Tag Archive for: food security

National food security preparedness Green Paper

Australia’s agriculture sector and food system produce enough food to feed more than 70 million people worldwide. The system is one of the world’s least subsidised food systems. It has prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values, but it now faces chronic challenges due to rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. The world is changing so rapidly that the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose. Potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is driving enhanced preparedness activity in Australia’s defence force, but that isn’t being replicated across the agriculture sector and food system in a coordinated manner. Food hasn’t featured as a priority in the public versions of the Defence Strategic Review or the National Defence Strategy. This has created a gap in Australia’s preparedness activities: if Australia’s national security and defence organisations are preparing for potential conflict, then Australia’s agriculture sector and food system stakeholders should also be preparing for this period of strategic uncertainty.

Food security is a pillar of whole-of-nation preparedness for an uncertain future. While current targeted preparedness efforts and resilience mechanisms are valuable, they aren’t sufficient. Stakeholders are calling for stronger, proactive national coordination from the government to empower and support private-sector action. Meeting that demand is essential to strengthening overall resilience. So, too, is understanding that Australia’s food security relies on a holistic and interconnected ecosystem rather than a fragmented supply chain. Australia is a heavily trade-exposed nation that exports 70% of production, so any disruption to maritime and other transport corridors or to the infrastructure needed to move food risks undermining both national food security and Australia’s standing as a reliable global supplier.

This work has been written and constructed as a Green Paper, not an academic publication. Informed by six months of consultations with government, the private sector and civil society, the paper combines applied policy analysis and real-world insights to promote deliberate conversation about protecting Australia’s food security with the same priority as protecting Australia’s national security. The Green Paper is divided into four parts. It also includes three case studies in the Appendix, which use a threat and risk assessment to analyse three critical inputs to the food security ecosystem—phosphate, glyphosate and digital connectivity—to help stakeholders evaluate the vulnerabilities in Australia’s food security ecosystem.

The intention of this Green Paper is to deepen understanding of food security as a key public policy issue, stimulate public discussion, inform policymaking and provide both government and key stakeholders with policy options for consideration. This Green Paper’s 14 recommended policy options have been designed to equip governments and the private sector with structured national-security-inspired assessment tools and a framework to continuously identify, prioritise and mitigate vulnerabilities. That includes options to centralise the coordination and decentralise delivery of preparedness activities, establish accountability and embed food security as a national security priority and a key element of Australia’s engagement across the Indo-Pacific.

Tag Archive for: food security

Australia’s food security needs national-security frameworks

Australia’s agriculture sector and food system have prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values. But the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose.

Australia and the Indo-Pacific now face chronic challenges: rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. While the government is acting to improve the Australian Defence Force’s readiness for conflict in our region, we are not trying to replicate this preparedness elsewhere in a coordinated manner, including in our agriculture sector and food system.

The importance of food security to national security, as well as policy options to resolve our national vulnerabilities, are core issues within ASPI’s newly released National Food Security Preparedness Green Paper.

The green paper argues that food is a fundamental pillar of Australia’s national security and the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific. The role of food in maintaining national security, as well as Australian and regional prosperity, has been taken for granted by civil and defence circles for long enough. Australia’s deteriorating strategic environment and critical dependencies on vulnerable supply chains mean we must now reassess our food security and consider its effects on Australian security and regional stability.

Australia is a heavily trade-dependent nation that exports 70 percent of its food production while facing an insidious domestic food insecurity challenge. Access to export markets is vital for all agriculture and food system stakeholders to maintain profitability. But, for decades, Australia has offshored the manufacturing of critical industry inputs in the name of globalisation and on the assumption that the world will remain in the rules-based order. Australia depends on many imported critical inputs, including fuel, AdBlue (to reduce diesel emissions), fertiliser and, increasingly, labour.

Heightening regional trade and military tensions threaten Australia’s access to critical food system inputs and global markets. The Australian government is clear on the threats that we face. Australia can no longer rely on the traditional 10-year strategic warning time for conflict. Lifting Australia’s ability to feed itself and its neighbours is as important as strengthening defence and expanding national resilience.

For food security, our problem is two-fold: Australia relies on vulnerable agricultural and food system supply chains, and, compounding the issue, doesn’t understand this vulnerability. It therefore has no clear plans for mitigation.

As shown in the figure below, since the 2008 global financial crisis, at least 20 academic papers, reports and inquiries have highlighted the importance of Australia’s food system and its exposure to external shocks.

Timeline of Australian food system reports.

Despite these reports, food security has not been a national priority, resulting in limited policy responses.

The Covid-19 pandemic revealed the scale of Australia’s exposure to long and fragile supply chains and the extent to which shocks to the international system could disrupt them.

Many disruptions have happened since then, with varying domestic effect. At the time of writing, yet another flood disaster is unfolding in regional Queensland, killing 150,000 head of livestock and counting. This disaster will have immense long-term effects on rural and remote communities and the region’s food production capacity. This follows the emptying of supermarket shelves in areas affected by Cyclone Alfred a month ago. There are also recurring Avian Influenza outbreaks in southern Australia.

On 4 March, the government committed to developing a National Food Security Strategy if re-elected. This is a starting point that has at least flagged food security as a specific policy priority. It appears likely that the opposition will support this initiative in some form. Regardless of what the next government looks like after the 3 May election, it must back this National Food Security Strategy with immediate action.

Australia must think of its agriculture and food system as an interconnected food security ecosystem, as opposed to a fragmented supply chain. Similarly, the importance of food security at a departmental and ministerial level must be elevated as a national security priority. To achieve this, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry should be established as the lead agency responsible for the food system and food security preparedness, its minister should become a full permanent member of the National Security Committee, and its secretary should be included in the Secretaries Committee on National Security.

This green paper’s 14 policy recommendations are a call to action: Australia must implement a National Food Security Strategy with preparedness as its immediate starting point, and with the urgency that our deteriorating strategic circumstances demand.

Collaborative planning for Australian food security preparedness

Australia’s food security, commonly assumed safe thanks to our being a net food exporter, is increasingly vulnerable in a world marked by geopolitical and environmental instability. Our reliance on critical imports in food production and the threat of disrupted supply chains expose weaknesses that could impair food accessibility and damage national stability.

To respond to these challenges, ASPI with industry and in collaboration with government is developing a National Food Security Preparedness Green Paper. This initiative aims to safeguard Australia’s food system and ensure resilience in the face of emerging challenges.

The assumption that Australia will always be food-secure is a dangerous fantasy.  Many think that a country that is a net food exporter cannot become short of food. But that mistake distracts us from addressing critical vulnerabilities, especially in inputs, such as fertiliser, needed for production. Our readiness to face future challenges depends on proactive, long-term planning that’s resilient against short-term events, such as elections, at home and abroad. Stability, security and social cohesion are built on strong fundamentals—and access to food is fundamental. Yet planned closure of more Australian production of the fertiliser super phosphate highlights our longer-term strategic vulnerabilities.

The National Defence Strategy says Australia faces its most challenging strategic environment since the World War II, and there is no longer a 10-year window of warning time for conflict. People outside of the defence organisation must also prepare accordingly.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation defines food security as when ‘all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food’. But food security conjures different meanings beyond this definition, depending on where people stand across the fabric of society: a wealthy family in Sydney’s inner east, for example, will experience minor inconvenience when egg supply is limited. But a struggling family in Sydney’s outer west may experience greater stress and frustration at lack of access to one of the healthiest and most affordable sources of protein.

Food insecurity sparks discontent, and discontent breeds instability, the severity depending on the length of insecurity. Restricted access to food is likely to imperil social cohesion and security, including dissatisfaction and further distrust of social institutions. Since 32 percent of Australians already suffer moderate to severe food insecurity, even a few days of disruption to supply could have dire results.

In a business-as-usual operating environment, and even during the Covid-19 pandemic, government and markets demonstrated that they could pivot quickly to resolve potential supply disruptions. But much worse disruption can be imagined—for example, in a war. Then markets may be unable to respond enough, and the government may not have policy levers for helping them. At the very least, that capacity remains untested.

This is why the agriculture sector and food system stakeholders, in partnership with ASPI, have initiated the development of a green paper focussed on Australia’s food security preparedness. The green paper will provide a strategic assessment of challenges to Australia’s food security and identify areas for collaboration between governments, industry and civil society. Importantly, this work will lay the foundation for national food security preparedness planning and will underpin a whole-of-nation approach to food policy.

The green paper will aim to establish a practical pathway to address the core strategic challenges set out clearly by the 2023 parliamentary report Australian Food Story: Feeding the Nation and Beyond. Among the report’s 35 recommendations is a call to develop a national food plan to serve as a food security strategy. This approach has been widely supported by stakeholders, but making sure that such an initiative is appropriately connected to Australia’s broader preparedness activities remains a serious gap. Bringing these lines of thought together is necessary to identify and address the core challenges to maintaining Australian food security and to address the complex effects that disruptions can have on communities.

Preparing an industry-driven Food Security Preparedness Green Paper is a novel approach. Yet some of the best public policy outcomes emerge at the intersection of industry and government—when a need is clear, but before it becomes a crisis. Debunking the myths around Australian food security is important and fostering collaboration to create solutions is a necessary conversation.

This industry-led approach lays the groundwork for the national food security preparedness planning that Australia desperately needs. Collaboration between industry and government is required to underpin a broader approach to food security preparedness and national food policy development. This is achievable and vital to Australia’s resilience and future prosperity.

Food security and national security: neither can be taken for granted

Australia’s food security should not be taken for granted. The Covid-19 pandemic shows what can go wrong with it during seismic strategic challenges.

January’s empty supermarket shelves across Darwin, caused by flooding, illustrate the precarious nature of food security even in Australia. It is not guaranteed, but it’s critical to Australia’s national security, and increasingly, the security of the region. That connection has been made clear by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture following its inquiry into food security in Australia. 

National security policy makers must also make that connection. Submissions to the inquiry show that the strategic vulnerabilities threatening Australian food security are well documented and indeed well understood by people who have paid attention to them. The impacts of war on markets and supply chain integrity, the rising cost of inputs, biosecurity threats in our region and climate change rank among the more serious risks highlighted. 

Policy and industry measures needed to address such vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly clear, and the need to act grows with each climate-related, supply chain or geopolitical disruption. 

Clear solutions have been offered by the inquiry’s report and recommendations. Chief among them is that the Australian government should lead the development of a national food plan, supported by a minister for food within the portfolio of the prime minister and cabinet. A national food council would advise the minister. 

The report gives us a timely opportunity to define just where the fundamental role of food sits within Australia’s broader defence and security frameworks. The opportunity to do so in the public version of the Defence Strategic Review was lost. The inquiry’s recommendations now present a late but crucial opportunity for the authors of the 2024 National Defence Strategy to support actions to address vulnerabilities to Australia’s food production. It’s a chance to achieve alignment and to work coherently and in collaboration with food system stakeholders who are steadfast in their commitment to galvanise Australia’s food security. 

A national food plan would constitute a food security strategy and, in the committee’s words, ‘needs to deal with the production and distribution of food, supply chain resilience, access to food, good nutrition (diet and health), and the management and disposal of food waste and other waste products.’ It should also ‘address the national security implications of food security—identifying and addressing vulnerabilities, particularly regarding food system infrastructure and vital inputs.’ 

It’s strongly in the interests of the defence and national security community to support these recommendations, so that food, or lack of it, does not become a problem that they have to deal with when their focus is best placed elsewhere. 

After all, as highlighted by the Foodbank charity in its submission to the inquiry, food insecurity has become increasingly ‘pervasive, chronic and intractable’ in our own society. If left unchecked, hunger in a population breeds discontent, and discontent breeds instability.  Dealing with the domestic and regional consequences of that instability is a responsibility that the security and defence establishment may not like to accept but would have to stomach anyway.  

Food insecurity is not just a problem for developing nations, as Australia has always been exposed to the vagaries of distance and geopolitical butterfly effects. We see a strong example of that now in shipping attacks in the Red Sea that have arisen at least in part from the Israeli conflict in Gaza. This disruption to global trade is creating headaches for Australia domestically and regionally. Most visibly, it forced the MV Bahijah, en-route to Israel with more than 17,000 head of high-quality Australian livestock, to return to Fremantle early in February. Regionally, the disruption is contributing to food insecurity by adding pressure on global food chokepoints, as highlighted incisively by Genevieve Donnellon-May. 

This is another reminder of Australia’s own supply chain fragility, which is compounded by the perilous state of our sovereign maritime shipping capability. We rely entirely upon access to the world for our critical inputs and for the exports that underpin our sovereignty and solvency. Accordingly, the committee’s report joins many others in recommending that the Australian government boost domestic sovereign capability by supporting ‘the development and expansion of essential inputs, such as fertiliser and agricultural chemicals’. 

Boosting that capability does however pose a vexing challenge for policy makers. While Australia relies on and is committed to the Western liberal rules-based order and multilateral system of trade, we have almost no choice but to contribute to its erosion by shoring up our own sovereign capacity and relying less on globalised supply chains. 

Despite that conundrum, addressing the challenge is not only in our own strategic interests; it also presents an opportunity to achieve the government’s stated ambition to ‘re-anchor ourselves as an economic, security and development partner of choice in the region.’ If Australia strengthens its capacity as a food producer, it will be more able to be that partner of choice to our neighbours. 

Australia’s place in the world will always be characterised by the natural strategic advantages of our geography, resources, and, perhaps most fundamentally, our ability to produce and export food. To ensure our own security we must own the increasing responsibility to use those advantages to underpin the stability and security of our region. A national food plan, with everything it entails, may be a decisive way to add real weight to Australia’s statecraft and boost our own food security, as well as that of our region using the diplomacy of food. 

Ultimately, food security is one of the greatest fundamental strengths of Australia’s national power, and these recommendations represent a significant opportunity to enhance it. Addressing the broad spectrum of issues that affect food security through a national security lens is one of the most crucial things the government can do in this term of office. Practically, that means two clear actions: giving effect to the committee’s recommendations, and enshrining the critical role of the food system in the 2024 National Defence Strategy. Doing so will activate real collaboration with food system stakeholders and demonstrate a genuine commitment to a whole-of-nation approach to Australia’s security.

Food security and national security: neither can be taken for granted

Australia’s food security should not be taken for granted. The Covid-19 pandemic shows what can go wrong with it during seismic strategic challenges.

January’s empty supermarket shelves across Darwin, caused by flooding, illustrate the precarious nature of food security even in Australia. It is not guaranteed, but it’s critical to Australia’s national security, and increasingly, the security of the region. That connection has been made clear by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture following its inquiry into food security in Australia. 

National security policy makers must also make that connection. Submissions to the inquiry show that the strategic vulnerabilities threatening Australian food security are well documented and indeed well understood by people who have paid attention to them. The impacts of war on markets and supply chain integrity, the rising cost of inputs, biosecurity threats in our region and climate change rank among the more serious risks highlighted. 

Policy and industry measures needed to address such vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly clear, and the need to act grows with each climate-related, supply chain or geopolitical disruption. 

Clear solutions have been offered by the inquiry’s report and recommendations. Chief among them is that the Australian government should lead the development of a national food plan, supported by a minister for food within the portfolio of the prime minister and cabinet. A national food council would advise the minister. 

The report gives us a timely opportunity to define just where the fundamental role of food sits within Australia’s broader defence and security frameworks. The opportunity to do so in the public version of the Defence Strategic Review was lost. The inquiry’s recommendations now present a late but crucial opportunity for the authors of the 2024 National Defence Strategy to support actions to address vulnerabilities to Australia’s food production. It’s a chance to achieve alignment and to work coherently and in collaboration with food system stakeholders who are steadfast in their commitment to galvanise Australia’s food security. 

A national food plan would constitute a food security strategy and, in the committee’s words, ‘needs to deal with the production and distribution of food, supply chain resilience, access to food, good nutrition (diet and health), and the management and disposal of food waste and other waste products.’ It should also ‘address the national security implications of food security—identifying and addressing vulnerabilities, particularly regarding food system infrastructure and vital inputs.’ 

It’s strongly in the interests of the defence and national security community to support these recommendations, so that food, or lack of it, does not become a problem that they have to deal with when their focus is best placed elsewhere. 

After all, as highlighted by the Foodbank charity in its submission to the inquiry, food insecurity has become increasingly ‘pervasive, chronic and intractable’ in our own society. If left unchecked, hunger in a population breeds discontent, and discontent breeds instability.  Dealing with the domestic and regional consequences of that instability is a responsibility that the security and defence establishment may not like to accept but would have to stomach anyway.  

Food insecurity is not just a problem for developing nations, as Australia has always been exposed to the vagaries of distance and geopolitical butterfly effects. We see a strong example of that now in shipping attacks in the Red Sea that have arisen at least in part from the Israeli conflict in Gaza. This disruption to global trade is creating headaches for Australia domestically and regionally. Most visibly, it forced the MV Bahijah, en-route to Israel with more than 17,000 head of high-quality Australian livestock, to return to Fremantle early in February. Regionally, the disruption is contributing to food insecurity by adding pressure on global food chokepoints, as highlighted incisively by Genevieve Donnellon-May. 

This is another reminder of Australia’s own supply chain fragility, which is compounded by the perilous state of our sovereign maritime shipping capability. We rely entirely upon access to the world for our critical inputs and for the exports that underpin our sovereignty and solvency. Accordingly, the committee’s report joins many others in recommending that the Australian government boost domestic sovereign capability by supporting ‘the development and expansion of essential inputs, such as fertiliser and agricultural chemicals’. 

Boosting that capability does however pose a vexing challenge for policy makers. While Australia relies on and is committed to the Western liberal rules-based order and multilateral system of trade, we have almost no choice but to contribute to its erosion by shoring up our own sovereign capacity and relying less on globalised supply chains. 

Despite that conundrum, addressing the challenge is not only in our own strategic interests; it also presents an opportunity to achieve the government’s stated ambition to ‘re-anchor ourselves as an economic, security and development partner of choice in the region.’ If Australia strengthens its capacity as a food producer, it will be more able to be that partner of choice to our neighbours. 

Australia’s place in the world will always be characterised by the natural strategic advantages of our geography, resources, and, perhaps most fundamentally, our ability to produce and export food. To ensure our own security we must own the increasing responsibility to use those advantages to underpin the stability and security of our region. A national food plan, with everything it entails, may be a decisive way to add real weight to Australia’s statecraft and boost our own food security, as well as that of our region using the diplomacy of food. 

Ultimately, food security is one of the greatest fundamental strengths of Australia’s national power, and these recommendations represent a significant opportunity to enhance it. Addressing the broad spectrum of issues that affect food security through a national security lens is one of the most crucial things the government can do in this term of office. Practically, that means two clear actions: giving effect to the committee’s recommendations, and enshrining the critical role of the food system in the 2024 National Defence Strategy. Doing so will activate real collaboration with food system stakeholders and demonstrate a genuine commitment to a whole-of-nation approach to Australia’s security.

The impact of global food chokepoint pressures on Asia’s food security

In the last few years Asia’s food security has suffered a series of crises induced by conflict, climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic, causing great disruptions to food supply systems and increasing  the number of people experiencing food insecurity. Now, pressure at four global ‘food chokepoints’—in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal due to geopolitical unrest, and the Panama Canal and the Mississippi River due to drought—are threatening Asia’s food security even more.

Disruptions in the global flow of goods have wide impact. They affect the trade of agricultural products, with delayed delivery times, rising prices and product shortages distorting competition between markets. Longer shipping times can make certain perishable foods unsellable. And changes to shipping schedules can increase pressure on cargo handling and road transport.

For Asian countries that rely on food exports and imports, the potential consequences are worrying. Those that produce and export food may experience shrinking profit margins prompting lower wages for workers, while those that import food could suffer higher prices due to increased transportation costs and greater price volatility, leading to changes in consumption.

Countries across Asia, many of whom are net food importers, are hit particularly hard by food chokepoint disruptions because they rely on European and Black Sea markets for key agricultural products such as soybeans, corn, wheat and edible oils. Notably, Singapore and Hong Kong, who have limited natural resources, import more than 90% of their food and are already vulnerable to export restrictions and global food price fluctuations. There is also ongoing concern about stable food supply in Japan, where more than 60% of food is imported.

In poorer countries, disruptions to food imports and subsequent food and energy price inflation could bring about a cost-of-living crisis, increase poverty and stall socioeconomic growth. This would be a heavy blow for those already rocked by crises such as Pakistan (extreme weather events), Bangladesh and Myanmar (conflict) and Sri Lanka (economic turmoil). It would also disproportionately affect households in the Philippines who spend 31% of their income on food, and low-income families in Indonesia who spend up to 64% of their budget on food, increasing the risk of undernutrition and malnutrition.

Sustained disruptions to supply chains and key trade routes could exacerbate geopolitical tensions across Asia, where fears of countries weaponising food and fertiliser supplies against each other, as demonstrated by the Ukraine-Russia conflict, are already amplifying food insecurity concerns. This makes it imperative for governments across the region to implement significant reforms to build resilience in supply systems and be better prepared for food shortages.

To start with, Asian governments should implement food import diversification strategies to avoid overreliance on any one market. Singapore, for instance, has already done this, increasing the number of food import sources from around 140 countries in 2004 to 180 in 2022. This may be one reason why in 2022 Singapore ranked second in the world for having the most affordable food, behind Australia, with the average household spending around 20% of their monthly expenditure on food.

To further increase resilience, Asian countries should coordinate investment in regional food supply chains and work together to implement early warning systems for climate monitoring. Having clearer oversight on food chokepoints, price volatility and extreme weather events can help countries in the region respond quickly and effectively to sudden changes.

Lastly, agricultural powerhouses in the region such as Australia and New Zealand could contribute to stabilise food security in Asia by increasing exports of grains and edible oils to the region.

Asia’s food supply systems are particularly vulnerable to both external shocks and domestic pressures. Disruptions increase food price inflation and the risk of malnutrition in countries already affected by both. Asian governments must urgently build resilience in their food trade routes through policies such as food import diversification, so that the region is better prepared for future food security challenges.

Northern Australia’s food-processing opportunity

In 2022, the northern Australia food technology innovation project was established to investigate the business and technical case for producing shelf-stable foods using novel food-processing technologies in the Northern Territory and the north of Western Australia.

Shelf-stable foods are products that have been processed (thermally treated or dried) so that they can be safely stored in a sealed container at room temperature for a long time. These products can be distributed without being kept cold, which reduces costs and increases supply-chain resilience. Products that are thermally treated to sterility can also bypass most biosecurity barriers to interstate and international trade.

The project opens a pathway to drive economic growth and enhance regional food resilience.

Most of Australia’s food processing takes place in the nation’s south. Food supply chains for northern Australia are thousands of kilometres long and vulnerable to natural disasters, supply-chain shocks like the Covid-19 pandemic, and fuel shortages. Given the vast distances, it’s plausible that a sustained fuel outage could compromise normal supply chains and lead to a food crisis in remote areas of northern Australia.

The project proposes that an initial pilot plant be built to lower the risks of building a modern food-processing sector in the north. It would involve the development of a certifiable, small-scale facility that pilots multiple food-processing lines. The plant would serve as a proving site for products and markets, providing investors with confidence in the sector’s future, and as a hub for research, development and training.

The project’s market research indicates that demand for shelf-stable and long-life foods in developed economies is increasing, especially in the Asia–Pacific. The value of shelf-stable seafood sales is predicted to rise across these markets between 2022 and 2027 at a compounding annual rate of 4.4%. Processed red meat sales are predicted to grow at 2.9% in the same period. These estimates are based on the region’s population growth, regional nations’ trade agreements with Australia, limited cold supply-chain reliability, and semi-regular food-security issues.

Potentially lucrative products to prioritise could include meal ingredients, snacks and convenience foods, health and beauty products, ready meals and luxury pet food. If processed, northern Australia’s surplus low-value or out-of-specification red meat, horticultural products and seafood could be converted into these higher-value shelf-stable products.

Any commercial-scale facility in the north needs feedstock-reserve capacity to overcome seasonal supply issues and to allow a plant to function year-round. For this to work, a large-scale drying capability is needed, possibly focusing on heat pumps or other novel technologies that are highly efficient in tropical conditions. Similarly, overpressure thermal sterilisation would likely use convenience plastic or biopolymer packaging rather than cans or glass. Industry 4.0 technologies will be critical to achieving a competitive advantage in the sector.

A pilot plant would inject an estimated $19 million into the local economy over two years, adding $5.2 million in direct value to the industry. It would directly support around 50 local jobs per year during the construction phase, and 24 ongoing jobs when ramped up to full production mode. With flow-on benefits for the community included, the total economic benefit could be as much as $25 million.

Food processing represents a huge economic opportunity for northern Australia, but governments need to get involved and help build this capacity to give the sector confidence. There’s no path to get the industry off the ground without a strong foundation that cultivates the region as fertile ground for future commercial investment.

It’s time to bring food defence to the table

Food contamination has been a regular feature in news headlines over the past fortnight.

The discovery of needles in strawberries and other fruit has been the main cause of concern, with incidents spreading across the country and overseas.

The food industry has long focused on food safety and assuring the quality of its products. These assurance systems primarily use Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles which are accepted and used globally to reduce the incidence of major food-borne disease outbreaks and have proven effective against accidental contamination.

Yet food safety practices are not sufficient to protect the food chain from deliberate contamination. Food defence is the protection of food and drink from deliberate contamination with chemical, biological, radiological substances or other hazardous materials—including foreign bodies like needles—and requires additional safeguards, procedures and controls to mitigate potential risk. Food defence is different to food safety.

Recognition of this difference is well established internationally. Deliberate contamination of food was the focus of the Food Defense Symposium organised by INTERPOL and the FBI in May 2016.

At the meeting it was acknowledged that ‘insider threat’ is one of the biggest challenges to overcome to prevent intentional tampering and contamination of food systems. While external security measures and HACCP practices generally work well to protect against lapses in food quality and unintentional food contamination, vulnerabilities inside the ‘food chain’ system were noted as significant issues.

Food defence strategies focusing on assessing vulnerability as part of broader risk management plans were one of the key topics covered during the food defence conference held in May in Minneapolis.

Deliberate acts against food and the supply chain can take on a few different forms including extortion, where a threat to contaminate a product may be made; economically motivated adulteration, which may include the addition of a contaminating substance; and malicious contamination, where a product has been contaminated with the intention to cause harm to the industry or human health.

A contamination crisis involving Fonterra, a global dairy company based in New Zealand, is a relevant example. In late 2014, the company received threat letters, accompanied by small packets of milk powder, which subsequently tested positive for the widely-used agricultural pesticide 1080. The letters contained implied threats of wider contamination of baby formula by a declared date unless the use of 1080 ceased.

The likelihood of widespread contamination of milk products was deemed very low but the incident triggered the recall of products and extensive testing to secure the food chain, at a cost of $A25 million. The scare also threatened dairy industry exports—particularly to China—and New Zealand’s food security reputation. In an interesting twist, the perpetrator was found to be a producer of an alternative pesticide and stood to benefit financially if 1080 was banned.

In 2016, reports surfaced in relation to adulterated Italian olive oil, with investigations demonstrating that well-known brands of Italian extra virgin olive oil were neither of Italian origin nor virgin and instead used low-grade oils and food colouring to pass off as the real thing.

A lucrative business, backed by criminal networks, was dismantled by Italian authorities who arrested 33 men and seized a total of $42 million in assets. At the time the profit margin in fake olive oil was higher than cocaine.

It’s no surprise that concerns were raised at the INTERPOL symposium about the increasing threats from criminals and terrorists to food products, grocery stores and other ‘soft’ targets, and the need for developing comprehensive risk-based strategies.

The recent strawberry tampering incidents have been described as ‘food terrorism’ by Strawberries Australia. This view seems a reflection not only of the criminality of the act but also the consequential impact on local and export markets and the wellbeing of consumers.

Food defence is regarded internationally as a specialised risk management framework that works alongside established food safety practices. Its convergence of techniques and practices from policing, applied science and national security perspectives may be a relatively new preventive focus for Australia but it’s one we need to consider implementing.

Product tampering is not new but we are facing the new reality of attacks on our own food supply that may have taken us into deeper water, beyond reliance on tried and proven ‘food safety’ standards and into a murkier world of food insecurity. It seems time to bring ‘food defence’ to our tables.