Tag Archive for: East China Sea

Hainan Island and China’s South Sea Fleet

China's mysterious fourth fleet might call Hainan Island home

Recent reports talk about China’s possible establishment of a ‘fourth’ naval fleet with jurisdiction over the Indian Ocean region (IOR), joining the existing North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. This mysterious fourth fleet will supposedly be based on Hainan Island—even though the island falls under the jurisdiction of the South Sea Fleet and is some distance away from the IOR. For that reason, many see a prospective Chinese fleet covering the IOR to be either entirely speculative or, at best, a hollow force existing in name only.

One should certainly be wary of overstating China’s military capabilities or, indeed, ambitions. Taking a worst-case view of a Chinese naval fleet in the IOR could overshadow more modest but also more plausible concerns about other possible roles for a fourth fleet based out of Hainan Island. Read more

Chinese public opinion on the East China and South China Seas

Spratlys

It’s now possible to do public-opinion surveys in China on everything from pandas to pensions. So why not slip in some questions about the territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas?

That’s what Andrew Chubb and the Perth USAsia Centre have done with 1,413 adult residents of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Changsha and Chengdu. The job was carried out by a Chinese commercial firm and the questions were part of a survey that also looked at wildlife issues and age pensions.

The first edition of what’s planned to be a regular survey—if the censors will allow—is ‘Exploring China’s “Maritime Consciousness” Public Opinion on the South and East China Sea Disputes’. This look into the mind of the Chinese public can both confirm the pessimists and comfort the optimists. Read more

ASPI suggests

German Chancellor Angela MerkelThis week’s wrap kicks off with an in-depth profile of German Chancellor Angela Merkel from the New Yorker’s December edition. Pay attention to Merkel’s strategy for dealing with Vladimir Putin and her razor-sharp insights into his psychology: on his attempt to intimidate her with his black Labrador (Merkel is terrified of dogs), she said ‘I understand why he has to do this—to prove he’s a man…He’s afraid of his own weakness. Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy. All they have is this.’

Meanwhile, Putin shared his thoughts (translated into English) with National State Television and Radio Company this week on the Minsk Protocol and the possibility of war between Russia and Ukraine.

Sadly, ISIS members in Mosul decided to express their artistic differences with ancient artefacts by taking to them with sledgehammers and power tools in an effort to destroy ‘false idols’. But The Atlantic’s David Graham offers a different take on the matter: ‘In reality, the relationship with icons in all three Abrahamic religions is rather more elaborate than Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would want us to believe—but the tradition is there. Destroying traces of forebears, and even robbing and destroying tombs, has perhaps a longer tradition in civilization than preservation.’ Keep reading here. Read more

Escalation scenarios in a changing Asia

BalanceNothing so clearly signals Australia’s involvement in a more strategically competitive Asia as the writings of Australia’s leading strategic academics. In quieter times, our academics focused on the meaning of self-reliance, or the durability of American power in the Asia–Pacific. Gradually, China’s rise made its way onto the agenda. And by late last year academics were busily writing papers about whether intra-Asian conflict scenarios in North Asia might see Australia drawn in.

In a paper published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU, Rob Ayson and Des Ball outlined their concerns about possible escalation scenarios in North Asia. Their scenarios turn essentially upon a set of judgments that a minor armed clash between China and Japan could readily escalate; that the Americans would be drawn in quite quickly; and that China might be attracted towards early options for nuclear weapons use. Because of that possible progression, Rob and Des set out some guidance for Australian policy-makers that emphasises the need to encourage both Japanese and Chinese counterparts to believe that they share common interests, and not merely competitive ones. Moreover, they caution that ‘any ideas of supporting Japan and/or the United States in a small North Asian conflict could involve Canberra in a catastrophically escalating war’. Read more

China’s military: the PLA comes of age

Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy sailors stand watch on the submarine Yuan at the Zhoushan Naval Base in China on July 13, 2011. The development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is of the utmost importance for Australia’s strategic policy. There’s a growing realisation in Asia and the United States that the PLA is gradually coming closer to developing a comprehensive ‘counter intervention’ capability, better known in Western strategic debate as ‘anti-access/ area denial’ (A2/AD). Beijing’s aim is to raise the costs of US military intervention in a conflict with one of its neighbours in East or Southeast Asia to a prohibitively high level—with potentially enormous ramifications for a regional security order long based on uncontested US military power in the Western Pacific. The newly released US Defense Department report on China’s Military is further testimony to China’s becoming a major military power in Asia.

Each year, the Pentagon is asked to provide the US Congress with a comprehensive, realistic assessment of the PLA’s evolution. Analysing the military capabilities of a player as opaque as China is always challenging and earlier reports sometimes appeared a bit alarmist regarding certain PLA capability areas. But overall, the reports struck a balance between progress and shortfalls. This year’s version comes amidst growing regional anxiety about China’s growing maritime assertiveness (such as its recent oil rig dispute with Vietnam) and fierce exchanges between US and Chinese defence officials at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Read more

ASPI suggests

U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Solberg with Engineer Troop, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, controls a Talon explosive ordinance disposal robot from inside an armored vehicle to destroy an improvised explosive device during pre-deployment training Feb. 20, 2013 at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. The Troop used Husky Metal Detecting and Marking Vehicles, RG-31 Mk3a armored fighting vehicles and Buffalo Mine Protected Clearance Vehicles to conduct counter-IED training. U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Joshua Edwards

We’re kicking off today’s round-up with an interesting article on the complex relationship between military robots and their soldiers. Here’s an excerpt:

From holding elaborate funerals for robots, complete with 21-gun salutes, valor medals, and memorial markers, to identifying with them as “an extension of our own personality,” as Simon, a Marine sergeant, says, soldiers are now working effectively with robots on a more intimate level than in perhaps any other field, saving human lives in the process.

These anecdotes above derive from new research at the University of Washington on human-robot interactions. And given the prevalence of machines on the battlefield (like counter-IED robots like TALON operated in the image above) and new projects like humanoid robots in the pipeline, understanding feelings they evoke in soldiers, whether creativity or distrust, is crucial. Read more

Reader response: defending the global air commons

Ben Schreer correctly noted yesterday that the US had ‘demonstrated its will and capability to contest China’s ADIZ in East Asia’.

As Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State, told the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on Wednesday:

China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in November was a provocative act and a serious step in the wrong direction. The Senkakus are under the administration of Japan and unilateral attempts to change the status quo raise tensions and do nothing under international law to strengthen territorial claims. The United States neither recognizes nor accepts China’s declared East China Sea ADIZ and has no intention of changing how we conduct operations in the region. China should not attempt to implement the ADIZ and should refrain from taking similar actions elsewhere in the region.

China’s unilateral and sudden action on the ADIZ is a violation of the Law of the Sea Convention, which ensures high seas freedoms throughout the EEZ beyond 12 nm, including airspace activities. The ICAO-authorised flight information region is recognised in the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation as the sole management authority for international civil aviation. Read more

China’s ADIZ gambit and the real ‘China choice’

 Sukhoi Su-35SChina’s recent declaration of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea undermines its attempts to portray its rise as ‘peaceful development towards a harmonious world’. Instead it reinforces regional concerns that China’s rapid economic development and military modernisation will allow it a greater ability to challenge an established rules-based international order, leading to a much more uncertain strategic outlook that is characterized by major power competition and a growing risk of interstate war.

Why has China declared its East China Sea ADIZ? Analysis by CSIS suggests that the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea is a response to China’s assessment that the ‘period of strategic opportunity’, which enabled China to focus on domestic issues, is under ‘unprecedented stress’, primarily as a result of US re-balancing to Asia, and that from the perspective of Beijing, the risk of regional conflict is rising. The East China Sea ADIZ enables Beijing to be more prepared for the outbreak of military conflict, and the ability to dominate the airspace over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is an essential enabler for the use of Amphibious, Airborne and Army Aviation Forces to rapidly seize the disputed islands, should China choose to do so. More broadly, it also reinforces China’s ability to ensure Sea Control within the ‘first island chain’, in line with a PLAN strategy of ‘offshore active defence’. Read more

The ADIZ and rebalancing on the run

 US Defense Secretary Chuck HagelFor the United States and its allies other than Japan, ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands doesn’t matter. What matters is the contest for influence in Asia which is being played out through the dispute, with China on one side, and the US and Japan on the other.

Ben Schreer’s post earlier today looked at the new ADIZ from the perspective of Washington and her allies in Asia, and in the context of that competition. So far, it looks like Washington and Tokyo have come out on top. But it would be risky to assume the move was just a mistake by Beijing.

Nothing that has happened in the last week should have come as a surprise to Beijing. There was always going to be a statement of support from the US. The Chinese probably hoped it wouldn’t be as clear, but Hagel’s words should have been seen as well within the bounds of possibility. Read more