Tag Archive for: fighter jets

US allies must band together in weapons development

Let’s assume, as prudence demands we assume, that the United States will not at any predictable time go back to being its old, reliable self. This means its allies must be prepared indefinitely to lean on it far less than they have.

They will have to lean on each other, and one of the most difficult areas for doing that will be weapons acquisitions, where the US has long been the main supplier of systems that use the most difficult technology.

An unwritten clause in the US’s alliances has been that Washington’s big spending included the development and mass procurement of big-ticket defence items that could then be exported, so foreign defence budgets helped employ US workers. Indeed, in many market segments, including combat aircraft, the most lucrative segment of all, the past 70 years has been a story of allies trying to resist the formation of a US monopoly.

Reversing that course may be hard, but it won’t be impossible. The democracies of Europe, North America and the Pacific together have money, national resources and human capital. They have competitive defence industries, and in some sectors (such as surface warships combatants and land vehicles) they clearly outperform the US.

The problem is not resources but making the best use of them. There was no need for the US to exercise divide-and-rule in the times before Donald Trump’s second presidency: US allies divided themselves. They still do, as Franco-German squabbles over the share of work and the technical leadership in their Future Combat Air System program show.

That’s not sustainable: military development and production in a world without a reliable US cannot be a pot-luck meal where everyone turns up with a casserole, two hot dogs, a brownie and a shrimp. Specialisation will be needed, and each country, while attending to its own specialties, will have to rely on those of others.

The leaders in a non-US world: British aircraft engines, largely French space launch, Franco-German and British-Italian rotorcraft, German and Finnish armoured vehicles, Swedish airborne early warning and electronic warfare, South Korean and Japanese warships.

Stop screaming in the back, please. I’m not advocating for a global defence acquisition agency, the sort of thing that Europeans see as another vast jobs program and trebles-all-round for the Belgian economy. What is needed is a set of rules and protocols that enable development of a new tech-defence web.

There are several factors, within defence and peripheral to it, that should make it possible to expand international cooperation by incentive instead of bureaucratic fiat.

Urgency is the biggest of those factors. Once it was clear that World War II was a serious issue, Britain’s aircraft industry—fragmented, conniving and thinking of itself as aristocratic—was willing to be run by the right-wing Canadian upstart Lord Beaverbrook and the far-left Stafford Cripps.

Next, change is easier in a growing business, and there is a lot of growth to be had if the US’s export customers take their business to each other.

There are many unknowns in defence technology, but there is broad agreement that cheap autonomy and affordable zero-miss-distance guidance, based on commercial hardware, will be important for a wide range of weapons. These run from battlefield drones to smallish cruise missiles that weigh under a ton and cost much less than today’s $1 million plus. Warships are changing radically to become crewless or have crew numbers in double, not triple, digits. A newly expanded defence industry can focus on such new concepts.

The same goes for manufacturing industry. Materials and processes designed for automation, repetition and high quality are very applicable to unmanned systems and advanced munitions because production lines can be set up with minimal staff and surged to high rate in a crisis. Anduril is developing this in the US, but the technology to do it is commercial and available elsewhere.

One overlooked aspect of the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) is its achievement bringing Japan into cooperation with Britain and Italy. A generation ago, it was enough of a challenge to design the Eurofighter Typhoon in four European countries with languages that were at least related and used a common alphabet. Yet, GCAP appears to have incorporated Japan with little drama. Auto-translate exists today, as does video conferencing, and engineers across the world can work together on the same digital mockup.

Another connected link is emerging between Italy and Turkey, the latter emerging as a hub for unmanned systems. Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar announced a joint venture in early March and talked about the latter’s Kizilelma unmanned combat aircraft as a potential element of GCAP. That came a few months after Baykar agreed to acquire the Italian company Piaggio Aerospace, which had been on the market since 2018: Piaggio’s Avanti commercial aircraft has been a slow seller, but the maritime patrol variant, with Baykar’s mission systems, is an attractive option for coast guard users.

A US-free industry can, should and will avoid the US’s stifling bureaucracy, which includes an export-control system that can involve three government departments.

And could the new alliance gain from a brain drain, particularly to Canada but also to Australia and Britain as some in the US industry are repelled by the administration’s social policies? Acquiring talent from the US might not be too hard.

One good starting point would be to develop an open set of common governance principles for international programs, alongside a study of what the best potential pilot programs could be, and the potential for a multi-national accelerator for new technology.

Should we call it ‘Project Beaverbrook’?

The five-domains update

Sea state

Australian assembly of the first Multi Ammunition Softkill System (MASS) shipsets for the Royal Australian Navy began this month at Rheinmetall’s Military Vehicle Centre of Excellence in Redbank, Queensland. The ship protection system, which uses launched decoy projectiles to defeat incoming sensor-guided missiles, will be integrated into Australia’s ANZAC-class frigates and Hobart-class destroyers. The system has already been operated by New Zealand’s two ANZAC-class frigates for about 10 years.

Last week, Defence announced upgrades to the main transmitter at the Harold E Holt Communication Station near Exmouth, Western Australia—the first major overhaul since the facility was commissioned by the US navy in 1967. The Australian-operated very-low-frequency antenna array contributes to US nuclear deterrent through long-range communication with US ballistic-missile submarines. Maintenance will be carried out on a rolling schedule, to ensure the station remains in operation.

Flight path

China’s J-36 stealth fighter was back in the sky for its second test flight, this time flying solo. The test flights seemingly reveal two unique features: a diverterless supersonic inlet design that assists in regulating air flow and a three-engine layout. Both features suggest supersonic speed capabilities. The timing of its debut signals China’s readiness to challenge the United States’ aerial dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Last weekend the US made a surprise announcement awarding the Next Generation Air Dominance contract to Boeing for the F-47 fighter jet.

Canada will become the first buyer of Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). The world-leading radar technology system can detect and track targets thousands of kilometres away by refracting high frequency radio signals. Its sale could be Australia’s biggest defence export to date. The surprise announcement from new Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney comes despite the US’s long-held interest in acquiring the technology.

Rapid fire

The first two of 42 planned High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) vehicles were delivered to Australia this week. The Albanese government accelerated the acquisition of the US-made precision-strike platform. The systems will be fielded by the 10th Fires Brigade and improve army capabilities. The delivery follows the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Australia and the US in March for co-assembly of Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System (GMLRS) munitions for use with HIMARS platforms. Assembly will begin at Orchard Hills in Western Sydney later this year.

At the end of February, Defence Minister Richard Marles inspected the first batch of the Australian army’s new AS9 self-propelled artillery and AS10 armoured ammunition resupply vehicles. The South Korean designs will be manufactured by Hanwha at its Armoured Vehicle Centre of Excellence at Avalon. Australian supply chain partners are already producing components to support delivery. The AS9 is the army’s first self-propelled artillery piece. The army currently operates M777 towed artillery.

Final frontier

An Australian-made nanosatellite was successfully launched into low-Earth orbit as part of Defence’s Buccaneer project. Weighing less than ten kilograms, Buccaneer Main Mission was a collaboration between Adelaide-based Inovor Technologies and the Defence Science and Technology Group. Over its 12-month operational lifespan, the nanosatellite will gather data on how radio waves propagate through the upper atmosphere, potentially improving Australia’s over-the-horizon radar capabilities.

At the end of last month, US-based Varda Space Industries retrieved its Winnebago-2 space capsule after re-entry over remote South Australia. The landing site, Koonibba Test Range, is about 500km north-west of Adelaide. It is operated by Australian firm Southern Launch in partnership with the Koonibba Community Aboriginal Corporation. As the first commercial return to a commercial spaceport anywhere in the world, this is a landmark moment for Australia’s space industry.

Wired watchtower

Microsoft has released research showing that Russian state-sponsored hacking groups are expanding cyber operations to target critical infrastructure and governmental organisations in Western countries, including Australia. The BadPilot campaign is associated with Russian state actor Seashell Blizzard, and intrusions have targeted sectors such as energy, telecommunications and defence manufacturing. Hackers exploit known but unpatched vulnerabilities in widely used IT management and remote access software platforms. Once they gain access, they maintain their presence in compromised networks using legitimate remote-access tools such as Atera Agent and Splashtop remote services.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is taking fixed-income broker FIIG Securities to court after a 2023 cyberattack. The attack affected FIIG’s entire IT network and resulted in the theft of approximately 385 gigabytes of confidential data, potentially exposing the personal information of around 18,000 clients. ASIC alleged that FIIG failed to update and patch its software and lacked sufficient cybersecurity measures, leaving its systems exposed to intrusion and data theft. This breach contributed to growing concerns over Australia’s cybersecurity resilience and was part of a broader pattern of intrusions, including those attributed to state-backed groups.

Bolt from the blue: what we know (and don’t know) about the US’s powerful F-47 fighter

When the F-47 enters service, at a date to be disclosed, it will be a new factor in US air warfare.

A decision to proceed with development, deferred since July, was unexpectedly announced on 21 March. Boeing will be the prime contractor.

The design will have much more range than earlier fighters, both at supersonic and subsonic speed. But it is not even a fighter as it is generally understood. It will be more stealthy. It will be larger, trading dogfight manoeuvrability for reach, and it will be designed to work within a family of systems, many of them unmanned.

Range and speed are defensive attributes, allowing the aircraft to be based farther from Chinese air and missile bases and keeping tankers at a greater distance from interceptors: the air force has backed away from trying to make a more survivable tanker. But range and speed are offensive characteristics, too: while no aircraft can be in two places at once, fast and long-range aircraft can cover a wide area and sustain high sortie rates.

The F-47 is the centrepiece of the US Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) effort. The intended fighter design, now the F-47, has also been called NGAD. And the name Penetrating Counter-Air has been attached to it, too.

Former secretary of the air force Frank Kendall characterised NGAD as large and costly, and the F-47 will have retained these attributes. Although Kendall and USAF chief of staff General Dave Allvin raised the idea of a less costly NGAD last year, it never got near the stage of an amendment to the initial request for proposals that was issued in 2023.

Stealth: the F-22 and F-35 are classic applications of bowtie stealth design, their vertical tails causing stronger radar reflections when viewed from the side than from in front or behind. (A graph of this looks like a bowtie.) The problem in the Western Pacific is China’s numerous long-range airborne radars and air-warfare destroyers, which make it next to impossible to avoid being illuminated from all angles.

Expanding the envelope of tailless flight in terms of speed and manoeuvrability was almost certainly a focus of the classified Aerospace Innovation Initiative (AII) demonstration program that led to Boeing and Lockheed Martin AII-X prototypes. (AII was run by the Aerospace Projects Office, specially established within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.)

The USAF sees a program for fighter-like drones, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), as an integral part of NGAD, with two or more uncrewed aircraft teamed with each F-47. The Increment 1 CCAs (the General Atomics YFQ-42 and Anduril YFQ-44) are being used to evaluate their role as air-to-air missile carriers, augmenting the F-47’s weapon capability and taking close-range shots; Increment 2 will be designed to target surface emitters—making it an unmanned and attritable wild weasel, a traditional category of aircraft assigned to dealing with air defences. As reported earlier, simulation tests are showing that pilots can manage more than two CCAs.

USAF Lieutenant General Alex ‘Grinch’ Grynkewich, in 2015 and 2016 led the service’s Air Superiority 2030 study that defined NGAD as what was called a Penetrating Counter-Air aircraft. He discussed the reasoning behind Penetrating Counter Air (what’s become the F-47) in a public essay in 2017, by which time AII had been under way for two years.

Grynkewich’s team had started with a range of options, including reliance on standoff weapons and what he termed a ‘Gen6’ concept with F-22-like fighter attributes—which turned out to be far too expensive. The Penetrating Counter Air identity, Grynkewich wrote, avoided both ‘Gen6’ and ‘fighter’ which presupposed ‘a short-range, highly manoeuvrable, supersonic, manned aircraft, typically armed with a limited number of missiles and a gun’.

We know something about the F-47’s size from open-source discussion of its engines.  A 2018 presentation includes a slide outlining the goals of the USAF’s variable-cycle engine program, and it makes a clear distinction between engines of the 200 kilonewton (45,000 lb) thrust class (the General Electric XA100 and Pratt & Whitney XA101) sized for the F-35, smaller ‘scaled core’ engines for what has become the F-47—engines now known as GE XA102 and P&W XA103—and a derivative for retrofit to F-15s and F-16s.

That implies a maximum thrust around 160 kilonewtons (35,000 lb) for the F-47 engine. Given a requirement for less manoeuvre and more range, that points to an aircraft with a loaded weight of about 45 tonnes (much like an F-111, which will please some Australian readers.) But the importance of the adaptive engine is that it allows a supersonic-cruise aircraft to minimise the use of afterburning, even for transonic acceleration, while still being efficient in subsonic flight.

Legions of would-be R. V. Joneses have spent the weekend poring over the F-47 artwork released by the Pentagon. I would advise caution: what we don’t know about its shape is still more important than what we do know, even before we take account of what we do know for certain but ain’t so.

But there are aspects of the artwork that call to mind the work of the late Alan Wiechman, who joined McDonnell Douglas from the Lockheed Skunk Works in the mid-1980s and headed the company’s stealth work until his retirement in 2014. His work included the X-36 tailless prototype, and the Bird Of Prey, demonstrating optical and radar stealth. His obituary in 2023 noted that he had ‘most recently’ been an adviser on stealth to the USAF Rapid Capabilities Office.

As with anything in the United States these days, there is much uncertainty ahead for the F-47. Boeing’s bid was submitted well before new CEO Kelly Ortberg joined, and the company has a painful history of low bidding and poor performance. The requirement may be sound and the technology may be good, but the F-47 is another pull on an overstressed air force budget, and by the time it enters service (not in Trump’s second term) it will face challenges, including whatever F-35X ideas emerge from Fort Worth.

But let’s get back to that surprise announcement on Friday by   President Donald Trump. It came as a surprise for good reasons.

Defying decades of practice, the F-47 was launched by an empty Pentagon C-suite: nominees for the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Air Force secretary, and undersecretaries for acquisition, and research and engineering, are all awaiting confirmation. Defense secretary, infantry major and TV host Pete Hegseth was the sole source selection authority.

Air force leaders had lobbied Trump personally to get his approval for the project, which Kendall put on hold in July. With no CJCS, the lead defense adviser to Hegseth is the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed last May: Grynkewich, the author of that NGAD-defining Air Superiority 2030 study.

Was this a Machiavellian plan by Kendall? Delaying the NGAD decision last year looks like a coup, allowing the air force to dazzle the president with secret technology, while talking up the threat of China’s new J-36 to inspire a sense of urgency, permitting Trump to present it as his own idea and calling it F-47. Conveniently, the sceptical Elon Musk, usually omnipresent at big occasions, was busy at a briefing at the Pentagon.

China’s other new combat aircraft: a crewed fighter, maybe for aircraft carriers

Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group’s J-36 scooped up most of the publicity around China’s late-December revelations, but a second combat type, one from Shenyang Aircraft and referred to for now as J-XX, was revealed at the same time.

It was smaller, and the pictures of it were less clear, so it got some attention. But it deserves plenty, as the other half of an unprecedented double revelation and a complementary part of China’s future air combat system.

Observation of the design reveals that it’s very much a standard-size fighter with a pilot. There are good hints that it’s intended for shipboard operation, though that would not stop it from also equipping the air force.

Since China already has a new naval fighter in the works, the J-XX may be at a very early stage of development. What we saw could have been not a prototype, an aircraft close in design to the intended production version, but a technology demonstrator, which would look like the real thing but lack many features.

The content and style of the two disclosures is no accident, because there are no such accidents in China. There were more and better pictures of the J-36, suggesting that the authorities want more attention for the Chengdu aircraft from their target audiences. One of the audiences is the Chinese population, to be reassured that China is disputing the lead with the United States; another may be the US itself, with a new administration that might be tempted to respond with disclosures of its own, to China’s benefit.

The J-XX appears to be closer to a classic large-fighter size—25 tonnes gross weight, similar to the Eurofighter Typhoon—than the J-36, which has the size of a medium bomber. The J-XX certainly cannot accommodate anything like the J-36’s impressively large main weapon bay and respectably large secondary bays. It is not a competitor or alternative to the J-36.

The J-XX has no vertical tails. Some observers saw, in the first pictures to appear, articulated V-tails that could fold flat in straight and level flight and move into a raised position for takeoff and landing and maneuvering flight; later images, however, showed a tailless lambda wing shape, with a highly swept and blended inner section and less swept, tapered outer panels. The planform resembles many notional designs for next-generation fighters seen in the US and elsewhere since the 2010s.

As on the J-36, the trailing edge incorporates multiple moving control surface panels, and the outer segments are likely split in the same way to act as rudders and speedbrakes. The inner half of the trailing edge is swept sharply forward, moving the control surface further aft to make it more effective in pitch. The exhaust nozzles are laterally separated and extend beyond the structure (unlike the J-36’s nozzles), so full vectoring is both possible and likely, and can add to control in pitch, roll, and yaw.

The engines are apparently separated by a narrow tunnel—a very unusual design feature. Unlike the widely separated engines on the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi Flanker family, they are too close together to accommodate stores between them. The narrow passage is a mystery because it seems to make little sense in terms of aerodynamics, signatures or vehicle packaging: it would appear more logical to fill the space in and use it for fuel.

The undersides of the engine housings are flattened, suggesting that a future version might have shallow weapon bays there. The rest of the shape does not offer any obvious bay locations: the main landing gear bays occupy the strategic terrain on the body sides.

The canopy seems to have a low profile, so low that some people thought the J-XX was uncrewed. But it does have a pilot, at least: there is very little logic to building a drone with two engines, adding weight and complication when there is no concern about losing someone onboard due to an engine failure.

What does this add up to? The tell-tale features may be the large pitch control surfaces and the location of the break line on the trailing edge. The first provides the pitch control authority needed for carrier landings and the second accommodates a wing fold.

Shenyang has been responsible for both of China’s carrier fighters—the Sukhoi-derived J-15 family and the new J-35—and therefore owns China’s expertise in this specialised and challenging area.

The J-35 is still under development, so if the J-XX is a follow-on carrier fighter, production may be some years off. If the aircraft is an early-stage technology demonstrator, that might explain some of the design details.

One is intriguing if this is a carrier jet: the nose is quite long and, as noted, the cockpit is low. As a near-delta with no canard wings, the J-XX will point high when flying slowly for landing. So the pilot will see little of the flight deck that he or she is approaching. But Northrop Grumman demonstrated fully automatic carrier landing in 2013 with the X-47B, which achieved much better consistency in touchdown point than is normal for navy fighters.

Applied to a crewed combat aircraft, autoland would eliminate many training cycles and reduce the number of heavy landings, allowing a lighter airframe and landing gear and reducing operational costs. The Chinese navy, too, would not face the same cultural challenges in making that change that would inhibit the US Navy. The idea is speculative, but it would help explain an early start to a demonstration program.

China’s big new combat aircraft: an airborne cruiser against air and surface targets

The speed, agility, range and stealth of an individual aircraft type are still important, but they’re no longer the whole story of air combat. Advances in sensing, processing and communications are changing military operations.

The Chengdu J-36, the big Chinese combat aircraft that first appeared on 26 December, has been developed to exploit these changes and support China’s strategic goal: to establish regional dominance, including the ability to annex Taiwan by force.

If J-36s can fly supersonically without using afterburning, as the prototype’s shape suggests they will, each will be able to get into and out of battle faster and more safely than conventional fighters and bombers, which cruise subsonically. A high degree of stealth will greatly help J-36s in penetrating defences. Supersonic cruise would also mean each J-36 could fly more missions in a given period.

The design’s big main weapon bays are sized for considerable air-to-surface missiles, which J-36s could launch against such targets as airfields, aircraft carriers and air-defence batteries. With great speed and height, J-36s could also throw inexpensive glide bombs farther than other aircraft could.

The main weapon bays are big enough to carry unusually large air-to-air missiles for engaging aircraft at great range, including vital support units such as tankers and air-surveillance radar planes. Targeting data for this might come from other aircraft, ships, satellites or ground sources. The missiles might also be launched at fighters at ranges that keep J-36s safe from counterattack.

J-36s are themselves likely to be sources of targeting data for other aircraft and for ships, using large passive and active sensors that aircraft of such size can easily carry. They may command aircraft that fly with them. In all this, they’d use radio links that are hard for an enemy to detect.

To call the J-36 an airborne cruiser may not be far off the mark—and may call into question the West’s decision to prioritise development and production of fighters that are, by comparison, mere torpedo boats.

(An earlier article in this series technically assesses the design of the J-36. The type’s designation is likely but not certain.)

For the Taiwan mission, China’s principal opposing force is US-led air power, comprising the US Air Force and the US Navy’s aircraft carriers, with support from Japan, Australia, Taiwan and maybe South Korea and others. Air power from China’s opponents can hinder its maritime and amphibious operations, resulting in slower progress and higher casualties.

So, counter-air capability is crucial for China. This is what the US thinks of as China’s anti-access and area denial capability. It includes surface-to-air weapons, fighters, air-base attacks and the information realm.

To understand where the J-36 fits in, start by considering China’s current force, of which the Chengdu J-20 is the spearhead. The J-20 is fast and stealthy, with good range for a fighter, but its weapon bays are limited to short-range and medium-range air-to-air weapons. Like the F-35, it is more detectable outside its forward quadrant. That becomes a greater vulnerability in a networked environment, where a sensor platform on your beam may not be well placed to launch a weapon but will pass your track to one that is.

The long-range Xi’an H-6 bomber, used as a missile carrier, can launch attacks at air bases throughout the Western Pacific. But its effect is limited to the warheads of up to six costly missiles that must fly far enough to keep their vulnerable launch aircraft safe.

The J-36 combines speed and range with all-aspect stealth. Potential internal loads include such long-range air-to-air missiles as the PL-17, which the J-20 cannot carry internally. Heavier, air-to-surface missiles would be aimed at airfields and warships. It also probably supports the kind of mass-precision attacks made possible by accurate, more autonomous weapons, or—as autonomous technology advances—the carriage of loitering munitions and jammers.

The J-36’s smaller outboard weapon bays might accommodate defensive and support weapons, possibly on extending rails like the J-20’s side bays.

The large transparent side apertures in the forward fuselage could be wide-field-of-view passive warning and cueing systems. But there’s another possibility: if you wanted to integrate a high-energy anti-missile laser into an aircraft, with a hemisphere-plus field of fire but without unstealthy turrets, it might from the outside look like those transparencies. A single optical chain could feed left and right steerable heads under the conformal windows. Cue panic.

Speed is not just valuable for survivability, although it does erode missile engagement envelopes. Even Mach 1.8 supersonic cruise halves flight time and greatly increases sortie rate compared with a subsonic-cruise aircraft.

The US considered developing a supersonic strike aircraft in the early 2000s. But with 9/11 and the cost of the F-35 program, a high-speed project could not get funded. ‘Response time, and cost per target killed, were the two holy grails,’ a Northrop Grumman engineer commented in early 2001. The supersonic aircraft was big and complex, but the sortie generation rate was far higher than that of subsonic alternatives, and fewer aircraft were needed. And it could use cheap, unpowered glide weapons with a stand-off range estimated at 170km from a Mach 2 launch.

Speed on one side of a conflict is an important advantage. If the J-36 can penetrate to threaten bases in the second island chain, forcing the US to move B-21s, B-52s and other high-value assets further back, US strike sortie rate and effectiveness will diminish.

It’s important to keep in mind that the J-36 will be part of a family of systems and a network of capabilities. The appearance over the holiday season of the KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control system, based on the Xi’an Y-20 airlifter, is significant.

China has produced five different airborne radar systems since 2003, more than any other nation, all based on the technology of active electronically scanned arrays (AESAs). It has expanded their role beyond that of forward-passing adversary track data to fighter aircraft. AESA radars can update tracks much faster than a rotating-antenna radar, so these systems can provide guidance-quality midcourse updates to missiles.

Compared with the propeller-driven KJ-500, the KJ-3000 can be moved faster and farther forward to support an operation, and it can fly higher for greater sensor range. Working with a KJ-3000, the J-36s could launch missiles while remaining radar-silent.

If its speed and stealth allow it safely to get close to the enemy, a J-36 itself will be able to provide targeting data to other weapons, such as missiles launched by H-6s that prudently stay well behind it. It will also be the command and control hub for other aircraft, crewed and uncrewed. If it is a two-seater, the second crew member will likely be a force manager.

As for how to classify the J-36, too many people have rushed to call it a ‘sixth-generation fighter’.

The ‘fifth-generation’ term, invented in Russia, was picked up by Lockheed Martin as a marketing tool in the early 2000s. What Lockheed Martin would call 5-gen fighters combine supersonic speed and maneuverability with some degree of stealth. The Chengdu J-20 fighter is fifth-generation by that standard.

But this ‘generation’ taxonomy misleads more than it informs, because combat aircraft designs need not and do not fall into discrete sequential groups of characteristics.

And ‘fighter’, ‘bomber’ and ‘strike’ definitions are getting less clear. Most Boeing F-15s, nominally fighters, have been built as strike aircraft, and the fighter-derived Sukhoi Su-34 is another step down the same path. Designed against air and land threats, the J-36 is even larger than the Su-34. Its size and flight performance put it into its own category, for which there is no name. Maybe ‘airborne cruiser’ will catch on.

F-35: who’s right?


Following the submission that James Mugg and I made to the Senate Inquiry into planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter), I was invited along to give evidence yesterday. It’s always good to see Parliament at work, and the Committee process is reassuring about the willingness of our politicians to engage with complex issues in a constructive manner. Here’s my opening statement to the Inquiry. (Watch my Twitter feed for the Hansard link for the rest of the discussion when the time comes.)

Thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning. As you probably know, the F-35, like the future submarine, has been a gift that keeps giving for someone in my line of work. The fact that we’re here today in 2016 to talk about it as a planned acquisition when the original conception was for a 2012 in-service date with the RAAF is a good illustration that things haven’t gone according to plan.

The question for the Committee is whether the deviation from plan is terminal, or whether it is a regrettable but ultimately manageable setback on the way to a mature capability. I think it is much more likely to be the latter than the former, despite much that the Committee has been told in written submissions and in evidence here. I won’t claim to have enough information at hand to make a solid judgement, though I would hazard that my professional qualifications and experience make me a reasonably experienced judge. My doctorate is in physics, I have been involved in defence capability development for over 20 years, and I managed a technical analysis branch in what was then DSD which had responsibility for electronic intelligence.

As well, I have had good access to the F-35 program during my time at ASPI. I have had briefings from our own Department of Defence, Lockheed Martin and discussions at the Pentagon on the subject. Most of the discussions were at the unclassified level, but I had the opportunity to discuss the modelling and simulation work that underpins the concept of operations for the F-35 with the practitioners. My conversations with those involved in modelling work suggested that I was dealing with careful analysts who well understood the nature of their business. They could explain their assumptions and, critically, how they tested the sensitivity of their conclusions to variations of those assumptions and of input parameters. The results of that work—which should be available to the Committee should you choose to ask for a brief—is starkly at odds with some of the material in submissions you have received.

Which brings us to the nub of the question that anyone wanting to understand the F-35 inevitable comes up against—who is right? On one hand you have a very active group of critics who have managed to get traction with the media and with elements of governments in Australia and Canada at least. As the submissions show, their view is that this program is a fiasco of extraordinary magnitude. On the other hand, you have the acquisition organisations and air forces of some of the most professional and competent operators of combat aircraft in the world—I include in that list Australia, Canada, Japan, Israel, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. Those groups have access to classified data on the aircraft, and the partner nations also have good internal access to the program. Their collective judgement is that the F-35 is the way ahead for their air combat capability. (I think the Canadian Government will return to that conclusion unless money is their only driver.)

It is true that the American procurement system has the odd hiccup, and it has produced some systems that are far from meeting the cost-benefit balance required to justify their procurement. That generally happens when they shoot for ultra-high performance with insufficient regard for cost. Occasionally the American system produces systems that don’t work as advertised (the airborne laser comes to mind)—but only very occasionally. Much more often it is cost that leads to a ‘death spiral’ of ever lower numbers and higher unit costs. In that list I’d include the Seawolf nuclear submarine, the B-2 bomber and—ironically, given that it is proposed by many as the solution for alleged intractable problems with the F-35, the F-22 Raptor fighter jet. All are fine platforms, and all are unaffordable. They are not good solutions to military problems.

In summary, to conclude that the F-35 is not the right solution for Australia’s air combat capabilities, we have to assume that the American procurement system has made a rare error on the biggest program it has ever done, and that the most professional militaries of the world have failed to notice when doing their due diligence.

That said, further slippage of the program seems possible—particularly where the software is concerned. In our submission we talked about a hedging strategy of additional Super Hornets in the event that a danger of a capability gap emerges in the next few years. That was certainly the right answer when the Howard Government purchased 24 Super Hornets back in 2007 as an ‘interim’ capability. But that came with a cost of over $6 billion once maintenance for the rest of this decade is taken into account. So it’s not something you’d repeat lightly. We believe that remains the most viable fallback position, and I’m happy to expand on that in our discussion this morning.