French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China and his subsequent comment that Europe should not get dragged into a confrontation over Taiwan made clear that his vision of strategic autonomy involves concentrating on security in Europe while pursuing financial prosperity through Beijing.

This betrays a continuing fantasy that security and economics can be treated separately. Macron’s attitude will reinforce a view spreading in the US that America’s interests are best served by focusing less on Europe and more on the Indo-Pacific region.

This episode has served as an unpalatable reminder that for all the rhetoric about democracies standing together against powerful authoritarians wherever they are in the world, some Western leaders remain ready to retreat to narrower and shorter-term definitions of their national interests.

This is entirely the wrong instinct. What is needed to constrain increasing collaboration between Moscow and Beijing is a form of grand strategic cooperation in which Europe, the US and others work together from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific.

The risk for Macron, given the precarious state of strategic preparedness in many traditional European powers, is that the US will hold him to account. The implication that tensions outside Europe are not Europe’s to help manage will fuel complaints already simmering in the US that it is doing more than its fair share of confronting the Russian menace on NATO’s doorstep and that its interests are perhaps better served focusing on the Indo-Pacific region.

If recriminations over the sharing of responsibility for Ukraine were to lead to dwindling global support, it could force Kyiv into negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin from a weak position, likely resulting in the cession of territory.

This would reward his blatant aggression and deliver a devastating blow not just to Ukraine, but also to Western unity, the perceived strength of liberal ideas and the West’s deterrence strategies that provide the best hope to de-escalate the war and prevent future conflicts.

This is what Putin wants, of course. It is also what Beijing wants to—and thinks will—happen. It is, in part, why Chinese leader Xi Jinping formed his ‘no limits’ partnership with Putin and why Beijing is helping Russia.

Beijing’s confidence stems from Xi’s view that democracies are structurally weak and lack the stamina to outlast authoritarian regimes, which are more focused on long-term objectives and willing to see their people suffer for a political cause.

It is doubtful whether Xi understands democratic societies as well as he thinks he does, but principles such as supporting Ukraine cannot be taken for granted.

Ukraine skeptics in the US are split between the ‘America firsters,’ who ignore history and reality to argue that domestic needs can be solved with isolation, and security advocates who judge that Beijing is the more important long-term challenge and therefore should be the focus of limited US resources.

Increased US concentration on Beijing might appeal to many in the Indo-Pacific region. But reduced US support for Ukraine — whatever the motive — would embolden Beijing and confirm Xi’s theory that the democratic world is in decline. This would harm the West’s ability to deter aggression globally and increase the risk of future conflicts.

Fortunately, there is an alternative: collective grand strategic thinking through better use of partnerships. It is the same logic that has produced AUKUS and the revitalization of the Quad. The US should focus on Beijing but cannot do so by leaving Ukraine to the predations of Moscow.

Europe, specifically Germany and France, must therefore step up. The fact is, the EU collectively can take on Russia in a way that no grouping in the Indo-Pacific region can do to counter Beijing’s power.

All countries want to be able to make independent decisions to advance their interests. But there is a distinction to be made between sovereignty and autonomy. Sovereignty does not always mean making decisions alone but can involve drawing strength from partnerships with others who share core values and interests and using the space created to make decisions based on long-term priorities.

NATO as a whole understands this, as do senior members of the EU Parliament and European Commission, including Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen and legislator Reinhard Butikofer.

Many small EU nations get it as well, as reflected in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania being among the largest providers of bilateral aid to Ukraine as a share of national gross domestic product. Germany’s Greens, part of the country’s ruling coalition, get it too, particularly Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, among the strongest appreciators of the connection between individual human rights and security.

Macron’s Beijing trip is unlikely to change this picture. But the implication that Macron and others do not see stability and security in the Indo-Pacific as a concern will have an impact on deterrence in the region and will amplify concerns in the US about major European powers’ commitment.

Chinese state media are already encouraging other countries to follow Macron, with China Daily saying he has ‘showed the rest of the world … it is possible to reject bloc confrontation and adhere to an independent policy.’

The US, NATO and the EU should answer with a combined show of resilience in supporting Ukraine against Russia — and delivering a clear message that this effort would be matched in the Indo-Pacific.

Global authoritarianism, as we are seeing through the behaviour of Beijing and Moscow, is being aggressively pushed as an alternative to democracy in a bid to upend the global order and to advantage might over right.

To confront and deter this push, liberal democracies need to move beyond talking about the connectedness of security in the Pacific and Atlantic regions and act on it. Stability, security and prosperity require working together and harnessing our strengths. By all means, this cooperation should recognize unique regional needs, leadership and contributions, but it should sit under a collective strategy.

This means Europe stepping up considerably to confront the autocrat on its eastern doorstep, with continuing support from the US and Indo-Pacific partners. It also means Europe recognizing that authoritarianism on its doorstep cannot be separated from authoritarianism in the Indo-Pacific.

The growing pressure and confidence of authoritarian regimes must be checked. It is disappointing that even as we see Russian atrocities in Ukraine and Beijing’s targeted aggression and coercion, some political leaders think they can split Moscow and Beijing.

They cannot be split. They are two parts of the same problem.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call to reform the European Union is a sign of hope for the entire continent. Even though we have our differences, we’re in agreement when it comes to the essential questions. Macron is fundamentally right about what Europe must do to continue flourishing. We must revitalise the EU by making it more democratic, cohesive and just. And we must strengthen Europe against enemies that want to weaken it—namely, internal populist forces and the foreign powers that support them.

When populists achieve power, as the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has in Poland, they dream of sowing division among democratic opposition parties. But we have overcome their cynical strategy by creating the European Coalition of opposition forces ahead of the European Parliament elections in May. This new democratic alliance, which I lead, is already ahead in opinion polls and is on its way to defeating PiS—first in May, and then in Poland’s general election this fall.

Both elections are crucial. Poland needs a new government that respects the rule of law and plays a positive role in the EU. And Europe needs a Poland that, while defending its own interests, also fights strongly for the democratic values that are essential to the EU’s future.

Poland knows first-hand the threats—anti-European attitudes and attacks on the rule of law—that Macron highlighted so well. Although Poles are among the most pro-European people in the EU, Jarosław Kaczyński, the PiS leader and de facto head of the Polish government, is poisoning our ties with the Union. The current government has marginalised Poland to such an extent within the EU that its voice matters little. This is why every sensible Polish politician views our country’s return to a respected and active position within European structures as a vital national-security interest.

That will not happen unless we defeat PiS later this year. If PiS wins a second term in power, Kaczyński may well administer the final doses of his xenophobic poison, by completely subordinating Poland’s judiciary and media to his party’s whims. Can a country without an independent judiciary remain in the EU? I think not.

A new Polish government led by the European Coalition would seek to participate in Macron’s initiatives to reform the EU. We agree with him that the EU can compete with other global powers in ways that no single member state can. We also agree that the EU must strengthen its external borders, protect its democratic processes from external manipulation, and invest in research and innovation at a level similar to the United States and China.

What’s more, individual member states and the EU as a whole must begin to coordinate economic, defence and education policies. Our current deficiencies in this area give foreign actors an advantage and raise the risk that they will take over further branches of European industry.

But I am not convinced by Macron’s suggestion that creating new EU agencies is the best way to tackle these issues. The EU already has more than 30. More agencies mean more bureaucracy—an outcome that is unlikely to inspire much enthusiasm for Europe. A simpler solution would be to strengthen existing EU institutions and ensure that they receive sufficient funding.

Macron is right that ‘progress and freedom are about being able to live from your work’. But any administrative attempt to equalise EU labour costs would lead to job losses in Poland and elsewhere in Central Europe, and reduce the capital inflows that help to raise wages and allow the region to catch up to wealthier countries. Manufacturing would continue to leave EU countries that are not sufficiently competitive, but it would go to other parts of the world, not to Central Europe.

Macron is undoubtedly correct, however, to emphasise the importance of European defence and security policy. Should we win power in Poland, the European Coalition intends to initiate a strategic debate among EU leaders to develop effective institutional measures and broaden the EU’s defence resources. The EU needs a robust defence budget and coordination of production within Europe’s defence industry to guarantee that we can realise the missions we undertake.

Here, the EU should show more initiative regarding future cooperation with NATO. It should aim to reaffirm transatlantic ties and strengthen operational links between the two organisations’ military capabilities. The key to our joint success is defence capacity—transatlantic wherever possible, and European when necessary.

Nor should we forget the important task of completing European integration. Let us welcome the Western Balkan countries when they are ready. And let us respect the European aspirations of Ukraine, which is of great strategic importance to Poland and the EU. European solidarity should reach as far as Ukrainian cities—if it does not, Europe will never be a secure whole.

Thirty years ago, Poles overcame their internal divisions and resoundingly rejected communism and subservience to the Soviet Union. This ultimately led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism in Europe. Today, confronted by a populist government that wants to divide us, we must remain as united in the cause of democracy, and in our rejection of lawless authoritarianism, as we were in 1989.

Macron’s call for European renewal has come at the right time. We are determined to return Poland to its rightful place in democratic Europe, and we are ready to undertake our common task of reforming the EU.

Confidence has returned to Europe’s chancelleries just in the nick of time, what with US President Donald Trump due in Europe in a few days. During the annus horribilis of 2016, many feared for the European Union’s survival. But in 2017, there is renewed hope for the European project, owing to Emmanuel Macron’s election as president of France, and electoral defeats for populists in the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany, as well as Trump’s plunging popularity at home.

The recently forged ‘Mercron’ partnership between Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel has European policymakers talking excitedly about a reinvention of the eurozone. There are now proposals for a shared eurozone budget and finance minister, and for an EU-level security union to tackle terrorism and strengthen border controls.

Moreover, the European Commission last month launched a new defense fund to close the gap between Europe’s aspiration to defend itself and its ability to do so. The hope is that 510 million Europeans will no longer have to depend on 320 million Americans for their security.

In the past, many EU member states complained that the ‘cold peace’ between France and Germany was hampering effective governance of the Union. Today, those countries have expressed renewed faith in the ascendant Franco-German relationship, though if France and Germany fail to give others a stake in their success, many countries may end up with buyer’s remorse.

At the European Council on Foreign Relations’ annual council meeting in Berlin last month, 250 former and current prime ministers, foreign ministers, policymakers, and thinkers convened to discuss the state of European affairs. Many of them were torn between excitement about a European re-launch and fear that the new ‘Mercron’ arrangement will leave other member states behind.

For France and Germany, it is worth remembering that the ‘Merkozy’ era—when Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy tried to forge an alliance—evoked hostility in other European capitals. Other EU member states resented the exclusive role of France and Germany in developing EU- or eurozone-wide solutions, which were then presented as faits accomplis to the rest of the bloc. To take one notable example, Merkel and Sarkozy once held a summit to forge closer ties with Russia without bothering to consult or include the EU member states in Russia’s immediate proximity.

The challenge for France and Germany now is thus to capitalize on the recent victories for pro-European governments without provoking a backlash in the other EU member states. But this won’t be easy, not least because French and German leaders are torn between two competing visions of Europe’s future.

One vision favors a union of concentric circles, with a Franco-German-led eurozone at its core. This idea is appealing, at least on the surface, because it would allow the core countries to continue integrating, while leaving behind perceived troublemakers such as Poland and Hungary.

But this strategy, though meeting the need for deeper eurozone integration, would not address Europe’s longstanding divides between east and west, north and south, or center and periphery. Issues such as Russia, refugees, austerity, military action, and Brexit would continue to challenge European solidarity.

The second vision for Europe’s future emphasises coalitions among countries that are willing and able to work together. In a largely intergovernmental EU, smaller coalitions could be an effective governance tool and mitigate the veto power that currently exists in formal EU meetings. They could even sign treaties to formalise their arrangements—such as the Schengen agreement on border-free travel.

Under a coalition model, country groupings might change, depending on the issue at hand, thereby allowing for more flexibility. And, although Germany and France would probably be at the center of many of these groupings, other countries could take the lead and share the limelight, making the EU re-launch less divisive. For example, in an earlier era, Poland and Sweden spearheaded the EU’s ‘eastern partnership’ strategy toward countries such as Ukraine.

The Mercron partnership has a better chance of building goodwill within Europe than the Merkozy partnership ever did. For starters, the balance of power between France and Germany will probably now shift a bit toward the former, given that the French economy is strengthening, and will be positioned for renewed growth after Macron’s promised reforms.

Moreover, owing to his knack for transcending traditional divides (which I previously described as the ‘Macron method‘), Macron might be able to build new, better relationships with member states that have not previously had close ties to France. And, last but not least, Macron has a huge store of soft power and political capital, similar to Barack Obama after grassroots enthusiasm brought him to power in the United States in 2008.

At the same time, Germany is in a weaker position than it was during the Merkozy era, which is good news for the Franco-German relationship. The refugee crisis has rendered Germany ademandeur, rather than a supplier, of European public goods. And although Merkel seems indispensable on the international scene, plenty of people in Germany are starting to plan for the end of her mandate, which is now going on 12 years.

Most important, Merkel and Macron both need the Mercron partnership to work if they are to succeed in building a stronger Europe. The Europe of the future must be capable of protecting its citizens from global threats; but to define those threats, it will have to consider all EU member states’ perspectives, not just that of France and Germany.

Fortunately, Merkel and Macron are both well aware of the limitations of the Merkozy tandem, and with the need to improve on the relationship between Merkel and Macron’s predecessor, François Hollande. Above all, their realism about the bilateral relationship and its possibilities will be essential, because Europe’s most powerful asset has never been a detailed vision of the future, but rather its collective willingness to improve upon past failures.

If Macron and Merkel keep this historical perspective in mind, they can turn their relationship into an open political marriage from which all of Europe will benefit. An exclusive partnership will breed more resentment than goodwill, and probably will not survive for long.

Emmanuel Macron’s election to the French presidency provides the European Union with an opportunity to move past the internal conflicts that have hastened its disintegration. Rather than standing exclusively with the old elites or the new populists, Macron has promised to rally broad political support under the banner of European reform. But can he really breathe new life into an ailing project?

When Macron met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, he offered a plan for ending the cold war between northern and southern Europe—which is to say the tension between advocates of austerity and those in favor of growth policies. And when he meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week, he could find a way to bridge the divide between the EU’s eastern and western flanks, which want, respectively, to contain and engage Russia.

Likewise, Macron has tried to reconcile the idea of a welcoming Europe with advocacy of a fortress Europe. He wants to take in more refugees, while urging the EU to create a border force of 5,000 soldiers, and to accelerate repatriation of illegal migrants.

But while many EU leaders were relieved to see Macron elected, it is often because they hope he will give a new lease on life to the old project, rather than a radical break with the past. To bring true change, Macron will have to transcend the two contradictory but mutually reinforcing political models that have defined the last decade of EU governance: technocracy and populism.

Technocracy has been a central feature of European integration from the beginning. Jean Monnet, the French economist who is considered one of the modern EU’s founders, was renowned for his ability to turn big political conflicts into smaller technical issues. This method was highly successful during the post-war period of European reconstruction, because it allowed diplomats and officials from different countries to bypass national disagreements or lingering resentments and address the continent’s most pressing problems.

But, over the years, EU policy discussions have departed from Monnet’s model. They now tend to be disconnected from national politics altogether, driven as much by the logic of EU institutions as by member states’ needs. Moreover, EU-level decisions have been pickled into rigid codes to which member states must adhere, even if their governments or electorates do not support them. Together, these trends have fed the widespread perception that there are no alternative forms of EU governance, and that Europe is being run by elites who have little concern for the interests of the people they are supposed to be serving.

The populist explosion in recent years is a natural reaction to this disconnected form of technocracy. It is no accident that leaders such as Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom have all posed as tribunes of the ‘people.’ Through referenda—their favorite political tool—they have been able to inflict damage to the EU constitutional treaty, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, refugee-repatriation deals, and, with the UK’s Brexit vote, the composition of the EU itself.

As European technocrats have pushed for covert integration to resolve the euro and refugee crises, the populists have struck back even harder. And every time populist-driven referenda against EU treaties force governments to retreat into technocracy, the populist narrative is reinforced.

The UK’s Brexit negotiations have already become a battleground between technocrats and populists, with each side vying for an outcome that will support its narrative. When British Prime Minister Theresa May says that she wants to ‘make a success of Brexit,’ she sets off alarm bells in Brussels and other European capitals, because such an outcome could inspire populist anti-EU movements elsewhere.

To forestall that scenario, some members of the German government, fearing that they will be unable to accommodate Macron’s other demands (particularly concerning eurozone reforms), are hoping to work with him to make Brexit unattractive. This also seems to be what EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker was getting at recently. ‘Brexit will show how much more attractive it is to be a member of our Union,’ he said. ‘Thanks to Europe, people enjoy the freedom to live, buy, love, and trade across borders.’

It is understandable that European leaders would latch onto Brexit as the one thing EU member states can agree on. But, unfortunately, the Brexit debate tends to bring out EU elites’ worst instincts, not least because it encourages them to fight for the status quo, rather than for reform and innovation.

If the EU continues to look inward, consumed by the questions posed by Brexit, the next five years will be as sterile and unproductive as the last. The big question now is whether Europe can accept the lifeline that Macron is offering, and look forward to a new project, rather than backward to old struggles.

To be sure, many observers have poked fun at Macron for refusing to commit himself to one side in any debate. And satirists have pointed out that he starts almost every sentence with ‘en meme temps’ (at the same time). But for a long-gridlocked EU, Macron’s proposed grand bargains could offer a valuable way forward—one that relies not on institutional changes, but on political trade-offs.

Macron’s security policies try to square tough anti-terrorism measures with a more humanitarian approach to refugees. On economic policy, he has offered reform in exchange for investment. And, given his tough stance on Russia and support for action in Africa and the Mediterranean, he might even be able to rally the EU’s southern and eastern members around a common foreign-policy cause.

If Macron lives up to his promise, he will not stand for technocracy or populism, but for a genuine third way. That is an admittedly shopworn term. But Macron could imbue it with new meaning if he can combine, rather than accept, today’s false choices. He will have to bridge the EU’s geographic divides, and position himself as pro-European and patriotic, establishment and anti-establishment, open and protectionist, pro-growth and fiscally restrained.

Can Macron’s method allow EU leaders to break the vicious circle of technocracy and populism, and end the paralysis of the last decade? For the time being, the only certainty is that—to invoke another hackneyed phrase—there is no alternative.