Tag Archive for: Disaster

Cyclone Tracy: 50 years on

This year marks a powerful milestone in Australia’s history: the 50th anniversary of Cyclone Tracy, a disaster that reshaped the nation’s approach to resilience and recovery. When the cyclone struck Darwin on Christmas Day in 1974, it killed 66 people, displaced thousands, and left the city in ruins. Yet, it also sparked an extraordinary national response that redefined how Australia prepares for and recovers from natural disasters. Darwin, once devastated, now stands as a modern, resilient city—built not just to recover, but to withstand the worst.

ASPI’s new report, released in honour of this anniversary, takes a deep dive into Cyclone Tracy’s lasting impact on Australia’s disaster management. It explores how the event prompted major shifts in urban planning, building codes, and national security frameworks. From the pivotal role of the Australian Defence Force in the immediate response to the Whitlam government’s establishment of the Darwin Reconstruction Authority, Tracy set a blueprint for modern disaster recovery. But the legacy goes beyond infrastructure. The report also highlights the resilience of First Nations communities and the growing role of the private sector in disaster preparedness—elements that continue to shape Australia’s response to climate risks.

As we face increasingly frequent and severe climate events, the anniversary of Cyclone Tracy serves as a sharp reminder: resilience is not just about bouncing back—it’s about building forward. The report argues that northern Australia must go beyond traditional recovery strategies, urging a renewed focus on proactive resilience measures that address not only infrastructure but governance, community involvement, and climate adaptation. Tracy’s lessons are not just historical—they are essential to ensuring Australia’s future readiness.

National resilience: lessons for Australian policy from international experience

The strategic circumstances that Australia contemplates over the coming decades present multiple, cascading and concurrent crises. Ensuring a safe and secure Australia, able to withstand the inevitable shocks that we’ll face into the future, will require a more comprehensive approach to strategy than we’ve adopted over the past seven decades. We can’t rely on the sureties of the past. The institutions, policies and architectures that have supported the nation to manage such crises in our history are no longer fit for purpose.

The report highlights lessons drawn from international responses to crisis, to assist policymakers build better responses to the interdependent and hyperconnected challenges that nations face. The report brings together the disciplines of disaster management, defence strategy and national security to examine what an integrated national approach to resilience looks like, and how national resilience thinking can help Australia build more effective and more efficient responses to crisis and change.

The report concludes that now is the time to commence action to deliver a national resilience framework for Australia. Collective, collaborative action, enabled by governments, built on the capability and capacity of Australian industry and the community, and aimed at the goal of a resilient Australia, can ensure that we’re well placed to face the future with confidence.

New beginnings: Rethinking business and trade in an era of strategic clarity and rolling disruption

This special report considers the relationship between our business and trade positioning in the context of the impacts of Covid, natural disasters and the actions of coercive trading partners.

Global economic integration has enabled the spread of ideas, products, people and investment at never before seen speed. International free trade has been a goal of policy-makers and academics for generations, allowing and fostering innovation and growth. We saw the mechanism shudder in 2008 when the movement of money faltered; the disruption brought about by COVID-19 has seen a much more multi-dimensional failure of the systems by which we share and move. The unstoppable conveyor belt of our global supply chain has ground to a halt. This time, what will we learn?

ASPI’s latest research identifies factors that have led to the erosion of Australia’s policy and planning capacity, while detailing the strengths of our national responses to recent crises. The authors recommend an overhaul of our current business and trade policy settings, with a view to building an ‘agenda that invests in what we’re good at and what we need, values what we have and builds the future we want.’

The authors examine the vulnerabilities in Australia’s national security, resilience and sovereignty in relation to supply chains and the intersection of the corporate sector and government. To protect Australia’s business interests and national sovereignty, the report highlights recent paradigm shifts in geopolitics, whereby economic and trade priorities are increasingly relevant to the national security discussion.

The rapidly emerging crisis on our doorstep

This Strategic Insight report warns that within a decade, as the climate continues to warm, the relatively benign strategic environment in Maritime Southeast Asia – a region of crucial importance to Australia – will begin unravelling. Dr Robert Glasser, Head of ASPI’s new Climate and Security Policy Centre, documents the region’s globally unique exposure to climate hazards, and the increasingly significant cascading societal impacts they will trigger.

Dr Glasser notes that hundreds of millions of people living in low-lying coastal areas will not only experience more severe extremes, but also more frequent swings from extreme heat and drought to severe floods. The diminishing time for recovery in between these events will have major consequences for food security, population displacements and resilience.

According to Dr Glasser, ‘Any one of the numerous increasing risks identified in the report would be serious cause for concern for Australian policymakers, but the combination of them, emerging effectively simultaneously, suggests that we’re on the cusp of an overlooked, unprecedented and rapidly advancing regional crisis.’

The report presents several policy recommendations for Australia, including the need to greatly expand the Government’s capacity to understand and identify the most likely paths through which disruptive climate events (individually, concurrently, or consecutively) can cause cascading, security-relevant impacts, such as disruptions of critical supply chains, galvanized separatist movements, climate refugees, opportunistic intervention by outside powers, political instability, and conflict.

Dr Glasser also proposes that Australia should identify priority investments to scale-up the capability within Defence, Foreign Affairs, the intelligence agencies, Home Affairs and other key agencies to recognise and respond to emerging regional climate impacts, including by supporting our regional neighbours to build their climate resilience.

After Covid-19 Volume 3: Voices from federal parliament

For this volume of ASPI’s After Covid-19 series, we asked Australia’s federal parliamentarians to consider the world after the crisis and discuss policy and solutions that could drive Australian prosperity through one of the most difficult periods in living memory. The 49 contributions in this volume are the authentic voices of our elected representatives.

For policymakers, this volume offers a window into thinking from all sides of the House of Representatives and Senate, providing insights to inform their work in creating further policy in service of the Australian public. For the broader public, this is an opportunity to see policy fleshed out by politicians on their own terms and engage with policy thinking that isn’t often seen on the front pages of major news outlets.

Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation

Arange of actors are manipulating the information environment to exploit the COVID-19 crisis for strategic gain. ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre is tracking many of these state and non-state actors online, and will occasionally publish investigative, data-driven reporting that will focus on the use of disinformation, propaganda, extremist narratives and conspiracy theories by these actors.

The bulk of ASPI’s data analysis uses our in-house Influence Tracker tool – a machine learning and data analytics capability that draws out insights from multi-language social media datasets. This new tool can ingest data in multiple languages and auto-translate, producing insights on topics, sentiment, shared content, influential accounts, metrics of impact and posting patterns.

The reports are listed in chronological order:

#10: Attempted influence in disguise

This report builds from a Twitter network take-down announced on 8 October 2020 and attributed by Twitter as an Iranian state-linked information operation. Just over 100 accounts were suspended for violations of Twitter’s platform manipulation policies. This case study provides an overview of how to extrapolate from Twitter’s take-down dataset to identify persistent accounts on the periphery of the network. It provides observations on the operating mechanisms and impact of the cluster of accounts, characterising their traits as activist, media and hobbyist personas. The purpose of the case study is to provide a guide on how to use transparency datasets as a means of identifying ongoing inauthentic activity.

#9: Covid-19 and the reach of pro-Kremlin messaging

This research investigation examines Russia’s efforts to manipulate the information environment during the coronavirus crisis. It leverages data from the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, which, through its EUvsDisinfo project, tracks pro-Kremlin messages spreading in the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. Using this open-source repository of pro-Kremlin disinformation, in combination with OSINT investigative techniques that track links between online entities, we analyse the narratives being seeded about COVID-19 and map the social media accounts spreading those messages.

We found that the key subjects of the Kremlin’s messaging focused on the EU, NATO, Bill Gates, George Soros, the World Health Organization (WHO), the US and Ukraine. Narratives included well-trodden conspiracies about the source of the coronavirus, the development and testing of a potential vaccine, the impact on the EU’s institutions, the EU’s slow response to the virus and Ukraine’s new president. We also found that Facebook groups were a powerful hub for the spread of some of those messages.

27 Oct 2020

#8: Viral videos: Covid-19, China and inauthentic influence on Facebook

For the latest report in our series on Covid-19 disinformation, we’ve investigated ongoing inauthentic activity on Facebook and YouTube. This activity uses both English and Chinese language content to present narratives that support the political objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These narratives span a range of topics, including assertions of corruption and incompetence in the Trump administration, the US Government’s decision to ban TikTok, the George Floyd and Black Lives Matter protests, and the ongoing tensions in the US–China relationship. A major theme, and the focus of this report, is criticism of how the US broadly, and the Trump administration in particular, are handling the Covid-19 crisis on both the domestic and the global levels.

29 Sept 2020

#7: Possible inauthentic activity promoting the Epoch Times and Truth Media targets Australians on Facebook

This ASPI ICPC report investigates a Facebook page which appears to be using coordinated, inauthentic tactics to target Australian users with content linked to The Epoch Times and other media groups. This includes running paid advertisements, as well as systematically seeding content into Australian Facebook groups for minority communities, hobbyists and conspiracy theories. Inauthentic and covert efforts to shape political opinions have no place in an open democratic society.

This report has been edited to delete references to a Facebook page entitled ‘May the Truth Be With You’. ASPI advises that, to the best of the Institute’s knowledge, the Facebook page has no connection with the other entities mentioned in this edited report.

Revised: 10 Dec 2021

#6: Pro-Russian vaccine politics drives new disinformation narratives

This latest report in our series on COVID-19 disinformation and social media manipulation investigates vaccine disinformation emerging – the day after Russia announced plans to mass-produce its own vaccine – from Eastern Ukraine’s pro-Russian media ecosystem.

We identify how a false narrative about a vaccination trial that never happened was seeded into the information environment by a pro-Russian militia media outlet, laundered through pro-Russian English language alternative news websites, and permeated anti-vaccination social media groups in multiple languages, ultimately completely decontextualised from its origins.

The report provides a case study of how these narratives ripple across international social media networks, including into a prominent Australian anti-vaccination Facebook group.

The successful transfer of this completely fictional narrative reflects a broader shift across the disinformation space. As international focus moves from the initial response to the pandemic towards the race for a vaccine, with all of the complex geopolitical interests that entails, political disinformation is moving on from the origins of the virus to vaccine politics.

24 Aug 2020

#5 Automating influence operations on Covid-19: Chinese speaking actors targeting US audiences

Automating influence on Covid-19 looks at how Chinese-speaking actors are attempting to target US-based audiences on Facebook and Twitter across key narratives including amplifying criticisms of the US’s handling of Covid-19, emphasising racial divisions, and political and personal scandals linked to President Donald Trump.

This new report investigates a campaign of cross-platform inauthentic activity that relies on a high-degree of automation and is broadly in alignment with the political goal of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to denigrate the standing of the US. The campaign appears to be targeted primarily at Western and US-based audiences by artificially boosting legitimate media and social media content in order to amplify divisive or negative narratives about the US.

04 Aug 2020

#4 ID2020, Bill Gates and the Mark of the Beast: how Covid-19 catalyses existing online conspiracy movements

Against the backdrop of the global Covid-19 pandemic, billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates has become the subject of a diverse and rapidly expanding universe of conspiracy theories. This report takes a close look at a particular variant of the Gates conspiracy theories, which is referred to here as the ID2020 conspiracy (named after the non-profit ID2020 Alliance, which the conspiracy theorists claim has a role in the narrative), as a case study for examining the dynamics of online conspiracy theories on Covid-19. Like many conspiracy theories, that narrative builds on legitimate concerns, in this case about privacy and surveillance in the context of digital identity systems, and distorts them in extreme and unfounded ways. Among the many conspiracy theories now surrounding Gates, this one is particularly worthy of attention because it highlights the way emergent events catalyse existing online conspiracy substrates. In times of crisis, these digital structures—the online communities, the content, the shaping of recommendation algorithms—serve to channel anxious, uncertain individuals towards conspiratorial beliefs. This report focuses primarily on the role and use of those digital structures in proliferating the ID2020 conspiracy.

25 June 2020

#3 Retweeting through the Great Firewall: A persistent and undeterred threat actor

This report analyses a persistent, large-scale influence campaign linked to Chinese state actors on Twitter and Facebook.

This activity largely targeted Chinese-speaking audiences outside of the Chinese mainland (where Twitter is blocked) with the intention of influencing perceptions on key issues, including the Hong Kong protests, exiled Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui and, to a lesser extent Covid-19 and Taiwan. Extrapolating from the takedown dataset, to which we had advanced access, given to us by Twitter, we have identified that this operation continues and has pivoted to try to weaponise the US Government’s response to current domestic protests and create the perception of a moral equivalence with the suppression of protests in Hong Kong.

11 June 2020

#2. Covid-19 attracts patriotic troll campaigns in support of China’s geopolitical interests

This new research highlights the growing significance and impact of Chinese non-state actors on western social media platforms. Across March and April 2020, this loosely coordinated pro-China trolling campaign on Twitter has:

  • Harassed and mimicked western media outlets
  • Impersonated Taiwanese users in an effort to undermine Taiwan’s position with the World Health Organisation (WHO
  • Spread false information about the Covid-19 outbreak
  • Joined in pre-existing inauthentic social media campaigns

23 April 2020

#1. Covid-19 disinformation and social media manipulation trends

Includes case studies on:

  • Chinese state-sponsored messaging on Twitter
  • Coordinated anti-Taiwan trolling: WHO & #saysrytoTedros
  • Russian Covid-19 disinformation in Africa

8-15 April 2020

A Pacific disaster prevention review

Disaster risk reduction is a global policy issue. Reducing the likelihood and severity of damage and related cascading and cumulative impacts from natural hazards has become central to all nations and   has triggered the  evolution of international cooperation, multilateral responses and humanitarian aid efforts over many years.

The nexus between natural hazards and vulnerability is central to appreciating the scale of the damage caused by large disasters and resultant sociotechnical impacts. Multilateral efforts to mitigate the impacts of weather and climate hazards have progressed over time.  The Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation was a harbinger for the Hyogo Framework for Action, which emphasised building the resilience of communities and nations to the effects of disasters, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction as the current flagship of unified effort.

Pacific island countries (PICs) have long been affected by weather-related disasters. Many PICs have been listed among the top 10 most disaster-prone countries in the World Risk Index over several years. In addition to damaging winds a convergence of flash flooding, king tides and high intensity rainfall contributed to damage to essential services, food supply and displacement of people across island economies. 

This year marks the fifth year of applying the Sendai Framework to Disaster risk reduction efforts globally – completing one-third of the Framework’s operational life cycle.  It seems an opportune time to take stock of the challenges faced by selected PICs in incorporating guidance from the Sendai Framework into policy, legislation and practice.  

This report details independent views on challenges to implementing the Sendai Framework in eight Pacific economies.  It does not pursue an in-depth analysis of constraints or impediments to implementation of the framework but seeks to present independent views on the ‘fit’ of the Sendai Framework to local needs in a general context of the Four priorities central to the Framework.

It hoped that it can contribute to ongoing discussion and thought about important issues in a vibrant yet vulnerable region.

After Covid-19: Australia and the world rebuild (Volume 1)

This Strategy report offers policy-focused analysis of the world we will face once the pandemic has passed. At a time when all our assumptions about the shape of Australian society and the broader global order are being challenged, we need to take stock of likely future directions.

The report analyses 26 key topics, countries and themes, ranging from Australia’s domestic situation through to the global balance of power, climate and technology issues. In each case we asked the authors to consider four questions. What impact did Covid-19 have on their research topic? What will recovery mean? Will there be differences in future? What policy prescriptions would you recommend for the Australian government?

Webinar

Some of the report authors discussing their chapters here…

Preparing for the Era of Disasters

Preparing for the Era of Disasters, a new ASPI Special Report by Dr Robert Glasser, warns that we are entering a new era in the security of Australia, not because of terrorism, the rise of China or even the cybersecurity threat, but because of climate change.

As the world warms beyond 2°C, as now seems increasingly likely, an era of disasters will be upon us with profound implications for how we organise ourselves to protect Australian lives, property and economic interests and our way of life.

The Report surveys the features of this emerging era of disasters including an increase in concurrent extreme weather events and in events that follow in closer succession. Communities may manage the first few but, in their weakened state, be overwhelmed by those following. Large parts of the country that are currently marginally viable for agriculture are increasingly likely to be in chronic crisis from the compounding impacts of the steady rise of temperature, floods, drought and bushfires. Dr Glasser contends that the scale of those impacts will be unprecedented, and the patterns that the hazards take will change in ways that will be difficult to anticipate.

He notes that this emerging Era of Disasters will not only increasingly stretch emergency services, undermine community resilience and escalate economic costs and losses of life, but also have profound implications for food security in our immediate region, with cascading impacts that will undermine Australia’s national security.

Dr Glasser outlines a number of steps the Australian Government and the state and local governments should begin taking now to prepare for the unprecedented scale of these emerging challenges, including:

  1. scale-up Australia’s efforts to prevent the effects from natural hazards, such as from extreme weather, from becoming disasters through greater investment in disaster risk reduction.
  2. increased planning for financial support to States for economic recovery following disasters and “fodder banks” and “land banks” to address the needs of communities in chronic crisis and the permanently displaced.
  3. strengthening disaster response capacity and planning at all levels, including in the military which will play an increasingly important role in transporting firefighters and equipment, fodder drops from helicopters and the provision of shelters, etc.  Joint task forces to coordinate the defence contribution, like the one established during the Black Saturday Victorian bushfires, will become increasingly necessary.
  4. ensure that flood and bushfire risk maps, building codes, planning schemes, infrastructure delivery and the supporting legislation fully embed consideration of climate change effects.

Weapons of mass economic disruption

While Australia no longer rides upon the sheep’s back, strong economic and cultural links with agriculture remain and our economy is still intrinsically linked to agricultural production.

As the so-called ‘strawberry sabotage’ clearly demonstrates, accidental or deliberate biosecurity breaches present very real existential and economic threats to Australia that can harm agricultural exports as well as impact food security and trigger concerns about its safety.

ASPI’s latest research report ‘Weapons of Mass (economic) Disruption: Rethinking Biosecurity in Australia’ highlights the importance Australia’s effective and successful plant and animal biosecurity systems and border protection services to our wellbeing and economy and adds a further perspective on new and emerging threats that need to be addressed.

Tag Archive for: Disaster

Australia’s disaster response should build resilience

When ASPI’s Cyclone Tracy: 50 Years On was published last year, it wasn’t just a historical reflection; it was a warning. Just months later, we are already watching history repeat itself.

We need to bake resilience into infrastructure, supply chains and communities, ensuring they are prepared for the next disaster, not just rebuilt to fail again.

This requires: a long-term effort to disaster-proof communities; cross-industry collaboration to strengthen supply chains; and a national resilience strategy.

In 1974, Cyclone Tracy forced Australia to rethink disaster preparedness. But in the five decades since, we’ve seen flood after cyclone after fire.

The February 2025 floods across northern Queensland—from Cairns to Townsville—once again exposed the region’s vulnerabilities.

Communities in Ingham and Cardwell faced widespread devastation. For two weeks, road networks were severed, triggering food shortages and economic disruption. In Cairns, homes that had only just been repaired after Cyclone Jasper were inundated again, highlighting the compounding effect of disasters. Townsville, while spared the catastrophic flooding seen in 2019, remains at risk and may not be as fortunate next time.

In response, the federal government has committed $84 million to strengthen disaster resilience in northern Queensland—a necessary but vastly insufficient sum.

The cost of inaction is rising rapidly, not only in infrastructure damage but in the long-term economic and social stability of the region.

The weaknesses seen during the February floods were not new. Essential supply chains were crippled as roads disappeared under floodwaters. The housing crisis worsened as displaced families were left scrambling for shelter in an already overstretched market. Small businesses, the backbone of regional economies, were once again left picking up the pieces.

And yet, the response remains the same: mop up, rebuild, repeat.

Communities need immediate disaster relief. But real resilience isn’t about recovery—it’s about making sure the same destruction doesn’t happen again.

That means disaster-proofing communities by:

—Retrofitting homes in high-risk areas with stronger materials and flood-resistant designs;

—Updating building codes for future-proofed development;

—Reinstating and expanding the Resilient Homes Fund to cover cyclone- and flood-prone regions;

—Reviewing the insurance system so unaffordable premiums don’t leave people uninsured; and

—Investing in community-led preparedness, building resilience with local knowledge and digital tools.

While much of the focus remains on housing and road repairs, supply chain resilience continues to be overlooked. When floods cut off road transport, food shortages quickly followed. The conversation remained reactive, surfacing only after supply lines had already collapsed. There was no plan to use alternative routes.

Collaboration across industries can strengthen supply chains and critical infrastructure. It should include review processes after disasters.

Australia’s national logistics framework must embed resilience into infrastructure planning. Maritime transport, for example, could have played a much stronger role in maintaining essential goods distribution. But without a contingency plan, there was no mechanism to pivot away from road transport.

Australia needs a national resilience strategy to consider ways to bolster northern infrastructure, supply chains and communities.

The strategy should consider alternative freight corridors to reduce reliance on flood-prone roads. This could include pre-established plans for emergency supply distribution via maritime transport and would require strengthening port infrastructure.

Beyond supply chains, emergency infrastructure must also be adaptable. For example, the temporary single-lane bridge built by the Australian Army over Ollera Creek restored access between Townsville and Ingham, but was unsuitable for heavy vehicles.

A national resilience strategy should also consider strategically positioning maritime assets. Historically, HMAS Cairns has supported various naval vessels, including landing craft. Given the region’s vulnerability to cyclones and flooding, relocating both light and heavy landing craft to Cairns would enable faster disaster response across the region. HMAS Cairns is already well-equipped to support and service these vessels.

This isn’t just a northern Queensland problem; it’s a national crisis. The Colvin Review found that 87 percent of Commonwealth disaster funding is spent on recovery, while the economic cost of disasters is projected to reach $40.3 billion annually by FY2050. The Insurance Council of Australia advised that redirecting funds from the 9 percent stamp duty on insurance premiums to resilience measures could save $6.3 billion by 2050. Yet, funding remains locked in a reactive cycle—fixing damage rather than preventing it.

As we head into a federal election, there’s a risk that disaster resilience becomes just another political football—but it shouldn’t be. The escalating costs of disasters affect all Australians, regardless of who is in power.

Fifty years ago, Cyclone Tracy forced Australia to rethink how it built cities, leading to sweeping reforms in building codes and urban planning. Queensland Premier David Crisafulli has repeatedly stated a commitment to ‘building back better’. It’s time to turn those words into action.

For a waterbombing reserve, adapt ADF aircraft

Australia should buy equipment to cheaply and temporarily convert military transport aircraft into waterbombers.

On current planning, the Australian Defence Force will have a total of 34 Chinook helicopters and Hercules airlifters. They should be able to serve as waterbombers when needed. Black Hawk army helicopters can also be used.

In contrast to permanent waterbombers, these aircraft would return to normal operations afterwards rather than sitting idle and waiting for the next big fire. And they wouldn’t be called out unless civilian waterbombing was inadequate or unavailable.

In January, fires ripped iconic parts of Los Angeles, even in the middle of winter. January is also when Australia’s fire season is most intense. Usually, we would rely on seven large waterbombers to put out life-threatening blazes. However, some of those waterbombers were 12,000km away waterbombing the California hills.

In the past decade, the New South Wales government has bought a waterbomber, a converted Boeing 737, for $26.3 million and the Queensland government has agreed to pay $18.1 million for waterbombers of comparable size to be stationed in the state for five years.

Although vital when fighting a fire, outside of fire season these expensive waterbombers mostly sit idle. The current alternative—maintaining a leased commercial fleet—is also expensive: the Australian government spends $51 million a year on the National Aerial Firefighting Fleet, a collection of commercial aircraft held on at-call leases to be available for firefighting. That’s in addition to state government arrangements, such as NSW’s $40 million annual contract.

Even though that money is budgeted, there’s no guarantee all those assets will always be available as they also fight fires in Europe and the Americas. Australia needs an adaptive, government-owned backup fleet that can be cheaply deployed if commercial leases fail to appear.

The Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force have dozens of aircraft suitable for temporary use: Hercules and Chinooks.

The tried and tested Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS), developed in the United States, can be installed into an unmodified Hercules plane in four hours. The current version has a capacity of 11,000 litres, turning the carrying aircraft into a class 1 large air tanker.

There are only six large air tankers in Australia’s national firefighting fleet. The federal government is spending $9.8 billion to replace the air force’s 12 Hercules with new ones and expand the fleet to 20 aircraft.

The MAFFS are reportedly inexpensive. Unlike at-call leases, Australia would own the systems, and unlike permanent waterbombers, the aircraft would remain in use outside of firefighting.

For the army’s 14 Chinooks, the equipment would be a temporary external tank made by Helitak Firefighting Equipment of Queensland. This company has been selling its equipment with US approvals to foreign customers since 2023.

The Helitak fire tank can be installed in 30 minutes without structural modification. It holds hold 11,000 litres and can be filled in 60 seconds.

Helitak also makes a tank for Black Hawk helicopters in a 4500-litre size. The army will have 40 Black Hawks by 2030.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review emphasised that the government should have the ‘resources and capabilities to deal with all but the most extreme domestic disaster operations’ and that ‘Defence must be the force of last resort for domestic aid’.

This recommendation was made in response to increasing Defence deployment as almost a first call to respond to natural disasters and provide community assistance. Some of those deployments are rightly criticised as an abuse of Defence resources that distracts from the organisation’s core purposes. Defence work shouldn’t be manning Australia’s state borders during Covid-19 lockdowns, acting as a surge workforce in aged care homes and mopping up mud for photo ops.

However, Defence cannot expect never to be asked to respond to disasters in Australia.

In the United States, firefighting agencies can only request a MAFFS activation after all available commercial air tanker options have been exhausted. This is an important restriction, and one that Australia should adopt to protect Defence resources. It would also keep the capability consistent with the Defence Strategic Review’s recommendations.

Australia has been relatively lucky this fire season, but we must put contingencies in place now and buy systems such as MAFFS and Helitak tanks before the next inferno.

Otherwise, when lives and livelihoods are in the path of a blaze, Australians will rightly ask why the government didn’t prepare to fight the fires we knew would come.

Best practices for calamity-ready governments

To the dismay of immunologists, virologists and public-health experts, governments are done with learning the lessons of Covid-19. Policymakers around the world, faced with a cost-of-living crisis, are baulking at spending enormous amounts of money on pandemic preparedness. But some of the key lessons concern the workings of government, and even cash-strapped countries should take basic steps to improve their crisis-management capabilities. These measures could also help them prepare for climate change and other potential emergencies.

The United Kingdom’s experience offers some important insights. In 2019, just before the emergence of Covid-19, the UK ranked second on the Global Health Security Index, which rated countries’ capacity to detect, prevent and report epidemics. In 2016, the British government ran a three-day simulation to estimate the impact of a potential flu pandemic, creating a risk-management playbook that it could use in the event of a contagious outbreak. Even so, the UK struggled to control Covid-19 more than it should have. As a recent report shows, the likely culprit behind the country’s messy pandemic response was not a lack of preparedness, but rather a dysfunctional political system.

During the pandemic, some countries managed effective coordination between central and subnational governments. In Germany, for example, national and state-level policymakers came together during the first few months of the crisis to forge a unified approach that allowed for diverse local responses. Similarly, Australian decision-makers joined forces during the initial outbreak to develop a coherent national strategy that integrated local expertise.

In the UK, by contrast, the pandemic strained the relationships between the British government and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The national government took over the nationwide procurement of personal protective equipment and diagnostics in the first few weeks of the pandemic and spearheaded the Coronavirus Jobs Retention Scheme (otherwise known as the ‘furlough scheme’) with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland following suit.

But the UK’s unified pandemic response fell apart on 10 May 2020, when Prime Minister Boris Johnson relaxed the country’s stay-at-home measures. The leaders of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland vehemently opposed Johnson’s decision. Their protests revealed not only the disconnection between Westminster and the UK’s devolved governments but also Johnson’s ignorance of the country’s governance structure. Pandemic preparedness requires dialogue, joint decision-making and the sharing of information and resources, particularly between governments controlled by different political parties.

In the UK, that failed across the four governments. It also failed at another level in England. The lack of engagement with local governments and cities made it extremely difficult to design and implement an effective pandemic response. While England’s local authorities have extensive and specific duties in emergencies, the national government didn’t know or trust their capabilities. In the decade before the pandemic, the government drastically cut funding to local authorities, leaving them with more responsibility but fewer resources and insufficient capacity.

At the beginning of the first Covid lockdown, local authorities faced a near-existential struggle to deliver basic services. Costs exploded, and revenues plummeted after Johnson’s government suspended businesses’ property taxes. In an effort to keep local policymakers on a tight leash, the government decided to provide additional funding incrementally and review future requests on a case-by-case basis, further weakening local officials’ ability to plan and prepare.

To prepare for future emergencies, the UK government must invest in local data-collection capabilities and crisis-management staff. It must also restore local government funding so that municipalities and regional administrations aren’t stretched too thin.

Another crucial lesson for strengthening governments’ crisis-management capabilities is that policymakers must foster long-term relationships that enable them to harness the power and reach of the private sector. During the pandemic, some governments worked with companies to plan and roll out workplace rules, design programs to support business owners, ensure effective procurement, and invest in testing and tracing facilities, as well as in the development and acquisition of new vaccines.

The vaccine taskforce, which the UK government created to facilitate the rapid production and distribution of Covid-19 vaccines, is a case in point. But even there, trust and collaboration were limited. In a 2021 lecture on her experiences chairing the taskforce, Kate Bingham, a managing partner at a venture-capital firm, described a deep suspicion of entrepreneurs and managers, who were often seen and treated as money-grubbing fat cats whose only interest was to rip off taxpayers. Government officials, she added, had little interest in understanding the difference between rent-seeking and economically valuable private-sector activity.

Unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of the UK’s response did indeed lead to some contracts going to fat cats and profiteers. In 2021, a group of business leaders produced a roadmap for successful public–private partnerships. They recommended that the government make a real long-term commitment to engagement and action, put merit before existing relationships when offering roles to private actors, and ensure that everyone brings real expertise—rather than merely a desire to lobby elected officials—to the table. Any government wishing to engage with businesses on a meaningful level should embrace these guidelines.

Over the next few decades, climate-related disasters, pandemics, migration waves and violent conflicts will stretch government capabilities to the limit. To develop crisis-management mechanisms that can withstand the coming shocks, national governments cannot afford to ignore the pandemic’s lessons, particularly the need to build long-term, trust-based partnerships with subnational authorities and local business leaders.

Disaster risk reduction a matter of survival in the Pacific

The following post is adapted from the foreword to ASPI’s latest special report, A Pacific disaster prevention review, released this week.

ASPI’s review of disaster prevention in the Pacific is a welcome initiative, coming as it does in a time of increased pressure on Pacific island nations from the combined threats of the global climate emergency and the Covid-19 pandemic.

The review serves as a platform for the small island developing states of the Pacific to share experiences learned from fighting this dual challenge and to explore how the new layer of complexity provided by Covid-19 has impacted on progress in the integration of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation as a core part of their national development.

Such integrated risk management has become embedded at the national level through the joint national action plan processes, which Tonga pioneered in 2010. It has also guided regional-level policy, notably the landmark Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific.

This policy is an outstanding example of putting the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) into action by strengthening governance to better manage disaster risk in a part of the world where global warming has combined with other risk drivers to pose an existential threat to a centuries-old way of life. It has also helped to develop a better understanding of disaster risk among the public at large, increase investment in disaster risk reduction and pave the way for more effective preparedness and response.

The impressive recovery in Fiji after Tropical Cyclone Winston, the risk-informed recovery budget of the government of Tonga after Cyclone Gita, and the prompt evacuations of Ambae Island in Vanuatu because of volcanic eruptions are just three of several examples of ‘Sendai in action’ across the region.

Regional recovery and resilience capacities are being further tested following Tropical Cyclone Harold, which caused widespread destruction in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga in April just as lockdown measures were being introduced across the Pacific to keep the new coronavirus at bay.

The combined challenge of the cyclone season and Covid-19 has brought into stark relief the important role of public health services in a disaster-prone region where such services are not always of the standard required. The lack of laboratory testing for Covid-19 and the economic impact of the pandemic on tourism and business continuity make the disaster response environment even more challenging. Nonetheless, taking stock of regional achievements in disaster risk reduction policy and practice is important alongside identifying the areas where the region needs to focus most in the coming years.

This is why the Pacific Disaster Prevention Review is so critical. It’s an important initiative to examine progress in implementing the Sendai Framework across the Pacific and to provide a range of independent views that will stimulate efforts to reduce disaster losses in the region.

It will also provide a vital boost to implementing target (e) of the Sendai Framework, which seeks a substantial increase in the number of national and local strategies for disaster risk reduction by the end of the year and the inclusion of pandemic preparedness, which has not always been a priority.

Five years into the Sendai Framework era, the Pacific region has come a long way. At the same time, it still has some way to go to achieve its agreed vision of a resilient future for its people, societies, economies and cultures and for the natural environment.

With sea-level rises in some countries four times greater than the global average, Pacific island countries and territories are on the front line of the escalating climate crisis. As coastal areas and degraded inland areas become uninhabitable, people will seek safety and better lives elsewhere. The very survival of communities and countries is at stake in the coming decades.

In such a challenging context, disaster risk reduction is truly a matter of survival. A resilient Pacific depends on achieving the targets for reducing disaster losses and building resilience set out in the Sendai Framework.

Australia needs to train for disasters like this one

In a nation as prone to disasters as Australia, it’s surprising that no day is set aside to remind people  to check their own disaster preparedness. Nor is there a regularly scheduled exercise to test our disaster-response systems on a national level.

The prime minister, premiers, chief ministers and their cabinets may never have an opportunity to test their own disaster plans—until they’re confronted by a real crisis.

Few elected representatives have managed a complex disaster before coming to office. Consequently, the first time they’re faced with such a situation is when they’re responsible for leading the response to a real event. Some rise to the challenge, others struggle.

Every year, the Republic of Korea conducts its national mobilisation drill, the Ulchi exercises, to test its crisis-management systems and preparedness for conflict.

Ulchi is South Korea’s largest annual training event, involving around 480,000 personnel from government offices and other public institutions, and civilians. Until 2018, Ulchi was conducted alongside the major US–ROK summer military exercise, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, which added thousands of military personnel to the mix.

Importantly, the president and ministers actively participate in Ulchi, as do elected officials and public servants at all levels across the country.

In Japan, 1 September is Disaster Prevention Day when the population prepares for events like earthquakes, missile attacks, nuclear disasters, floods and typhoons. Exercises and emergency drills are held across the nation to ensure that it’s prepared at all levels and that its processes and procedures are effective and up-to-date. In Tokyo, the prime minister calls cabinet together so that the individual members of the government’s leadership team can be practised and tested in a crisis.

In Australia, disaster-response exercises with differing scenarios and of varying complexity are conducted across the country. Airports test procedures in the event of an accident; police, fire and ambulance services work with the state emergency services to prepare for events ranging from motor vehicle crashes to fires and floods. These activities are usually focused on a single situation rather than a multifaceted scenario.

While some involve multiple organisations, these exercises rarely test the entire the system and fewer still bring the Commonwealth, states and territories together around the same table.

An Australian national disaster preparedness day, with a national disaster-response exercise involving the prime minister and cabinet ministers, would provide an annual focus for the nation to ensure every citizen is prepared for a potential disaster.

Anyone with military experience will tell you that they spent most of their time on exercises rather than ‘doing it for real’. This training hones skills and provides an environment in which communications, planning, techniques, procedures, decision-making and individual skills can be tested and evaluated.

Exercising tests teamwork. You get to see how all the other players play and whether they do what you expect them to do. Weak points can be exposed, new ideas can be introduced, and if something doesn’t work, it can be reversed without consequences and an alternative can be tried.

A ‘battle rhythm’ can be established with times set for strategy meetings, videoconferences, staff briefings, reviews of outcomes, meal breaks and rest and rejuvenation. Using an established battle rhythm removes the need to create one from scratch when uncertainty and confusion reign.

Had Australia’s national cabinet been established before the Covid-19 pandemic struck, a framework could have been developed and tested to ensure a smooth, well-coordinated and quick response.

Exercises also have many intangible benefits. A well-planned and well-structured exercise allows participants to learn about themselves—how they perform under stress, how well they work with a team, how good their capacity for decision-making under pressure is, and how their personal resilience stands up. It also provides them with insights into their colleagues’ capacities.

When someone talks on a new responsibility, there’s learning to be done before they become effective. Politics is no different.

Introducing a national disaster-response exercise would ensure elected representatives and officials, from the prime minister down, experience crisis-management before being plunged into the real thing. It would also give ministers the opportunity to be coached and mentored to prepare them for what could be a career-defining role.

In responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, Prime Minister Scott Morrison and his government have shown that they learned from the bushfire crisis, particularly about the jurisdictional and political divide between the Commonwealth and the states and territories, and the expectations of the Australian people.

A national exercise will ensure the nation’s leaders fully understand the role of each layer of government, every department and agency, and the private sector: where they intersect, where the rub points are, what the redundancies are, and what the gaps and shortfalls are.

And the exercise must go beyond natural disasters to include scenarios dealing with terrorist attacks, health incidents, financial crises, and supply-chain disruptions.

A national exercise will test intergovernmental, interdepartmental and interagency links. It will strengthen relationships and facilitate shared goals and understanding between those who make the decisions and those who enact them.

Most of all, it will mean that when the next crisis emerges the nation’s leaders won’t approach it  from a standing start.