen out of the current model. Currently, Australians with top secret clearances can command rapid promotions or high salaries for jobs that they’re not strictly the most qualified candidate for but which they get because of the prohibitively long time it takes to clear a new employee from scratch. An additional avenue for building security-cleared workforces within universities and businesses will help alleviate this problem and mobilise Australia’s world-class researchers to the most pressing economic and security challenges we will face.

Tit for tat and the costs of attacking journalism

Australia started the journalist war with China.

Tit-for-tat logic made it inevitable that Australian journalists in China would pay the price.

Hard questions should be asked about Canberra’s thinking on the costs and consequences of raiding Chinese journalists in Australia.

A dismaying Canberra mindset—shaped by politics, secrecy and security—views journalism as a disagreeable, troublesome bit of our democracy.

Unfortunately, our politicians, minders, officials, judges and cops repeatedly prove the truth of Tom Stoppard’s line: ‘I’m with you on the free press. It’s the newspapers I can’t stand.’

Love the principle; just disdain the people and the press that practise it. Canberra’s secrecy obsession feeds on security fears and it’s all bad news for the hacks.

My argument is not that there’s some moral equivalence between China and Australia in the way they treat journalists. Rather than false equivalence, Australia should hold itself to the much higher democratic standards we proclaim.

Add to proper Australian standards the question of judgement and an apparent lack of smarts by Canberra about consequences.

Raiding Chinese journalists in the same way Australian journalists were raided last year demanded a Chinese response. We didn’t expel four Chinese journalists but we showed them the door.

The lore of diplomacy that became tacit law during the Cold War states that if you kick out my diplomats or journalists, I do the same to you. That lore/law has been on vivid display in a big tit for tat between the US and China.

In February, Beijing expelled three Wall Street Journal reporters—the first foreign correspondents ordered to leave China since 1998. The Journal’s alleged offence was a commentary under the headline, ‘China is the real sick man of Asia’. Then Washington cut to 100 the number of Chinese citizens allowed to work in the US for five state-controlled Chinese news organisations. China responded by expelling journalists (including Australians) working for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.

Plenty of fresh lore/law to show Australia what’d happen if it went after Chinese journalists. Oz journalists in China would be hit, and Beijing plays this harder and harsher than we do.

Consider the timeline of our journalist war.

On 26 June, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation searched the homes of Chinese journalists, warning the reporters that under Australian law they couldn’t make public the fact of the raids.

The ‘you must be silent’ instruction makes the strange point that it’s better for a journo to be done over by the federal police than by ASIO. At least with the wallopers, you can still talk. ASIO takes you to the hall of mirrors inside the cone of silence.

After the ASIO questioning, the Australia bureau chief of China News Service, Tao Shelan, China Radio International’s Sydney bureau chief, Li Dayong, and two other Chinese journalists left Australia. Not expelled, mind, just fled.

It was left to Chinese media to break the silence, with this from China News Service:

At dawn of June 26 this year, Australian law enforcement officers conducted an unprovoked search on the residences of four journalists from three Chinese media organisations in Australia on the grounds of alleged violations of Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act.

Items such as mobile phones, computers and writing materials were seized.

On 7 July, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade issued new travel advice warning Australians they may face ‘arbitrary detention’ for allegedly ‘endangering national security’ if they visit China. Canberra was voicing its hostage diplomacy fears.

On 14 August, Australia was informed of the detention of Cheng Lei, an Australian citizen who is a ‘high-profile, respected business journalist’ for the state-controlled China Global Television Network. China has announced that Cheng is suspected of criminal activity endangering China’s national security.

Such detention is a ‘rare event’ and this appears to be the first involving a foreigner, according to former Australian ambassador to Beijing Geoff Raby, who observes: ‘It’s not an accidental or random incident in China when they decide to take action like this.’

Raby says Cheng is ‘a very experienced journalist’ who has ‘done the job for a long time in China’. He told the BBC her reporting was ‘thoroughly objective’, and she worked within the constraints of the state broadcaster to be as fair as possible.

On 2 September, Ministry of State Security officers came knocking on the door of the ABC’s Bill Birtles, in Beijing, and the Australian Financial Review’s Michael Smith, in Shanghai. Full marks to Australia’s diplomats who negotiated the deal that got the two correspondents on a plane to Australia on 7 September, after police had interviewed the two about their links to Cheng Lei.

The questioning on Cheng, however, was perfunctory. As Birtles commented: ‘I think the whole thing was premeditated by the Chinese government. They wanted to get us out without expelling us. It’s a good outcome for China—now there is no Australian media on the ground in China.’

Action by Australia may have played a part in China’s detention of Cheng. It’ll be an interesting moment in a Senate estimates hearing when DFAT is asked whether it was consulted on the diplomatic repercussions of raiding Chinese journalists. I dread either answer: DFAT wasn’t asked, or it was asked and ignored.

A Canberra wise owl with much experience of the system, Allan Behm, offers this dry truth: ‘It is difficult to imagine that DFAT would have advised an ASIO “raid” on Chinese journalists in June.’

On truth or consequences, Canberra has done poorly.

In dealing with its Oz journalists, Australia hasn’t met its own standards on the fundamental truths of press freedom. In weighing the consequences of actions against Chinese journalists, Canberra has been low on smarts, perhaps even cavalier.

An old warning applies: in waging the fight, don’t become what you’re fighting.

Bots foment political polarisation through social media

In a report released earlier this week, I and my ASPI colleagues Albert Zhang and Jake Wallis investigated a small-scale digital influence operation linked to Chinese-speaking actors. This activity targeted social media users in the United States and involved the use of heavily automated bot accounts on Facebook and Twitter to boost legitimate media coverage and social media content that presented negative or divisive views of the US. There was a particular focus on racial inequality, the Covid-19 response, the failings of the Trump administration and scandals linked to President Donald Trump himself.

The activity appears to have gained little direct traction with real social media users. However, the impact of inauthentic activity like this can be hard to gauge, because the goal isn’t necessarily about generating direct engagement. Social media algorithms often prioritise the content users are shown based on how much engagement that content has received, which means that inauthentic engagement can lead to the content being shown to more real users than it otherwise would have been. For example, a bot that shares a New York Times article may not itself receive any likes or shares, but it could still be considered successful if it leads to platform algorithms promoting that content to others.

Despite being small and generating little direct engagement, the campaign makes for an interesting case study because of what it demonstrates about the information ecosystem writ large: digital foreign political interference is no longer the sole preserve of well-resourced actors. Today, even very small-scale operators can launch persistent, cross-platform (and, in this case, likely foreign) political influence efforts, run on the metaphorical smell of an oily rag.

This has broader implications. Even if each individual small-scale operation, such as this one, has little direct impact, the proliferation of coordinated inauthentic influence efforts run by anyone and everyone with a political axe to grind could have a serious and detrimental effort on the political information environment.

We’ve seen something similar happen before in another context. Over the past several years, the tools and techniques enabling cybercrime have become ever more accessible to small-scale and low-skilled criminals. Cyberattacks that not so long ago could have been perpetrated only by nation-state actors are now readily carried out by criminal groups using off-the-shelf malware and purchased exploits. Other hacker groups offer crime-as-a-service, effectively making the ability to conduct cyberattacks available to anyone with the money to pay for it.

Individually, each small ransomware operator or online fraudster may have a minimal impact, but overall the global cost is in the trillions of US dollars each year.

That same dynamic is beginning to play out in the political information sphere, and the cost will be counted not in dollars, but in increased distrust, polarisation and fragmentation.

Disinformation that is not effective in achieving its intended goal still has effects. It distorts the authentic social media conversation in a range of ways, whether by interfering with algorithms through inauthentic engagement or by contributing to the suspicion that anyone with a divergent opinion is in fact a bot (aka the now widespread ‘anyone who disagrees with me is a Russian bot’ meme). This is in some senses a dehumanisation of political opponents, and contributes to growing political polarisation.

The widespread proliferation of low-quality, unsophisticated but persistent disinformation and political influence efforts on social media has the potential to crowd the information space. The small scale of such operations may contribute to the problem. Large, noisy campaigns such as the Chinese-state-linked operation we researched in Retweeting through the Great Firewall are likely to be detected and removed, but small operations may simply continue to buzz along at a low level over a sustained period, as this one has, persisting through account removals and blending into the background noise of the internet—and, over time, changing the tune.

ASIO director-general’s annual threat assessment

The main purpose of my talk tonight is to deliver my first annual threat assessment.

Some of you may think of this as ASIO stepping out of the shadows.

The glib response to that might be that we have always been out of the shadows, it’s just that our people are so good at what they do you have just never noticed them!

A more considered response is I’m taking this opportunity to talk about the security environment we are facing, explain what the threats are and why they are a problem.

I want to move beyond the bureaucratic language of annual reports and help everyone understand the significant threats we see directed at Australia and Australians. And I want to give you some insights into what ASIO does every day.

I want to be clear that the ASIO I have the privilege to lead is not a secret organisation operating as a law unto itself, conducting shadowy business around the margins of our democracy and our law.

Nothing could be further from the truth and nothing could be further from the vision I have for ASIO and its place in the life of Australia.

We are an organisation that operates in full accordance with Australian law.

ASIO has significant powers under law, but our application of these powers is proportionate to the security threat or matter at hand.

We are not seeking to be a secret organisation with secret powers. That would not be an agency that I or my staff would want to have any part of. And I’d also be confident neither would any of you.

Yes, we need to keep secret the precise nature of many of our operational capabilities and the details of our operational activity.

These are the tools of our trade that give my team its edge to prevail against some of the most difficult challenges imaginable and so must be protected.

I will never knowingly put any of my team at additional risk by carelessly talking about their operations.

I see ASIO very much as your security service, working to protect Australia and all Australians from those who would seek to do us harm.

As director-general of security I am committed to ensuring that ASIO always operates legally and ethically.

As your security service we don’t just do what is allowed; we do what is right.

As part of that I intend to bring my own personal belief in the power of sunlight and transparency to bear as a fundamental principle of my tenure as director-general.

I will therefore be as open and frank with you as I can about what we do and why we do it.

I will continue to welcome public debate on the extent of ASIO’s powers. Such conversations are a vital part of our democracy.

And, I will continue to welcome our regular and frank engagement with parliamentary committees and with the inspector-general for intelligence and security, who, I remind you, has powers that are very similar to a royal commission’s.

I’m very pleased to see Margaret Stone is here this evening. I can assure you that the inspector-general is rigorous in her oversight of us, and that is entirely appropriate.

ASIO is enabled by the law and we are overseen by our minister, the attorney-general, the government, our parliament and the inspector-general. The law and our oversight are fundamental to our success.

At times I will seek to talk about ASIO publicly. At other times it will be through open and respectful conversations with community and business groups, the media and with our elected members of parliament.

I hope you will value this engagement and I trust you will also understand and respect when I say that I cannot talk about certain subjects in the detail you might want.

If I cannot discuss something it will be because it will risk a significant national security capability or it will risk the safety of my officers or the Australians they seek to protect.

Through the parliament, the Australian people have entrusted ASIO with significant powers of investigation. These are used to protect Australia from only the most serious threats.

Unlike many other agencies in the national intelligence community, we use our powers to investigate fellow Australians.

Of course some of ASIO’s enquiries establish no threat to security and no further action is required. In these cases it is imperative that our enquiries remain confidential.

This is one reason why you will often hear me say I cannot comment on specific individuals or cases. A security service in a liberal democracy like ours must investigate in secret to protect the reputation of the innocent.

So, let me start by talking a little about ASIO as an organisation.

ASIO and its people

When I commenced my role as director-general of security I made a commitment to my team that I would spend my first 90 days listening and learning about the organisation and about my new role.

And as it turned out, my 90th day was a Friday, Friday the 13th. I didn’t plan that, but I did enjoy that fact … just a little bit.

And those who know me will know how difficult it was for me to listen for that long!

But it was vital that I did so because ASIO and the role of director-general are like no other organisation or role I could imagine.

It perhaps goes without saying that I have been impressed by the work ASIO does.

I have also valued the fact that my organisation is part of the Home Affairs portfolio and part of a highly capable and dedicated national intelligence community.

ASIO in fact operates as part of a wider national security team that includes state and federal agencies, departments and enforcement agencies, as well as our overseas partners.

Protecting Australians and Australia’s interests’ demands partnerships.

And of course, one of our key partnerships is with the Australian community.

So, on that note, please let me take a few moments to highlight the single most important element of ASIO’s business: our people.

The people who work alongside me every day are ordinary Australians just like you. They may be doing extraordinary things to protect you, but when they are not at work they are ordinary members of our community.

They have family and caring responsibilities. Many of them have mortgages and worry about the same sorts of things that we all do.

They may be your neighbours or your friends and you may stand beside some of them in a supermarket queue or on the sidelines of a sporting event.

Members of our team have also been on the front lines battling bushfires and at times of crisis many of them put on their ADF Reserve uniforms to continue their service to their community in other ways.

The point is we are you. It is just that the people on my team spend their days working anonymously but tirelessly to identify and stop those people who would seek to do our community harm.

My team put themselves on the line and wrestle with significant complexity and risk every day.

Their efforts ensure that Australians can live their lives in safety, and that our economy and institutions remain secure and free from covert, pernicious foreign interference.

If they do not tell you where they work, or they sometimes have to use assumed identities, it is not because they wish to be deceptive. Rather it is a very necessary part of enabling them to do what they do effectively and safely.

In the national security business the term ‘human intelligence’ refers to the classical business of recruiting and managing human sources for intelligence purposes.

Such operations are a rich part of our heritage and remain a critical part of our armoury, even in this fifth-generation world of hyperconnectivity, massive data and artificial intelligence.

If I can riff off that heritage and offer a shameless recruitment plug for ASIO, our success is built on the imagination and intelligence of our humans.

We need people who can out-think and out-imagine our adversaries, and who can harness the power of technology and data alongside good old-fashioned relationship-building to achieve our mission of protecting Australia.

We also need to ensure that our workforce continues to mirror the diversity of the society we serve.

So if you are interested, I’m just saying … www.asio.gov.au.

I promised at the start I would provide you with the first of my annual threat assessment, but before I do that I must address one other aspect of our operating environment.

Technology and the rule of law

Some of you might be wondering how technology impacts and enables ASIO’s business. Surely, the time of human-focused intelligence has come and gone?

As the first director-general of security to have also led ASD [the Australian Signals Directorate], I am perhaps uniquely placed to answer this.

ASIO’s range of capabilities and special powers are more relevant than ever in this transformative technological age.

But it is also fair to say we are also challenged by technology, the internet, encryption and the dark web.

In responding to this challenge let me first recognise the enormous upside to technology and connectivity.

The internet has massively democratised access to knowledge and it has enabled incredible new businesses.

Global connectivity and the ready availability of messaging apps which are encrypted for privacy offer tremendous capabilities to connect with each other, whether across the street or across the world (or even across the lounge room or dinner table—you will know what I mean if you have young people at home).

While these things are a force for good, they also have a potential dark side when used by those who would seek to do harm.

Encrypted communications damage intelligence coverage in nine out of 10 priority counterterrorism cases.

That’s 90% of priority cases!

And that’s just counterterrorism. In the counterespionage world we are dealing with even more sophisticated targets.

The government recognises this dilemma as do senior executives in the tech sector. We need to work together to help organisations like ASIO and the police defeat the threats posed by malicious use of the internet, while protecting the opportunities and freedoms it offers for all Australians.

It is important we continue our open and productive dialogue. We must be open about the challenges, open about the need for balance between privacy and security, and open about the importance of the rule of law that supports a free society, while at the same time providing the right response to the security threats we all face.

Technology should not be beyond the rule of law.

Contemporary legislation, such as TOLA (Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018) that came into force just over one year ago offers a clear case in point.

The relentless advance of technology was outstripping our technical capabilities to monitor threats and protect our fellow Australians. Remember, encrypted communications impact intelligence coverage in nine out of 10 priority counterterrorism cases.

So we needed some changes in legislation to allow us to deal with the effects of that technology while still preserving the essential integrity and privacy of those communications for ordinary Australians.

I can confirm that ASIO has used the Assistance and Access Act to protect Australians from serious harm. We needed to take advantage of the new powers within 10 days of the legislation coming into effect—a clear indication of its significance to our mission. And I’m happy to report that the internet did not break as a result!

The bottom line was this: these new powers helped ASIO prevent a real risk of injury to Australians.

That is not to say we’ve solved this challenge; we haven’t and we continue to face challenges to our lawful access capabilities.

We know this and we are responding with energy and purpose.

We are making judicious investments in technology and our people. And we are continuing to balance the need for new powers alongside privacy and other concerns to ensure that we can continue to deliver on our mission.

Consideration of new powers is not just confined to the impacts of technology; we also review our powers and their suitability in helping ASIO identify and deal with evolving security threats.

Having the right technology applied to the right problems is of course vital, but it is our people that have always been the critical element of our success. And I am confident that by putting the right people with the necessary legal authorities onto the right problems we will succeed.

The terrorist threat

Now getting to the main purpose of tonight’s talk. Let me begin with the terrorist threat.

ASIO’s number one mission continues to be protecting Australians from threats to their lives.

The terrorist threat remains at ‘probable’.

That is, we have credible intelligence that individuals and groups have the capability and intent to conduct terrorism onshore.

ASIO has previously assessed and stated publicly that the threat posed by terrorism in Australia has plateaued at an unacceptable level. This is sometimes misunderstood as the fact that the threat has simply plateaued.

So let me be clear: the threat of terrorism at home is ‘probable’ and will remain unacceptably high for the foreseeable future.

The unfortunate reality is that, right now, terrorists are still plotting to harm Australians.

Some of that plotting is occurring within small cells of people meeting in secret, but equally worrying is the ease with which terrorists continue to use the internet to spread their hateful messages, radicalise people to their cause and provide how-to advice on committing atrocities against Australians.

I am particularly concerned that we continue to see vulnerable and impressionable young people at risk from being ensnared in the streams of hate being spread across the internet by extremists of every ideology.

As a father, I find it truly disturbing to see cases where extremists are actively trying to recruit children who have only just started high school and are as young as 13 or 14.

Our view is that the threat of terrorism will remain a constant feature of the global security environment in 2020 and the threat to Australia and Australian interests will remain.

The number of terrorism leads we are investigating right now has doubled since this time last year.

The character of terrorism will continue to evolve and we believe that it will take on a more dispersed and diversified face.

Violent Islamic extremism of the type embodied by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and their offshoots will remain our principal concern.

Tens of thousands of Islamic extremists travelled to the Middle East to join AQ-aligned groups and ISIL, including from countries which weren’t previously known as sources of Islamic extremists. And as we all know Australians joined that movement.

There are now more Islamic extremists from more countries active in more places than ever before.

But we are also seeing other actors operating in the terrorism arena.

Intolerance based on race, gender and identity, and the extreme political views that intolerance inspires, are on the rise across the Western world in particular.

Right-wing extremism has been in ASIO’s sights for some time, but obviously this threat came into sharp, terrible focus last year in New Zealand.

In Australia, the extreme right-wing threat is real and it is growing. In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology.

These groups are more organised and security conscious than they were in previous years.

We continue to see some Australian extremists seeking to connect with like-minded individuals in other parts of the world, sometimes in person. They are not merely seeking to share ideology and tactics.

Earlier this year, ASIO advice led to an Australian being stopped from leaving the country to fight with an extreme right-wing group on a foreign battlefield.

While these are small in number at this time in comparison to what we saw with foreign fighters heading to the Middle East, any development like this is very concerning.

Meanwhile, extreme right-wing online forums such as The Base proliferate on the internet, and attract international memberships, including from Australians. These online forums share and promote extremist right-wing ideologies, and encourage and justify acts of extreme violence.

We expect such groups will remain an enduring threat, making more use of online propaganda to spread their messages of hate.

While we would expect any right-wing extremist inspired attack in Australia to be low capability, i.e. a knife, gun or vehicle attack, more sophisticated attacks are possible. And we also need to be mindful of state-sponsored terrorism as states seek to use terrorism to further their goals.

This dispersal of the terrorist threat and the range of actions they might choose to carry out will continue to complicate our efforts to combat the threat they pose.

We will need to continue to monitor a threat spectrum that stretches from self-radicalising lone actors across the range of extremist ideologies through to experienced terrorists associated with longstanding extremist groups.

And we will need to protect against attacks that range from individuals using knives or their vehicles as weapons in crowded spaces, to meticulously planned high-casualty terrorism.

It is also clear that we will need to remain constantly alert to the enduring power and attraction of extremist messaging to those vulnerable to radicalisation.

Despite the best efforts of governments here and abroad to manage terrorists who have been jailed for their offences, extremist ideologies run very deep.

We have all been shocked by the recent experiences of our UK friends, where radicalised individuals, released from prison, took the opportunity of their freedom to attack their fellow citizens in the name of their extremist cause.

I recognise that this is a complex problem to solve but it does reinforce to me, at least, the need to remain vigilant about the reach and the strength of extremist messaging.

We cannot afford to become complacent about the potential threat posed by terrorists after their release from prison.

Let me be clear that, whatever the motivation of terrorists, whatever the method planned, they will continue to be creative in evolving their methods in response to both our investigative efforts and protective security measures.

ASIO must therefore remain vigilant and be ready to take the necessary actions in response to these threats.

Threat to life will always be our top priority but it is not the only serious security threat I am concerned about. So let me now cover espionage and foreign interference.

Espionage and foreign interference

Espionage is pretty much what it says on the tin: foreign intelligence services seeking to steal and gather national security, economic or other information.

Most nation-states conduct espionage. Indeed, countering espionage was the reason ASIO was formed more than 70 years ago and it has remained a central part of our mission ever since.

Foreign interference is a broader, more nuanced concept.

All foreign states seek to influence deliberations of importance to them. When those activities are conducted in an open and transparent manner they are not of concern.

However, when it is conducted covertly by, or on behalf, of a foreign actor, when it is clandestine, deceptive corrupting or threatening in nature, and when it is contrary to Australia’s sovereignty and interests, we classify this as foreign interference.

Foreign interference is about covertly shaping decision-making to the advantage of a foreign power and, left unchecked, it becomes highly corrosive.

Almost every sector of our community is a potential target for foreign interference, particularly our parliamentarians and their staff at all levels of government; government officials; the media and opinion-makers; business leaders; and the university community

Regardless of the methods employed by hostile services and nation-states, Australia is currently the target of sophisticated and persistent espionage and foreign interference activities from a range of nations.

ASIO has uncovered cases where foreign spies have travelled to Australia with the intention of setting up sophisticated hacking infrastructure targeting computers containing sensitive and classified information.

We’ve seen visiting scientists and academics ingratiating themselves into university life with the aim of conducting clandestine intelligence collection.

This strikes at the very heart of our notions of free and fair academic exchange.

And perhaps most disturbingly, hostile intelligence services have directly threatened and intimidated Australians in this country. In one particular case, the agents threatened the physical safety of an Australia-based individual as part of a foreign interference plot.

The level of threat we face from foreign espionage and interference activities is currently unprecedented. It is higher now than it was at the height of the Cold War.

Indeed, some of the tactics being used against us are so sophisticated, they sound like they’ve sprung from the pages of a Cold War thriller.

As one example, I can reveal that a foreign intelligence service sent a ‘sleeper’ agent to Australia. The agent lay dormant for many years, quietly building community and business links, all the while secretly maintaining contact with his offshore handlers.

The agent started feeding his spymasters information about Australia-based expatriate dissidents, which directly led to harassment of the dissidents in Australia and their relatives overseas.

In exchange for significant cash payments, the agent also provided on-the-ground logistical support for spies who travelled to Australia to conduct intelligence activities.

These are the sort of insidious activities ASIO works to detect and disrupt every day. And in the case of the sleeper agent, I can confirm ASIO did disrupt the operation. Regardless, the threat is real and the threat is extremely serious.

What we are trying to protect here is nothing less than who we are as a society and who we want to be into the future.

As director-general and as Mike Burgess, private citizen, I would think that is something worth protecting with all the energy we can muster.

So why do we use the term ‘unprecedented’? Well, it is because of its scale, breadth and ambition.

Espionage and foreign interference are affecting parts of the community that they did not touch during the Cold War.

And the intent is to engineer fundamental shifts in Australia’s position in the world, not just to collect intelligence or use us as a potential ‘back door’ into our allies and partners.

There are more foreign intelligence officers and their proxies operating in Australia now than at the height of the Cold War and many of them have the requisite level of capability, the intent and the persistence to cause significant harm to our national security. But the character and focus of that espionage activity continues to evolve.

Hostile foreign intelligence services are being directed to target us because of our strategic position and alliances; because of our leadership in science and technology; because of the unique expertise that exists across our economy; and because we are comprehensively retooling our defence force and the defence industrial base.

Hostile foreign intelligence agencies have always sought access to personal information because they want to identify and cultivate potential human sources.

We still see hostile services continuing their efforts to recruit human sources in much the same way they always have but, thanks to the efforts of ASIO and others, that is getting more challenging and includes more risk for those services than ever before.

As a result we are also seeing hostile foreign intelligence services recognising the opportunities presented by the internet and the proliferation of social networking applications.

In the past, attempted recruitment was time-intensive, expensive and risky because the foreign spies would need to operate on location and in person.

But now, they can use the internet to work from the safety of their overseas headquarters to launch cyber operations against Australian networks and to send thousands of friend and networking requests to unsuspecting targets with the click of a mouse.

Many of the attributes that make social media so valuable also make it vulnerable. Professional and social networking sites share rich stocks of personal information, and that makes it much easier for hostile foreign intelligence services to gather the information they want.

Critically, those same platforms then offer those hostile services a low-cost and easily disguised method to approach their targets and so we are working to help educate people on these threats.

It can be difficult for me to talk in detail about this aspect of our work because we don’t want to make life easier for our adversaries by telling them what we do and don’t know about their operations.

But I can tell you this: over the last few years, ASIO has consistently detected and regularly disrupted espionage operations in Australia.

While terrorism is almost always public—it’s visible both when we disrupt it and sadly when we don’t—espionage and foreign interference has been different.

Due to the very nature of spying, the efforts of my organisation to detect and counter espionage have almost always been hidden from public view.

But this is changing.

While we will continue to deploy our traditional highly classified tools and tradecraft to counter espionage and interference, these tools will not be enough on their own.

There is now a robust public discussion on the threats posed to our safety and prosperity by espionage and foreign interference. This is a conversation which I very much welcome as a vital part of strengthening the resilience of our community and our democracy.

As part of this conversation, the parliament passed new legislation relating to espionage and foreign interference. This is already bringing dividends and it is likely to grow in importance for us.

And the government has recently announced the establishment of a Counter Foreign Interference Task Force which is operating out of this building. With all of the critical elements of the national security community engaged by the task force, it will become a vital element of our strategy to defeat this threat.

I can tell you tonight that the mere passage of this new law caused discomfort and possibly pain for foreign intelligence services. We have seen tradecraft and behaviours change; we’ve made it more difficult for them to operate here.

We know this won’t stop it all, but it does make and it has made a difference, driving more cost into their risk calculus.

I’m confident any future announcement of a prosecution will have a further chilling effect—and certainly a successful prosecution will—although it’s important to understand that prosecutions are not the only weapons in this space.

Wherever possible, ASIO seeks to ‘detect and protect’ before damage is done. In this context, for example, I can confirm that ASIO has recommended visa cancellations when we’ve identified foreign agents trying to travel to Australia, and we’ve intercepted foreign agents when they’ve arrived here.

The point is that the unprecedented nature of the threat will require ASIO and our national security partners to deploy an array of effects to identify espionage operations directed against us.

Our thinking and our actions, our capabilities and our law must reflect the threat and provide what is needed to manage the risk and consequences effectively.

As director-general of security, I intend to step up our actions to counter espionage and foreign interference.

We will actively support the prosecution of espionage and foreign interference before the courts.

Now, for reasons I have already made clear, I won’t talk about any of these matters any further, other than to say that we will need to have a wide range of tools in our toolbox to counter this growing threat.

No one of them will succeed on their own, but there is real power in being able to draw on all of them in the right combination to defeat individual threats and to develop the necessary cumulative effects to make Australia a harder target for our adversaries.

My message here is simple. If you intend to conduct espionage or foreign interference against Australia, ASIO and our partners will be hunting you. We will shine the light on this behaviour and we will deal with it.

Conclusion

In conclusion let me reiterate that ASIO is a capable organisation and our security and law enforcement partners are equally capable.

Those threats across the terrorism, espionage and foreign interference domains are formidable and continually evolving.

They will require us to deploy a range of imaginative and sophisticated effects to harden our environment to make sure we continue to detect threats and raise the cost of entry for our adversaries.

I know that, as private citizens and members of your security service, the members of our team are incredibly mindful of the very significant powers they have been granted.

They are focused on only using those powers lawfully and in the most proportionate manner possible. And, always, in support of the mission to protect Australia and Australians from harm.

As an organisation we have a lot of work ahead of us to ensure that we can meet the challenges of technology and data that are impacting our operations.

But I am confident that with the thoughtful and innovative plans we already have in place, we will be able to bring the right technology and the right people together to solve those issues.

To ensure this happens we will be redoubling our efforts to make sure that we can continue to attract the best and brightest Australians to work with us on these challenges.

This will not only ensure that we can bring the ability to out-think and out-imagine our adversaries, but it will also ensure that we continue to reflect the diversity of the community we serve.

As I’ve outlined tonight, the threats are significant, the security landscape is evolving and our adversaries are more determined and sophisticated than ever before.

But so is ASIO.

Nobody at ASIO, me included, is under the illusion that combatting these security challenges will be anything but really hard work.

But I can assure you that the ASIO team relishes the challenge and is up for that work.

We are your security service. And we are determined to make a difference.

Tag Archive for: Foreign Interference

Stop the World: TSD Summit Sessions: Defence, intelligence and technology with Shashank Joshi

In the final lead-in episode to the Sydney Dialogue (but not the last in the series!), ASPI’s Executive Director, Justin Bassi, interviews Shashank Joshi, Defence Editor at the Economist.  

They discuss technology, security and strategic competition, including the impact of artificial intelligence on defence and intelligence operations, the implications of the no-limits partnership between Russia and China and increasing alignment between authoritarian states. They also cover the challenge of protecting free speech online within a framework of rules which also protects public safety.

They talk about Shashank’s latest Economist report ‘Spycraft: Watching the Watchers’, which explores the intersection of technology and intelligence, and looks at the history of intel and tech development, including advancements from radio to the internet and encryption.

The Sydney Dialogue (TSD) is ASPI’s flagship initiative on cyber and critical technologies. The summit brings together world leaders, global technology industry innovators and leading thinkers on cyber and critical technology for frank and productive discussions. TSD 2024 will address the advances made across these technologies and their impact on our societies, economies and national security.

Find out more about TSD 2024 here: ⁠https://tsd.aspi.org.au/⁠    

Mentioned in this episode: ⁠https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2024-07-06⁠  

Guests:
⁠Justin Bassi⁠
Shashank Joshi