Tag Archive for: EEZ

Why Indonesia’s new map is not (all) about the South China Sea

On 14 July, Indonesia released its new official map. During the press conference, Havas Oegroseno, Indonesia’s deputy coordinating minister for maritime affairs, highlighted several changes to the old map, including the renaming of the waters northeast of the Natuna Islands bordering the South China Sea as the ‘North Natuna Sea’.

A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman condemned the move, arguing, ‘The so-called change of name makes no sense at all and is not conducive to the effort to the international standardization of the name of places.’ A Chinese expert quoted by the Global Times further claimed that Indonesia is merely seeking a bargaining chip before engaging in bilateral ‘maritime boundary delimitation’ talks in the future.

Regional analysts jumped on the name change and speculated whether Indonesia was deliberately taking a tougher stance against China in the South China Sea (see here and here), even if executed in a unilateral fashion. But the new map wasn’t all about the South China Sea. Indonesia doesn’t recognise any existing maritime delimitation dispute with China. The renaming of waters only applied to Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf on the southern part of the Indonesian–Vietnam border and didn’t encompass the entire South China Sea.

And the North Natuna Sea is not the only feature of the new map. The press conference noted updates to the map that related to Indonesia’s maritime borders with Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Palau. The July 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling, in particular, was invoked to justify the ‘expansion’ of Indonesia’s EEZ in its border with Palau by assigning Tobi Island, Helen Reef and Merir Island a 12-nautical-mile enclave rather than a 200-nautical-mile maritime entitlement.

That designation, it should be noted, remains subject to negotiation. Similarly, the designation of an enclave for Pedra Branca, Middle Rock and South Ledge will ruffle feathers in Singapore and Malaysia and might shape Jakarta’s ongoing border negotiations with Kuala Lumpur. That said, the recently concluded agreements with Singapore and the Philippines were cited in the press conference as providing further momentum to the efforts to update the map.

Aside from these diplomatic–legal dimensions, the renaming of the Natuna waters was also pitched as an economic move to align the existing designations of oil and gas investment areas with Indonesia’s EEZ and continental shelf. That is no small feature, considering the waters contain 16 oil and gas blocks (with eight of them having total proven reserves of some 47.2 trillion cubic feet). In fact, the East Natuna natural gas block is believed to hold one of the world’s largest reserves of untapped gas. But its future is now embroiled in controversy as ExxonMobil recently announced that it’s pulling out of development plans for the area.

While the new map shows some areas that require further maritime delimitation negotiations, Oegroseno also noted its importance in assisting maritime law enforcement agencies in Indonesia in patrolling the waters. In the absence of a specific code of conduct between the region’s maritime law enforcement agencies—and at a time when incidents at sea over illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing are increasingly more frequent, with wider strategic ramifications—greater cartographical clarity of maritime zones is certainly beneficial.

Finally, while the map wasn’t designed with the South China Sea in mind, there might be domestic political benefits to an announcement highlighting a seemingly tougher stance on China. At a time when Jokowi is fighting on multiple fronts domestically, including fending off criticism that he’s becoming an ‘anti-Islam dictator’ following the Hizbut Tahrir ban, he doesn’t need another weak flank. Jokowi in particular has been criticised for being ‘too pro-China’, sparking a wide range of conspiracy theories from the revival of communism to the role of ethnic-Chinese Indonesians. The North Natuna Sea name could take some of the pressure off.

Yet, perhaps in a move to minimise adverse reactions from the region, including from China, Luhut Pandjaitan, the coordinating minister for maritime affairs, commented on 24 July that the new map and the renaming of the Natuna waters was merely an ‘exercise’ and that the main purpose of the government was to strengthen economic cooperation. Oegroseno, however, previously noted that the map is an official government document signed onto by 21 different agencies and ministries, including the foreign ministry and navy.

This incoherent articulation of China-related policies underscores the ongoing debate within Indonesia’s political elites—between those wanting Jakarta to take a tougher public stance on crucial strategic interests (including the South China Sea) and those preferring to eschew ‘megaphone diplomacy’ and engage Beijing and resolve tensions behind closed doors.

Nevertheless, the new map continues Indonesia’s long-held tradition of strengthening an UNCLOS-based rules order in the region. Indonesia’s citing of the Arbitral Tribunal ruling in drawing it (the first country to do so) is a clear testament to that. Like all strategic geography, however, there’s more to Indonesia’s new map than drawing lines in the water.

The Philippines v. China verdict: China’s crossroads

Image courtesy of Flickr user Joe Gratz

‘An overwhelming victory’ is how Paul Reichler, lead counsel of the Philippines, describes the Award issued by Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal in the case of Philippines v. China concerning the South China Sea (SCS).  The Tribunal unanimously granted all but a handful of Manila’s claims, and in doing so laid down a significant number of rulings that will reshape the discourse over the SCS disputes in the years to come.

First and foremost, the Tribunal definitively characterised and then struck down the most expansive of all the various claims to the SCS: China’s historic rights claims, as represented by the ‘nine-dash line’ map. The Tribunal held that clearly, any and all historic rights claims to waters beyond the territorial sea were relinquished and abandoned by China when it signed and ratified UNCLOS and thereby agreed with the establishment of the EEZ and continental shelf regimes in favour of all coastal states.

Second, the Tribunal comprehensively characterised all of the features in the Spratly Islands region and Scarborough Shoal. The islands and rocks created pockets of disputed territorial sovereignty, but the sea areas around them could be jurisdictionally allocated to adjacent coastal states in accordance with UNCLOS.

Third, the Tribunal found that China’s interference with Filipino fishing and petroleum exploration activities, construction of artificial islands, and failure to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ, were all in violation of the Philippines’ sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf. The Tribunal also determined that China’s construction of seven artificial islands and failure to prevent its fishermen from engaging in destructive fishing practices, violated its obligations to preserve and protect the marine environment.

Lastly, the Tribunal found that by creating artificial islands, China violated its obligations to refrain from taking actions that cause permanent and irreparable harm to the marine environment and acted prejudicially against the rights of the Philippines. China thereby acted contrary to international law by aggravating the dispute.

The Award has serious implications that ripple across the Southeast Asian region and the rest of the Asia-Pacific. It closes the door on China’s claims to excessive maritime jurisdictions in the SCS based on historic rights. The vindication of the Philippines’ rights to its EEZ and continental shelf outside of these disputed enclaves implies that beyond the mainland coasts and enclaves of islands or rocks, the SCS is open to either coastal state exclusive resource rights or common international uses.

The smaller littoral states of the SCS naturally gain from the legal reinforcement of their EEZ and continental shelf entitlements extending from their mainland coasts. If China insists on enforcing its now-illegitimate historic rights claims in these EEZ and continental shelf areas, it would clearly be acting illegally under international law and the coastal states would be entitled to take legal or other actions to defend their rights and jurisdictions. China must therefore immediately scale back and halt its maritime assertion and coercion activities against its neighbours, such as blocking and threatening non-Chinese vessels engaged in resource exploration and exploitation, and protecting Chinese fishing in other states’ waters.

The Award also reinforces the high seas freedoms of extra-regional states, such as the US, Japan, and Australia.  Maritime navigation is adequately protected by innocent passage rights through the territorial enclaves and seamless navigational freedoms through the EEZs and high seas of the SCS. However, the numerous territorial enclaves create a virtual obstacle course for aerial overflight.

China’s declared option of imposing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the futureif implemented using these territorial enclavescould interfere with the practical needs of overflight through the SCS, whether for commercial or military purposes. It would create hazards to commercial air traffic routes and spawn numerous opportunities for military-to-military aerial encounters. An ADIZ spanning the entire Spratly Islands would also be unjustifiable given that China has insisted that its artificial islands and facilities are intended for civilian uses and to provide public goods. An expansive ADIZ centered around these facilities would only highlight their actual military purposes.

Overall, the Award clearly establishes the basis for a fair and equitable allocation of rights and jurisdictions over the SCS: between the littoral states, it allocates exclusive maritime zones and resources among all littoral states (including China) based on their coastal frontage and opens an area of international commons from which they can all benefit. It also accommodates the interests of external user states by maximising the areas for the exercise of high seas rights and freedoms with due regard to coastal states jurisdictions. The reduction of the area of legitimate disputes into scattered enclaves pose continuing but not insurmountable challenges. The Award lays down the conditions and points in the direction of a just and equitable resolution of the SCS dispute that’s fair for all states.

For all practical intents and purposes, the ball is now on China’s court: should it persist in its attempt to impose its will through unilateral assertion and coercion activities that have been clearly determined to be illegal, or should it adjust its policies and recognise the equitable balance of maritime rights and interests prescribed by international law binding on all states?

China’s response will determine whether its long-term regional and global aspirations can still be achieved on the basis of mutual acceptance, accommodation, and cooperation with willing and trusting neighbors and partners in accordance with known rules, or shall be denied due to suspicion and rejection by an international community wary of unilateralism, expansionism, and domination by a rising great power. Philippines v. China has ended and placed China on a geopolitical crossroads that will undoubtedly determine its future.  

Trilateral Dialogue on the Indian Ocean: round two

Frigate HMS Kent is pictured during counter piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.Last week ASPI, the Indian Council of World Affairs, and Indonesian participants, met in Canberra at the Trilateral Dialogue on the Indian Ocean (TDIO) to build upon the work initiated at the first round held in New Delhi last year. The TDIO came hard on the heels of the Indian Ocean Dialogue, held in Kochi, and organised by the Observer Research Foundation and India’s Ministry of External Affairs. It considered maritime security policy issues in the Indian Ocean.

Australia puts a high priority on strengthening bilateral relations with Indonesia and India, as reflected in recent prime ministerial and ministerial visits. What the TDIO countries found last week was that there’s also lots of opportunities to enhance trilateral cooperation, in the broader context of developments in the Indian Ocean region.

In a way that’s hardly surprising: TDIO countries have common interests in the eastern Indian Ocean that provide a potential building block for addressing concerns of the wider Indian Ocean region, without the diversions of the strategic troubles of East Asia and the northwest Indian Ocean. Read more

Indonesia and China’s energy security ambitions in the South China Sea

Maritime claims in the South China SeaA recent Foreign Policy article argued that China’s deployment of a billion-dollar offshore oil rig into maritime territory claimed by both Vietnam and China represents a potentially dangerous escalation of tensions in the South China Sea—one signaling China’s determination to exploit energy resources that lie under disputed waters.

Over the past two decades, China has gone from being a net energy exporter to a net energy importer. Forecasts in the 2013 IEA World Energy Outlook show Chinese demand will account for 31% of global net energy demand growth between 2011 and 2035. Its energy demand in 2035 will be double that of the United States and triple that of the European Union. And China’s growing appetite for energy resources will be increasingly backed by its growing naval power—meaning it’ll have options to push the strategic envelope in the South China Sea in order to enhance its own future energy security. Read more