Tag Archive for: Erdogan

The fight for Syria

The collapse of Syria’s al-Assad dynasty, which had ruled for more than a half-century, was always going to represent a daunting challenge for the country and its neighbours. But the escalating conflict over Syria’s future between Turkey and Israel compounds the risks considerably.

In Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s view, Syria could not have emerged from its ‘dark era’ had he not lent support to the militias that brought down Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Now, Erdogan sees himself as the patron of Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), and he is eager to shape the new ‘bright’ Syria in Turkey’s image—and promote Turkey’s interests along the way.

For Erdogan, one of those interests is to repatriate the three million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey. Another key priority is preventing Kurdish nationalism from spilling over in Turkey, even if that means taking military action against Kurdish forces in Syria. Moreover, Erdogan is reportedly negotiating a defence pact with Sharaa, which would allow Turkey to establish air bases in Syria and provide training to Syria’s military. As Iranian and most Russian military forces are pulling out, Turkey’s are moving in.

But Israel believes that it, too, deserves credit for Assad’s fall, which probably would not have happened if Israeli military action had not weakened Iran—including by degrading its air-defense capabilities—and devastated its Lebanon-based proxy, Hezbollah. So, why should Turkey be permitted to use the regime change to become the Levant’s new hegemon and attack Israel’s and the United States’ traditional Kurdish allies in northern Syria?

Already, Israeli forces have seized territory in Syria’s south, supposedly to secure the area temporarily. Meanwhile, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has pledged to ‘reach out and strengthen our ties’ with the Kurds. And the Committee for the Evaluation of the Defense Establishment Budget and the Balance of Power has recommended that Israel prepare for a possible military confrontation with Turkey in the Kurdish regions of Syria’s north, where Turkey has long supported local armed groups.

In the wake of Assad’s ouster, Israel clearly sees Turkey’s rising regional clout as a threat. But whether Israel likes it or not, Turkey is better positioned to dominate in Syria. And if it succeeds, the implications will reverberate well beyond both countries’ borders.

Napoleon said that a state’s policy ‘lies in its geography’. For Erdogan, this means historical geography: his foreign policy has Turkey straddling the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans, which were once largely under Ottoman rule. After the June 2011 parliamentary election, Erdogan boasted, ‘Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara.’

Now, Erdogan has a chance to realise his long-standing dream of using Turkey’s model of Islamic democracy as a vehicle for diplomatic outreach across the region and positioning the country as a key intermediary between East and West. But he is likely to take a calibrated approach in pursuing his neo-Ottoman ambitions, not least because they have historically drawn bitter opposition from other Sunni powers in the region, especially Egypt.

For Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, containing the Muslim Brotherhood—which led the government that Sisi ousted in 2013—is a matter of existential importance. It was differences over the Muslim Brotherhood that drove him to collaborate with Cyprus, Greece and Israel in 2019 to exclude Turkey from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum. So, Sisi was hardly pleased to witness Assad’s fall, fearing that it might open the door for the Muslim Brotherhood’s resurgence in Egypt.

Rather than jeopardise the nascent thaw in bilateral relations, Erdogan met with Sisi in December to underscore his commitment to supporting Syria’s reconstruction and reconciliation, while allowing Syrians to decide their own future. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was even more explicit, noting that the new Syria should be pluralistic, with all ethnic and religious groups—including Alawites, Christians, and Kurdish minorities—represented.

This is what Sharaa is apparently trying to build. Seeking to position himself as a moderate leader of a multiethnic country, he has severed all ties with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and declared that all rebel groups that fought against Assad would be dissolved and integrated into state institutions. This vision cannot work without the Kurds. Even if it could, Sharaa, who has been working hard to amplify his international legitimacy, would not want to target US allies who played a decisive role in the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Overcoming the legacy of centuries-long colonial rule, decades of brutal dictatorship, a civil war and the risk of state failure would be a daunting challenge for Syria’s new rulers even under ideal conditions. But the geopolitical ambitions of Syria’s neighbours risk making a difficult task impossible. Adding to the list of regional powers with such ambitions, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, representing two irreconcilable political visions, also aspire to influence the outcome.

In any case, Syria’s stability is in Turkey’s best interest. The Syrian state’s collapse would mean a new influx of refugees and the emergence of a Kurdish proto-state along the Turkish border, with the likely backing of Israel and the US. Turkey could not tolerate a Kurd-controlled statelet in northern Syria, but it could live with a semi-autonomous Kurdish region fully integrated into a unified Syrian state.

A stable Syria is also in Israel’s best interest. In lieu of a Western-style democracy—which is not in the offing anywhere in the Arab world—an Islamist regime whose leader has announced the disbanding of 18 armed militias and called for peace with Israel is about the best outcome Israel could hope for. Instead of encroaching on Syrian territory and cultivating potentially self-fulfilling prophecies about war with Turkey, it should be doing everything it can to support this outcome.

Years of negligence and cronyism underpin devastating earthquake toll in Turkey

The magnitude 7.8 earthquake that hit Turkey and Syria a week ago, and the powerful aftershock that followed, have left at least 30,000 people dead. More than 5,000 buildings have collapsed, including critical infrastructure such as hospitals and schools. The death toll could rise by tens of thousands over the coming days as emergency services dig through the rubble and unearth the tragedy.

This tragedy only adds to the humanitarian crisis that has raged on the Turkish–Syrian border for the past decade. Countries worldwide have responded to the catastrophe by sending humanitarian aid and workers to help the Turkish government and civil-society organisations deal with the disaster. The devastation in the Turkish province of Hatay, near the epicentre of the quake, is a stark illustration of how seriously unprepared government officials were for the earthquake. The country is in mourning, and the implications of this disaster will be widespread for Turkish society, politics and foreign affairs.

Earthquakes are a natural part of Turkey’s past, present and future. The country sits along many active and inactive fault lines, most notably the Marmara fault line that runs south of Istanbul. Yet this is the worst disaster in Turkish history. There is a human element to it and the devastation and death toll could have been avoided.

As Istanbul-based journalist Borzou Daragahi noted last week: ‘If one building collapses in a known earthquake zone, it is a tragedy. If dozens across several major cities collapse, it signals a preventable tragedy.’ In the aftermath of the magnitude 7.6 earthquake that struck Turkey’s Kocaeli province in 1999, killing around 18,000 people, building practices were updated and earthquake insurance was made mandatory for all buildings. In the decades since, scientists repeatedly told the Turkish government that an earthquake of this magnitude could happen again and that they should be prepared for it. However, despite the best intentions with these reforms to the building sector, they have been largely ignored, as indicated by the devastation seen in southwest Turkey.

Successive Turkish administrations have enacted amnesty laws allowing suboptimal building practices to win votes among the poorer sections of the Turkish electorate. Amnesties in the 1980s granted legal titles to the building of illegal gecekcondu(low-cost, hastily built housing) that arose during the rural to urban demographic shift in the 1960s and 1970s.

It is no secret that Turkey’s growth since the early 2000s has been fuelled by the rapid development of the domestic construction industry throughout the region. Over the past 20 years, construction firms aligned with the governing Justice and Development Party (known as AKP) have grown rich from favourable contracts and government subsidies. Development projects have turned the expansive green spaces in cities like Istanbul into concrete jungles. Only recently, it was speculated that a new amnesty law would be passed that would have allowed unregistered construction work to go ahead.

The powerful government-backed housing agency TOKI leads the development of new housing projects throughout Turkey. TOKI was involved in a well-publicised 2014 corruption case against the AKP and people close to Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The charges were later dismissed. Affordable housing is still out of reach for the average Turkish person despite the massive construction increase throughout the country. Yet the easy riches of the real estate industry led to developers and inspectors reportedly cutting corners and ignoring regulations that could have prevented such a disaster.

Recently, the governing party has looked to the construction industry as a source of cheap money to fuel growth rates. Questionable economic policies are crippling the economy, and the AKP needs funds for its election spending and political projects in the lead-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in May. The government has allegedly misappropriated earthquake tax revenue meant for alleviating such disasters and spent it on other state and political projects. Given the lack of resources, civil-society organisations in Turkey have had to fill in the gaps while they wait for international assistance. It appears that in these politically charged times and in the ‘new Türkiye’, politics trumps people.

Yet, despite Turkey’s recent bellicose conduct in international affairs towards Greece and Sweden, the international community has been quick to put politics aside and respond to the crisis. When the dust settles and the election cycle ramps up again, it’s likely that political pragmatism will lead Erdogan and his AKP to forget the generosity shown. With the election less than six months away, Erdogan and the AKP will likely again turn to increased hostility in foreign policy to distract from Turkey’s economic problems and the fallout of the earthquakes.

Natural disasters are unavoidable, but a combination of negligence, lack of regulation and possible corruption contributed to the destruction from this earthquake. Turkey will mourn its dead, and the rebuilding will begin soon. Turkish construction firms will likely get a slap on the wrist from the government for their shoddy practices, but no heads will roll at the top. Pro-government companies and organisations like TOKI will likely reap the benefits of this disaster, given their closeness to the government. It’s highly likely that these companies will be given contracts to rebuild collapsed buildings in cities affected by the earthquake. It remains to be seen whether the AKP will politicise the disaster for political gain and demonise the opposition as it has done in the past.

The AKP and Erdogan, however, would be wise to learn from history. It was a botched response to the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, combined with a freefalling economy, that led to the demise of the Bulent Ecevit government. In the wake of these disasters, the AKP won the election in 2001. If the AKP botches the response to this disaster and wraps its response up in partisan politics, it’s distinctly possible that it will backfire and expose what 20 years of its governance has done to Turkey. Come May, the AKP might find itself on the losing side of a 2001-style defeat.

Turkish drones are destroying Ethiopia’s promise of peace

As NATO has pulled together in opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey, the ‘black sheep’ of the family, remains awkwardly straddled between its roles as Europe’s ally and antagonist.

In recent weeks, Turkish state banks have become the latest to suspend the use of Russia’s Mir payment system, just a month after Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati raised eyebrows by dismissing warnings of sanctions over Turkey’s continued business with Russia, even disdainfully labelling the West’s threat as ‘meaningless’.

While Turkey’s recent compliance is encouraging, such contemptuous rhetoric from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s administration has become as common as it is troubling. Erdogan has weaponised refugees to strongarm the European Union; facilitated the ethnic cleansing of Kurds; and arrested, abducted and tortured countless political opponents. He has, unsurprisingly, little affection for the West.

However, by fixating on Erdogan’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his war in Ukraine, we have neglected Turkey’s involvement in another tragedy that epitomises its uncomfortable fit within NATO: Ankara’s drone sales to Ethiopia.

The Telegraph has labelled the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region as the ‘Great War of Africa’ and the ‘deadliest war in the world’. It is on track to be the bloodiest and most costly conflict of the new millennium, yet it has failed to grab major headlines.

Clashes in late August between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and the militant Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia’s northern regions reignited a two-year civil war that has seen horrific crimes committed by both sides.

At least half a million Ethiopians have been killed and millions more displaced. These figures, which already dwarf the human cost in Ukraine, don’t include the cost of the war’s agricultural devastation during a severe drought, which the World Bank estimates will plunge 70 million East Africans into famine by next July.

Disturbingly, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—a former Nobel Peace Prize winner—has morphed from Africa’s democratic darling into a repressive and autocratic warmonger.

Worse still, Abiy has equipped his forces with fleets of armed drones from international suppliers, including the United Arab Emirates, China and Iran. Since last November, however, when it finalised a security pact with Erdogan, the ENDF has been turbocharging its drone fleet with Turkish Bayraktar TB2s—a platform so cheap, reliable and popular it has been called ‘the Toyota Corolla of drones’.

The use of these drones has fundamentally changed the strategic calculus underpinning both sides’ behaviour, threatening to push any potential peace deal out of reach. The damage they have wrought throughout Tigray prompted UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk to issue a statement last week describing the toll on civilians as ‘utterly staggering’.

First, the use of armed drones undermines one of the key forces motivating a resolution to any conflict: cost aversion. Drones will likely not permit a Clausewitzian culminating victory over the TPLF, particularly given their guerrilla tactics. However, they do allow Abiy to score cheap, regular tactical victories, reducing the incentive for negotiations while forcing his insurgent opponents deeper underground. Tragically, the inevitable terrorist retaliations will likely target Ethiopian civilians as much as ENDF personnel.

In addition, given both the TB2’s range and the TPLF’s inability to counter aerial vehicles, previously salient borders between TPLF-controlled and ENDF-controlled territories are becoming blurred. No longer safe within Tigray, TPLF fighters are encouraged to move into neighbouring regions such as Amhara, widening the conflict’s zone of devastation while Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan contribute greater resources to the war.

ENDF drone strikes have already prevented aid providers from providing much-needed food, water and medical services to victims of the violence, famine and human rights abuses, compounding the crisis and pushing East Africa closer to the point of no return.

There are arguments both for and against launching a full-scale intervention in Ethiopia, led by the United Nations, the United States or others. However, there’s no excuse to sit by while Ethiopians are devasted by advanced military technologies sold by despotic human rights abusers, particularly when they target peacekeepers and aid providers.

Turkey’s recent suspension of the Mir payment system in the face of Western sanctions suggests that the confluence of Ankara’s precarious economic situation and Erdogan’s own political vulnerabilities might motivate NATO’s black sheep to move a little closer to the flock. If Erdogan demands customers for Turkish drones, Western-allied states could arrange to purchase more TB2s. NATO could kill two birds with one stone by arming Eastern European militaries with drones already proven against Russian armour, while keeping them out of the hands of the developing world’s autocrats.

Given the widespread atrocities in Ethiopia, the West can’t give full moral support either to Abiy’s regime or to the TPLF. It can, however, support the millions of innocent people trapped in this conflict zone by addressing the impact of Turkey’s drones.

More than just military platforms, Erdogan is exporting instability throughout the developing world—sales from which Turkey is profiting handsomely.

Erdogan’s drones would surely be better used to uphold security in Ukraine than to undermine it in Ethiopia. As the bodies in Tigray pile higher and higher, so too does our obligation to act.