Tag Archive for: FARC

Colombia’s president sells the skin before catching the bear

This year won’t only be remembered by who gets elected to the Oval Office. It’ll also be known as the year the Colombian public rejected a hard-fought peace deal with the leftist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

With the unexpected results in the plebiscite (50.24% rejected the deal), I’ve been constantly asked, what happened? Why did Colombians vote ‘No’ after 52 years of war?

The answer is that the plebiscite wasn’t just about peace, but was also about President Juan Manuel Santos and his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe’s, pursuit of power. It was about winning the people’s hearts and minds ahead of the 2018 presidential elections, when both men’s hand-picked successors will contest the presidency.

President Santos was the main proponent of the peace agreement, and his stunning defeat has brought the legitimacy of his leadership into question. Remarkably, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the conflict last Friday, with the committee making it clear the award was didactic, based on the hope that he would achieve peace. While there’s been a lot said about the reasons behind the peace deal’s failure, Santos made a number of errors that also played a role.

Firstly, he was overconfident. Buoyed by significant political support, Santos underestimated Uribe’s persuasive power. Santos enjoyed the support of 12 out of the 13 registered political parties in Colombia throughout the peace process and during campaigning ahead of the plebiscite. That political backing didn’t transcend into public support, as Uribe’s Democratic Centre Party—Centro Democrático in Spanish—managed to convince Colombians that Santos’ deal wasn’t good enough.

Secondly, he miscalculated, which is easy to do when overconfident, and is something that Santos has done a lot during the past year. He announced in September 2015, with much fanfare, that a definitive peace deal would be reached by March 2016. That didn’t happen. In June he announced that peace talks would finish by 20 July. That didn’t happen either. And he ‘sold the skin before catching the bear’ late last month, hosting a pompous signing ceremony in Cartagena, more than a week before Colombians had their say on the agreement.

Finally, he lacked focus. The peace talks became the epicentre of Colombia’s present and future, but you don’t put all the eggs in one basket. Throughout the process, Santos linked a broad set of issues to the peace accords that had little or nothing to do with the agreed agenda, including gender identity issues.

Other possible explanations include miscommunication and misinformation. Both of the plebiscite campaigns were soaked in lies, catchy-slogans, and contradictions. Reading the 297-page long agreement was a mammoth task given the 38 days between the announcement and the plebiscite. And even for avid readers, being well-informed was a challenge amid the plethora of polarised debates and opinions.

The result of the plebiscite has plunged Colombia’s future into deeper uncertainty. Santos now needs to negotiate with a strengthened Uribe before re-negotiating with FARC. Santos is rushing to save the peace deal, with the ceasefire with FARC due to end on 31 October. And even if Uribe and Santos can reach an agreement before that deadline, the country’s stability will depend on how willing FARC is to negotiate.

Polarisation is another side effect of the vote, particularly if the Colombian government re-engages in conflict with FARC. Before the plebiscite, Colombia was split between Santos and Uribe’s versions of peace. Now, it runs the risk of demonising Uribe and those who voted ‘No’.

What’s clear though is that—for now—Uribe has emerged the victor.  The UN Mission in Colombia and peace are both in limbo.  For sustainable peace, Colombia must deal with the structural problems it faces in both the cities and the countryside.

Peace is still possible and both sides have made clear they want it. But it’s probably not possible for the Santos government. Uribe’s measure of immunity in exchange for peace is different to Santos’. And FARC leaders are unlikely to concede that amount of terrain. Even if they do, coming to an agreement will take time.

If the plebiscite had gone the other way, there’d still be uncertainty, but would instead revolve around FARC’s intentions to hand in weapons, stop filling its coffers with drug-trafficking money, and what their new role in Congress would look like. Colombians may have wondered if Santos’ Nobel Peace Prize would make a difference and if Uribe’s party would still have a chance in the upcoming presidential elections.

Unfortunately, as long as Santos and Uribe retain some form of power, Colombians will remain polarised. Uribe and Santos’ legacies are hard to match and the rivalry is likely to heat up before the election.

Even if a deal is reached, a formal peace probably won’t have significant impact on the ground. With only 37% of Colombians turning out to the polls last week, it’s clear that the peace deal isn’t that important to Colombians. Perhaps after 52 years of war, they’re simply accustomed to living with it.

Demining Colombia

The war between Colombia and the FARC rebel group is over. After four years of negotiating, on 26 September in Cartagena both sides shook hands and bid farewell to the longest-running conflict in the western hemisphere.

Peace in Colombia has bordered on being unimaginable for 52 long and bloody years. But at last, it’s a reality for its 48 million resilient people.

Still, why should this matter to Australia?

There are two answers. The first is essentially self-interest. Australia has its eyes set on Colombia, both economically and diplomatically. Australia’s recent diplomatic outreach efforts are exploring the feasibility of expanding trade relations via a free trade agreement between the two countries. And there’s a strong desire to establish a resident embassy in Colombia’s capital, Bogotá.

But there’s another more altruistic reason. Landmines are a global issue. Every year, they kill 15,000 to 20,000 people—most of them children, women and the elderly, and severely injure countless more in some 78 countries. Australia’s long played an active role in reducing the number of deaths and injuries from landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Australia’s commitment to a world free of landmines has taken demining assistance to dozens of countries across the Asia–Pacific, Middle East and Africa. That has earned the nation a well-deserved reputation as a good international citizen. But the landmine problem isn’t exclusively confined to those regions and, despite the role that anti-mine action has played in Australia’s foreign policy, its efforts have so far overlooked Latin America.

Perhaps surprisingly, Latin America hosts the second most mine-affected country in the world, the number one source-country of new landmine victims and the country with the second-largest internally displaced population (IDPs) in the world. Colombia holds the dubious distinction of holding each of those titles.

Internal conflict—mainly but not exclusively with FARC—left a horrific toll, devastated an otherwise vibrant country and left a deadly legacy. 693 of Colombia’s 1,123 municipalities have reported the presence of landmines and ERW contamination. And yet the full scope of the problem in Colombia is little known: landmines have claimed more than 11,000 victims in Colombia since the early 1990s.

As rural areas once controlled by FARC start to open up, landmines and ERW will remain a barrier for thousands of FARC combatants —yet to be demobilised— to reintegrate into civilian life in rural areas and for over six million IDPs to have a fresh start. Creating favourable security conditions to guarantee victims and pardoned perpetrators a safe return home is vital. FARC rebels have agreed to work alongside Colombia’s military to remove landmines and other explosive devices. This will provide Colombian authorities with a golden opportunity to make presence, build governance, and bring stability in FARC-controlled areas where none previously existed.

But getting the endgame right in Colombia doesn’t come with the stroke of a pen, and a big effort will be required to rid the country of landmines. Diplomatic and financial support is needed. That’s where Australia might come in. In a region where it’s hoping to open doors, its expertise in demining can work to the benefit of both sides.

Of course it comes at a cost and Australia —like many other nations—is struggling to maintain previous levels of funding to anti-mine action. But in the Foreign Minister’s own words, ‘Australia’s candidacy to the UNHRC 2018-2020 is a measure of our longstanding commitment to promoting and protecting human rights, both in Australia and around the world’.

The loss of lives and limbs, also means the loss of livelihoods and the loss of economic productivity. If a free trade agreement with Colombia and an embassy in Bogota are to become a reality, anti-mine action in Colombia could be a powerful tool for Australia’s bridge building efforts.

Closing Colombia’s war: a plebiscite then peace?

Image courtesy of Flickr user Juan Pablo González.

The war in Colombia is over. But it’s too early to celebrate.

The Colombian government and the FARC rebels last week announced that they’d settled a final peace deal that will end 52 years of fighting—and the longest-running conflict in the Americas.

Getting signatures on the deal is a historic achievement, but peace in Colombia won’t be achieved with pen strokes alone. Indeed, a Brexit-like plebiscite is the only thing standing in between three generations of Colombians and their first day of peace in over half a century.

President Santos referred to the plebiscite, which is currently scheduled for 2 October, as the most important visit to the polls in Colombian history.

Will Colombia say no to peace with the FARC? It’s hard to tell how this peace deal will unfold. The latest polls show mixed results. Since 2 August, the ‘no’ votes drew closer to the ‘yes’ votes five times. But the last poll revealed that the ‘yes’ is expected to win with 32.1% support over a 29.9% ‘no’ vote. But the polls are neck and neck—it’s anyone’s guess at this stage.

What we can tell is that the government isn’t in a comfortable position, for instance, by looking at the President’s plunging approval ratings. Santos reached a new low of 21% in the most recent polling, his lowest figure since taking office 2010.

That may be music to the ears of former president Alvaro Uribe ahead of his ‘vote no’ plebiscite campaign. But with only 4.4 million votes (13%) of registered voters endorsing the deal, Uribe’s hopes to negotiate a different one and postpone the celebration will likely be shattered.

And what if Colombia say yes? Even if Colombians push the final deal through, peace should be met with cautious optimism. Significant challenges to implement this deal lie ahead.

Transitional justice was highly controversial for the duration of negotiations. Impunity is a constant concern among sectors of society and among some politicians. Peacemaking has a sweet and sour flavor, but any aftertaste of impunity will affect peacebuilding in the long-term.

FARC has to approve the accord during its 10th—and hopefully final—conference. It’s a necessary step for the top leaders’ buy-in. It could also be a moment for internal dissent about the agreement to manifest. That’s unlikely to be a big issue as FARC leaders have been informally discussing the accords for years, but it could weaken the demobilisation process.

In an agreed process, FARC members will hand their weapons to a UN mission and begin their reintegration into Colombian society. But landmines remain a significant barrier for thousands of FARC rebels seeking to transition to normal life and will likely seek to settle in Colombia’s country regions rather than major urban areas.

Colombia is the second most mine-affected country in the world after Afghanistan, and the source of the most new landmine victims.

That affects victims, too. For Colombia’s six million internally displaced people—the second largest number in the world—landmines could get in the way of their fresh start once rural areas under control of FARC begin to open up.

Another challenge for a post-peace deal Colombia is serious organised crime, particularly drug trafficking. According to the annual United Nations report on Illicit Crop, Colombia’s coca crop increased 39% last year and has doubled since 2013, meaning that Colombia is once again the world’s top coca producer. Having a major coca problem can increase violence in urban areas while undermining the effects of FARC’s definite ceasefire. FARC’s absence could create a vacuum that any number of other criminal groups already in the jungle may seek to fill, giving rise to more violence.

Regardless of those challenges, Colombia has made impressive, if hard-won, gains in economic growth, citizen security, and improving the rule of law over the last decade. This has contributed significantly to the reduction of violence in rural areas in recent years. The final peace deal between the government and FARC is another monumental step forward.

If everything goes according to plan, next month’s highly-anticipated symbolic ceremony (especially by those seeking to make political mileage out it) will mark the beginning of a new chapter in Colombia’s history. FARC will move from the jungle to the Congress, trading their camouflage for suiting as over 47 million optimistic eyes watching.

The road ahead will put Colombia’s patience, forgiveness, and adaptability to the test. Peacebuilding takes time, requires sacrifice and is driven by real change. The final deal isn’t the perfect deal, but it’s the best deal possible. Both sides would have liked to achieve more, but—at least for now—everything the deal appears done. Colombians will now have to decide whether this is the right tool for building a lasting peace before they can celebrate.

Colombia’s organised crime landscape in a post-FARC era

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Several weeks ago on The Strategist, I discussed why Colombia’s 51-year-old battle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) may come to an end on 23 March 2016. But as negotiations march towards a peace deal, there are five primary reasons why law enforcement agencies may have to hold off on their celebrations a little longer.

First, the eventual demobilisation of FARC rebels wouldn’t be a fatal setback to Colombia’s illicit narcotics industry. Drug lords have been killed or imprisoned only to be replaced quickly, if not immediately, by their lieutenants. In the early 1990s, the end of the big cartels—Medellin and Cali—gave rise to a new breed of smaller, low profile cartels, including the Norte del Valle cartel.

Second, BACRIM—an acronym from the Spanish Bandas Criminales referring to Colombia’s 17 largest organised crime groups—could become a bigger problem. BACRIM emerged in 2003 when the government struck a peace deal with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—Colombia’s right-wing paramilitaries. The emergence of those groups was the unintended consequence of the then promising demobilisation process. They are now Colombia’s number one national security threat.

Third, the National Liberation Army (ELN)—Colombia’s second largest leftist guerrilla group—is still active, so it’s possible that factions of FARC could join ELN’s line-up. But that’s unlikely as a peace accord with FARC would take the ideological struggle from the jungle to the Congress. The government expects FARC becomes a political party once rebels give-in their weapons. And with FARC off the battlefield, a debilitated ELN may have no choice but to move toward a peace process as well.

Fourth, FARCRIM—BACRIM 2.0—could emerge. Those mid-level FARC commanders who are unwilling to embrace a law-abiding life under the peace deal will have sufficient financial incentives to create their own criminal drug running organisations—and stop running drugs for others, including the ruling secretariat negotiators in Havana. And let’s not forget that the revenues that FARC derives from drug trafficking have doubled since 2011.

So bluntly speaking, FARC rebels—particularly those unwilling to disarm—face the trilemma of either joining a BACRIM or the ELN, or forming their own FARCRIM. And with Colombia’s illegal narcotics industry providing fertile ground for continued exploitation, it seems that the FARCRIM scenario is the most rational path to take.

Yet under current negotiations, FARC agreed to help eradicate the illegal drug trade. Over the last 40 years Colombia’s cocaine business has proven to be extremely resilient. Worryingly, UNODC’s 2015 illicit coca cultivation monitoring survey showed Colombia’s cultivation area and production output both increased substantially between 2013 and 2014, growing from 48,000 hectares to 69,000 hectares, and from 290 metric tonnes to 442 metric tonnes respectively.

But even if upon demobilisation FARC rebels didn’t re-engage in the drug trade, a fifth scenario depicts Mexican cartels taking control of Colombia’s narcotics industry. The anti-narcotics directorate of the Colombian Police has warned that such a scenario has been slowly unfolding since 2013. Indeed, it has been reported that some FARC commanders are selling-off some of their drug laboratories and other assets to Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel, as they try to cash-in before a peace treaty is signed.

Colombian law enforcement agencies are well aware that these five scenarios exist, but the prospects that more than one of them will unfold and combine is more than enough to keep authorities awake at night.

Having FARCRIM, Mexican cartels and BACRIM actively operating in Colombia would only confirm law-enforcement agencies have good reasons to be concerned. While a peace deal with FARC is a positive step, we should be realistic about the likelihood that domestic and international, particularly Mexican, players will rush to fill the power vacuum that a neutered FARC will leave.

FARC runs an enticing and lucrative business that isn’t exclusive to narcotics. Indeed, FARC is one of the world’s richest organised crime/terrorist organisations.

While estimates vary, Forbes Magazine reports FARC’s annual turnover to be US$600 million—behind only ISIS and Hamas. However, that’s significantly less than previous estimates from Colombian officials. In 2013, Colombia’s former head of police said that FARC earned as much as US$1 billion. The year before, Former Defense Minister, Juan Carlos Pinzon said that FARC’s net annual revenue should range from US$2.4 billion to US$3.5 billion. However, Pinzon’s estimate only included revenues derived from cocaine production and processing, as well as a ‘tax’ charged on growers and traffickers operating in FARC’s territory.

Illegal mining—particularly gold—is FARC’s second largest revenue source. Yet it’s still unknown how much of the US$4 billion dollar business feeds FARC coffers. Illegal mines are present in over 20% percent of Colombia’s municipalities, affecting over 16,784 hectares of land. Unsurprisingly, in July this year, President Juan Manuel Santos declared war against illegal mining.

FARC has also muscled their way into kidnapping for ransom and extortion. In 2003, the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIAF) revealed  that kidnapping represented annual earnings of US$37 million for FARC, while more recent estimates suggest that FARC receives around 10% of the estimated US$1 billion per year earned from extortion in Colombia.

Other criminal activities include a US$5 million cattle rustling business, oil and bank robberies, land appropriation for agricultural exploitation, façade companies, financial investment’s returns and the list continues.

FARC’s estimated fortune accounts for a significant portion of Colombia’s US$14 billion organised crime industry, and also an annual money-laundering operation that is equivalent to over 3% of Colombia’s Gross Domestic Product.

The breadth and depth of the organised crime problem FARC could inherit threatens to spoil the peace-building process in Colombia. So while reaching a peace agreement is a monumental task in and of itself, maintaining that peace will be much harder if an organised crime boom takes place.

Save the date: peacetime for Colombia seems to have finally come

Presidente Juan Manuel Santos en el APP de Manizales

Last month in Havana, Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos claimed that ‘on 23 March 2016, we will be bidding farewell to the longest-running conflict in the Americas’—something indeed that Colombians have long wished for. Colombia’s 51-year-old fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) and its vast trail of destruction appears to finally be coming to an end.

Colombia’s internal conflict has at least claimed 220,000 lives, including 176,000 civilians. It’s made Colombia accountable for the world’s second-highest number of landmine victims, second only to Afghanistan. It’s displaced more than 5.7 million people—more than New Zealand’s entire population—and it’s been responsible for 27,000 kidnappings, over 5,000 cases of forced disappearances and over 1,000 massacres.

This isn’t the first time the Colombian Government has tried to bring conflict to an end, though. Five Colombian presidents have unfruitfully attempted to strike a peace deal with FARC rebels since 1981. And despite the words of the current negotiation team ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, President Santos’ statement suggests his three-year-old peace process has finally passed the point of no return.

The breakthrough came with the Joint Communiqué # 60 regarding the Agreement for the creation of a Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), in which President Santos and FARC’s highest commander, Rodrigo Londoño—known as Timochenko—announced that both sides had agreed on a formula for transitional justice. That was perhaps the biggest hurdle in the agenda.

This SJP will seek to punish every actor directly or indirectly involved in the conflict while ensuring the victims’ rights are restored, truth is disclosed and, ultimately, that conflict of this magnitude never occurs again. Those three elements are indispensable to access any special justice treatment the jurisdiction creates, and have now become the cornerstone of building a stable and strong peace in Colombia.

But practically speaking, the SPJ would create important incentives for violators to confess to their crimes while the Colombian State grants the broadest possible amnesty for political and related offences. That means that crimes which violate international treaties and laws won’t be subject to amnesty.

Those admitting responsibility to war crimes and crimes against humanity could face a maximum of five to eight years of restricted liberty under specific conditions. Those who don’t could face 20 years of ordinary imprisonment.

As those specific conditions are still to be determined, criticism and the questions about impunity arise. Colombia’s Former President—and foremost critic of the peace process—Alvaro Uribe said ‘Santos is not the peace that is near, it’s Colombia’s surrender to FARC’. Jose Miguel Vivanco, the US director at Human Rights Watch (HRW) said that the SJP would allow those most responsible for mass atrocities to completely avoid prison, effectively denying their victims their right to justice.

Those are genuine concerns. Colombia’s Attorney General Department (AGD) estimates that there are 11,269 cases involving over 16,000 FARC rebels, and are currently investigating the alleged commission of over 58,000 war crimes and crimes against humanity. And one of the consequences of the SJP involves freedom for at least 1,600 rebels of the 1,800 that are currently arrested and convicted.

Another issue is drug trafficking. In the aftermath of the announcement, Colombia’s Supreme Court also decided that drug trafficking will be considered a political crime, leaving the door open for amnesty and for FARC rebels to skip extradition.

But that’s no surprise. As President Santos said bluntly in March: ‘I don’t believe that any guerrilla is going to turn in his weapon only to go and die in a US jail’.

In spite all this, the preliminary agreement was seen as favourable to the US—Colombia’s long-standing ally in the war against drugs– and also among members of the international community. But most importantly, Colombians will have the final word on what is ultimately agreed, through a referendum or a similar mechanism.

Finding the right balance between justice and amnesty is a colossal challenge that comes with peacemaking. But the pain that millions have endured for over 50 years is now being given a chance to heal.

The preliminary deal commits FARC rebels to sign a final deal by March next year and lay down their weapons 60 days after the broad agreement is reached.

After the unprecedented announcement, President Santos and Timoshenko, both dressed in white, in a symbolic gesture, sealed their partnership by shaking hands. Peace in Colombia isn’t only possible now, it’s necessary.

However, peacemaking and peacebuilding are different things. A peace treaty will ratify the collective sentiment of walking towards a new Colombia, but post-conflict scenarios aren’t easy terrain.

A thorny path may still lie ahead. Among the various challenges policymakers are likely to face, an organised crime escalation with international implications may sit high on the priority list of law-enforcement agencies. The demobilisation of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) that started in 2003 is a not distant reminder of this. And let’s not forget that FARC ranks third on a list produced by Forbes on the world’s richest ‘terrorist’ groups, with the Islamic State (ISIS) and Hamas taking the top two spots. I will discuss the likelihood of an organised crime escalation in Colombia’s post-FARC era in a second post.