In a recent Strategist article, Malcolm Davis asked an interesting question: should Australia take a cue from Japan and deploy F-35Bs (the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the joint strike fighter) at sea?

The debate is complex. The argument against rests on the significant cost burdens associated with converting the navy’s existing landing helicopter docks to accommodate the F-35Bs or acquiring a new one (although this point has been disputed). There’s also, as Davis explains, a serious question about the survivability of large surface vessels in a war involving anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles (a point that transcends the F-35B issue).

The argument for, on the other hand, rests on the aircraft’s potential as an enabler of a ‘system of systems’. In an operational context, that means participating in a common multi-spectrum sensor network that allows any platform to engage a target outside its line of sight, speeding up the observe–orient–decide–act loop and cementing decision superiority. That would make the aircraft a significant force multiplier for both the navy and the amphibious force it is built to deploy.

From a strategic point of view, adding a small aircraft carrier to the ADF’s capabilities would enable Australia to project force well beyond the limits of land-based aircraft. Overall, it seems the idea has traction. Davis argues that, ‘If the money is made available, a third LHD with a wing of between 12 and 16 F-35Bs, supported by a larger fleet of destroyers and frigates, is an option that should be on the agenda in any force structure debate.’

Adversary capability, however, is increasingly coming from assets that operate below a threshold of conflict that calls for deploying F-35Bs—such as ‘fishermen’ occupying maritime territory, strategically placed oil rigs, research ships mapping undersea cable routes or deploying sensor networks on the seafloor, unmanned gliders monitoring vessel movements, China Radio taking over former Australian shortwave radio frequencies, psychological and legal operations, and dual-use infrastructure established through ‘debt diplomacy’. Like anti-ship missiles, these ‘left of launch’ operations are also unfavourably shaping our strategic environment. And they cannot be countered with more of the same military capabilities they’re designed to circumvent.

Left-of-launch operations are particularly effective because they challenge the organisational architecture that any ADF asset must work within. It’s an application of architectural innovation theory, which posits that large organisations struggle to adapt when an innovation challenges their internal structures.

Xerox, for example, invented the personal computer 10 years before Apple came along, but couldn’t adapt because the PC challenged relationships between other arms of the company (photocopiers and duplicating systems). Similarly, the British Army failed to recognise the true value of the tank 100 years ago because it challenged the tactical relationship between infantry and cavalry. Left-of-launch operations ask similar questions today: if invading soldiers are a problem for the ADF, and wayward fishermen are a problem for Foreign Affairs or Home Affairs, which department solves the problem of invading fishermen?

In other words, the structure becomes the problem, internal politics abounds, and the result is strategic inertia. Davis observes that Japan should hesitate before sending its newly converted aircraft carriers into China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) perimeter, which now extends ‘as far out as Guam’. Yet China was only able to extend the perimeter that far by deploying missiles onto territories it seized through left-of-launch methods. Acquiring F-35Bs won’t prevent further encroachment by similar means. The US is yet to seriously contest China’s control over those territories despite strong language and a higher tempo of freedom-of-navigation operations. That is strategic inertia. After all, if a stray oil rig off the Philippines is a problem for the State Department, and an occupying naval force is a problem for the Pentagon, which solves the problem of an occupying oil rig?

In order to overcome this inertia, the same ‘system of systems’ thinking that makes the F-35B such a potent force multiplier must equally apply to the organisational structure that governs its deployment. That means improving cooperation between the ‘systems’ of national power that exist both inside and outside traditional conceptions of Australia’s national security architecture, such as information systems (the media), commercial systems and cultural systems.

Canberra is certainly pursuing some of these avenues, as evidenced by a raft of Pacific-themed announcements and foreign visits in recent months. Yet it’s not enough to wield the Canberra-based systems of national power in isolation from those headquartered elsewhere. Like fifth-generation military platforms, all must learn to engage targets outside their individual lines of sight in order to compete in a networked world.

If the F-35B is on the agenda to improve our force-projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, then the agenda must also include an organisational structure that can better compete left of launch. Otherwise, the aircraft will deploy into an environment shaped by the adversary.

In part 1, I considered the implications of sustaining and upgrading the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet (alongside the E/A-18G Growler) as an alternative to buying an additional squadron of F-35s. It’s the next big force structure choice for the ADF, as the 2016 defence white paper highlights.

The decision will be made when Defence is deep into its next quadrennial force structure review, which gets underway in 2019. It will also occur in the context of Australia’s worsening strategic outlook, characterised by a rising and assertive China, and uncertainty about the US’s strategic commitment to Asia.

That worsening strategic outlook justifies spending more on defence than was planned in the 2016 white paper. The current target of 2% of GDP should be a mandatory floor, rather than an aspirational ceiling; ASPI’s Peter Jennings has suggested 2.5 or 3% as the new target.

The RAAF’s lack of a long-range strike capability is a curious oversight in the white paper. Australia, as a key partner to the US (and increasingly to regional powers such as Japan, and our Southeast Asian neighbours) can’t simply coast along in a ‘defence of Australia’ mode, ignoring any developments beyond the archipelago to our north.

Certainly future naval capability, specifically the Shortfin Barracuda submarines, will allow a degree of power projection. But the first of those won’t appear until 2032, and we won’t have five boats until the 2040s, which is far too slow given the rapid changes in our region.

The F/A-18F and F-35, and the E/A-18G Growler, are all short- to medium-range tactical fighters that depend on tanker support to reach areas such as the South China Sea or key Southeast Asian straits. That places a lot of critical combat enablers in harm’s way, vulnerable to China’s long-range air combat capabilities, which in the future could operate from bases in the South China Sea.

How to fix this dilemma?

One option is to get longer-range platforms. The RAAF lost its long-range strike capability with the retirement of the F-111 in 2010. Beyond the option of investing in very expensive strategic bomber-type platforms, there’s simply nothing flying or in advanced development that would offer similar capability to the F-111.

The other option is to invest in long-range standoff weapons, including air- and sea-launched land-attack cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons.

As I’ve noted, missile systems such as LRASM (long-range anti-ship missile) and JASSM-ER (joint air-to-surface standoff missile—extended range) could be used by both the F-35 and Super Hornet, and would restore some of the long-range strike capability lost with the F-111. That could be matched by Tomahawk cruise missiles on the navy’s Hobart-class destroyers and Hunter-class future frigates. It would be a relatively straightforward integration process that could be bought off the shelf through the US foreign military sales program. There would be no need to slow things down and drive up costs by attempting to Australianise the capability or build locally.

LRASM and JASSM-ER add extra strike reach to the F-35 and F/A-18F, but their ranges, while considerably longer than that of the planned Kongsberg joint strike missile, still demand tanker support and preferably access to host bases.

Establishing that host base access is an option Australia could consider. We already have access to the Butterworth base in Malaysia, but we could seek new arrangements in the region to open up access in a crisis. Closer cooperation between the RAAF and the Indonesian Air Force, for example, should be explored in areas where both countries can benefit from mutual access to bases, shared intelligence and training.

As an alternative to acquiring a long-range strike capability, we might put more effort into developing penetrative ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) to identify targets that the US or our other partners could strike in a crisis. That could involve a bigger investment in space capabilities and high-altitude unmanned systems, including those capable of operating in contested airspace, to cue coalition forces equipped with long-range standoff weapons.

Two other factors suggest that it may be prudent to hold off on acquiring a long-range strike capability. First, there’s the question of weight of attack. Our limited numbers of platforms—be they ships or submarines or aircraft—constrain our ability to deliver decisive blows against an opponent. Second, the future might belong to supersonic, and ultimately, hypersonic strike missiles. Contemporary standoff weapons are all subsonic, and the Tomahawk isn’t even that stealthy, increasing the risk it can be intercepted by sophisticated ground defences. It might be better to wait for a technology like hypersonics to mature before investing in a new capability.

Finally, we have to think about AI and its use to create ‘intelligent weapons’. Unlike our authoritarian adversaries, Australia can’t ignore constraints on the use of lethal autonomous weapons. But AI may enable ‘brilliant’ or intelligent weapons to mitigate risks posed by enemy ground defences. Combined with hypersonics, the stealthy, fast, intelligent standoff weapon—with human oversight—that could appear in the 2020s might be more suitable for Australia’s needs than quick investment in existing technology now.

In the third part of this series, I’ll consider where to take our air combat capabilities. Does the future lie with a 5.5 or 6th generation aircraft, or will it be more about manned–unmanned teaming?

Welcome to The Strategist Six, which provides a glimpse into the thinking of prominent academics, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world.

1. The ADF has been on operations overseas almost continuously since East Timor in 1999. Have the lessons learned been put to good effect?

We’ve learned a lot and we are building those lessons into our planning and our training. The result is a very effective and modern force. Since East Timor and Afghanistan, and now operating in support of the Iraqi forces, each soldier needs to be considered as an individual weapons system with a weapon, integrated communications, electronic countermeasures and body armour.

The Air Force has grown into a very potent force. When we were asked to contribute to the campaign against Daesh in Iraq we were able to put a self-contained air task group there within two weeks and to be on operations within three.

For Navy, decisions are coming on the nine new frigates and the Offshore Patrol Vessels taking on lessons from border protection and maritime surveillance. The OPV will be a bigger, more capable vessel which can operate in all conditions. The Army is getting new armoured reconnaissance vehicles to enable its people to do their job and survive.

The ADF is trained for diverse tasks from aid to civilian communities in times of disaster and relief operations in the region to high end war fighting if required. It has the ability to fight and win because, let’s face it, that’s what it’s there to do. There are some big challenges coming, including some of the acquisition projects. But the biggest lesson we’ve learned is that it’s your people that matter.

2. Is the ADF a truly ‘joint’ force?

It’s evolving very well. Army, Navy and RAAF are totally interoperable with the connectivity to pass information around quickly to help the decision makers whether that’s a corporal on the ground or a company on patrol, through to the Commander of Joint Operations (CJOPS) making strategic decisions.

CJOPS can focus on those operations and let the service chiefs raise, train and sustain the force. The next step is to appoint a manager to provide the necessary capabilities which don’t naturally fit within a single service such as cyber, intelligence, health, education and training. In July the ADF will appoint a two star officer as chief of joint capabilities who will bring all of these enabling systems together. That’s the bit we haven’t done as well as we should and what we are going to focus on for the near future.

3. What changes have most significantly improved the ADF’s effectiveness?

The acquisition of the RAAF’s giant C-17 transport aircraft and the introduction of Navy’s two LHDs, HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide. The C-17 has fundamentally changed the way we can operate and very significantly extended the options the CDF can give the government. We can be in place, across the world in 48 or 72 hours. An example was going into Ukraine to work with the Netherlands repatriating the remains of those killed on the downed Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. When the cyclone hit Fiji, the RAAF was able to fly in helicopters aboard C-17 to help immediately while HMAS Canberra loaded up with stores and heavy equipment.

4. What will the Joint Strike Fighter bring to the broader ADF?

A lot, as it integrates with the rest of the force. The JSF is much more than an aeroplane. It’s not just the missiles and air to surface weapons it carries but the information it gathers and its ability to disseminate it to whoever needs it, tactically right there and then, or to send it for analysis for future fights. The F 35 will be taking information from the battlefield control system like the Wedgetail, Tritons Predators, Reapers—anything that’s out there with fifth generation capability will be able to pass that information backwards and forwards. The soldier on the ground won’t know that’s what’s providing him or her with the picture of what’s going on around them. The RAAF’s Operation Jericho is about having the rest of the ADF think about how you use fifth generation equipment to best effect.

5. The ADF is in the midst of a massive re-equipment program but some of the 12 new submarines, for instance, will not be operational for decades. The Defence White Paper warned of uncertainty in the region. Will Defence get this equipment in time to deal with any threat and, if not, will that mean capability gaps?

I don’t think about it that way. We are always an evolving force so what we know is rolled into our current systems. The Collins submarine has evolved with upgrades of its capabilities including weapons and sensors. The RAAF’s Classic Hornet now is nothing like the Classic Hornet I learned to fly in 1984. It’s a far more capable aircraft through upgrades to weapons, systems and how we train. The Collins are very capable submarines and they will be going until the new submarines are ready to replace them. The Collins and the RAAF’s new P8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned Tritons and frigates will all have an anti-submarine capability.

6. Since the Martin Place siege there have been calls from some quarters for a greater ADF role in dealing with domestic terrorist attacks. Should the ADF do more in this area?

The ADF’s primary role in counterterrorism is offshore. Our main aim is to stop terrorists getting here. We’re in the Middle East to stop the flow of foreign fighters back to the region and to our country. Should something happen onshore that is beyond the skills and capabilities of the state or Federal Police, we could be called in. But predominantly the first responder will be the state police. For major events such as international summits or the Olympics then the ADF will work closely with the police.

The 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP16) signals that ‘options to replace the Super Hornets in the late 2020s will be considered in the early 2020s in the light of developments in technology and the strategic environment and will be informed by our experience in operating the Joint Strike Fighters’. As Andrew Davies and I previously argued, rather than rushing such a decision, Australia should pause to consider exploiting the revolutionary potential offered by Unmanned Combat Air Systems (UCAS).  In this regard, it’s worth looking at the USAF’s Air Superiority 2030 (AS-2030) Flight Plan, which is the latest American perspective on the future of air power.

The USAF is thinking about the implications of improving peer capabilities in fighter aircraft, sensors and weapons, the threat to US advantages in Space and Cyberspace, and the emergence of hypersonic weapons. It concludes that ‘the Air Force’s projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of fighting and winning against this array of potential adversary capabilities.’

It marks something of a change from previous USAF thinking, as the focus isn’t entirely on aircraft. The plan proposes a mix of capabilities operating ‘in and across the air, space and cyberspace domains’, rather than a ‘single capability’ to provide a ‘silver bullet’ solution. The aim is to deploy new capabilities rapidly, rather than wait years or decades for ‘next generation’ platforms. This eschews the concept of a ‘sixth generation fighter’. It notes that ‘gaining and maintaining air superiority in 2030 and beyond requires a new approach.’

So as the RAAF thinks about its future capabilities, should it continue with more of the same, or should it explore more radical force structures? Purchasing more F-35As to replace the F/A-18Fs seems antithetical to current USAF thinking that’s heading in a different direction.

I’m not advocating scrapping the F-35A—they’ll form the core of the ADF’s strike and air combat capability for the foreseeable future. But the USAF has begun to recognise that adversary electronic warfare (EW), cyberwarfare and counter-space capabilities, counter-stealth, long-range ground-based air defences, and advanced beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles will erode the F-35’s current advantages in stealth, data fusion and situational awareness.

AS-2030 raises the idea of a Penetrating Counter Air (PCA) capability, along with an Arsenal Plane (in effect a very large flying launchpad for UCAS, long-range missiles, and potentially even directed energy weapons).  The B-21 Raider bomber is central to the concept, but perhaps the PCA and Arsenal Plane concepts are more relevant for Australia.

The Arsenal Plane would stay out of harm’s way, and expand the ‘punch’ of an air force, with F-35s or UCAS acting as forward nodes in the network to cue munitions launch from the Arsenal Plane in the rear. As for PCA, for which analysis of possibilities begins in 2017, USAF thinking emphasises rapid acquisition of innovative capabilities spread across a networked ‘system of systems’ rather than a single platform. The PCA capability, which could be a mix of manned and unmanned systems, would escort B-21 bombers or protect the Arsenal Plane, if necessary. As is the case now, it would be supported by EW, space, and cyberspace capabilities, but the implication of the document is that air operations would be much more closely integrated with these domains which may assume primacy over air platforms. So as domain boundaries blur, labels like ‘fighter’ or ‘bomber’ will become less meaningful—what matters are delivered effects.

Australia’s strategic geography suggests that long-range, persistence and endurance is important for airpower. DWP16’s Strategic Defence Framework implies a requirement to operate well beyond the ‘sea-air gap’, and the South China Sea must clearly be a key region of interest. Shorter-range manned platforms like the F-35 are not suited in this regard because they could not reach the South China Sea from bases in Northern Australia, even with airborne refuelling. Instead they would be dependent on forward bases, which would then be vulnerable to Chinese land-attack capabilities, or simply not be offered due to political pressure on the host country from Beijing. So larger platforms, like the Arsenal Plane, or a long-range PCA capability, would allow the RAAF to project decisive effect or support a ‘distant blockade’ strategy for Coalition partners, without the risks imposed by short-range systems.

It’s unlikely that the USAF’s AS-2030 document will be the final word on the subject. Aspects of it will be overtaken as concepts are further developed, but it’s an important milestone in an increasingly important debate on the future of airpower. Buying more F-35’s to replace the F/A-18Fs tends to tie Australia into an older way of thinking at a time when concepts are in flux, and we could miss a window of opportunity for exploiting revolutionary capabilities suggested in AS-2030. So Australia rushes into such a decision at its peril.

Despite continuing challenges with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) development, the F-35 program forms the core of Australia’s future airpower. Australia remains committed to the JSF program, with the F-35A expected to reach initial operational capability sometime between financial year 2019–20 and 2022–23. The acquisition of the F-35A JSF, alongside the Super Hornets and the acquisition of 12 E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, form the shape of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)’s main ‘strike’ component of its future force structure through to the late 2040s or even early 2050s.

Yet 30 years is a long time in the development of modern airpower. The defence policy community should therefore be considering now how Australia can best sustain the military-technological advantage of planned future air combat capabilities, including the JSF, through their life of type. Advances in adversary C4ISR, air combat capabilities, and ground-based air defence technologies are certain to occur over the life time of those platforms in a manner that could erode their effectiveness, notably in anti-access area denial environments. Military technological advantage is always transitory and unless policy planning looks at capability development, the loss of that advantage will likely occur.

For example, a clear opportunity exists for Australia to forge closer involvement with the US over the development of a sixth generation air combat capability. US plans for the sixth generation fighter are gathering pace, even to the extent of promoting ideas for such aircraft during the recent Super Bowl! The US Navy’s F/A-XX could field a successor to the F/A-18E/F as early as 2035, while the US Air Force F-X project, known as ‘Next Generation Air Dominance’, may formally begin as early as 2018 with the aim of replacing the F-22 by the 2030s. In another perspective on the future, unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) clearly have a role, perhaps controlled from a larger stealthy manned aircraft acting as a mothership. France and the UK continue their Dassault Neuron and BAE Systems Taranis demonstrator projects.

Conversely, the US Navy has opted to convert the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) platform into an airborne tanker and extend the life of the F/A-18E/F. Although a step back from an unmanned future, the Carrier Based Aerial Refuelling System (CBARS) capability could forge the path for more advanced platforms.  All those options are worth considering in any policy analysis on where to take ADF air combat capability in the 2030s and beyond.

The ADF’s 2012 Defence Capability Plan refers to follow-on development for the F-35A through the life of type that could include block upgrades and technology refreshes through collaboration with the private and public sector. One option in that regard is that as the US moves to update the F-35A, as a key international partner in the JSF program Australia would be well placed to benefit from such efforts as part of a joint collaborative effort.

A more capable F-35 (an ‘F-35E’) may be an option in the future but so much investmentis going into the JSF program as it is currently configured, that any move to develop an ‘E’ is unlikely to occur soon, and updating an ‘A’ to an ‘E’ may be challenging in an engineering sense. If updating is possible, the focus of that process should be on software, sensors and weapons. The potential for powering cutting edge technologies such as directed-energy weapons and countering adversary ‘counter-stealth’ sensors; acquiring advanced standoff weapons; and enhancing the aircraft’s networking and data fusion capabilities against adversary EW and cyber-attack is another likely requirement. But real advances in aerodynamic performance and manoeuvrability, speed, range and payload are likely not possible in the F-35 airframe.

Other potential partnerships might emerge to help Australia sustain a capability edge in its future air power requirements. Japan recently unveiled its X-2 technology demonstrator which will serve to test concepts and capabilities for a future Japanese F-3 fifth generation fighter that could begin production by 2027. Although Japan’s past record of manufacture of fighter aircraft has been spotty, there’s much greater incentive now for Tokyo to get the F-3 right, given its highly challenging security environment—a rising China challenging a US whose power is declining in relative terms, and the problem of an erratic North Korea—as well as increased commercial competition with South Korea that’s pursuing its own ‘KF-X’ fighter project. Australia and Japan are pursuing closer defence relations, and if Japan wins the Competitive Evaluation Process for SEA 1000, that will deepen the strategic partnership between Tokyo and Canberra to an even greater degree.  If Tokyo can produce a viable product that meets Australia’s requirements, there’s no reason why Australia shouldn’t also collaborate with Japan in other areas of military capability, such as air combat capabilities, which will integrate with US sensors, weapons and networks.

The final point, as always, is money. The Abbott Government committed to growing defence spending to 2% GDP by 2023, although it remains unclear whether that commitment will be carried forward after the upcoming election, whichever party wins. Although Government must balance fiscal responsibility with responding to security risks, the future strategic outlook is increasingly challenging and a strong argument can be made that the 2% GDP commitment shouldn’t be an aspirational ceiling but become a mandatory floor. That would better enable capability choices beyond the scope of Force 2030 to be considered sooner rather than later. The JSF project dates back to the 1980s, and it wasn’t until 1997 that Lockheed Martin was chosen to produce the F-35. Nearly 20 years later, the aircraft is yet to achieve initial operational capability.

If new air combat capability options for the RAAF are to be viable by the 2030s, thinking about those options needs to begin as a process emerging from the upcoming Defence White Paper. That wouldn’t be to challenge the choice of the F-35A, but to ensure ADF air combat capabilities remain credible even in the face of military developments that overtake past assessments or assumptions.