Tag Archive for: Extremism

As antisemitism strains Australian social cohesion, the government must step forward

Australia’s national resilience and social cohesion are under strain, with the most visible cracks seen in the alarming rise of antisemitism. Governments, most particularly the federal government, whose responsibility it is to lead national debates, desperately need to engage more forthrightly with the Australian public.

The discovery in Dural of a caravan containing explosives and, reportedly, an antisemitic message and the addresses of a synagogue and other Jewish buildings, is the latest shock that will heighten anxiety in Australia’s Jewish community and further inflame public tension.

We can give police some benefit of the doubt that they had operational reasons for secrecy about the caravan, but these decisions must be balanced against the need to confront the underlying problems of extremism and hatred, and to reassure Australians that we have national leaders who are facing up to them. If our politicians had been leading the conversations that we need, there would be greater goodwill for understanding operational decisions, rather than the fraying patience that we are seeing.

Instead of confronting extremism, radicalisation and the growing influence of ideological violence, policymakers have retreated into reticence, offering platitudes that fail to give the public confidence or deter those who seek to cause harm. This absence of leadership is a communications failure and a strategic miscalculation that threatens social cohesion and national security.

The federal government’s reluctance to educate and inform the public about terrorism and extremism is fuelling uncertainty and fear. Security agencies such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police play a vital role in countering threats, but their mandate is to act once the danger has escalated to the level of criminality and national security risk.

The broader responsibility—explaining the ideological drivers of extremism, reinforcing shared values, and setting clear boundaries of acceptable conduct—belongs to the government. Yet, time and again, the government has abdicated this duty, preferring to let ASIO’s annual threat assessment stand as the only authoritative voice on extremism in Australia. That is not enough. National security is not just about neutralising threats but about preventing them from taking root in the first place.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hardly lifted anyone’s morale when speaking defensively about the discovery of the caravan during two radio interviews on Thursday morning. On ABC radio, he failed to mention antisemitism at all. He refused to say when he’d learnt about it, describing that as ‘operational details’, and refused to say whether the national cabinet had discussed the investigation. Most of his commentary was about what the police had said and done. The closest he gave to an expression of the government’s view was by saying: ‘We remain concerned about this escalation.’

It wasn’t until a press conference later in the day that Albanese said, unprompted, that there was ‘zero tolerance in Australia for hatred and for antisemitism’ and that he wanted ‘any perpetrators to be hunted down and locked up’.

One of the core failures underpinning this crisis is a misinterpretation of tolerance. Australia prides itself on being an open and inclusive society, but inclusivity does not mean tolerating the intolerable. Support for terrorist leaders and groups is not free speech, nor is it a legitimate expression of diversity—it is a direct threat to social stability. When governments fail to call this out unequivocally, they enable a dangerous dynamic by which extremists feel emboldened, and the broader population grows resentful and anxious. An anxious public is not a resilient one.

While the rising cost of living is at the forefront of most Australians’ minds, physical and social security must remain the government’s highest priority. People need to feel safe, and that safety is reinforced not just by policing, but by clear, decisive leadership.

The government’s approach—avoiding public discussion for fear of inflaming tensions—belongs to a bygone era. Excessive reticence was a flawed strategy even before social media, but now, in an age in which digital communications dominate every aspect of our lives, it is a liability.

Government hesitancy leaves a vacuum that is filled by those who want society to break. Without direct and frequent public engagement, we give ground to those who distort facts, push dangerous ideologies and promote violence.

ASIO head Mike Burgess was left swinging in the breeze last September after he told the ABC that the organisation assessed entrants to Australia for any national security risk, which might not cover someone who had only expressed ‘rhetorical support’ for Hamas. Amid the political controversy that followed, the government should have swung in quickly and stressed that the wider visa check would, of course, include rhetorical support for Hamas but that this wasn’t ASIO’s job. That failed to happen, leading to days of public anger and confusion.

Equally dangerous is the government’s willingness to indulge in false equivalencies. Responding to attacks on Jewish Australians by condemning ‘all forms of hate’ or vaguely mentioning ‘antisemitism and Islamophobia’ is both politically weak and strategically harmful. Each act of violence or intimidation should be condemned for what it is—without hedging, without lumping disparate issues together, and without fear of offending those who sympathise with extremists.

This failure of clarity extends to the review of Australia’s terrorism laws, where there is discussion about removing the requirement for an ideological motive. Instead of diluting definitions, the government should lead the discussion on what ideology is, why it matters, and how it fuels extremism.

The government’s refusal to deal with reality is at the heart of this crisis. There is no neutral ground when it comes to national security. Attempting to placate all sides by responding too slowly and downplaying threats only emboldens those who seek to justify intimidation and violence.

Everyone accepts that history and geopolitics are complex—not least in the Middle East—but there is no justification for bringing foreign conflicts onto Australian streets. Like it or not, the federal government’s faltering responses have facilitated a false equivalence between Israel and Islamist terrorist groups, emboldening extremists who now see Australia as a battleground for their ideological struggles.

Australians can see the world is unstable and don’t appreciate being dismissed or misled. The government’s failure to engage honestly is backfiring. Public trust erodes when people feel their concerns are ignored, and social cohesion weakens without leadership. To maintain our national resilience, the government must step up, speak clearly and reassert the values that make Australia a safe and united society. Silence is not a strategy—it’s a surrender.

Romance and radicalisation: an overlooked concern for young Australian women

Radicalisation of vulnerable women in romantic relationships is a poorly recognised threat in Australian domestic security. This issue isn’t just a passing concern; it’s a persistent one that can devastate lives and communities.

With extremist groups targeting vulnerable women, we need to understand how love can become a dangerous trap. We must develop measures that help women become less exposed to these tactics.

Adolescence and early adulthood are tough periods, during which many people search for acceptance. As many young women navigate development stages, they grapple with complex questions of identity and self-worth. Young women often seek validation from relationships that seem to offer love and belonging, making them prime targets for extremists posing as knights in shining armour.

These extremists know how to exploit vulnerabilities. Research shows that women who crave external reassurance are more likely to adopt extremist beliefs, just for a little affection. Those who may be more avoidant and struggle to make connections may be more vulnerable to the false camaraderie of extremist groups. If recruiters can identify these vulnerabilities, they can use them as tools of radicalisation.

Social media makes these struggles harder, distorting self-image and intensifying feelings of exclusion. It is also part of the radicalisation process. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok are breeding grounds for extremist views. Recruiters use the anonymity and reach of these platforms to engage with young women under the guise of romantic interest. Once drawn in, the women can find themselves ensnared in extremist ideologies through emotional manipulation and promises of love and belonging.

ISIS recruiters use striking short videos and photos on platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp. They entice women with promises of love, marriage and meaningful lives as ‘jihadi brides’.

Similarly, the Nordic Resistance Movement, a neo-Nazi group, specifically targets women by promoting traditional gender roles and highlighting their importance in the movement. They romanticise motherhood and family values, suggesting that joining the group is a way to protect a pure society. Their propaganda features eye-catching posts, testimonials from women in the group, and discussions that celebrate women as key players in their ideology.

Both groups exploit emotional vulnerabilities, making their messages especially appealing to those looking for acceptance and community.

The European Union has made some progress in protecting young women from radicalisation. A report published by the European Commission detailed extremists’ use of social media to recruit young women and presented recommendations for addressing the threat.

In Australia, most existing youth outreach programs don’t address the particular vulnerabilities faced by young women at risk of radicalisation. Initiatives such as the Australian government’s Youth Engagement Strategy promote social inclusion but often overlook the specific emotional and relational challenges that can make girls susceptible to extremist influences.

With these challenges in mind, we need to develop initiatives tailored to the vulnerabilities of young women. These programs should include workshops that build emotional resilience and self-esteem, helping participants recognise unhealthy relationship dynamics and signs of manipulation. Mentoring schemes that connect young women with positive role models can provide guidance and foster a sense of belonging, steering them away from harmful ideologies.

Targeted educational programs should also be established. Initiatives in schools, for example, can integrate education on emotional intelligence and healthy relationship into teaching. By teaching respect, consent and the importance of supportive friendships, schools can help create an environment where young women feel empowered and valued. This directly addresses the vulnerabilities that extremist recruiters seek to exploit.

Domestic violence awareness campaigns are another opportunity for education. They should not only highlight signs of abusive relationships but also stress the importance of strong, supportive friendships. Young women must be empowered to recognise manipulative behaviours and understand the need to seek help when necessary. Critical media literacy programs can further equip them to evaluate online content, enabling them to spot extremist propaganda and resist its allure.

Collaboration between community organisations, mental health professionals and law enforcement will also be crucial for developing these comprehensive approaches to tackling radicalisation. Providing opportunities for discussion and support allows young women to process their experiences and concerns constructively, reinforcing resilience.

The radicalisation of young women through romantic relationships is overdue for attention. Strengthening self-esteem, fostering resilience and promoting healthy relationships will address the issues that often lead women to extremism in the first place. This preventative approach will fortify our society against the insidious pull of radicalisation and save lives.

Addressing this issue isn’t just about security; it’s about ensuring that every young woman feels empowered to pursue her dreams and find her voice without falling prey to harmful ideologies. The stakes are high and the potential for positive change is immense.

Countering terrorism and violent extremism beyond the sandpit

Many counterterrorism experts and observers have long said that one of the key failings of the post-9/11 era was a lack of a cohesive, overarching strategic concept. Research indicates that short-term operational and tactical planning can dominate policy and security risk management at the expense of future scenario planning.

To be sure, a rigorous approach to counterterrorism as a security practice will always be needed, even as terrorist activity, and its immediate relevance in relation to other geostrategic and national security threats, peaks and dips. However, we need also to analyse events and issues through effective strategic thinking in counterterrorism, taking us beyond the more traditional focus on tactical innovation, organisational variations and changes in the modus operandi of terror groups.

That is why ASPI’s 2022 counterterrorism yearbook zooms out to the wider strategic horizon. One of the lessons we’ve learned during the past 20 years is that what determines a turn to violence doesn’t only come down to individual trajectories and the appeal of ideology in conjunction with structural variables but interacts with a much broader enabling environment. Several contributions in the yearbook highlight this.

For most of the past two decades, terrorism and extremism were largely seen as the domain of a foreign ‘other’. Even when talking about ‘homegrown jihadists’, extremist ideological motivations were generally ascribed to sources not only culturally different, but in direct opposition to our national identity and values, however abstractly defined.

If we want a counterterrorism and counterextremism approach that integrates with and complements a long-term, purposefully pursued national security policy framework, we need to move the discussion beyond what we did in the sandpit. Challenges today are increasingly systemic, amorphous and endemic. This is a much more uncomfortable, politically difficult reality.

Responsive policymaking in this environment—especially at a time of heightened strategic competition—requires ongoing recognition of the dilemmas and complexities inherent in countering terrorism and extremism. For instance, as one chapter in our yearbook argues, trust in government is crucial for preventing extremism and combating the activities of terrorists—of all persuasions—and delegitimising their actions in the eyes of the community.

Our approaches and policy measures must be built on a clearer distinction between security and societal outcomes, while at the same time factoring in the possible impact of geopolitical forces on domestic policies. We’re witnessing the proliferation of anti-democratic ideas as hate speech, hate crimes and politically motivated violence become more prominent in the evolving landscape internationally.

We have to be cognisant of lessons from the 6 January US Capitol attack, and from Canada’s, New Zealand’s and Australia’s various experiences with ‘freedom convoys’ converging on national parliaments.

Overall, these events highlight that efforts to counter extremism and build resilience can’t focus just on specific extremist fringes. Rather than considering the ability to recognise and withstand the appeal of anti-democratic ideas as a skill needed by individuals identified as ‘vulnerable’, or as a commitment by certain at-risk communities, the task takes on a fuller meaning as the threat changes and shifts.

As well as the ‘classic’ counterterrorism and counterextremism topics related to jihadism, a successful approach to combating terrorism requires research, commentary and dialogue on other (violent) contestations of democracy. This is certainly the approach that ASPI’s reoriented counterterrorism program is taking.

This broadened focus involves overlapping forms of ideological extremism, such as anti-government and conspiracy extremism, militant patriot and sovereign citizen movements, and other anti-pluralist discourse, gender-based hate and novel expressions of anti-Semitism, including how these developments are affected by evolving information and propaganda dynamics in a changing strategic environment.

We need a forward-looking, integrative approach that views countering terrorism and extremism as enduring political and societal challenges. If we define resilience as the ability to withstand extremist ideas through a commitment to Australian democracy and identity, we need to allow for contestability—that is, the ability to also question the meaning and application of national values, particularly in times of crisis or when the practice of democracy has polarising or exclusionary effects.

Keeping the strategic effects on democracy and the rules-based international order in centre view is fundamental to a comprehensive, long-term response in harmony with broader national and foreign policy objectives.

In terms of what lies ahead on the threat landscape, we must continually ask ourselves whether our approaches to countering terrorism and extremism are directed by a clear understanding of the distinction between the desired end state and the ways and means to get there.

Adapting to changed times means aligning a range of security priorities and other national objectives so they complement each other, rather than allowing the driving logic of one policy field or strand of national power to have adverse effects on another.

Going beyond the sandpit is therefore about recognising the need to stake out new strategic parameters and ensuring that the right questions are driving our analysis and policymaking.

Counterterrorism yearbook 2022: the road from 9/11

It’s been more than two decades since the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States. Two planes hit the World Trade Center, one hit the Pentagon and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania. Close to 3,000 people died, many were injured, and even more were traumatised by the experience and the loss of loved ones. Today’s release of the Counterterrorism yearbook 2022 coincides with the anniversary of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks which caused the deaths of 174 people. These and other acts of terror have left an indelible mark and shaped the world as we know it today.

Australia’s overall security environment is increasingly challenging to navigate. Emerging threats such as information operation campaigns, cyberattacks and climate change are intensifying the complexity of the world’s human security challenges. Policymakers face an era of complex continuous and concurrent crises. In 2022, major geopolitical events, including Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s continuing coercive operations and aggression, occupied a significant place in the national discourse. Foreign interference and espionage have continued to rise to the forefront of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s priorities.

Yet terrorism prevails as a significant security concern for Australia and the wider region. These continuing challenges mean that the sixth edition of ASPI’s Counterterrorism yearbook is as important as ever.

ASPI’s executive director, Justin Bassi, notes in the preface that, ‘while terrorism is no longer assessed by ASIO to be our top security threat, it hasn’t disappeared and in fact continues to be one of the predominant security concerns for Australia and the region.’

I coedited the Counterterrorism yearbook 2022 with Katja Theodorakis, head of ASPI’s counterterrorism, countering violent extremism and resilience program, which examines counterterrorism challenges through the broader lens of today’s global challenges, exploring wider policy considerations through a range of chapters from 16 expert authors.

Theodorakis notes in the introduction:

For most of the past two decades, terrorism and extremism were largely seen as an external issue brought to Australia by foreign problems. Even when talking about ‘homegrown jihadists’, extremist ideological motivations were generally ascribed to global terrorist sources in faraway places.

Motivated violent extremist groups continue to have a presence and are increasingly accompanied by issue-specific radicalised individuals. A key aspect of the changing environment is the use of social media by extremist groups to tap into public discord arising from Covid-19 lockdowns and vaccination mandates, as well as violence driven by divisive political agendas in democratic countries like the US Capitol riot in 2020.

Bassi also notes:

Beyond our borders, it remains the case that Australians are at risk of being affected by terrorism in our near region. Governments, policymakers and intelligence analysts will need to maintain an awareness of the implications of the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan following the US withdrawal, including in relation to the risks of ungoverned spaces being used by terrorist groups and the rekindling of extremist links into Southeast Asia. The return of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Kabul, where he was killed by a US operation, emphasises that our work in countering terrorism and violent extremism abroad is not complete. Post-withdrawal, much of the work by countries such as Australia to monitor and prevent the spread of extremism and terrorism from Afghanistan will have to be done from outside that country’s borders.

The Counterterrorism yearbook 2022 is presented in three parts. The first provides a snapshot of the world context involving trends abroad, including in our region. The second looks at challenges closer to home, such as the impact of Covid-19 on radicalisation and the role of police in managing extremism that has not reached a threshold of violence, or ‘precrime policing’. The third explores wider policy considerations, including those related to strategic competition, democracy and multiculturalism.

This edition includes chapters on forecasting extremism in Southeast Asia by Munira Mustaffa, precrime policing and extremism by ASPI’s John Coyne, teen radicalisation by ASPI’s Jasmine Latimore and me, strategic competition and counterterrorism by Andrew Zammit, and multiculturalism by Theodorakis. It also includes a conversation with Levi West on strategic trends in terrorism.

A dominant theme is that the increasing complexity of the strategic context and the terrorism threat means there are no easy solutions. Strategies to address it need to emphasise the importance of understanding security as a shared responsibility that requires a broad, whole-of-government and whole-of-community approach extending beyond the remit of security agencies. The role of security agencies to identify and prevent threats is as vital as ever, but there’s a crucial need to simultaneously focus on national resilience as a means of withstanding challenges such as economic crises, pandemics, foreign interference, online disinformation and cyberattacks.

Strengthened national resilience will help ensure that social cohesion is maintained even in challenging times and that those who would do us harm are unable to leverage crises and threats to create societal division or to radicalise individuals and groups to violent extremism and terrorism.

Today’s national security environment is an increasingly complex one, and the impact of terrorism hasn’t diminished. It represents a challenge that requires governments, community and academia to continue to work together.

What’s the connection between Islam and extremism?

The issue of whether the religion of Islam is a faith that endorses extremism, and more specifically violent extremism, or is used and abused by extremist groups for notional objectives, is an important one. This query continues to be a recurrent theme at different levels in world politics. In a new book, Extremist Islam: recognition and responses in Southeast Asia, counterterrorism expert Kumar Ramakrishna urges authorities to pay more attention to the persistent danger of violent Salafism in the region.

The debate about Islam and extremism has become more potent in the decades following the advent of the Islamic government of Iran in 1979, the jihadist resistance to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and al-Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States.

The rise of various ideologically linked violent-extremist networks and groups—including al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Abu Sayyaf Group, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and Jemaah Islamiyah—has threatened the stability of many states and challenged the sanguinity of the international order. It has polarised world opinion between those who hold the religion of Islam as responsible for the violent activities of such groups and those who attribute their actions to political and societal conditions and the lack of a comprehensive strategy on the part of states and the global community to counter them by addressing their root causes.

Hence, scholars, policymakers, commentators and community leaders of different ideological and political persuasions have come up with various descriptors to try to make sense of where Islam stands in relation to extremism. They prominently include political Islam, reformist Islam, moderate Islam, radical Islam, extremist Islam, Salafist Islam, Wahhabi Islam and Deobandi Islam, or a combination of these.

Do these terms capture the essence of Islam as a communal faith and way of life, or do they indicate that the Quran is open to a range of interpretations, including the ones that can justify violence and terrorism? Have responses in the form of counterterrorism and counternarratives attempting to define and delegitimise extremism as distinct from legitimate resistance in defence of Islam, freedom and independence been adequately grounded in a viable strategy?

It is often argued that the best way to deal with violent extremism is to have a globally comprehensive, cooperative political strategy to tackle those root causes of the phenomenon that defy the application of brute force.

The market has been flooded with scholarly and popular literature about ‘Islamic terrorism’ or ‘violent Islamism’ and responses to it. While such terms are overloaded and imply that the religion of Islam itself endorses such phenomena, it’s important to distinguish between violent and non-violent Islamism. There are many Muslim thinkers and activists who believe in Islam as an ideology of political and social transformation of their societies but reject violence as a means to achieve these objectives. In essence, Islam damns any act of terror that takes innocent lives or damages peaceful and prosperous societal existence. It puts a very high premium on the sanctity of life and specifically forbids suicide in any form or shape.

In other words, a clear distinction needs to be made between the jihadi or combative Islamists who justify their actions on the basis of a literary and self-centred interpretation of Islam, while regarding violence as a means to an end, and the ijtihadi or reformist Islamists who base their understanding and application of the religion on independent human reasoning according to changing times and circumstances. This distinction is often overlooked inside and outside the Muslim domain, as authorities have often found it expedient to brand all forms of Islamist opposition as threatening and unacceptable.

In his book, Ramakrishna explains the challenges posed by violent Salafism and the potential solutions that should be considered. The book has a strong regional dimension, with a focus on the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. While urging the authorities to be cognisant of the distinction between different strands of Islamism, the author alerts them to what he identifies as a fundamentalist theological–ideological amalgam that has been called Salafism in Southeast Asia.

This brand of Salafism has never had wider space than since 9/11. The killings of Osama bin Laden in 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019 and many of their main operatives and the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan have not seriously diminished opportunities for violent Salafist jihadis. The defeat of the US and its NATO allies in Afghanistan was a significant shot in their arms.

Ramakrishna invites governments, civil society organisations, social media firms and other relevant bodies to act jointly to ‘steer vulnerable constituencies of Southeast Asian Muslims away from “rigid and fixed” Salafism … towards “flexible and tolerant” or ijtihadi Islam’ by ‘educat[ing] them in those values and beliefs that are both theologically authentic and compatible with the lived realities of the multicultural, globalized societies of Southeast Asia’.

The Taliban and their governing practices don’t fit neatly within a Salafist theological–ideological model. They stand in a class of their own and it’s hard to describe them in any Islamist way, except that their dispositions may approximate a mix of Deobandi, Wahhabi and Salafist Islamism. A recent UN Security Council report makes it clear that the Taliban’s relations with al-Qaeda have regained strength in Afghanistan. The group constitutes a major security threat, despite its denial of this and the existence of other violent extremist groups, such as the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State, in the country. The point about the Islamic State Khorasan is that, while it is a rival to the Taliban, many of its members are renegade Taliban.

Yet, our world is so divided, conflict-ridden and polarised that one can’t be very hopeful for the scourge of violent extremism, whether conducted in the name of Islam or any other ideological or geopolitical dispositions, to dissipate for the foreseeable future. The question remains how to understand it and deal with it. This is where Ramakrishna’s book makes for a very cogent and interesting read.

ASIO chief flags alarming increase in children lured to extremism

The number of children attracted to extremist groups has increased dramatically and minors are now the focus of more than half of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s highest priority investigations each week.

The alarming increase, involving children as young as 13, was revealed by the head of Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, Mike Burgess, in his annual threat assessment, delivered this week.

‘As the director-general of security, this trend is deeply concerning,’ Burgess says.

‘As a parent, it is deeply distressing. As a nation, we need to reflect on why some teenagers are hanging Nazi flags and portraits of the Christchurch killer on their bedroom walls, and why others are sharing beheading videos. And just as importantly, we must reflect on what we can do about it.’

Two years ago, Burgess said ASIO was seeing an increase in the radicalisation of young Australians.

‘Unfortunately and alarmingly, this trend is continuing,’ he says. ‘The number of minors being radicalised is getting higher and the age of the minors being radicalised is getting lower.’

Burgess says most radicalisation occurs online but some happens face to face. ‘Children as young as 13 are now embracing extremism, and this is happening with religiously motivated violent extremism and ideologically motivated violent extremism.’

Many of these young people do not come from families where a parent or sibling already holds extreme views, as happened in the past.

‘A few years ago, minors represented around 2% to 3% of our new counterterrorism investigations,’ says Burgess. In the past year, the figure’s been closer to 15%. And perhaps more disturbingly, these young people are more intense in their extremism.

‘Where once minors tended to be on the fringe of extremist groups, we are now seeing teenagers in leadership positions, directing adults, and willing to take violent action themselves,’ says Burgess.

‘At the end of last year, on average, minors represented more than half of our priority counterterrorism investigations each week. This should concern us all.’

Burgess says ASIO is aware of minors preying on other minors, seeking to turn them to their violent ideology and using grooming techniques similar to those used by paedophiles. ‘We have seen cases involving young, radicalised violent extremists systematically targeting vulnerable associates who were lonely or going through tough times.’

The targeting takes place in a variety of settings, even schools. The tactics used by the extremists in these cases involve a combination of attention, flattery and friendship, which shifts to bullying and manipulation.

‘We’ve seen young ringleaders deliberately desensitise their targets, gradually exposing them to more extreme and more violent propaganda, until the most graphic material imaginable was normalised,’ says Burgess.

‘Believe me when I tell you that ASIO finds these kinds of cases challenging—we do not belong in the schoolyard—and while we act when there is a threat of violence, the broader trend of teenage radicalisation demands a different response, one where ASIO and law enforcement are not the answer.’

Burgess says it is very hard to deradicalise an adult extremist, but there are many more options to redirect young people who are experimenting with extremism in response to unhappiness or insecurity.

‘As a society, we have to recognise the signs and step in early. Radicalisation in young people can happen quickly—in days and weeks, not months and years—and kids are most vulnerable when they are under stress.’

In these situations, ASIO’s role is at the end—at the point when there’s an active threat to security, says Burgess. But before that point there are nearly always off-ramps and opportunities to redirect behaviour.

Government plays a key role in helping to counter violent extremism, he says, and policy agencies, law enforcement and community organisations are doing important work.

‘But the community can play a pivotal part identifying signs a teenager isn’t just going through adolescence but is heading towards radicalisation. Without knowing about these indicators, it’s much harder for us to divert them from a dangerous path.’

Security is a shared responsibility, says Burgess. He urges schools and sports clubs to notice and ask questions if young people are acting antisocially and out of character. ‘Parents and carers—notice and ask questions if your children are receiving or circulating inappropriate material online. Children often start with moderately objectionable material, which then becomes worse and worse. Identifying it early can be critical.

‘Community leaders—notice and ask questions if young people you know are showing marked changes in their demeanour or views.’

Burgess says Australia’s security outlook remains complex, challenging and changing. Covid-19 and its associated lockdowns added considerable volatility to the mix and continue to influence the security environment.

During lockdowns, the internet brought many benefits, but more online shopping meant more cybercrime. More online engagement provided greater opportunities for radicalisation. More working from home increased the risk of cyber-enabled espionage.

In the past two years, thousands of Australians with access to sensitive information have been targeted by foreign spies adept at using the internet and social media profiles for their recruitment efforts. On any of the popular internet or social media, they make seemingly innocuous approaches—such as job offers, says Burgess. This then progresses to direct messaging on different, encrypted platforms, or in-person meetings, before a recruitment pitch is made.

That threat spread during the pandemic with a jump in suspicious approaches on messaging platforms like WhatsApp that provide an easy way for foreign intelligence services to target employees of interest.

ASIO is also tracking suspicious approaches on dating platforms such as Tinder, Bumble and Hinge. ‘My message for any potential victims on these sites is a familiar one—if it seems too good to be true, it probably is!’

As long ago as 2007, ASIO warned that a pandemic would see an increase in anti-government behaviours. ‘We have certainly seen that with Covid,’ Burgess says.

Covid sent online radicalisation into overdrive, he says. Isolated individuals spent more time online, exposed to extremist messaging, misinformation and conspiracy theories.

‘Social media platforms, chat rooms and algorithms are designed to join up people who share the same views and push them material they will “like”. It’s like being in an echo chamber where the echo gets louder and louder, generating cycles of exposure and reinforcement.

‘More time in those online environments—without some of the circuit-breakers of everyday life, like family and community engagement, school and work—created more extremists. And in some cases, it accelerated extremists’ progression on the radicalisation pathway towards violence.’

Some believe the government’s approach to vaccinations and lockdowns infringed their freedoms. In a small number of cases, violent incidents were fuelled by anti-vaccination, anti-lockdown and anti-government agendas. ‘We have also seen threats against public office holders, an attack on a vaccination clinic, and several physical assaults on healthcare workers.’

ASIO believes these tensions and the possibility of violence will persist.

The introduction of vaccination requirements for some forms of employment, social engagement and travel will continue to drive anger, uncertainty and fear within a small section of society.

‘This cohort views the restrictions as an attack on their rights, the creation of a two-tier society and confirmation of their perceived persecution,’ says Burgess.

‘ASIO does not have any issue with people who have opinions they want to express. This is a critical part of a vibrant democracy. We do not—and cannot—investigate peaceful protest or dissent. Our concern is where opinions tip into the promotion of violence, or actual acts of violence.’

He says the vast majority of people who choose not to be vaccinated will not engage in violence in response to vaccine mandates. The vast majority of protestors are not violent extremists, and the vast majority of the protests are not violent. ASIO’s focus is on a small number of angry and alienated Australians.

Lockdown and vaccination protests are not specifically left or right wing, says Burgess, but a cocktail of views, fears, frustrations and conspiracies. Individuals who hold these views, and are willing to support violence to further them, are most accurately described as ideologically motivated violent extremists.

For ASIO, many of those involved are newcomers, so it’s harder to get a sense of what is simply big talk and what is genuine planning for violence.

‘Making the call about which statements indicate a genuine plan for violence and which are purely sounding off or wishful thinking is one of the greatest challenges our analysts have. Our information is often incomplete—and the stakes are high.’

Burgess says the most likely terrorist attack scenario in Australia over the next 12 months continues to be a lone-actor attack.

‘That fact weighs heavily on my mind and the minds of our staff.’

What’s wrong with calling the Melbourne protests ‘far right’?

Over the past week there has been a great deal of debate about who exactly has been storming through Melbourne’s streets. It’s been repeatedly claimed, including by union leaders, that the protests, which started over mandatory Covid-19 vaccinations and restrictions on the construction industry, have been ‘infiltrated’, ‘orchestrated’ or otherwise organised by far-right actors.

So far, the allegations of far-right manipulation have been vague and unspecific. No one has yet identified any actual far-right figures involved in organising the protests (although some have attended them), given any evidence of what they’ve done or even been clear about what exactly they mean by ‘far right’.

Thus far, there is little indication of meaningful involvement by known far-right groups or actors in organising the protests. Indeed, as anyone who has been watching them would know, the protests have barely been ‘organised’ at all. Meeting points are sent out over Telegram and individuals share them across their own social media accounts on other platforms like Facebook and Instagram. Beyond those meeting points, however, there really hasn’t been much organisation in the protests to date.

It’s clearly true that there have been individuals with far-right beliefs in the online groups and on the streets of Melbourne over the past several days. However, there’s no good reason to think that these people form a majority of the crowd. The nature of these kinds of ‘anti’ protests is that the participants are united by what they’re against, but often have wildly differing opinions on what they’re for. Protesters are likely to be driven by a range of views, from a genuine opposition to mandatory vaccination on the grounds that it violates their rights to an equally genuine conviction that Bill Gates is using the vaccines to smuggle microchips into people on behalf of Satan.

Labelling all these people as being far right, white supremacists or neo-Nazis, as the building industry union has suggested, is not just inaccurate. It’s actively harmful, because it hands anti-lockdown protesters a propaganda tool which they can use to their advantage. The logic goes: ‘They say we’re white supremacists, but we’re not. If they’re lying to you about this, what else are they lying about?’

In a multitude of protest chats and livestreamed videos over the past week, protesters have reacted angrily to the suggestion that they are far-right extremists. Well-known livestreamer Rukshan Fernando spent the first minutes of his video of Tuesday’s protests seeking out non-white members of the crowd, jokingly asking them if they were white supremacists.

‘I’m here with the right-wing extremists,’ he said, filming a group of Sikh protesters. ‘These are the neo-Nazis extremists here. The media is saying that the working people of Victoria are right-wing baby neo-Nazis, but here we have people from India, Sikhs from Punjab, working-class Australians from all walks of life, and they’re calling them baby Nazis and right-wing extremists on television!

‘So what I’m trying to show you guys is the way that the media and the authorities have manipulated this entire thing with their false narratives,’ he said. The video had received more than two million views as of 24 September.

In another example, during the stand-off between protesters and police at the Shrine of Remembrance on Wednesday, a speaker with a megaphone said, ‘One thing I wouldn’t mind knowing is when they’re going to get better rhetoric than saying we’re all white supremacists. I’m not seeing a lot of white supremacists! Maybe one. Go on man, we know your rhetoric, we’re onto your rhetoric, and it’s weak. The people are seeing through it, and we’re seeing through it, and maybe that’s why [the police] have to keep showing force, because you know your rhetoric is failing and the regime is dying.’ That video had 1.2 million views as of 24 September.

This demonstrates why it’s so important to be accurate, careful and evidence-driven when talking about these protests, these movements and these groups. Fraying trust in authorities and legitimate media is further eroded by simplistic, inaccurate narratives about supposed shadowy far-right puppet-masters who never seem to materialise.

The threat from the far right is real. Where there is clear evidence for the involvement of far-right groups or influences, that should be called out.

However, the use of ‘far right’ as a generic label slapped onto every anti-lockdown protest dilutes the meaning of the term, hinders understanding of what’s actually going on, and can be actively counterproductive.

We cannot combat conspiracy theories with our own search for invisible bogeymen. Inaccurate reporting and commentary on protests like those Melbourne has experienced this week undermine trust just when it is most crucial.

How Australian far-right extremists fundraise online

As the Australian parliament continues its inquiry into extremist movements and radicalism, it’s vital that attention be paid to the ways online funding mechanisms can be exploited by individuals and groups promoting right-wing extremist (RWE) ideologies in Australia.

In a new report from ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, Buying and selling extremism, I provide a preliminary map of the local RWE online funding ecosystem. The report examines nine Australian Telegram channels that share RWE content and finds they are linked to more than 20 different potential funding mechanisms. These include microdonation websites, merchandise sales and cryptocurrencies, as well as new live-streaming platforms such as DLive.

In general, these platforms weren’t built for RWE content. But while mainstream fundraising services such as PayPal and Patreon were found in the sample, the increased scrutiny paid to RWE content by mainstream social media companies appears to have encouraged these groups to move to a range of alternative online platforms that provide additional ways to earn money. In fact, even if accounts have been stripped of their ability to earn money on DLive and YouTube, for example, new services such as Entropy encourage users to port a livestream from those sites and continue to receive paid ‘chats’.

While some funding requests were for specific purposes, such as paying legal fees, others seemed framed largely as a means of supporting the production of content, such as livestream shows in which RWE content is discussed and promoted. This may mirror a social media ‘influencer’ model, in which individuals are rewarded for the entertainment value and perceived credibility of the material they create online—or for ostensibly ‘living’ the ideology they propagate, much like wellness ‘influencers’ who use online platforms such as Instagram to embody their health approach and build audiences ‘off the appeal of intimacy, authenticity and integrity’.

Of course, the online funding ecosystem could also lead people to make RWE content simply to court money and attention rather than to demonstrate an ideological commitment. However, distinguishing between the social harms caused by those who are dedicated to right-wing extremism and those who are only exploiting a fundraising or profile-raising opportunity is complex. This ‘influencer’ model also demonstrates a potential impact of more leaderless or decentralised strategies on fundraising approaches.

The fundraising facilitated by these alternative platforms has the potential not only to increase the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but also to be a means of building the RWE community both in Australia and with overseas groups, and to be a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms being used in Australia mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests being made here are being boosted online by foreign actors.

Indeed, another important factor is how funding drives can act as an additional point of connection between RWE entities in Australia and overseas. We found that fundraising requests published by some Australian individuals and groups are being forwarded and promoted in British, Canadian and American RWE Telegram channels, some with tens of thousands of subscribers, potentially helping to build ties between Australia-based RWE ‘influencers’ and similar figures overseas.

For example, we observed pleas for support for Thomas Sewell’s legal fund forwarded into North American RWE Telegram channels (see figure 1). Again, some of them have tens of thousands of subscribers. Sewell is associated with the white supremacist National Socialist Network, among other groups, and faced armed robbery, assault and violent disorder charges as recently as June 2021.

Figure 1: Calls for funding created in March 2021 in a Telegram channel associated with Tom Sewell and forwarded into a sample of Australian and overseas RWE and conspiracy theory channels (channel subscriber numbers recorded in July 2021)

Any response must, of course, include strong policies and programs to address the drivers of right-wing extremism. However, another strategy that Australian law enforcement, intelligence agencies, policymakers and civil society should explore involves scrutinising the financial incentives that can help sustain and grow RWE movements. This response should include examining whether emerging online funding platforms have obligations under Australian laws aimed at countering terrorism financing, as well as enhancing the transparency and accountability of platform policies and enforcement actions related to fundraising activity by individuals and groups promoting RWE and other extremist content.

The Australian government should also create systems to better monitor hate crimes and incidents that can be used to assess linkages of crimes to extremist ideologies and groups, and to track trends to inform the formulation of policy responses related to RWE fundraising. Likewise, more research should be supported to examine the relationships between online content creation and fundraising by RWE online influencers, radicalisation and mobilisation to violence, and the potential financial and social-influence appeal of online funding and content-production mechanisms when disengaging people from RWE groups and movements.

Listing of neo-Nazi group won’t stop the far-right threat to Australia

The 2019 Christchurch massacre woke Australians up to the intent of right-wing extremists and their capability to act on violent ideologies. Covid-19 has left many young Australians isolated and vulnerable to the far-right’s hate messaging, which has surged globally and is showing its face domestically with more audacity and coherence than ever before. This dangerous combination of events led to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security inquiry into extremist movements and radicalism in Australia, which is due to report in April.

Fierce debate on political and legal censure of far-right groups has surrounded the review. Yesterday, Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton indicated that one far-right violent extremist group, the UK-based Sonnenkrieg Division, is set to be listed as a terrorist organisation, despite Australian intelligence agencies saying no Australians are known to be involved in the group.

It’s unclear if other groups with closer connections to Australian far-right activity will also be listed, like the newly amalgamated Nationalist Socialist Network that recently held a very public training and networking camp in Victoria. Neither is it clear how the government plans to regulate these groups’ activity online.

All four of Australia’s partners in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network have taken steps to list right-wing extremist organisations as terrorist groups. Australia needs to do the same, and in a meaningful way. It’s vital that the listing of far-right groups is done with the same rigour and guidance by intelligence agencies as the listing of Islamic terror groups, rather than as a token gesture to fend off criticism that the far-right threat is not being taken seriously enough.

Canada recently added four far-right and nine Islamic violent extremist groups to its terror list. The four far-right groups are all white supremacist groups that seek societal collapse and restructure through violent means, and that have links to other cells and groups internationally. Legal sanction of members and affiliates by banning travel, seizing assets and blocking business transactions is intended to stop groups recruiting, radicalising and acting on their threats, by disrupting their communication and funding channels.

Australia faces a significant and growing threat from far-right violent extremist groups. By late last year, 30–40% of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s counterterrorism caseload involved the far right, up from 10–15% before 2016. Yet Australia’s list comprises only Islamic extremist groups.

The far-right threat in Australia is similar in terms of ideology to that in North America and Europe, even if on a much smaller scale in terms of capability.

Like modern organised crime syndicates, terror groups have projected their activities globally. Spurred on by political events, online activity and successful attacks by like-minded groups and individuals, far-right terrorism has become an interconnected network giving those involved their own global echo chamber to encourage and enable each other. Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch gunman, was inspired to act by white extremist attacks in the US, UK and Europe and, in turn, has become an inspiration for right-wing extremists worldwide.

This network needs to be met with a cooperative, international policing response. Australian agencies should be legally enabled to contribute to this effort by comprehensively denying these groups the time and space to recruit, encourage and support terrorist attacks.

Adding far-right violent extremist groups (not to be confused with those that are far-right but non-violent) to Australia’s list presents two valuable ways to police the increasingly organised threat they pose.

First, legally designating terrorist groups enables law enforcement to dismantle support activities and networks that sustain groups. The Australian government says that interrupting terror organisations’ planning and finances is vital to preventing terrorist acts.

Second, it provides a much-needed legal framework for regulating far-right groups’ activity online. We know that social media platforms and chatrooms, from Facebook to 4chan, have provided the mediums for extremist individuals and groups to connect, organise and mobilise over the past decade.

This second element is crucial and has so far been precluded by debates about free speech and the responsibility private companies have to regulate activity that can culminate in violence. The inability of Australia’s public discourse and politics to move beyond a tennis match of free speech versus hate speech (demonstrated most recently by political theatrics during debate of a Senate motion to condemn far-right extremism) stands in the way of intelligence and police responses to the threat.

Legally designating a group a terrorist organisation in Australia is a stringent process requiring either successful prosecution of a terrorist offence, or a decision by the home affairs minister, based on direct advice from ASIO, that an organisation is ‘directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, or advocates the doing of a terrorist act.’ This must be supported by evidence that the terrorist act is likely to happen in Australia. In acting on ASIO’s advice, the minister must ensure this list is used as a scalpel, not a hammer or a token.

The process is not intended to give the minister the power to censor far-right or far-left speech online. If ASIO finds a group warrants inclusion on the terror list, shutting down its online activities to plan and finance violent attacks can’t be confused with censoring free speech.

While it’s conscientious for private companies to take responsibility for the activity they tolerate on their platforms, it’s a nation’s responsibility and purview to use domestic law to regulate the planning and financing of criminal activity within its borders.

The recent standoff between the government and Facebook over news content showed that the lines between the responsibilities and influence of transnational corporations and governments have become blurred, where sovereignty once provided a clear demarcation. We can’t rely on social media corporations to regulate terrorist activity online because their business strategy is not designed to prioritise enabling policing, nor should it be.

Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton is right—legally proscribing a terrorist organisation is not a political decision. It’s an intelligence and policing decision.

Providing law enforcement with the legal framework to regulate far-right groups’ activity on and offline puts the responsibility of preventing terrorist attacks where it belongs, with police. And it puts private companies where they belong, which is being accountable to the legislation that applies in the nations in which they operate.

How dangerous is the boogaloo?

On 29 May, against the backdrop of a Black Lives Matter protest, a gunman opened fire on Federal Protective Service officers outside a courthouse in Oakland, California, killing one and badly wounding another. He fired from a van with no licence plates and escaped in the vehicle.

On 6 June, officers confronted 32-year-old Steven Carrillo at his home after receiving a tip-off about a van filled with guns and bomb-making materials. Carrillo, a sergeant at Travis Air Force Base, allegedly ambushed the officers with a homemade semi-automatic rifle and explosives. One officer was killed, and another was shot in the chest, though the bullet was stopped by his protective vest.

Carrillo escaped the scene, wounded, and stole a car, which he soon abandoned. He then attempted to steal another vehicle at gunpoint. The car owner tackled him and held him until police arrived.

Before abandoning the first vehicle, Carrillo had scrawled ‘I became unreasonable’ and other phrases related to the evolving phenomenon known as the ‘boogaloo’ across the car in his own blood.

Carrillo’s two alleged murders are not the only instances of boogaloo-linked violence in recent weeks. Three men, two of them US Navy veterans, have been arrested and charged in Las Vegas with terrorism offences for their alleged plans to exploit a Black Lives Matter protest to stoke violence with a firebomb attack.

These attacks, combined with the conspicuous presence of heavily armed, predominantly white men in Hawaiian shirts at ReOpen and gun rights rallies earlier this year, and most recently at Black Lives Matter protests, have sparked a wave of media attention as people around the world rush to find out what the boogaloo actually is.

Among them, paradoxically, are boogaloo followers themselves. The sudden glare of the public spotlight is forcing this inchoate bundle of memes, Facebook groups and half-serious jokes tinged with violence to wrestle with its own identity in real time. Meanwhile, the publicity appears to be driving an influx of intrigued, enthusiastic new social media users to engage with the boogaloo.

What is the boogaloo?

The boogaloo is not a single, organised group. Nor is it a coherent ideology. It’s perhaps best understood as a meme, or idea, transitioning into a movement.

The word ‘boogaloo’ comes from a meme which uses ‘Civil War 2: Electric Boogaloo’ as a reference for an impending, desired second civil war in the United States. Its adherents have been referred to as ‘boogaloo boys’ or ‘boogaloo bois’.

The meme may have originated on the imageboard 4chan, but boogaloo groups and content have since spread across the major social media platforms and many fringe platforms as well. By far the most activity takes place on Facebook, where the largest boogaloo groups have thousands of members. Carrillo was an active member of several of these groups.

This memetic origin makes it difficult to define what the boogaloo is. The advantage of a movement based on a meme is its useful ambiguity—that it can be, if not all things to all people, then at least many things to many people. An image may be worth a thousand words, but it can be a different thousand words for each person who sees it.

This ambiguity has allowed the boogaloo meme to appeal to individuals with different motives. So long as the boogaloo remained more a meme than a movement, these differences had little impact.

Under the current pressure to define themselves, however, it is becoming apparent that, while boogaloo bois all to some extent support the call for a violent uprising, their reasons for doing so and what they hope to achieve by it are not necessarily the same.

This dynamic has become strikingly clear in the debate over whether the boogaloo is a white supremacist movement. Administrators of some of the most prominent boogaloo groups took offence at media coverage describing the boogaloo as racist, neo-Nazi or white supremacist, and have repeatedly asserted their groups’ anti-racism stance. The boogaloo, in their view, is about armed insurrection against state oppression, not about supporting white supremacist calls for ‘race war’.

For some, the claim that the boogaloo is not an inherently white supremacist or at least white nationalist movement came as a surprise. The imageboards where the boogaloo meme was incubated have also nurtured white supremacist terrorists, including Christchurch gunman Brenton Tarrant. Many of the communities and movements which spin off from these boards carry that legacy of ingrained racism, misogyny and anti-Semitism. Despite the efforts of some boogaloo groups to define themselves in opposition to police oppression, including oppression of people of colour, there’s an undeniable white supremacist fringe.

Over the coming weeks and months, this split between the pro- and anti-racism wings may widen.

How serious is the threat?

The threat of mass mobilisation or armed insurrection emerging from the boogaloo movement appears to be low. While it has tens of thousands of supporters on social media, posting memes on Facebook is a far cry from taking up arms against the government. Only a small minority have shown an inclination to take the boogaloo any further than their computer screens.

However, as the recent attacks demonstrated, there’s clearly a risk from radicalised individuals or small groups. One of the difficulties in gauging the significance of the threat from the boogaloo is its jokey nature. The fondness for Hawaiian shirts, for example, is based on the way boogaloo groups and pages sometimes use the phrase ‘the big luau’ as code for the boogaloo to avoid Facebook’s content moderation.

The ironic, jokey nature of the boogaloo community makes it difficult to tell how seriously any individual takes it. For some, it’s genuinely just a joke. For others, it’s the kind of thing you write in your own blood on a stolen car after shooting two police officers.

What is being done about it?

Although the boogaloo’s presence is growing on other platforms, Facebook is still undeniably the locus of the movement. In the weeks since Carrillo and the Las Vegas suspects were arrested, the number of boogaloo groups on the platform appears to have increased and there’s been an influx of new users into existing groups, presumably driven by heightened public awareness.

Facebook has claimed that it is taking steps to reduce the groups’ activity and has banned the use of the term ‘boogaloo’ and about 50 related code words ‘when they are accompanied by images or statements depicting armed violence’. Facebook also said it had removed groups in which Carrillo was active, but at least some of them remained active as of 23 June.

To date, Facebook’s actions appear to have had little, if any, impact on the boogaloo groups, most of which have simply changed their names to new coded references—often very thinly coded at that. Talk of armed violence continues unabated, including discussions of Carrillo’s attacks, with some supporting his actions or suggesting that the attack might have been faked to smear the boogaloo movement.

The bottom line

The boogaloo began as a meme, but is rapidly evolving into a movement that glorifies violence, in some cases with white supremacist undertones. The pressures brought by heightened media scrutiny in the aftermath of planned and actual attacks linked to the boogaloo are accelerating that evolutionary process, forcing influential members (such as the administrators of large Facebook groups) to start articulating an ideological basis for what was previously a fuzzy and indistinct call to arms.

However, at least for the foreseeable future, the greatest risks from this movement are likely to come from radicalised individuals and small groups.