Tag Archive for: Donald Trump

Trump’s doomed Afghan strategy

In a rare presidential address last week at Fort Myer, Virginia, Donald Trump outlined his administration’s strategy for the United States’ future engagement in Afghanistan. Trump avoided admitting outright that he was authorising an increase in the number of US troops in that troubled country, saying instead that military leaders would make such decisions. Yet the reality is that Trump’s plan will deepen American involvement in a military mission that has already lasted for 16 years.

Trump, who campaigned on the promise to extricate the US from foreign conflicts, reiterated in his speech that he shared the ‘American people’s frustration’ about a foreign policy that has already cost too much time, energy and money, and too many lives. His new strategy, he said, is the result of deep reflection by him and his national-security team, about how to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes the source of a terrorist attack on the US like that of September 11, 2001.

Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush sought the same goal. In fact, though Trump attempted to portray his strategy as a stark break from those of his immediate predecessors, many of the steps he announced have been tried already. Still, there are key differences in Trump’s approach, which will have serious long-term consequences for Afghanistan.

For starters, Trump has dropped the ‘nation-building’ element of America’s Afghan strategy. Criticising previous efforts to ‘rebuild countries’ in America’s ‘own image’, rather than putting US security interests first, Trump asserted that the US will no longer engage in explicit state-building, aimed at helping Afghanistan to become a relatively modern political and economic entity. It will, however, demand that the Afghan government deal effectively with corruption, improve governance, and make better use of the resources it receives from the international community.

Second, Trump brought Pakistan much more explicitly into his Afghan policy than Bush or Obama did, arguing that the country will face significantly increased US pressure to crack down on the terrorist sanctuaries along its border, from which insurgents launch attacks on Afghan and NATO forces. If Pakistan fails to do so, Trump declared, it will ‘have much to lose’. Already, Trump has determined that Pakistan should no longer be paid for providing valuable services to American, NATO, and Afghan forces, and has even blocked a large payment to the country that was already due.

Finally, Trump has invited India to play a larger role in Afghanistan, despite the risks India faces in a country that Pakistan views as a second front in its historic struggle with its southern neighbour. Trump appreciates what India has already done, but is urging it to do even more, using its vast earnings from exports to the US to help rebuild Afghanistan’s economy. He also suggested that the US will work with India to create an Indo-Pacific security zone. In any case, it seems that the potential for US–India security cooperation in the region, while only hinted at in Trump’s speech, has already been discussed by the two governments.

The implications of Trump’s speech extend beyond America’s policy in Afghanistan. The address also sharpened the contours—already limned during his May visit to Saudi Arabia and his July visit to Poland—of what might be called the ‘Trump doctrine’.

Trump, it seems, sees a world split between the West and the ‘rest’, with conflict all but inevitable. In Saudi Arabia, Trump invited Muslim-majority countries to join the West in eliminating adherents of Islamic radicalism. In Poland, he challenged the West to demonstrate its will to resist the impact—physical and philosophical—of its adversaries.

Trump is not targeting only the Muslim world. His speech on Afghanistan also pointed to his efforts to contain China. While Trump seemed briefly to be more interested in securing the Chinese government’s help in reining in North Korea, Trump seems eager, now that the North Korean nuclear crisis has apparently been returned to the back burner, to resume his administration’s focus on constraining the Asian giant.

But the Trump doctrine seems no more capable of limiting China than it does of eliminating the terrorist threat to the West. In fact, in the long term, the strategy Trump laid out at Fort Myer will probably have the opposite impact.

If military force has not succeeded in stabilising Afghanistan in the last 16 years, it is difficult to imagine how Trump thinks it will work now. What is needed is precisely what Trump rejects: a serious and sustained effort to build the Afghan state and economy, in order to give hope to Afghanistan’s young population (the median age is only 18.6). Young men will lay down their weapons only if they have confidence in the future.

Moreover, cornering Pakistan will serve only to force its government to align itself more openly with actors like the Haqqani network, a guerrilla group that has been fighting NATO and Afghan forces. This would strengthen insurgent groups’ control over border areas, effectively creating a buffer state between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As funding from the US declines, Pakistan probably will also deepen its ties with China. It has already sent its foreign secretary to Beijing to meet with her Chinese counterpart. In the statement issued after the meeting, China pledged total and unconditional support to Pakistan.

If the goal of the Trump doctrine is to create a stable global backdrop against which America can pursue its own interests, it is doomed to fail. In fact, it is likely to have the opposite effect, unleashing a destabilising genie that will be almost impossible to put back in its bottle.

Washington’s new approach to Afghanistan

On the morning of 31 May 2017, a 1,500-kilogram truck bomb was detonated outside the German Embassy in the Afghan capital of Kabul, only streets away from the US and Australian missions. Windows were smashed all the way from Great Massoud Square to the Haji Yaqub mosque in Shahr-e Naw, over 90 people were killed, and over 500 were injured. If ever there was an indicator that a fresh approach to dealing with the insurgency in Afghanistan was required, then this was it.

On 21 August, after a somewhat agonising series of discussions involving senior US military personnel plus a motley group of presidential associates, US President Donald Trump gave a speech at Fort Myer, Virginia, that sought to outline such an approach. President Trump’s speech was very well received in Afghanistan, met with some consternation in Pakistan, and was quietly welcomed by a satisfied Indian leadership.

The positive reception accorded to the speech in Afghanistan was more significant than most external commentaries picked up. It’s not so much the numbers of US troops in Afghanistan that matter in shaping the future trajectory of the conflict; rather, what’s important is the psychological message that the reaffirmation of a troop commitment sends.

Regimes in Afghanistan in recent decades haven’t fallen because enemies have fought their way to the seats of power in Kabul; in that respect, the fall of Berlin in April 1945 is a poor precedent for making sense of the real sources of danger in Afghanistan. By far the greatest risk is that of a cascade, brought about by the phenomenon of bandwagoning. Cascades occur when actors re-position themselves on the basis of their perceptions of what others are thinking and doing, and it was cascades that finally brought down the communist regime of Dr Najibullah in April 1992, and the Taliban regime in November 2001.

This by no means implies that the Taliban enjoy broad popularity in Afghanistan. On the contrary, a careful survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2016 found that 77% of respondents had ‘no sympathy at all’ for armed opposition groups. The problem is that prudential as well as normative calculations can shape people’s alignments. Even those who loathe the Taliban might calculate that it’s in their interest to align with them if they seem likely to return to power anyway. It’s therefore extremely important that actors such as the United States signal that this won’t be allowed to happen—and that, fortunately, was read as one prominent element of Trump’s speech.

The other key element of Trump’s speech was its discussion of Pakistan. Here, he pulled no punches:

For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror … The next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach and how to deal with Pakistan. We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. … We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But that will have to change, and that will change immediately.

It is in this context that Trump’s welcoming of a greater role in Afghanistan for India needs to be understood. In the short run, such a statement might seem almost calculated to infuriate Pakistan’s military establishment, but the longer run message for Pakistan is nonetheless a clear one—namely, that the United States retains the option of swinging firmly behind India on a range of issues on which Pakistan would strongly prefer that it not do so, most notably the Kashmir dispute. More broadly, however, much will depend on the willingness of President Trump to supply some bite to match his bark. The US on the whole has a poor record of following through on signals of this kind. When in 2011 the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, bluntly referred to the terrorist Haqqani network as a ‘veritable arm’ of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, it was barely a matter of hours before other US officials began to back away from the statement. That kind of equivocation is to be avoided at all costs f the president’s speech is to have a positive effect.

There are actually a number of firm steps that can be foreshadowed to modify Pakistan’s approach, starting with a signal that generals’ sons and daughters might need to consider going to graduate school in Russia or China rather than the Ivy League. It would also be a positive step if the US and its allies such as Australia were formally to designate the Afghan Taliban a terrorist organisation, something which its campaign of bombings against innocent civilians would well justify. Positive incentives have thus far failed to modify Pakistan’s behaviour. Now is the time for a different approach.

ASPI suggests

It’s been a busy week for editors googling pictures of Terminators (as in the Schwarzenegger variety). The main driver has been reportage on an open letter to the UN, signed by 116 tech industry leaders from around the globe, calling for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons (i.e. killer robots). The UN plans to debate autonomous weapons in a meeting this November.

The call for a ban on killer robots has faced plenty of criticism: a piece at Wired says that it ‘just isn’t practical’, as there’s just too much incentive for advanced militaries to continue developing them. A couple of Brookings Institution authors argue similarly that AI is becoming essential to keep up with the increasing speed of warfare. And drones are already emerging as an important component of the defence of Guam against North Korean missiles. A piece from RealClearDefense includes comments from the Atlantic Council’s August Cole, who encourages the international community to develop a ‘legal, moral and ethical framework’, but he notes that even that might be too much to expect agreement on.

Celebrity entrepreneur and AI doomsayer Elon Musk signed the open letter, but that could just be because he thinks ‘Skynet’ will gain control over all of them when the war for humanity’s survival begins. If you don’t know what Skynet is in this context, you can educate yourself by watching the 25th-anniversary cinema re-release of Terminator 2 in 4k 3D—or read this piece about some of the film’s scientific flaws.

US President Donald Trump has given his seal of approval on a new strategy in Afghanistan. The defence policy wonks are out in force. A piece by Kelly Magsamen, former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia–Pacific security, says Afghanistan is now Trump’s war, and she has additional questions. William F. Wechsler, former US deputy assistant secretary for special operations and combating terrorism, argues that the announcement should precede a period of constant US diplomatic interaction with officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. And a brief from the Council on Foreign Relations on the subject offers the grim evaluation that the US is resigned to a perpetual stalemate in Afghanistan.

For a little more variety, you might be interested to know that there are multiple new TV programs about the CIA’s past role in Latin America’s drug trade. There’s a great piece at The Strategy Bridge from Australian Army officer Mark Gilchrist about the inherent chaos of war. It’s difficult to describe succinctly, but I recommend you check it out. And you may be interested to read this Brookings piece about the coming of age of China’s sixth generation of leaders ahead of the next party congress. If military history is more your thing, you might enjoy this long read from the Smithsonian Magazine about Chuck Parsons’ clandestine work in the Philippines during World War II.

In terms of research content this week, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has a new 80-page report on the United States’ 250 years of irregular war that should be of interest to any war historians out there. CSIS has a couple of new reports, too: one on Russia in the global arms market (that one’s high up on my personal to-read list), and one on European terrorism since 1970.

Lastly this week, let’s take a moment to envy our American friends who were able to observe the total solar eclipse on Monday. President Trump was caught looking at the eclipse without special glasses—a big no-no (American readers take note: those glasses can be recycled). Julian Assange defended the President on Twitter using some half-correct optical science, which just made the whole ordeal even more surreal.

Podcasts

War on the RocksBombshell podcast this week covers a variety of geopolitical goings-on, including in North Korea, Afghanistan, Venezuela and Charlottesville.

And from the team that brought you the Dead Prussian podcast comes War for Idiots. This week’s episode gives an in-depth discussion of the Clausewitzian concept of a military ‘centre of gravity’.

Video

Australia’s ambassador to Russia, Peter Tesch, sat down for a 20-minute chat with the Australian Institute of International Affairs this week. He offers an Australian perspective on modern-day Russia, and discusses the economic opportunities and challenges for Australians in Russia.

A VICE news segment discusses North Korea with Clinton-era energy secretary Bill Richardson. Richardson reflects on some of the interactions he’s had with the North Koreans, and expresses optimism about the potential for a deal of some kind (4 mins).

Chatham House has put together a short informational video on the potential for cyber attacks against satellites and space assets (1 min).

Events

Canberra: This Saturday is the ADFA/UNSW Canberra open day. There’ll be drill displays, a C-130 fly-by, small training drones and military working dogs.

Melbourne: The Lowy Institute is hosting an evening panel discussion on 29 August about some of the findings from the 2017 Lowy Institute poll. The event is being held at the wonderful National Gallery of Victoria, where you can also see an exhibition of works by legendary Japanese artist Katsushika Hokusai.

North Korea? Call the G2!

If Donald Trump can’t get a deal with North Korea, the only deal in town is with China. If not ‘fire and fury’ with Pyongyang, it must be a fix with Beijing.

A president keen to tear up the Iran nuclear agreement doesn’t want to create his own version of a deal with the devil in North Korea. Do something with China instead.

The G2—the group of two—must step from the shadows. Time for Washington and Beijing to build their condominium to shape Asia.

When Xi Jinping was pondering a ‘new type of great power relationship’ with Barack Obama, it amounted to a g2. Solving North Korea demands much more heft. The group of two can earn its capital letter.

Come the crisis, come the man. Maybe The Donald is the man. He’s going to need Beijing to deliver his famous television line to Kim Jong-un: ‘You’re fired!’ Time for the US president to channel another venerable bit of American television—Let’s Make a Deal.

In negotiating a grand bargain with Beijing, Trump is the rule-breaking leader who can put lots of the Korea chips on the table. Every US president since Truman has had to play the hand Truman bequeathed in much the way Truman did. Not Trump. He doesn’t like alliances.

In casting aside his Truman heritage in Korea, the president will ask Xi Jinping to junk his Mao Zedong inheritance in Korea. A G2 compact is the only sort of creation that could tempt Xi to do a Mao re-do.

The terms of a G2 contract/compact are simply stated: China denuclearises North Korea and renders it neutral. In return, the US military steps back from South Korea. The US alliance with South Korea stays, even as American forces leave. Simple to state and extraordinarily difficult to construct.

The hints of such a compact have been coming from Chinese thinkers for a while. And from America’s modern Metternich, Henry Kissinger.

In this US president, the mandarins and the Metternich may have found the man willing to dump Truman and do it the Trump way.

A settlement that removes US forces from South Korea looks like a victory in Trump world: nukes gone and regime changed. Our job is done here and our boys are home. Over to you, Xi.

Donald the dealmaker delivers a great America First outcome by treating China as a top-ranked equal. A grand G2 settlement must offer Xi much more than the bloody draw that Mao Zedong won by sacrificing his own son and so many others in Korea.

Xi isn’t going to be the Chinese leaders who loses North Korea and watches US forces march up to China’s border shoulder to shoulder with South Korea. That’s a huge strategic defeat for Xi—close to the prestige disaster of a Chinese leader losing Taiwan or botching Hong Kong.

So the G2 will have to do more than render North Korea neutral. The solution is going to have to have a South Korean element as a matching part. The Japanese have worried from the start about Trump the dealmaker. Tokyo feared Trump could ‘do a Nixon’. The Donald is the sort of president who can go into a room with Xi and strike a bargain without reference to anybody else, even the closest ally. Seoul could live that vision (or dream, or nightmare).

In sketching G2 scenarios, it’ll quickly become clear to Beijing and Washington that their condominium can decide and depose, even impose. But then the United Nations must be involved to bless the bargain and make it work. The deal will need a lot more weight than a handshake with Donald Trump. The first UN war must have the UN present at the settlement. The Security Council resolution that China agreed to on North Korea on 5 August is just the start.

Xi has to get a lot that can be made permanent if he’s to turn against the malign Marxist monarchy that Beijing has paid and protected. China must achieve many wins if it’s to junk Mao’s status quo in Korea.

Trump is going to have to offer Xi lots of face and plenty of favours. To start with, he’ll need to show uncharacteristic patience and give Xi time to complete the vital item on his calendar this year. Nothing can get in the way of Xi’s procession to the 19th Communist Party national congress. Much is on hold in China this year as Xi reaches for another 10 years in power, not the further five years that should be his lot under Deng’s settlement.

Once Xi settles that personal power issue by remaking Deng’s rules, he might just be ready to remake Mao’s heritage in Korea.

A G2 compact to refashion Korea would be power politics played as a US acknowledgement of China as its true equal. It’d remake the balance of power in northeast Asia as an expression of the new Chinese relationship with America. Kissinger, the modern Metternich, gives this outline:

An understanding between Washington and Beijing is the essential prerequisite for the denuclearisation of Korea. China may have an even greater interest than the US in forestalling the nuclearisation of Asia. Beijing risks deteriorating relations with the US if it gets blamed for insufficient pressure on Pyongyang. Since denuclearisation requires sustained co-operation, it cannot be achieved by economic pressure. It requires a corollary US–Chinese understanding on the aftermath, specifically about North Korea’s political evolution and deployment restraints on its territory. Such an understanding should not alter existing alliance relationships.

Trouble in the neighbourhood. Who ya gonna call? The G2!

Turnbull and Trump: ‘shoulder to shoulder’ on North Korea?

Last week Prime Minister Turnbull committed Australia to join the United States in a war with North Korea. His remarks were strangely brief and informal for such a weighty issue, and left it rather unclear under what circumstances he would be willing to fulfil that commitment. Much of the language he used—phrases like ‘shoulder to shoulder’ and ‘joined at the hip’—seemed to suggest that the specific circumstances of conflict were irrelevant: we would fight alongside America however the war had come about, come what may.

Turnbull did use the words ‘if there is an attack on the United States’, which may have been intended to limit the commitment to supporting America in responding in self-defence to a clear act of aggression by North Korea. If so, he would have been well advised to make that clearer, because in the current context that’s far from the most likely scenario in which America would seek Australia’s military support against Pyongyang.

Despite Kim Jong-un’s bellicose talk, a serious direct attack on America or its allies has always been very unlikely, because the North Koreans know that it would lead to a devastating war that would destroy their country. And the Americans understand that perfectly well. Their real concern is the North’s rapid progress towards developing an ICBM. And while the temperature may have gone down a little in recent days after last week’s heated rhetoric, that problem hasn’t gone away.

No one seriously believes that diplomacy and sanctions will fix things. So over the next few months, the North Koreans will probably stage further tests offering clear evidence of progress towards an operational ICBM force. Would the US then launch a war—and it would be a very big war indeed—to stop them? It’s far from clear where Washington stands on that at present. Much of the tough talk about military options being on the table is intended to scare Pyongyang, but how would the Americans jump if their bluff was called?

The messages from the administration on that are mixed. Key figures like secretaries Mattis and Tillerson seemingly swing between caution and belligerence, while many others in Washington plainly believe that a major war is better than a North Korean ICBM.

And obviously, after all that’s been said, doing nothing would be a humiliating backdown, and a big blow to President Trump’s ego and America’s credibility. So it’s really quite possible that a war with North Korea will be initiated by the White House in the next few months.

One hopes that Turnbull has thought carefully about whether his commitment to stand shoulder to shoulder with America would still hold if that happens. It would be a much tougher call than supporting America if it was fighting in self-defence against clear aggression. It would require him to do more than simply invoke the alliance as ‘the absolute bedrock of Australia’s security’.

He would have to weigh the real strategic questions involved, and there are no simple answers. It’s not enough to say that North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces are a threat to regional security: one has to decide whether that threat is bad enough to justify what it would cost to remove it.

These are very hard choices between very unpalatable alternatives, but they must be faced realistically. The direct threat posed to the US itself is less than it appears at first sight, because America is so well placed to deter a North Korean nuclear attack on the US. There is always a theoretical chance that deterrence might fail in some way, but no leader in Pyongyang could be in any doubt that an attack on a US city would result in the total destruction of North Korea. That means the risk of such an attack being mounted by a rational leader is very low indeed.

That leaves the risk of an irrational action, or an accidental launch. Neither of those can be completely ruled out. Accidents are always possible, especially as one might imagine North Korea’s command and control systems leave a little to be desired. An act of sheer irrationality is also clearly credible, either by the North Korean leadership or by a subordinate in the chain of command.

This risk is not new or unique to North Korea. For decades America has lived with the threat of nuclear attack from a number of nuclear powers as a result of deterrence failure, accident or irrationality, and so have many other nations. Adding North Korea to the list of countries that could hit the US with nuclear weapons increases the risk somewhat, but doesn’t change its nature fundamentally. And it’s hard to argue that America would be justified in launching a war costing hundreds of thousands of lives to eliminate that risk, or that Australia would be justified in supporting it.

But that is not the only consequence of a North Korean ICBM. I have argued elsewhere that the more significant effect would be to weaken America’s alliances in Asia by undermining the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence undertakings. But it hardly makes sense to fight a major war to try to avoid that. And Trump’s suggestion that he would do so only adds to the broader damage to US strategic credibility in Asia and beyond caused by the president’s tendency to issue threats that he can’t realistically fulfil.

Turnbull should both think and speak very carefully before further committing himself and Australia to support US policies that seem certain—however things play out—to do a lot of damage to America’s strategic position in Asia, and hence to Australia’s real interests.

 

North Korea, war and ANZUS

President Trump’s excitable rhetoric about US military options in relation to North Korea—‘fire and fury’, ‘locked and loaded’—has attracted considerable media attention in recent days. But look behind the rhetoric. Allied decision-makers are starting to get their heads around the North Korean problem. As they do so, their statements are becoming more deliberate. General McMaster has stated openly that ‘classical deterrence’ is unlikely to work against North Korea. That’s a big judgement.

It’s exactly the same judgement that Prime Minister Turnbull rehearsed—albeit more conditionally—in his interview with Neil Mitchell on 11 August:

You know the idea that an American President, any American President—whether it’s Donald Trump or someone else—can tolerate a regime which has the capacity, assuming it has developed the capacity, it has not yet, but if it were to develop the capacity to deliver a nuclear warhead to attack an American city, the idea that that would be tolerable is absurd.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Tillerson has been signalling determinedly that diplomacy and sanctions are still the preferred pathway forward. And Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Mattis have even crafted a new label for the administration’s policy: ‘strategic patience’ has given way to ‘strategic accountability’.

General Dunford, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently visiting regional American allies and China. Doubtless, part of his purpose is to reassure regional audiences that the US believes a peaceful solution can still be found to Pyongyang’s burgeoning nuclear and missile programs. But remember Dunford’s comments at the Aspen Security Forum in late July. His thinking clearly parallels the McMaster/Turnbull comments above:

Many people have talked about military options with words like ‘unimaginable’… But … what’s unimaginable to me is allowing a capability that would allow a nuclear weapon to land in Denver, Colorado … [M]y job will be to develop military options to make sure that doesn’t happen.

True, armed conflict isn’t on the cards in the immediate future. If it was, we’d see a far higher level of military prepositioning on both sides of the demilitarised zone. But make no mistake. The prospects for conflict are likely to grow, not diminish, in coming months. This is a crisis with a host of speed bumps but a shortage of genuine off-ramps. And, as North Korean testing continues, the Trump administration is going to be looking at a grim choice between war and tolerance of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the US and a pariah state.

And that, of course, brings us to ANZUS. Prime Minister Turnbull copped a wave of negative commentary recently after stating the bleeding obvious: that Australia would support the US if it was attacked by North Korea.

The ANZUS Treaty means that if America is attacked we will come to their aid. If Australia is attacked, the Americans will come to our aid. We are joined at the hip.

Some commentators believe we ought to have a parliamentary debate to think about that. Really? What do we have to think about? Article 4 states:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

That is what J.G. Starke called ‘the key or operative provision of the Treaty, the one which lays down the casus foederis of the alliance’ (page 117). The article requires an actual physical attack on one of the treaty’s parties, not merely the imminent threat of such an attack. Hence, it does not require us to support a preventive war by the US on North Korea. But the term ‘armed attack’ does cover events such as nuclear or biological use, or missile strikes.

What the treaty doesn’t do is tell us how we should act, except in the broad sense that we would ‘act to meet the common danger’. That action, says Starke, needn’t be a military one. In some circumstances, diplomatic action may suffice. Nor is the action automatic. No party is bound to declare war. Moreover, the general principle underlying Starke’s treatment of that issue is one of proportionality: the parties may ‘act’ only to the degree that meets the threat. In that sense, the detonation of a North Korean nuclear weapon over Denver might not justify an allied retaliation that essentially turned North Korea into a carpark; a retaliation that, as Mattis threatened recently, would lead to ‘the end of [the DPRK’s] regime and the destruction of its people’.

True, Mattis’s comments were probably meant to maximise the deterrent leverage on Pyongyang, and so might not accurately reflect US war planning. Even so, it’s hard to imagine that US retaliation would be limited to a game of one-for-one city-busting. That wouldn’t directly slow North Korea’s missile launch rate, or blunt Pyongyang’s capability to repeat the exercise against other American cities. The sensible response from the US wouldn’t prioritise city-targeting—or ‘people-targeting’—at all, but the targeting of military forces.

Of course, some ‘acts’ might also be disproportionate at the other end of the spectrum. If North Korea did nuke Denver, Australia’s filing of a strongly worded diplomatic protest in Pyongyang would probably be seen as an exercise so underwhelming in its significance as to place Canberra in breach of its alliance obligations.

So it’s important that the ANZUS allies discuss potential North Korean scenarios, not least because Australia is not a regular contributor to ongoing war-planning in relation to the Korean peninsula. If push does come to shove in relation to the North Korean program—and, frankly, it’s hard to see the crisis being resolved by diplomacy or sanctions—a difficult and bloody conflict might lie ahead.

Pax Russica-Sinica: making the world safe for authoritarians

On 3 July, two of the planet’s three most powerful leaders met in Moscow. It was their 20th encounter at least since March 2013 and the latest in a long Sino-Russian discourse that began in 1618. The Russians and Chinese don’t leak transcripts, but Xi and Putin presumably welcomed a 37% increase in two-way trade in the first quarter of 2017—especially as the value of trade for 2016, US$66 billion, had fallen from US$88 billion in 2012.

They doubtless passed over the reality that in recent years Chinese investment in Russia—as opposed to credits—has been under US$2 billion. That’s less than in countries in Africa and Latin America and in Kazakhstan, according to Andrei Klepach, chief economist at Vneshekonom Bank. The reason given by Xin Zhongyi, of Gerzhouba Corporation, is ‘the very specific Russian business culture’, to which the Chinese ‘hope to grow accustomed in 10–15 years’. Russia’s 2016 GDP was one-tenth of China’s (the figure was 15% when measured in purchasing power parity) and China now accounts for 14% of Russia’s trade, so commerce, though growing, is not the mainstay of the present propinquity.

The relationship carries a heavy sediment of history, with a tangle of unresolved tensions (see pg. 3–10). For now it rests firmly on converging perceptions of national interest. Both leaders present as tough men who deal ruthlessly with any threat to their pre-eminence. Putin has used military force externally four times (with at least 10,000 deaths in Ukraine alone). Xi has, in effect, changed China’s maritime borders, and is trying something similar on the Sino-Indian border, so far without bloodshed. Both depict their rule as the only alternative to anarchy and foreign depredation. Both control massive domestic paramilitary forces, suggesting that both, however oddly, feel insecure.

Under a constitutional amendment he oversaw in 2008, Putin can rule until 2024, and could be president for life. Xi shows an intent to emulate him. Both have built a cult of personality: a Russian poll nominated Putin as the second-greatest figure in world history, after Stalin. The Chinese media was referring to Xi as ‘Uncle Xi’, until it was decided that that sounded undignified. As the ANU’s China in the World Centre has noted that Xi has become ‘COE—Chairman of Everything’.

There’s an important ideological dimension: under the guise of defending ‘traditional values’, both promote a cultural relativist challenge to the notion of universal human rights, and oppose humanitarian intervention and democratic revolutions or reforms anywhere, stigmatising them as a ‘Western’ conspiracy. Both will have been gratified by the swelling ranks of the dictators’ club. Their shared neighbour, Mongolia (the only country to have defeated them both), looks like the newest candidate member. And both share a view of how the world should look that recalls Orwell’s 1984, where the planet is divided into three spheres of influence. Putin has repeatedly called for NATO to be disbanded and Lavrov for the building of a post-America world. For Putin, the US has no legitimate interests anywhere on the Eurasian continent. Xi, too, may wish the US to leave East Asia, though presumably in an orderly way.

Even given both men’s innate caution, when they met in Moscow they may have shared a wink of Schadenfreude over the most acute crisis in the US since the Civil War. For both Putin and Xi, former students of Marxism–Leninism, Trump may be proof that the contradictions of US capitalism are shunting it into the dustbin of history. That prospect might give Putin an inner glow, but Xi’s attitude may be ambivalent—he sent his daughter to study at Harvard, and in 2015  the US took 18% of China’s exports. And both leaders would presumably much prefer a competent foe to the wrecking ball they now face.

Names matter, which is why Beijing and Moscow insist they are partners, not allies. In their view, alliances are hostile to someone, but, apart from their critics, they’d say they aren’t hostile to anyone, other than terrorists and separatists, as they define them. So they can’t be in an alliance.

But content matters too. They surely share intelligence on terrorists and ‘splittists’, and experience in bridling the internet. Russia has much to offer on cyber warfare, email hacking and fake news. But even the Russians must be impressed by the capacity for social control that China’s two million web-police demonstrated in erasing the death of Liu Xiaobo. In less than a second, Chinese face- recognition technology can check hundreds of thousands of images from ubiquitous video cameras against databases of all suspect people, nationwide.

At the Hamburg G20 meeting, for the first time Xi and Putin collaborated against the EU, rejecting a proposal by Donald Tusk to ease refugee pressure on the EU by imposing UN-level travel bans and asset freezes on people smugglers. Similarly, the unprecedented joint naval manoeuvres in the Baltic look like reciprocation for Russia’s partnering with the Chinese navy in the South China Sea and around the Senkaku Islands. In Vasily Kashin’s view, ‘the actual level of defense cooperation and policy coordination is that of an alliance’.

But as Bobo Lo has argued, crucial in determining the essence of Sino-Russian ties is that they remain less important to each than each’s relations with the US. And despite their confidence that their interests now converge, crucial too is the legacy of four centuries of dealings: a complete lack of illusions about each other. Both would endorse the Leninist principle of kto-kogo: all that matters is who will dominate whom. Today, the dominant party looks set to be China.

That transcript: the Turnbull/Trump call re-examined

The full transcript of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s now infamous phone call with President Donald Trump seems to offer something for everyone. Coverage and analysis has ranged from describing the call as one of Turnbull’s ‘finest moments’ to ‘one of his worst’. Whether you think the transcript shows the PM as a tough negotiator or as something less flattering, it’s hard to ignore Bismarck’s supposed missive about the making of laws and sausages. Diplomacy can be ugly, too, especially when conducted between leaders. It is perhaps better left unobserved, or at least observed only after many decades, in the rarefied atmosphere of the archives. The fact that the transcript was leaked raises serious questions about Washington’s internals and the president’s ability to conduct discreet and effective diplomacy.

In contributions for The Strategist following the initial coverage of the phone call in February and again before Trump and Turnbull’s meeting in May, I argued that the PM would be wise to accentuate the things that he and the president have in common, namely their business backgrounds and status as political outsiders. I also suggested that while Trump was likely to be fiery in their exchanges, Turnbull would be better served by being firm but cool-headed. The transcript indicates that Turnbull did just that, and that he’s approaching his relationship with the president in a strategic way.

Some commentators have focused on the call’s conclusion. It was originally speculated that the call ended with Trump hanging up on Turnbull. The transcript shows that it in fact ended with:

Turnbull: You can count on me. I will be there again and again.

Trump: I hope so. Okay, thank you Malcolm.

At first blush, the PM’s line is reminiscent of Harold Holt’s ‘all the way with LBJ’ remark. There are, however, important differences. Holt made his comment not just in public, but on the White House lawn during his June 1966 trip to Washington. It was a moment of ad-libbing, which suggests he was charmed by President Johnson and overwhelmed by the unexpected grandeur of his reception. Johnson responded with gratitude and warmth, and on his subsequent visit to Australia, he made a point of publicly saying, ‘Every American and LBJ, is with Australia all the way.’

Trump’s response to Turnbull was quite different. Curt to the point of rudeness, it not only lacks any hint of reciprocation but also suggests a man who feels that he is owed something.

Holt’s line came to define him, somewhat unfairly so, as his approach to diplomacy and his awareness of Australia’s interests were more nuanced than it suggests. His words, the reaction to them and their legacy in the public memory are a reminder and a warning that although the Australian public strongly supports ANZUS, they abhor any hint of sycophancy in the relationship.

Over at the Lowy Interpreter, James Curran has argued that Turnbull’s form of words will encourage the Americans to take Canberra for granted. James is right to say that language is important and that there’s a difference between being a trusted ally and being taken for granted. Regrettably, the distinction is rarely made today. It’s likely that by the time the phone call took place, the issue of resettlement of asylum seekers had reached a state of such uncertainty that it could only be resolved at the highest level. Getting that issue wrong, especially in the current political climate, could easily have threatened Turnbull’s leadership. The transcript indicates that he knew that and he went into the call with the narrow but difficult objective of saving the deal. That was his strategy and it was successful.

The deal should never have been made. A lesson largely overlooked from the episode is the risk of mixing domestic and alliance politics when there is no need. The deal struck between Canberra and an already lame-duck Obama administration was made on the lazy assumption that Hilary Clinton would win the election. She didn’t, and the man who did could easily have scuttled the arrangement. If that had happened, Turnbull’s position would, at the very least, have been severely weakened within his own party, and beyond. It’s possible that he wouldn’t be prime minister today. Trump is probably aware of that, and it could inform his approach to the alliance relationship and their next deal.

A post-America world?

After last year’s shock US election result, many critics of Donald Trump had hoped he would grow into the presidency and heed its reasonable conventions. Not so.

After more than six months, his administration has been characterised by chronic chaos and toxic infighting (two chiefs of staff and two press secretaries, not to mention serial leaking); by an unprecedented laxness in the use of language (outgoing communications director Anthony Scaramucci’s profanity-laced interview to the New Yorker); by an inability to pass any key legislation, notwithstanding Republican Party control of Congress (last week’s failure to repeal Obamacare); by an inability to establish and then respect priorities (vacillation over Syria, North Korea); and by an inability to staff key official positions (of the 570 key agency positions requiring Senate approval, only 50 nominees have been confirmed). Above all, there is no adult supervision in this White House.

Hardly any serious American thinker disagrees with this litany of charges. Left-leaning liberals view it with a mixture of dismay and a smug I-told-you-so satisfaction, while conservatives either vent their anger or try to change the subject. In between, there is much sighing and shaking of heads.

Abroad, leading newspapers and commentators use strong language, expressing not the customary resentment of America but uncomplicated contempt and even downright disgust.

In June, the Pew Research Center’s survey of people in 37 countries found that a median of just 22% had confidence in Trump to do the right thing in foreign policy, compared to 64% during the final years of the Obama era. A striking 47% expressed a positive view of Communist China; the US was just two percentage points higher at 49%.

As disturbing as these observations are, here’s a more disturbing thought: what if the decline of US prestige and influence that has accompanied this administration’s first six months is a harbinger?

That is a more plausible prospect than you might think. After all, although Trump has contributed to the loss of America’s global standing and, consequently, a reduced ability to lead and persuade, let’s not forget the reckless dissipation of US credibility and prestige in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks. (Iraq, Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, Afghanistan, the GFC, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and so on.)

Barack Obama, of course, was self-evidently far more popular than both his successor and predecessor George W. Bush. Yet even under his leadership, Washington’s demands and requests were increasingly ignored: by not just its long-time foes in Tehran and Pyongyang, but also its largest aid recipients, Cairo and Jerusalem.

On Obama’s watch, US influence had faded at global summits, too—from the G20, where the Germans rejected the US Treasury’s loose fiscal policy prescriptions in the wake of the financial crisis; to security talks, where Washington failed to reverse Russia’s incursion in Ukraine or implement Obama’s regime-change policy in Syria.

Remember, too, that Trump was elected in large part because so many ordinary Americans railed against the establishment. During last year’s primaries, whenever Trump and Democrat Bernie Sanders questioned Washington’s penchant for military intervention in the Middle East, promoting democracy across the globe and subsidising the defences of allies, they resonated with war-weary voters. The same Pew surveys that show widespread contempt for Trump’s America consistently showed a distinctly isolationist public mood in pre-Trump America. (See, for instance, this one from 2013.)

None of this is to deny America’s great strengths. It remains the world’s largest economy, the issuer of its reserve currency and its lone military superpower. Thanks to the shale gas revolution, the US is on the track to becoming more energy efficient and independent. With higher immigration and fertility rates than other developed nations, it is also in a relatively good position to deal with an ageing population.

It’s just that US prestige and influence have waned during the past 15 years and they are likely to wane in what the CNN host Fareed Zakaria calls the ‘post-America world’. What emerges in place of the kind of US global hegemony that has defined the post–Cold War world remains to be seen.

But one thing is clear: the very real tensions between Trump and the establishment are producing a foreign policy that is difficult to comprehend. That happens to perplex and even frighten US allies, such as in our region, as the University of Chicago political scientist John Mearsheimer told me recently.

That matters greatly if you want to keep in check a rising China—the only true power capable of destabilising regional order and threatening US primacy. (By themselves, Iran and Russia lack the will and capacity to overturn the balance of power in the Middle East and Europe, respectively.) If America is serious about foreign affairs in coming years, it needs a president who is thinking strategically and working closely with its allies to preserve the Asian peace and prosperity that US strategic pre-eminence has ensured for generations.

But that is not happening, because Trump is such a loose cannon and strikingly ignorant of the world—a potentially deadly combination in a crisis. What he is doing, however, is unnerving US allies in East Asia, which is no way to preserve the regional balance of power in the face of a rising China.

Trump’s gift to Europe

At a recent conference in France, a number of Europeans surprised their American guests by arguing that US President Donald Trump might be good for Europe. With Trump returning to Europe for the G20 summit in Hamburg, it’s worth asking whether they are right.

By most accounts, Trump’s presidency has been terrible for Europe. He seems to disdain the European Union. His relationship with German Chancellor Angela Merkel is cool in comparison to his friendship with Turkey’s authoritarian president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Moreover, Trump welcomes Britain’s looming exit from the EU; upon meeting Prime Minister Theresa May for the first time, he is alleged to have asked enthusiastically, ‘Who’s next?’ Finally, Trump only belatedly reaffirmed NATO’s Article 5 (which pledges mutual defence); he withdrew the US from the Paris climate agreement, which is very popular in Europe; and he has cut US funds for the United Nations, which has strong European support.

Not surprisingly, Trump is personally unpopular across Europe. A recent Pew poll indicates that only 22% of Britons, 14% of French, and 11% of Germans have confidence in him. But this very unpopularity—more anti-Trump than anti-American—has helped to reinforce European values.

Earlier in the year, there was a fear that a rising tide of the type of nationalist populism that brought Trump to office and led to Brexit might be about to sweep Europe, even giving the far-right Marine Le Pen the French presidency. Instead, the populist wave seemed to have crested with Trump’s election. Since then, populists have been defeated in Austria and the Netherlands; the French elected Emmanuel Macron, a centrist newcomer; and May, the champion of a ‘hard’ Brexit, lost her parliamentary majority in last month’s snap general election.

Europe still confronts the slow growth, high unemployment, and political disunity that have plagued it in the decade since the 2008 global financial crisis. But whoever wins the German election this September will be a moderate, not an extreme nationalist, and will understand the importance of working with Macron to restart the Franco-German engine of European progress.

The Brexit negotiations promise to be complex and contentious. For ‘soft Brexiteers’, who want to preserve Britain’s access to the European single market, the problem is that the Brexit vote mainly reflected concerns about immigration, not about the minutiae of the single market’s rules. Yet Europe refuses to allow goods and services to flow freely without free movement of people. Some three million Europeans currently live in Britain, and a million Britons reside in Europe.

A possible compromise could be found by creating a new Euro-British entity, one that would guarantee the rights of both sides’ citizens while allowing some limits on immigration as well as on some goods. One could think of this entity in terms of concentric circles, with free movement characterising the inner circle of the EU and constraints allowed in the outer circle.

Whether such compromises will be possible depends upon European flexibility. In the past, Europeans have talked about allowing ‘variable speeds’ toward the implied goal of ‘ever closer union’. This federal goal would have to be replaced, and a metaphor of different levels would have to replace that of different speeds.

Many Europeans elites have already become more flexible regarding Europe’s future and have moved past the federalist goal to envision a European entity that is sui generis. They point out that three different levels of participation already exist in Europe: the customs union, the euro currency, and the Schengen Agreement on the removal of internal borders. Defence could become a fourth.

In the past, European progress on cooperation in defence has been inhibited not only by concerns about sovereignty, but also by the security guarantee offered by the United States. With Trump raising doubts about American reliability, the security issue has moved to the foreground.

Efforts to build a common European defence system have begun, but the process is slow. Other than Britain, only the French have major expeditionary force capabilities, while Germany has been inhibited by history from doing more. And Britain was always reluctant to do anything that might compete with NATO. But these attitudes are beginning to change.

Again, the image of concentric circles can help. In the run-up to the Iraq war in the early 2000s, some argued that, in terms of security, Americans are from Mars, while Europeans are from Venus. But the world has changed, and Europe now faces a series of external threats. Russia’s attacks on Georgia and Ukraine have reminded Europeans of the dangers they face from their large neighbour. Deterring Russia will still require a strong NATO.

Another set of threats, however, could come from violence in the Balkans. Some observers believe that civil war was only narrowly averted recently in Macedonia. A European peacekeeping force could make a major contribution to stability in the region.

A third set of threats to Europe originates in North Africa and the Middle East. Libya is in chaos and the source of dangerous Mediterranean voyages by desperate migrants, and one can also imagine the need to protect citizens or rescue hostages in the region. Here the French expeditionary capability, perhaps coupled with Britain’s, could help provide security. Even if Britain does not participate, other Europeans could help, as Germany now does in dealing with terrorism in Mali.

Europe is a long way from a common defence structure, but the need is growing. And, ironically, the unpopular Trump may prove more of a help than a hindrance.