Tag Archive for: Digital Diplomacy

Winning hearts and likes

How foreign affairs and defence agencies use Facebook

What’s the problem?

For defence and diplomacy, digital media, and specifically social media, have become an unavoidable aspect of their operations, communications and strategic international engagement, but the use of those media isn’t always understood or appreciated by governments.

While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Defence (DoD) both use social media, including accounts managed by diplomatic posts overseas and by units of the ADF, both departments can improve how they reach and engage online. It’s important to note, however, that their use cases and audiences are different. DFAT’s audience is primarily international and varies by geographical location. Defence has a more local audience and focus.

More importantly than the content, online engagement is dependent on the strength of the ties between the senders or sharers and the recipients of the content. For both departments, improving those online ties is vital as they seek to influence.

What’s the solution?

The Australian Government should use social media far more strategically to engage international audiences—particularly in the diplomatic and defence portfolios. Both DFAT and Defence should review outdated digital strategies, cross-promote more content and demonstrate transparency and accountability by articulating and publishing social media policies.

Both departments should create more opportunities for training and the sharing of skills and experiences of public diplomacy staff. They should refrain from relying solely on engagement metrics as success measures (that is, as a measure of an individual’s, usually senior staff’s or heads of missions’, level of ability or achievement).

Instead, by changing the emphasis from the producers of social media content to the audiences that interact with it, the engagement data can be usefully regarded as a proxy for attention and interest. This can tell us what kinds of audiences (mostly by location) are engaged, and what types of content they do and don’t engage with. This information indicates the (limited) utility of social media; this should guide online engagement policy.

This report also highlights and recognises the value of social media for the defence community — especially as a means of providing information and support for currently serving personnel and their families—by supporting the use of Facebook for those purposes by all defence units.

DFAT should remove the direction for all Australian heads of mission overseas to be active on social media. While this presence is indeed useful and boosts the number of global government accounts, if our ambassadors aren’t interested in resourcing those accounts, the result can be sterile social media accounts that don’t engage and that struggle to connect with publics online. Instead, both departments should encourage those who are interested in and skilled at digital diplomacy to use openness, warmth and personality to engage.

Introduction: the global rise of Facebook

This report examines DFAT’s and the DoD’s use of one social media platform—Facebook—and evaluates current practices to identify how, where and for what purposes Facebook has impact. 

The focus on Facebook reflects the platform’s global reach and its popularity as an everyday, essential medium for accessing and sharing information. Besides notable exceptions (such as China), in most places (such as some Southeast Asian countries), Facebook is so popular that it’s often roughly synonymous with ‘the internet’. This is a symptom of the platform’s ubiquity and utility as well as a consequence of Facebook’s heavily promoted services, including the Free Basics internet access service, which provides limited online access via a Facebook application.1

In order to generate lessons learnt, this report makes comparisons between Australian Government pages and their counterparts in the US, the UK, New Zealand and Canada. The analysis of Facebook use for diplomatic purposes is based on 2016–17 data extracted from Facebook pages of the diplomatic missions of eight ‘publisher’ nations (the five that are the subject of this report, as well as India, Israel and Japan) in 23 ‘host nations’.2 More recent data couldn’t be used because access is no longer available, but a review of the pages suggests that the analysis stemming from the data extracted during that period remains relevant.

The underlying design of Facebook deeply influences and limits its use by publishers and users. The Facebook newsfeed—the most commonly used feature for getting regularly updated information — prioritises posts from accounts that are either closely associated through a history of user activity, including liking, sharing, commenting and messaging, or are boosted through paid promotion.

One of the main consequences is that the more a Facebook user interacts with content that they prefer, the more likely they are to receive that type of material in their newsfeeds, which they’re in turn more likely to interact with and so on. Successful content has emotional appeal, or is useful, and comes from a Facebook page that’s been frequented by the user or been shared with a close member of a user’s Facebook network of friends. As this cycle continues, Facebook ‘gets to know its users better and better’.3

In other words, it isn’t enough to make engaging (meaning fun, compelling or relevant) content. Online engagement is dependent on the strength of the ties between the senders or sharers and the recipients of the content, at least as much and very probably more than the nature of the content. Understanding this is vital for governments as they seek to influence online.

But, as a social media network, Facebook brings with it complications for public diplomacy and defence social media strategies. For example, Facebook’s utility is limited by its underlying algorithm architecture and the habits and preferences of individual Facebook users, which are influenced by in-country patterns of social media usage and internet access. These issues need to be factored into departmental communications policies and social media strategies.
 

Online content, classified

Facebook posts can be classified into four types, according to their apparent function or purpose: outward-facing publicity (including propaganda), inward-facing publicity, engagement, and diplomacy of the public.4 The categories often overlap: content may be both inward- and outward-facing, for example. An analysis of these four types of content can be very useful for creating a strategy for effective DFAT and DoD Facebook use.

1. Outward publicity

Outward-facing publicity is the most common. It’s characterised by its evident target being the broader public of the country in which it’s posted, or a section of that public, such as overseas students, potential immigrants or, less commonly, large expatriate populations. It therefore uses the language of the local population and locally popular themes and topics. Content varies but usually involves the provision of information, publicity for events, branding exercises or the posting of trivia (such as pictures of koalas). Posts can also be warm and personal and include one of the internet’s maligned features—cuteness.

The most popular Facebook post recorded during this research displays many of those features. It’s a video of two American embassy ‘diplokids’ playing the Indian national anthem on the occasion of India’s Independence Day.5 It’s been viewed 2.53 million times and shared more than 125,000 times (as of January 2020).

Many popular posts are practical and transactional, such as information about employment, scholarships, funding opportunities and visa applications. The US Embassy in Mexico, for example, published a series of videos outlining the procedures for various visa classes. The Australian Consulate in Hong Kong published a sequence of posts targeting Australian citizens in the lead-up to the 2016 Australian federal election with information about how to vote, and—taking advantage of Facebook’s potential to target specific audiences—paid to promote them.

Posts announcing employment opportunities at the embassy or consulate for locally engaged staff are consistently among the most popular, especially in small and developing countries. These posts can serve as more than mere job ads. One such post, on the American Facebook page in Iraq, prompted an enquiry via the comment feed from a potential applicant who feared he might be too old to apply. The American page administrator replied, assuring this applicant that his application would be welcome and reiterating American policies against age-based discrimination in a way that promoted US values and demonstrated respect for an older Iraqi man, which in return inspired several positive comments in the thread.

Other popular outward-facing promotional posts include commemorations on significant memorial days and on the occasion of tragedies such as natural disasters. Noting these days of significance on Facebook should out of respect be considered obligatory, as they largely appear to be. Posts announcing support in the aftermath of disasters are often very well received (as indicated by numbers of shares and supportive comments) and suggest that Facebook can have a useful role in promoting aid and relief efforts. For example, the Australian Embassy in Fiji posted about assistance efforts after Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016; those posts had engagement figures in the thousands (the mean engagement figure for 2016 was 29).6

Facebook posts promoting military activity elicited significant support in other contexts. US Facebook posts in support of Iraqi soldiers serving as part of the American-led coalition against Daesh, for example, were widely shared and commented on, almost entirely positively.

How important are ambassadors and consuls-general as proponents of outward-facing publicity? The research suggests that they’re significant assets where they’re personable and relatable and embrace the community and nation where they’re posted. Speaking the local language, either proficiently or with evident effort, is a major asset. While most posts are typically published in the local language (often as well as in English), publishing videos of heads of mission speaking the language seems to have additional audience appeal. One of the few Australian Facebook pages that increased its levels of engagement from 2016 to 2017 was that of the Embassy in Paris. Australia’s Ambassador to France, Brendan Berne, a fluent French speaker, features in a number of posted videos, including media appearances and official speeches.

In one popular video post, Ambassador Berne introduced changes in Australian law to legalise same-sex marriage and then popped the question to his unsuspecting partner, Thomas.7 This was acknowledged as unorthodox but was a calculated risk that paid off, increasing the profile of the Ambassador and thereby providing him with further platforms, including popular mainstream broadcast media, on which to promote the bilateral relationship.

Former US Consul-General in Hong Kong, Clifford Hart, exemplified how the personal can empower public diplomacy, to the extent that he was known as Clifford Baby (or ‘Clifford BB’).8 His very popular farewell video post featured Hart reflecting in Cantonese on his favourite places and dishes in Hong Kong. The video also uses catchphrases from Stephen Chow (an iconic actor in Hong Kong), which, while meaningless for those unfamiliar with his work, carried immense appeal for Hong Kongers.

2. Inward-facing publicity

Inward-facing publicity is related to outward-facing publicity but has an internal focus by appealing to smaller audiences—perhaps the local diplomatic or government community or to (even more internal) colleagues in Barton, Foggy Bottom or Whitehall.

This content frequently features a staged, formulaic photo of ‘distinguished guests’ at an official event.

Anecdotally, it’s been made clear to me on a number of occasions that this type of content is regarded as important, to the extent that hours can be spent on its production—the text carefully parsed and often escalated up the chain for approvals.

Although these events have limited appeal, they have a specific value that isn’t evident in their typically low engagement metrics.9 They’re important for those people featured in the photo and at the event as a record and an acknowledgement of their participation, and for indicating their status by highlighting their access, but the limited broader appeal of the posts suggests that the resources devoted to them should be minimised.

Other types of posts are evidently not (or poorly) targeted at a broader local public. These posts are characterised by the negligible use of local language or cultural connections and an overt emphasis on topics and themes that are of minimal interest to local target populations and more aligned to internal or specialised interests.

Common examples include key messages from governments about matters that are perhaps of global significance and represent core national values or positions on international matters (such as an opinion on certain environmental or human rights issues) but do not, according to the engagement data, resonate locally. These types of posts do no harm and are probably useful as records of, and advocacy for, important international issues. However, if they’re resource intensive, they present a poor return on investment.

One example of content that’s, probably inadvertently, inward-facing is a series of podcasts produced by the Australian Embassy in South Korea using the time of very senior diplomatic officials and promoted on the Embassy’s Facebook page. The podcasts featured interviews in English with significant Australians, including senior government figures. The low engagement metrics on Facebook (and the modest listening figures via Soundcloud) are unsurprising: in a saturated media market it’s difficult to imagine the appeal of podcasts in English featuring guests who (although esteemed and accomplished) are of marginal interest to a Korean audience.

The podcasts weren’t an evidently effective way of engaging with a Korean audience and, after 28 episodes over 18 months, were concluded at the end of 2017. While here it’s characterised as unsuccessful, creativity and bravery in public diplomacy should be supported. The idea of using podcasts is one that has value and could be adopted elsewhere, perhaps targeting specific audiences such as potential international students or investors and promoted via a more professionally oriented platform, such as LinkedIn. The South Korean experiment has the obvious lesson that such efforts can be made more likely to have impact if they’re planned to connect to and target local audiences as well as conveying Australian views and expertise.

Analysis for this report reveals that both outward- and inward-facing publicity posts by DFAT and Defence vary greatly in the engagement rates they enjoy. It’s difficult to see a pattern, and most successful posts are probably a result of good luck, good management and additional localised idiosyncrasies. But the general sense is that audiences largely pay attention to content that’s useful and relevant for them, not necessarily what’s most important to the authors of the content.

3. Engagement

Engagement posts are far less common than publicity posts. This is a bit surprising, as social media has been lauded as a site for interaction, discussion and debate and for making connections.

Some recent scholarship has concluded that diplomats aren’t taking advantage of this potential due to ingrained, institutionalised resistance, based on norms for information control and risk aversion.10 As a probable factor, this report outlines another entrenched problem: Facebook, due to its algorithmic factors that prefer close ties or paid promotion, isn’t often a very good platform for two-way engagement.

There are, however, some excellent examples of how Facebook has been used by Australian diplomats to facilitate a limited yet effective type of engagement through photo competitions. One, in Timor-Leste, invited photographs that characterised and shared affection for that country, thereby demonstrating ‘relational empathy’.11 Another, in the Australian Office in Taipei, invited Taiwanese in Australia to submit photographs of their travels and experiences, resulting in Taiwanese participating in a kind of networked conversation with other Taiwanese about their positive experiences in Australia, via an Australian diplomatic Facebook page. These types of photo-based campaigns could be replicated elsewhere.

Both of these competitions take advantage of a key function of social media—the ability to share images and tag friends—to increase the reach of their content. This turns Facebook users into micro-influencers, quite powerful at a smaller scale, distributing and personally endorsing content in their networks. An obvious advantage is that the content is provided and driven by users, not government officials. The fact that the content providers are from the local community also makes the content itself likely to have local references and appeal.

4. The audience, themselves

The last type of content present on these Facebook pages isn’t authored by the account holders (the diplomats) but by the Facebook users themselves. Usually, this appears in the comments, which can easily veer off onto (some malicious but some benign, even useful) tangents. The US Embassy in Mexico, for example, posts information about visa applications that can prompt reams of comments that ask for advice about people’s precise circumstances. Many of the requests are responded to by other Facebook users, who are able to offer specific advice.

Examples like this underscore the key lesson about Facebook for public diplomacy: social media users are often active audiences and participants who make choices about what content they respond to and how they respond to it based upon how relevant, useful and appealing they find it. This fundamental conclusion is a core lesson for DFAT and similar agencies.
 

Engagement—by the numbers

Ranking nations according to metrics fuels the spurious idea that those nations might be in competition with each other for attention in the digital space. Instead, it’s evident that diplomacy per se is in competition with the practically limitless amount of material published from all manner of sources, much of it antithetical to the aim of international amity, and all diplomats could benefit by learning from each other’s experiences. Instead of treating them as a measure of success, engagement metrics can be useful means of approximating audience size and attention.

On average, the data (in Figures 1–4) indicates that the Facebook audience for the 23 US official diplomatic accounts reviewed is far larger than others, but is also relatively passive. In comparison, Australia’s audience is comparatively more active and engaged. But we should note that all the figures below are global averages, varying considerably by location (again suggesting that a global ranking is unhelpful). The variations between the locations (see Table 1) contain important insights about what types of useful content, and which audiences are more active and engaged, are consequently more valuable.

All the following data is based on the Facebook pages of official diplomatic posts (embassies, consulates and similar offices).12 They’re typically managed by diplomatic staff who are often not public diplomacy specialists and are usually on a 3–4 year posting, usually with considerable input by locally engaged staff.

Figure 1 is based on the numbers of page likes (people who have ‘liked’ a Facebook page) in the host country where an embassy or consulate is located. Figures 2–4 are based on the levels of engagement (reactions, comments, shares) with the content that those embassies and consulates posted on their Facebook pages.

Figure 1: Facebook page likes, January–February 2018 (total, users located in host country)

Note: This data is no longer downloadable from Facebook’s application programming interface due to restrictions introduced by Facebook in 2019. This is one of the ways Facebook has limited public access to data. For example, until early 2018, it was possible to extract data about the location (based on their Facebook profile) of Facebook page followers, making it feasible to analyse the percentage of followers who were located in the host country (that’s the figure used here) or who were located elsewhere, either based in the home country (probably mostly expats) or in a third country. This includes followers who are suspected to be bogus, either paid to follow through click farms or fake accounts attempting to appear real. See D Spry, ‘Facebook diplomacy, click farms and finding “friends” in strange places’, The Strategist, 7 September 2017, online.

Figure 1 is the total for all of the embassies and consulates counted (a list of them is included in Table 1). Figure 2 is the average figure per embassy or consulate.

Figure 2: Average engagement per Facebook page, January–February 2018

The large number of the US Facebook page likes/followers highlighted above results in a relatively high level of engagements per post but not more engagements per user. In the latter category, Australia leads; the US runs last.

Figure 3: Average engagement per Facebook post, January–February 2018

Figure 4: Average engagement per Facebook user, January–February 2018

Table 1 shows Facebook reach (the percentage of a country’s total Facebook users who are following an embassy or consulate Facebook page) for 23 countries. As per Figure 1 (and see endnote 11), these figures include only those Facebook users who are located (according to their profile) in the country where the embassy or consulate is based (for example, followers of the Australian Embassy in Dili who are based in Timor-Leste). The figures in Table 1 are the average figures for the five nations and can vary considerably. For example, for Timor-Leste the average for all five embassies is 10.495% but for Australia it’s considerably higher (approximately 35% when last checked; this is one of the few embassy Facebook pages that demonstrates significant growth).

Table 1 also demonstrates the correlations between Facebook reach and per capita GDP, population size and median age (see the appendix for the methodology). Also, countries that are closer or more strategically intertwined are more likely to follow embassy and consulate Facebook pages (for Australia, Timor-Leste; for the US, Mexico and Iraq). An important finding of this research for Australian officials is that Facebook appears to be more useful for public diplomacy in developing countries that are small, young and geographically close to Australia.

Table 1: Facebook reach across 23 countries via a selection of indicators

The metrics vary by orders of magnitude: in Timor-Leste (on average) a Facebook page will be followed by about 10% of the population who have Facebook accounts; in Myanmar, it’s about 2%; in Taiwan and New Zealand, it’s about 1 in 1,000; in the UK and Canada, it’s about 1 in 10,000. In other words, on average, a Facebook page in Timor-Leste is close to a thousand times more likely to have a local follower than one in the UK or Canada.

For Australian diplomatic posts, the contrast is even starker: in Timor-Leste, around 26% of the local Facebook population follow the Facebook page of the Australian Embassy in Dili; the equivalent in the UK is 0.01%; in Canada, 0.005%. Australia’s Facebook page in Timor-Leste is around 5,000 times more likely to have a local follower than in Canada.

The temptation is to see this as a measure of the performance of Australia’s staff in Dili, Ottawa and London. That temptation should be resisted—there are, as Table 1 suggests, demographic factors (age, size, wealth) to consider when seeking reasons for the large variations in Facebook reach.

These demographic correlations suggest that Facebook diplomacy’s ‘success’ (or, I would suggest, ‘relevance’) isn’t necessarily the result of the public diplomacy staff’s skills and endeavours but more likely a product of external factors: the popularity of Facebook as a means of accessing information among younger populations; a lack of competing sources of information in smaller countries (with smaller media industries); and the funnelling of users onto the Facebook platform in those countries (including Timor-Leste and Cambodia) where Facebook’s Free Basics service provides free but limited internet access.

This implies that, while a Facebook page may be an effective, even a primary, public diplomacy tool in some places, it won’t always be in others: therefore, resources and strategy can be adjusted accordingly. For example, it suggests that the Australian embassies in Dili, Port Moresby and other high-ranking Facebook locations should be supported and encouraged to use Facebook (as they appear to be successfully doing). The high commissions in London, Ottawa and similar locations should maintain a presence but not prioritise Facebook as a means of public diplomacy, as it isn’t an efficient communication channel.

Limitations of using Facebook for diplomacy

However, if these numbers look small enough to question the point of having a Facebook page in some locations at all, it gets worse: average posts prompt engagement from between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1,000 followers. This means that in the UK, for example, the reaction rate is about 1 in 1 million active Facebook users. While reaction rates don’t equate to reach (reach figures aren’t obtainable), they’re indicative of attention and interest, and also contribute to the organic (non-paid) spread of the content.

This is likely to get worse. Changes to the Facebook algorithm since 2014 have made it more difficult to reach large audiences unless content is promoted through paid boosts. This is reflected in the engagement metrics falling or flattening year-on-year in most locations, with a few exceptions.

Therefore, the argument for an active Facebook page shouldn’t rest on the average engagement metrics alone. Facebook posts, as long as they’re prepared using minimal resources, are low risk, low investment and usually low reward. But some posts are quite valuable, even in locations where there’s usually little engagement, potentially serving as an economical means to exert influence with small, but repeated, effects. An examination of the types of posts and the levels of engagement they receive offers some insights.

Defence’s use of social media

A review of available defence organisations’ policies and associated commentary outlines three general areas of social media use:

  1. personal use by personnel, whether or not on deployment or active duty, and their families
  2. professional use by personnel in matters relating to their employment, such as networking and communication for the purposes of professional development and knowledge sharing
  3. official use by personnel acting as representatives of the defence force and in pursuit of the defence force’s aims.

The first type—personal use—prompts concern among military forces for its potential to endanger military personnel and operations, or to damage the reputation of defence organisations. Those risks aren’t confined to official Facebook pages and are as likely to occur elsewhere; infringements are already covered under existing policies (such as preventing harassment and promoting operational and personal security). Posting on social media may bring infractions to light, meaning that they can be addressed, but also increases the risk of exposing the offending content to a wider audience before it can be deleted and the infraction contained.

The UK and US defence forces are especially active in promoting responsible social media use, including by publishing guidelines for personnel.

These concerns are counterbalanced by the capacity for social media to act as a means for military families and friends to stay in touch with loved ones while they’re on deployment. Also, as some American studies suggest, social media are especially beneficial for military spouses who form support networks based on their shared experiences and concerns.13

The second type of use—professional but unofficial use—is evidenced in limited ways on Facebook.

One example is the Facebook page for The Cove,14 a website set up for the purposes of promoting research for military professionals.

The third type, official use, is the focus of this report. The defence forces of the Five Eyes nations all operate numerous Facebook pages. In the case of the US, each branch of the armed services has at least hundreds (US Air Force), if not thousands (US Army), of Facebook pages.15 The pages representing each of the main branches have millions of followers, while pages at the level of operational units (regiments, battalions and the like) vary in size accordingly.

Unsurprisingly, the Facebook pages of the branches of the US military have followers (page likes) an order of magnitude larger than in other nations (Figure 5).

Figure 5: US main military Facebook page likes, March 2018

The militaries of the others have comparable numbers of page followers, but the British Army has a significantly larger cohort than the others (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Main military Facebook page likes, non-US, March 2018

Quantitative analysis of the defence forces’ Facebook pages indicates that they receive considerably more attention and engagement than their diplomatic counterparts. The average Australian diplomatic Facebook page is followed by about 0.02% of the Facebook population in the host country (the notable exceptions are Timor-Leste, 26%, and Papua New Guinea, 7%). The larger defence force pages are followed by a larger portion of the Australian Facebook population: Defence Jobs Australia (3.3%) and the Australian Army (2.4%).

The raw numbers are similarly stark. Defence Jobs Australia has close to half a million followers, the Australian Army more than 360,000, the RAAF more than 280,000 and the RAN more than 120,000. Those numbers increase daily.

The combined figure of the page likes of the ADF Facebook pages analysed for this report is 1.45 million, or close to 10% of the Australian Facebook population (although of course many Facebook users can follow multiple pages and some may come from overseas).

In comparison, major news programs have about 1.5–2 million Facebook followers, and the ABC News Facebook page has close to 4 million. News and magazine pages are the leading Facebook pages for engagement, averaging about 100,000 engagements per page per week; Defence pages averaged 45,000 in total. The Australian Army page alone received 12,500 engagements on average per week—comparable to the music industry average and above education, department stores and politics.16

Other nations’ pages are similarly popular. These figures suggest that Facebook is valuable for defence forces as a means of communicating to their publics. They also suggest that those publics are paying attention to these pages.

Why? Partly, the answer lies in the content posted on the pages and the ways that publics engage with it. Defence department Facebook pages differ from their diplomatic counterparts in important ways—chief among them is the nature of their audiences, which appear more domestic and more closely engaged. Partly, this arises out of the large numbers of current and former personnel and their friends and families. Also, in many democracies, publics have greater levels of emotional connection— trust,17 nostalgia, admiration—with militaries than with other parts of government (including foreign affairs agencies).

Official use of these Facebook pages includes a number of related functions. The main ones are:

  1. publicity, firstly in the sense of promoting the defence force’s values, achievements and legacies, as well as information for potential recruits, and secondly in the sense of maintaining the openness and transparency that (within the parameters of operational and personal security) are expected from defence forces of democratic nations
  2. information sharing with the defence force’s broader community of interest, including family and friends of serving personnel and veterans as well as other stakeholders (such as people residing near bases or training areas), and including sharing details about exercises and deployments
  3. commemorations, including notifications and memorials for service personnel who have died on deployment or exercises, celebrations and thanks for retiring senior service personnel, and days of significance, either national (such as Anzac Day) or specific to the defence force.

This report’s analysis suggests that Facebook performs each of those functions usefully and in ways other forms of media would find difficult. User engagement varies considerably across the Facebook pages analysed. Some general observations include the following:

  • Levels of engagement are generally higher than for public diplomacy pages. In particular, defence content is shared more and attracts more comments.
  • Content on smaller Facebook pages (such as regiment, brigade or group pages) has a higher level of engagement per capita, suggesting a smaller but more engaged user community.
  • Comments appear to be positive and supportive: they express admiration for defence personnel, thanks for service (especially for those who died on duty), patriotism and nostalgia.
  • Military hardware in use has considerable appeal—cinematographic and otherwise.
  • Defence forces are highly regarded for their service (the ‘trust factor’) as well as their embodiment of national identity.
  • Members of defence forces, and their families and loved ones, use defence Facebook pages to express and share emotions, including, commonly, pride and admiration.

Some important posts—including notices about mental health—attract less engagement because those topics are sensitive and Facebook is public. This is an example of how Facebook users are conscious of their online personas and tend to portray themselves cautiously. It isn’t an argument against the value of those posts, which are useful opportunities for defence forces to raise awareness of important issues and available support services.

In action and in memoriam: ADF pages

The ADF Facebook pages attracting the highest engagement fall into two main categories: accounts of activities undertaken by ADF personnel (including community undertakings, training, exercises, deployments and military action) and commemorations of days of significance, the loss of military lives, or both.

The most important commemorative day on the Australian calendar, Anzac Day, is also the dominant topic on Defence Facebook pages, appearing in the top five most engaged posts of all the larger pages.

An exception is the Chief of the Defence Force’s Facebook page, where the most popular posts are those commemorating the return to Australia of fallen Vietnam War veterans and the 20th anniversary of the loss of 18 Army personnel during a Black Hawk helicopter collision in 1996.

On the smaller, unit-level Facebook pages, in addition to Anzac Day, popular posts commemorate important battles in the history of the unit, such as Long Tan in the Vietnam War and Kapyong in the Korean War. Other popular Facebook posts noted Australia Day, Mothers’ Day, Fathers’ Day and Christmas, sometimes connecting them to personnel currently serving overseas.

The popularity of commemorative posts suggests that Facebook facilitates support for ADF personnel and traditions in a public, shareable forum. Anzac Day’s popularity among the larger Facebook pages implies that those pages enjoy widespread popularity, whereas attention to unit-specific commemorations in the smaller pages indicates their importance to those with closer ties to those units, including veterans and their families.

Some posts feature videos of ADF personnel using impressive military equipment. These have evident appeal for military aficionados and, according to the Defence Jobs Australia Facebook page metrics, for potential recruits.

Another popular type of post outlines current actions taken by the ADF. Examples of this type include HMAS Darwin’s seizure, under UN sanctions, of illicit weapons heading to Somalia; assistance provided by HMAS Canberra to Fiji following Cyclone Winston; and Operation OKRA: Strike Vision, involving F/A-18A Hornets destroying facilities operated by Daesh in central Iraq.

Other examples of popular Facebook pages featuring the ADF in action include graduations (the Australian Defence Force Academy), promotions and—especially at the unit level—posts showing personnel assisting local communities and charities.

Five-Eyes defence forces

Commemorations and actions are top posts in other defence forces’ Facebook pages. The US defence forces’ pages, in particular, are notable for their popular displays of military hardware as well as being sites of public, patriotic support for troops.

The most popular post on the US Army Facebook page, on the anniversary on the 6 June 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy, exemplifies this combination of patriotism and military memorialisation. The comments on this post further indicate the commemoration’s personal significance for veterans’ families.

These US Facebook pages demonstrate the significance of the military services and suggest how deeply they’re embedded in American culture, in family histories, national identity and popular culture. Popular UK posts similarly suggest the link between military service, family legacies, history and nationalism—in this case sometimes represented by the British royal family.

Although similar themes are evident in all defence force Facebook pages, some examples of popular content from UK, Canadian and New Zealand pages offer small but significant contrasts with Australian pages.

For example, a New Zealand Defence Force video of a ceremony at the Menin Gate memorial in Ypres, Belgium, featuring personnel performing the haka was shared more than 30,000 times,18 and the most popular New Zealand Navy Facebook post was a link to a news report on the first sailor to get a moko (a full-face traditional Maori tattoo; Figure 7).19 The popularity of these posts reflects support for Maori culture as an intrinsic and valued part of New Zealand and its defence forces.

Figure 7: New Zealand Defence Force personnel perform a haka at Menin Gate, Belgium

25 April 2017, online.

Popular Canadian Facebook posts also showcase diversity and personality. The Canadian Army’s most popular post pays tribute to an indigenous veteran, Sergeant Francis Pegahmagabow of Wasauksing First Nation, a highly decorated World War I scout and sniper.20 Other popular content includes videos of deployed personnel in a snowball fight in Poland,21 a light-sabre fight marking Star Wars Day (#MayTheFourthBeWithYou),22 a warning against venturing onto military property while chasing Pokémon23 (see cover image) and personnel wearing red stilettos to support domestic violence survivors (Figure 8).24

Figure 8: Members of 3rd Canadian Division taking part in the #WalkaMileInHerShoes fundraiser in downtown Edmonton

Source: 3rd Canadian Division, ‘Members of 3rd Canadian Division are taking part in the #WalkaMileInHerShoes fundraiser in downtown Edmonton’, Facebook, 21 September 2017, online.

Defence recruitment

The relative popularity of defence recruitment sites indicates the value of Facebook for promoting military careers. This use of Facebook differs from the pages of the main defence force branches or at unit level, as it’s more akin to advertising and promotion and less like a community site: more bulletin board than discussion boards. It’s likely that many of these posts have been promoted through paid boosts and advertising, which is a common and reasonable use of marketing budgets (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Defence force recruitment page likes, March 2018

Generally, the recruitment pages’ content appears to have similar appeal to the main pages. For example, the most popular posts on the Defence Force Australia page are a 360-degree view of a boat drop from the amphibious ship HMAS Canberra (the second most popular post on Australian defence Facebook pages) and Anzac Day 2016. 

The recruitment Facebook pages are also notable for the high number of posts by Facebook users. Between 20% and 30% of the posts on the Defence Force Australia, RAF and UK Royal Navy recruitment Facebook pages are by users. Many of these user posts are genuine requests about positions and recruitment procedures.

Defence social media policy and strategy

The ADF’s social media guidelines, policies and strategy documents are not public. The last publicly available external review of Defence’s use of social media was released in 2011. 

This aversion to publicness and openness contrasts with the position of DFAT, which has published its public diplomacy25 and digital media strategies26, as well as the defence force of Canada, which has published its social media strategy,27 the defence force of the UK, which has published social media guidelines,28 and the various US forces, which have each published numerous policy and guideline documents.29

The Canadian social media guidelines go so far as to promote transparency and accountability as ‘principles of participation’, aimed at meeting community standards of trust and confidence.

It’s unclear why the ADF doesn’t operate on similar principles.

Conclusion and recommendations

Facebook pages provide opportunities for defence forces to communicate to publics and, at least as importantly, for publics to express their gratitude, admiration and affection to defence forces.

In contrast, diplomatic Facebook pages are targeted at, and receive attention from, foreign publics. Compared to defence, diplomatic Facebook pages receive far less attention, but the levels of attention vary. Specifically, in countries that are smaller, younger, poorer and closer (such as Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea), Facebook is, based on the data, an important means to inform—and engage with—general publics. Communications strategy should therefore prioritise Facebook in those countries by training personnel, allocating funds to content production and paying heed to the levels and nature of engagement by publics. Elsewhere, such as in Canada and the UK, Facebook is far less important and should be deprioritised in, but not eliminated from, public diplomacy strategies.

The strengths and limitations of Facebook’s usefulness are determined by its algorithm, which prioritises audiences’ pre-existing connections and optimises content that appeals to their needs and desires. It’s essential therefore that Defence and DFAT prioritise those audiences when determining if, when and how to make use of Facebook.

This report argues for a measured, more strategic use of social media. Specific solutions are as follows.

For diplomacy

  1. Review the digital media strategy to account for the location-based variability of Facebook’s usefulness and prioritise resources accordingly.
  2. Encourage diplomatic missions to develop, implement and review localised social media plans using the experience and expertise of locally engaged staff (providing training where required), and redefine the role of Australia-based staff to strategic oversight and governance.
  3. Remove the direction for all heads of mission to be active on social media; encourage those who are active on Facebook to use openness, warmth and personality to create relational empathy.
  4. Create opportunities for training and sharing the skills and experiences of public diplomacy staff.

For defence

  1. Demonstrate and promote transparency and accountability by publishing social media policies.
  2. Recognise the value of social media for the Defence community, especially as a means of providing information and support for currently serving personnel and their families, by supporting the use of Facebook for those purposes by all defence units.
  3. Continue Defence’s impressive work using Facebook as a platform for the community to express support for personnel and veterans, and maintain the dignified, sombre tone of the memorial content.

For diplomacy and defence

  1. Consider cross-promoting content. Defence pages reach the large national audience that diplomacy increasingly needs. Diplomatic Facebook pages—in some locations—provide opportunities for the ADF to promote its actions and values to international audiences, acting as a useful vector for strategic communication.
  2. Refrain from using engagement metrics as success measures for diplomats; use them as proxies for public attention in order to gauge how the value of Facebook varies according to audience type and location.
  3. Prioritise audiences’ use of social media when developing strategies, creating content and allocating resources.

Appendix: Methodology

This research focused exclusively on Facebook. While other social network platforms, especially Twitter, are also relevant, they lie outside the scope of this report.

The research used digital media research methods, which made it possible to gather and analyse large amounts of data indicating Facebook users’ engagement with online content, including which posts received more than average attention, through the examination of Facebook engagement metrics (likes, comments and shares).

This enabled analysis of Facebook users’ interests based on either the content (what types of posts receive the most attention) or the users (who was engaging with content). In turn, this suggested how social media are used and therefore how they can be useful.

The analysis of Facebook use for diplomatic purposes is based on 2016–17 data extracted from Facebook pages of the diplomatic missions of eight ‘publisher’ nations (the five that are the subject of this report, as well as India, Israel and Japan) in 23 ‘host’ nations.30 Restrictions imposed by Facebook in 2019 (and before 2018 data was extracted) mean this form of research isn’t currently replicable. The database used in this research is therefore unique; it’s available from the author.

Unlike the defence Facebook pages, the data for the diplomatic pages includes the location of those Facebook users who have followed the Facebook pages of the diplomatic mission. Again, this feature is no longer possible due to restrictions introduced by Facebook in early 2018, before the defence Facebook pages analysis was undertaken.

This report is based on data that accesses the Facebook application programming interface and obtains Facebook post and comment content (text, and links to images and video), as well as engagement data (reactions, including likes, comments, and shares). Analysis followed a two-stage, mixed-methods approach. First, quantitative data analysis identified trends and outliers. Second, identified outliers (such as high-performing pages and posts) were treated as key case studies and their content was considered more closely using methods based on qualitative media studies.

The analysis of the Facebook pages was contextualised and informed by an examination of publicly available policy and strategy documents as well as background discussion with several currently serving or former defence and diplomatic personnel from Australia and elsewhere. An important note: the engagement metrics are not, and shouldn’t be, considered as indicators of the ‘success’ of a particular Facebook page. Instead, they were used here as indicators of attention, and therefore as a means of assessing what content a specific page’s audience was more interested in and how it made use of that content.


Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the members of the Australian and international defence and diplomatic communities for their informal advice and support, as well as for their dedication and professionalism. Any errors and all findings, conclusions and opinions contained herein are my responsibility.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber and emerging technologies and their impact on broader strategic policy. The ICPC informs public debate and supports sound public policy by producing original empirical research, bringing together researchers with diverse expertise, often working together in teams. To develop capability in Australia and our region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises both in Australia and overseas for both the public and private sectors. The ICPC enriches the national debate on cyber and strategic policy by running an international visits program that brings leading experts to Australia.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

First published May 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online)
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

  1. L Mirani, ‘Millions of Facebook users have no idea they’re using the internet’, Quartz, 9 February 2015, online. See also Facebook, ‘Where we’ve launched’. ↩︎
  2. D Spry, ‘Facebook diplomacy: a data-driven, user-focussed approach to Facebook use by diplomatic missions’, Media International Australia, 168(1):62–80. ↩︎
  3. ‘The inquiry: How powerful is Facebook’s algorithm?’, BBC World Service, 24 April 2017, online. ↩︎

Taking Australian diplomacy digital

What’s the problem?

Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) now has a presence on the main digital platforms, but it is yet to master digital diplomacy: using these powerful new communication tools and platforms to better conduct its core mission of persuasion, influence and advocacy. There’s too much use of new media channels to transmit old media content, a tendency to duck rather than address difficult issues, and a failure to engage within the digital life cycle of a news story.

Data analytics and the integration of digital tools into mainstream diplomatic campaigns are both lacking. Beyond this, there’s a need to rethink how Australia does diplomacy in the digital age.

DFAT needs to find better ways to communicate with its stakeholders, using digital tools. It needs to recognise that increasingly statecraft is playing out in the cyber and information domains, and invest more in equipping itself to engage in those domains—even when such online engagement brings risk. 

DFAT must also reconceive its overseas presence and embrace some of the agility and nimbleness of the tech world in doing so.

What’s the solution?

DFAT needs to start treating digital diplomacy as core tradecraft, rather than optional add-on. It should provide compulsory digital training for all outgoing heads of mission and encourage healthy internal competition and innovation. It should pilot more sophisticated data analytics tools and integrate digital tools into regular diplomatic campaigns. It should develop and pilot a new stream of diplomatic reporting that’s punchier and timelier, and reaches a broader audience on hand-held devices.

DFAT should create new positions of ambassador to Silicon Valley and ambassador to the Chinese tech giants based in Beijing. It should experiment more with ‘pop-up’ diplomatic posts, pilot one-person posts and encourage innovation and experimentation in the conduct of digital diplomacy, conceiving of embassies as hubs and connectors for a broad set of interactions. 

Finally, DFAT needs to adopt some of the nimbleness and agility of the tech world in how it conducts Australia’s external policy. Failure to do so means the field is left to others.

Introduction

Australia’s DFAT has come a long way in a short time in its embrace of digital tools and technology.

DFAT, and most of our embassies around the world, now have a significant social media presence, often across several platforms (Figure 1). There has been an explosion of Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, Instagram accounts, and even blogs and YouTube channels,1 adding colour to what was (and remains) a rather lifeless website-only presence. In this, DFAT has been helped by political leaders who have embraced these tools as a means of modern-day communication.

After coming late to the game,2 DFAT now has a decent digital presence when benchmarked against other foreign ministries worldwide. It’s certainly not in the top 10, but it is credible.3

Figure 1: DFAT’s social media presence

Digital, but not yet doing digital diplomacy

However, in the rush to embrace digital media, there’s a danger that some of the bigger questions have gone begging, and that ends have been confused with means. Doing digital diplomacy well not only requires having the requisite digital platforms—it entails using them strategically and effectively to advance a diplomatic agenda.

This is where DFAT is struggling: it has gone digital, but it isn’t yet doing digital diplomacy. Having a large number of social media accounts and a growing crop of followers or friends isn’t sufficient. The test of success is whether those factors are being properly utilised to bring Australian diplomacy from the analogue into the digital age.

A changed operating environment

The essence of diplomacy hasn’t changed. Its main purpose remains the facilitation of communication between states and the exertion of influence (on other states or the international system) to protect and advance national interests. But what has changed vastly, almost beyond recognition, is the operating environment of diplomacy.

Even as recently as a decade or two ago—well within the professional lifespan of most of Australia’s senior diplomats—diplomacy as a profession, and hence DFAT as an institution, enjoyed several natural monopolies. First, there was the monopoly on information. It wasn’t that long ago that diplomats would fax press clippings or transcribe news articles and send them back to their capitals.

At a time when news on developments within other countries was scarce, and almost impossible to access remotely, diplomats stationed abroad were a vital—sometimes the only—source of information for capitals hungry for such intelligence.

Second, there was the monopoly on communication. In the era before modern modes of communication, the bulk of interactions between states took place through the medium of their diplomats. Leaders would meet or talk occasionally, but usually the challenge of making direct contact meant most communication was, of necessity, passed through ambassadors or envoys.

Third, there was the monopoly on representation. When communication with capitals was slow and difficult, and it could take several weeks to get an answer, diplomats abroad were expected to make decisions and improvise within a wide area of policy discretion.

These natural monopolies guaranteed relevance for foreign ministries, DFAT included, and sheltered them from competition. A government simply couldn’t run a foreign policy without a foreign ministry and its overseas diplomatic missions. Modern-day technology, however, has eroded most of these natural monopolies.

Diplomats no longer enjoy a monopoly on information. Leaders and decision-makers in capitals can readily access and follow most news from abroad, usually on demand, and from a variety of sources. Nor do diplomats enjoy a monopoly on communication. Today, leaders and senior officials are just as likely to communicate directly with their counterparts in another country—by phone, email, text message or, increasingly, an encrypted chat service—rather than through their diplomats.4

Finally, the monopoly on representation has ended. Diplomats are now expected to check nearly everything of significance with their capitals first, and modern communications mean they can (and are expected to) obtain revised instructions on how to handle an issue almost instantaneously.

Disruption, disintermediation and the digital pivot

The end result is that diplomacy has become a much more competitive space. Diplomats are being disintermediated by new technology and communication advances. States are increasingly able to understand, communicate and negotiate directly with other states, without the need for the intermediating service of diplomats. With the disruption of much of the traditional role of diplomats, the challenge for foreign ministries today is to pivot: to find new ways to generate value and ensure relevance in a much more contested field. And this is where digital tools can prove so important.

One of the main purposes of national security agencies is to deliver a strategic effect: to shape the behaviour and decision-making of foreign countries and their leaderships. Defence forces do this through alliances and partnerships, their force posture, deployments, joint exercises and military diplomacy (and, in extremis, through the threat or use of force). Development agencies do it through the direction and composition of their aid spending. Intelligence agencies do it through the collection of sensitive information, espionage and disruption.

In diplomacy, words are the bullets. A strategic effect is delivered through persuasion, influence, argument and advocacy directed towards a foreign population, nation or group of key actors or decision-makers. For this task, new communication tools—and especially social media—are a potential boon for diplomats.5 They allow diplomats to engage directly with the public or segments of the public in their country of posting, often in a targeted fashion. They provide the tools to deliver a message or engage in debate directly, rather than through traditional platforms.6 And they allow real-time interaction with a rapidly evolving media cycle, including the ability to rebut falsehoods, contest narratives, correct mistakes and provide the public with additional context to media reporting.

This is especially important now that political power is highly dispersed (partly the result of digital media giving each person a loudspeaker). To be an effective diplomat today requires more than just the formal engagement of your host government. If you want to be effective and shape the course of decision-making, then you need to be monitoring and engaging with those who shape the decision-making environment of political leaders within a society. That might include the media, business and industry groups, civil society, pressure and lobby groups, religious organisations, politically active diasporas and social media ‘influencers’. While this may be less true in autocratic countries, even there—thanks to social media and digital platforms—civil society has a voice that it previously lacked, and a means with which it can be directly engaged.7 Knowing and understanding the terrain of local opinion, and how to engage and shape it—the ‘last three feet’ of diplomacy8—is the unique value proposition of today’s diplomat and something that only a local, informed and networked presence can provide.

A credible but flawed digital presence

DFAT and the Australian network of embassies and high commissions abroad now have, on the whole, a credible digital presence—the tools needed to conduct those last three feet of diplomacy. This is necessary but not sufficient. The challenge is to fully utilise these platforms to conduct DFAT’s core business, which is diplomacy. And here, there’s still quite some way to go. There’s not yet a wholesale recognition and appreciation of how the advocacy landscape has changed. As a result, and with a few stand-out exceptions, most of DFAT’s digital channels suffer from the same three ailments.

First, there’s too much use of new media channels to transmit old media content. Digital media are a different format; they speak to a different audience, and require different—and more engaging—content. Good digital content is pithy, impactful and tailored, but too little of DFAT’s digital content meets that test. Using new media channels to transmit old media content (press releases and the like) ruins both.

Second, there’s a pronounced tendency for DFAT’s digital platforms to duck the difficult issues. There’s a place for building brand Australia, promoting tourism and spruiking soft news stories about Australia on digital platforms, but public and cultural diplomacy can’t be the sum total of our digital effort, or else we risk being (in the words of one insightful commentator) ‘all gums, no teeth’.9 Tempting as it is, there’s no point in running dead or lying low when a controversial issue is unfolding. This is exactly when digital platforms come to the fore and the credibility of your digital presence is tested. Too often, when a storm of controversy is raging all around them, DFAT’s digital channels bury their heads in the sand, go radio-silent, or promulgate the Panglossian fiction that all is well. If Australian nationals are set to be executed in a foreign country, or there are suggestions that the Chinese are building a military base in the southwest Pacific, or if a candidate for the Philippines presidency jokes about the sexual assault and murder of an Australian missionary, then we should expect that the relevant Australian digital diplomatic platform will have something worthwhile to say about it— to articulate our views and interests on an important issue.10 Likewise for major world events. The message must obviously reflect diplomatic realities, but to say nothing in such scenarios is simply not credible. It also lacks a prized trait of the digital age—authenticity—and so diminishes the value of the platform and treats readers as fools.

Figure 2: Twitter feed from selected foreign ministries on 12 June 2018, date of the US – North Korea summit in Singapore

Closely linked to this is a frequent failure to respond within the digital life cycle of a news story. Time differences and clearances may make this challenging, but our senior diplomats abroad have enough judgement and common sense to be trusted—indeed encouraged—to speak publicly on most issues within their patch without having every word approved by Canberra.11

Third, there’s a lack of personality in much of DFAT’s digital content. Part of the appeal of social media is its authenticity and directness—the idea that you get to know the person behind the message and can interact with them directly. But most of DFAT’s digital media content attempts to uphold the traditional division between public and private spheres. It’s stiff and aloof, and frequently non-responsive to attempts to engage. That’s an approach that may remain suitable to traditional diplomatic settings, but it jars in the flat, non-hierarchical, informal world of digital.

Operating in a new information domain: opportunities and threats

If used as part of a comprehensive strategy, the new digital world provides many opportunities to reinforce traditional diplomacy. The UK used digital tools to complement traditional diplomacy in its successful assembly of a broad coalition to respond to Russia’s apparent use of chemical weapons on UK territory, in Salisbury (Figure 3). Canada deployed a multifaceted digital campaign to support its objectives as G7 chair (notably, its initiative to tackle the problem of ocean plastics). Russia is an adept practitioner, frequently taking to digital channels to muddy the waters, promote alternative theories and create distractions when under international pressure (Figure 4). These countries have each integrated digital platforms into the prosecution of mainstream diplomatic priorities and campaigns, realising that digital tools can have a potentiating effect in support of a diplomatic campaign. In Australia, we’re yet to do this properly: we maintain an unhelpful separation between the digital realm and the mainstream diplomatic realm.

Figure 3: Part of the UK’s digital diplomatic effort to hold Russia accountable for Salisbury

Figure 4: Twitter feed from the Russian Embassy in London

Professional data analytics can be a powerful tool for this new diplomacy. Big data and network analyses can help identify online influencers and force amplifiers; track how narratives spread among online publics, and thus help to shape or combat them; allow communications that are tailored to the preferences and attributes of specific online communities; and support the rollout of sophisticated, multiphase campaigns. Most major corporate outfits use such tools, as do the diplomatic services of many foreign countries. The UK Foreign Office even has an internal ‘Head of Data Science’ position.12

Australia needs to get similarly professional and move beyond the simple counting of ‘likes’ and ‘followers’ as the metrics of digital impact.

Just as digital tools bring new opportunities to diplomacy, so they also bring new threats. They are changing the nature of statecraft, and the information domain is growing in importance as a theatre for contest between states. ‘Control of the narrative’—about what happened, about who’s at fault, about where justice lies, about what’s ‘real’ and what’s ‘fake’—is at the heart of this contest (Figure 5).

Diplomats have an important role to play here, in combating misrepresentations, squashing rumours and misinformation, and promoting their own country’s analysis and policy. Effective digital tools and good data analytics will be vital to this effort.13

Figure 5: The information domain is becoming a new theatre of state competition: textbook ‘trolling’ by two of its most capable practitioners

Similarly, today’s digital age means that disinformation, propaganda and rumours designed to influence or destabilise another country’s political system can be launched almost instantaneously, from across the globe, timed for maximum impact, and targeted towards a narrow audience (Figure 6). Unlike overt steps or traditional covert action, such measures are low-cost, low-risk and highly deniable. Russian state interference in the 2016 US presidential elections is likely to be just the tip of this iceberg.14 Although defending against such attacks is primarily the work of intelligence and cybersecurity agencies, we should expect our diplomats to be alert to the risk of such attacks and attuned to the tell-tale fingerprints. But they need to have the tools and the digital literacy to recognise, understand and engage with such information-warfare and ‘active measures’ campaigns.

Figure 6: Content identified by Twitter as originating from and spread by the Russian Internet Research Agency during the 2016 US presidential election.
Source: Update on Twitter’s review of the 2016 US election, 31 January 2018, Twitter, online.

Moving beyond social media

DFAT’s use of digital tools needs to extend far beyond social media, however. In the consular sphere, the department now does a good job in engaging with the travelling public through the digital Smartraveller platforms, but it is yet to modernise how it communicates with some of its main clients within the government. 

The Australian diplomatic network’s main form of communication remains the classified diplomatic cable or telegram. This was once one of the best—indeed one of the only—ways of communicating information and analysis from abroad in a timely and secure fashion. But while modern technology has since moved on, and the pace of events with it, the cable system has remained frozen in time. For the demands of the modern ship of state, it’s too slow, too cumbersome and too difficult to access to be of much operational use. It’s thoroughly analogue, is largely internally focused and has a steadily shrinking readership and impact.

DFAT’s continued reliance on this system as its primary means of communication needlessly restricts its audience and increasingly deals it out of policy influence in Canberra, where many of the national security agencies don’t access or don’t bother to read DFAT’s cables. The department is completely out of sync with the working habits and preferences of today’s governing class, and how they wish to receive information. It doesn’t connect easily or widely to other agencies. Consequently, DFAT’s analysis and advice from its overseas network—one of its main value propositions—is underutilised and undervalued, with implications for policy influence, credibility and the contest for finite government resources.

DFAT must create and foster new methods of communication that are timelier, more accessible and more relevant. There should be different information products for different purposes and different audiences, and the cable system should be only one of several ways in which our diplomats convey information and analysis. As just one suggestion, why not create the equivalent of an encrypted Telegram group or closed Twitter feed that allows non-sensitive but time-critical reporting from across the diplomatic network, with a smattering of judgement and analysis, to be accessed by decision-makers in news-feed style from their handheld devices? Figure 7 shows what it could look like: daily headline take-outs from across our diplomatic network, designed for decision-makers without the time, ability or appetite to wade through the cable system (but with links to more comprehensive analysis). There would still be a place for more detailed reporting and analysis (perhaps accessed via links to a secure cloud-based site), but that, too, should be in a form that reflects the habits and preferences of the readership. Newspapers have made the painful transition away from print and towards new media. DFAT should walk the same path.

Figure 7: Illustrative example of a sample DiploFeed from 2018 (fictional infographic only—does not represent the views of DFAT or its posts)

Rethinking diplomacy

We need to rethink how we do diplomacy in the digital age. A diplomatic presence shouldn’t always have to mean an embassy or a chancery, with all the expense and infrastructure and security overlay that entails. Modern-day communication tools are so powerful that we should rightly expect our diplomats to operate more self-sufficiently, just as foreign correspondents do. There are many parts of the world where Australia would benefit from greater diplomatic representation—we have one of the smallest diplomatic footprints of any country in the OECD, after all 15 —but where we have none because the entry costs to establish a full embassy are so high. Digital tools have brought those barriers to entry down. There should no longer be a minimum viable size for an embassy. We should consider an ‘embassy-lite’ or one-person post in countries where we could do with a presence but can’t justify a fully fledged embassy. With DFAT’s ‘pop-up embassy’ in Estonia, Australia has made a small start down this path. We should continue.16

Similarly, we must assess whether states and international organisations are the only external actors that are worthy of a dedicated diplomatic presence. We should look at creating dedicated ambassadors to the tech giants of Silicon Valley, as France and Denmark have done.17 The FAANGs— Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google—are now immensely important international actors in their own right. Together, their market capitalisation is US$3 trillion, but it’s their business model and ubiquity as much as their size that make them key actors for states. We have issues at stake with each of them—from privacy to taxation, from counterterrorism to cyber-interference and national security capabilities. Similarly for the major Chinese tech giants, the BATs (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent), whose enduring influence might prove to be greater and about which we know and understand far too little.

Why not have ambassadors dedicated to building and managing these critical relationships, which are surely as important as our relationships with some of the smaller countries where we maintain a diplomatic presence?

In order to modernise diplomacy, Australia needs to begin envisaging the diplomatic network in a different way. Whereas in the past the government provided the network and infrastructure for traditional diplomatic interactions, the erosion of that monopoly means this network is at risk of becoming an underutilised asset. The flag and the chancery, the titles and the flummery, still count for a lot, as do the local networks, contacts and expertise, but how do we get more out of those assets?

The answer lies in broadening our conception of an embassy. We should be using our overseas presence as a platform and enabler to advance our interests across a much broader spectrum, and for a much broader set of stakeholders. Trade, economic and commercial diplomacy have always been traditional partners in this respect, but we need to look much further afield. How can we use the overseas network to support collaboration in innovation and research? How can we use our embassies to keep Australia on the cutting edge of public policy? What value or perspectives from overseas can be brought to bear on some of the major challenges in Australian domestic policy? These areas will depend on the complementarities and opportunities that exist, but they shouldn’t be treated as the poor cousins of traditional diplomatic work. The challenge is to conceive of the embassy as a facilitator of productive interaction and a broker of relationships—a creative hub of networks—and to find creative, non-traditional ways to use the overseas network to advance Australian national interests across the full spectrum.

Finally, DFAT needs to adopt some of the nimbleness and agility of the tech world. The bureaucracy is still far too slow to adopt reform and changes, partly because it insists on any changes happening wholesale, only after painstaking deliberation, and in a culture that focuses debilitatingly on downside risk and punishes failure. Why not encourage internal innovation, meaning different ways of delivering the same product? Promote experimentation and differential approaches. Test new platforms and business models. Run some pilots, iterate and adjust, gather the evidence, and see what works best. Don’t insist on homogeneity. Tolerate some screw-ups and failures and learn from them.18 This is the secret to innovation and continuous improvement, and it’s essential if our diplomatic services are to keep pace with the modern world.

Recommendations

  1. Commission an independent review of DFAT’s digital diplomacy efforts.19 The review should examine the department’s digital capabilities, assess the digital operating environment for Australian diplomacy, and make recommendations to improve Australia’s digital diplomacy effort.
  2. Treat digital diplomacy as core tradecraft, rather than optional add-on. Provide compulsory digital platform training for all outgoing heads of mission.
  3. Encourage healthy internal competition and innovation. Generate a monthly scorecard highlighting the best digital performers and posts. Promote and celebrate the successes.
  4. Pilot more sophisticated data analytics tools to analyse and measure impact, reach and engagement—and adjust tactics accordingly. Appoint a Chief Data Scientist to harness and employ data in the service of diplomacy.
  5. Develop and pilot a new stream of diplomatic reporting that’s punchier and timelier and reaches a broader audience on hand-held devices.
  6. Create new positions of ambassador to Silicon Valley (based in San Francisco) and ambassador to China’s tech giants (based in Beijing).
  7. Increase avenues to engage the Chinese public via Chinese social media platforms. This expansion should include dedicated Weibo accounts for the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.20
  8. Run a pilot of ‘embassy-lite’ or one-person posts. They’ll be more substantial and enduring than the ‘pop-up embassy’ in Estonia but still substantially lighter in footprint than a fully fledged diplomatic mission.
  9. Encourage innovation and experimentation in the conduct of digital diplomacy. Highlight and champion successes. Learn from (but don’t punish) the inevitable failures. Use DFAT’s Innovation XChange in this task, but broaden its focus beyond the aid program and extend its remit into mainstream diplomacy.
  10. Recognise that our overseas network is an underutilised asset. Find creative but non-traditional ways to use it to advance Australian national interests. Conceive of embassies as hubs and connectors for a broad set of interactions. Highlight and promote the strong performers (sending the cultural signal to others).
  11. Create a Twitter account for the Secretary of DFAT to internally signal the importance of digital diplomacy, to provide a further mouthpiece for Australian interests, and to give the public insight into the important work that Australia’s diplomatic service does every day.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

The ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre’s mission is to shape debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues, informed by original research and close consultation with government, business and civil society.

It seeks to improve debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues by:

  1. conducting applied, original empirical research
  2. linking government, business and civil society
  3. leading debates and influencing policy in Australia and the Asia–Pacific.

We thank all of those who contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the subject matter. The work of the ICPC would be impossible without the financial support of our various sponsors.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2019

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

  1. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Social media, Australian Government, no date, online. ↩︎
  2. See, for instance, Fergus Hanson, ‘DFAT the dinosaur needs to find Facebook friends’, The Australian, 23 November 2010, online. ↩︎
  3. See twiplomacy, online, for rankings across a number of dimensions. ↩︎

Weibo diplomacy and censorship in China

Sina Weibo

Since its inception in 2009, Sina Weibo – China’s souped-up version of Twitter – has provided a rare foothold for foreign governments in the PRC’s tightly-controlled media environment.

Yet while the PRC is allowed free reign to push its messages in Western media and social media platforms, Beijing’s censors have been hampering the legitimate digital diplomacy efforts of foreign embassies.

This ASPI ICPC report provides an in-depth look at the increasingly sophisticated censorship methods being used on foreign embassies on Weibo and provides a series of recommendations for foreign governments, including Australia, to address these policy challenges.

What’s the problem?

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led state extends its reach into other nations, it’s actively limiting the ability of other countries to do the same in the People’s Republic of China. Seeing itself in an ideological confrontation with ‘the West’,1 the CCP under Xi Jinping is determined to ensure ideological conformity in its own information space.

A key battleground is Weibo, the Chinese micro-blogging service most closely analogous to Twitter. Since Weibo’s inception, embassies have maintained a presence on it—a rare foothold for foreign governments in China’s tightly controlled information space.

While some governments, particularly those of Western countries, have occasionally spoken outside the CCP’s frame of acceptable public discourse, most do not. As Weibo continues to introduce new and subtle methods of direct censorship, foreign embassies are both self-censoring their messaging and failing to speak up when their content is being censored.

In Australia’s case, this lack of transparency and cycle of self-censorship sits oddly with the description of Australia as ‘a determined advocate of liberal institutions, universal values and human rights’ in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.2

What’s the solution?

To not be seen as agreeing to the CCP’s ideological agenda, like-minded governments, in coordination with each other, should commit to publishing transparency reports to reveal the extent to which their legitimate online public diplomacy efforts are being curtailed in China.

Foreign governments should establish and publish clear terms of use for their social media accounts in China so that they don’t fall into the trap of self-censoring their policy messages and advocacy. They should use uncensored social media platforms such as Twitter—which, despite being blocked in China, still has an estimated 10 million active users in the country.3

Embassies could cross-post all of their content there so that audiences are both aware of any incidences of censorship and have alternative avenues to access their full content. The Australian Government should establish Weibo accounts for the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

‘Orwellian nonsense’

In early May 2018, the US Embassy in China put Weibo censors in a delicate bind when it issued a provocative slapdown of Beijing’s censorship overreach.

‘President Donald J Trump ran against political correctness in the United States’, read the White House statement, which had been translated into Mandarin.4 ‘He will stand up for Americans resisting efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to impose Chinese political correctness on American companies and citizens.’

The statement was put out in response to the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration’s call on 36 foreign airlines, asking them to come into line with Beijing’s preferred terms of reference for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau as ‘Chinese territories’.

The statement continued: ‘This is Orwellian nonsense and part of a growing trend by the Chinese Communist Party to impose its political views on American citizens and private companies.’ It went further still: ‘China’s internal Internet repression is world-famous. China’s efforts to export its censorship and political correctness to Americans and the rest of the free world will be resisted.’

The post, most likely penned by White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, was a deliberate poke in the eye for Beijing and it promptly caused a firestorm on the platform.

In the short history of Weibo diplomacy, sometimes referred to as ‘Weiplomacy’, it was the most direct challenge to China’s censorship regime yet. Having shone a mirror on their own activities, Sina Weibo’s censors were put on the spot.

‘Only folks with strong connections (like you) can avoid getting censored’ read the most upvoted comment in the hour immediately after the post went out (Figure 1). ‘I can imagine the censorship department scratching their heads over this,’ read another comment.5

Notably, Hu Xijin, the chief editor of Global Times, the nationalist newspaper owned by the CCP, took to his own Weibo account to call on ‘Weibo management’ to refrain from intervening.6

Instead, in the ensuing few hours, Sina Weibo’s censors used every tool at their disposal short of deleting the post to ensure that the missive had as little impact as possible. Not only was the sharing function for the post switched off, but the comments section under the post was carefully manicured to remove liberal voices and replace them with CCP-approved sentiment (Figure 2).

Figure 1: The comments section under the US Embassy post less than an hour after it was published included users directly challenging the censorship regime.

Translation

  • Only folks with strong connections (like you) can avoid getting censored. [2,656 Likes]
  • I’m also against political correctness or imposing your ideology on others but respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries should not be mixed up with ideology. [2,077 Likes]
  • If we were exercising extreme oppression on the domestic Internet, do you think you’d still be talking shit here? [1,277 Likes]
  • Hahahahaha seeing in my living years the US opposing China’s political correctness.. [1,027 Likes]
  • How does our press freedom rank in the world again, one hundred and something right? [634 Likes]
  • I sincerely hope the Indians can claim back their land and establish their own country, while Hawaii could become an independent country. [814 Likes]
  • If you don’t want to do business here, then f&#% off. If you do want to do business here, respect our laws. [497 Likes]
  • [I] support President Trump’s thinking, the world belongs to the people, not a certain party. [378 Likes]
  • Leave your name here before the post gets deleted. [321 Likes]

Figure 2: The comments section under the US Embassy post (now seen in mobile view) around 2 hours after it was published and after censors removed posts that didn’t toe the party line.

Translation

  • If you don’t want to do business here, then f&#% off. If you do want to do business here, respect our laws. [110,000 Likes] 
  • When China and the US established diplomatic relations in 1972, Nixon openly accepted China’s political correctness during his trip here. Are you now denying the establishment of diplomatic relations? [7,854 Likes]
  • Independence for Hawaii
    Independence for Alaska
    Independence for California
    Independence for Texas
    Independence for New Mexico [7,108 Likes]
  • 1. This is not political correctness, this is the one-China principle.
  • 2. Please abide by the terms of the Sino-US joint communique, if you choose to unilaterally go against them, it will be seen as a violation of the agreement. [6,560 Likes]

The incident was an object lesson in how sophisticated the PRC censorship apparatus has become and how precisely it can be deployed. It may be ‘Orwellian nonsense’, but it does largely work. While some Western media reports 7 took care to note that more varied opinions were expressed by Weibo users under the post before the censors swooped in, most reports didn’t.8

What remained after the censors had done their work was nothing more than a Potemkin post, with the comments under it carefully selected to give the impression of a uniformly nationalistic online Chinese public. Such an impression has led previous scholarship on ‘Weiplomacy’ to conclude that the power of Weibo to further the goals of public diplomacy might have been overestimated.9

But a closer examination of the comment section under the post revealed a plethora of viewpoints that the censors failed to expunge. Even though the censors had cherrypicked CCP-approved comments to feature as the most upvoted comments, many of the comments under those comments weren’t toeing the party line (Figure 3). Peeling back the curtain on the Potemkin post reveals the raucous marketplace of ideas that still exists on Weibo, if one takes the time to seek it out.

Figure 3: The comments under the cherrypicked nationalist comments reveal sentiment from opposing ideological clusters.

Translation

  • If you don’t want to do business here, then f&#% off. If you do want to do business here, respect our laws. [12,076 Likes]
  • ‘Little pink’ maggots [a derogatory term for young nationalists] are really disgusting [4,879 Likes]
  • So ZTE deserved to be prosecuted in the US because it didn’t obey their laws. [3,319 Likes]
  • ‘War Wolves’ [a reference to patriotic hit Chinese film Wolf Warrior] always think the rest of the world couldn’t survive without China. [3,302 Likes]
  • Saying it like this is a bit extreme. China and the US affect each other mutually. Chinese airlines need to fly to the US and US airlines need to fly to China. It’s not possible for only one side to depend on the other for business. [3,091 Likes]
  • [The commenter] is obviously a slave but one who talks with the tone of a master. [1,970 Likes]

Weibo and foreign governments: a history of censorship and self-censorship

Three years after the UK Embassy became the first foreign embassy to open an account on Sina Weibo, Jonas Parello-Plesner warned that diplomats should be wary of creeping self-censorship.

‘Embassies shouldn’t accept self-censorship by only posting innocuous tweet[s] that can pass through the censors,’ Parello-Plesner wrote in The Diplomat in 2012.10 ‘Instead they should give the full spectrum of views including on values—even if it means more deleted postings.’

In the intervening years, some foreign embassies took up the challenge, showing a willingness to push the envelope even at the risk of having their content censored. At times, the envelope pushing has been inspired. Doing this required them to be quite creative, because being predictable means being easily blocked.

On 30 May 2012, the US Embassy tapped into Michael Jackson’s popularity in China to give a boost to a politically sensitive interview with then ambassador Gary Locke.11

‘Michael Jackson has an album called Thriller, one of the best selling records in the history of music. The story we’re telling today is also a Thriller. Click to read,’ read the post, which also included a picture of the famous album (Figure 4).

The link led to a Newsweek interview titled ‘Ambassador to China Gary Locke talks Chen, Drama in China’,12 which included details about the attempt by former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun to get political asylum from the US, as well as the dramatic story of activist Chen Guangcheng’s successful bid for political asylum.

Figure 4: The censored 2012 Weibo post from the US Embassy, which used Michael Jackson’s celebrity as a smokescreen for a politically sensitive interview with then ambassador Gary Locke. The post was archived on FreeWeibo.com.

In 2014, the UK Embassy posted a 2013 human rights report to Weibo using ‘Martian’, a coded language based on Chinese characters (Figure 5).13

Figure 5: The 2014 Weibo post from the UK Embassy, which used coded language in an attempt to evade censorship.

If the post had gone out using standard Chinese, keywords deemed sensitive by the party-state, such as ‘human rights’, would have been flagged automatically. But by using the ‘Martian’ coded language, the longevity of the post was prolonged before the censors became aware of it.14

In other instances, embassies have posted ‘sensitive’ content on Weibo in order to address what they have perceived as unfair treatment by China’s state-controlled media.

On 3 August 2011, the Canadian Embassy was censored for the first time after it posted about Chinese fugitive Lai Changxing. The post included a full federal court decision that resulted in his deportation to China. It included mentions of Liu Xiaobo and Falun Gong and was deleted almost immediately.15

At other times, foreign embassies have tested the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable discourse by Beijing’s censors. In 2016, the US consulate in Shanghai sent out a Weibo post asking for virtual private network (VPN) supplier recommendations. The post was deleted within an hour of its appearance.16

On 1 February 2017, the British Embassy posted an EU statement calling for the investigation of allegations of torture of detained human rights lawyers.17 According to Citizen Lab, Weibo users weren’t able to forward or comment on the post.18 The post was subsequently deleted. And on 3 June 2014, a day before the 25th anniversary of the massacre at Tiananmen Square, the Canadian Embassy posted a photo of Ambassador Guy Saint-Jacques posing with his wife at the site (Figure 6). The low comments-to-shares ratio on the provocative post would suggest some form of censorship, with comments either being deleted or not allowed at all.

Figure 6: Canadian Ambassador and his wife at Tiananmen Square, 2014

The text reads:

  • ‘On June 1, ambassador Guy Saint-Jacques and wife Sylvie Cameron took a tour around the Chairman Mao Memorial on their bikes. A visit to the place they once saw reminded of various past events associated with the square, including the once more cordial and relaxed atmosphere there.’
  • Despite being shared 917 times, the post only displays a few comments—a telltale sign that censors had throttled engagement with it.
  • One share of the post added the comment: ‘There are only a few comments on this post, and you can’t see any of the shares of it.’

At times, the act of censorship happens not because an embassy has made a decision to push the envelope, but because it’s made a diplomatic faux pas. On 26 March 2014, the Russian Embassy Weibo account made what Foreign Policy called a ‘large digital diplomacy gaffe’ when it made mention of the Tiananmen incident. The embassy argued that ‘Russia’s current situation’, following Western sanctions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, ‘somewhat resembles what China suffered after the Tiananmen incident.19

More recently, however, the instances of blatant censorship—in which posts and even the accounts themselves are deleted—appear to have dropped off. Instead, as this report shows, the invisible hand of Beijing’s censors is, for the most part, eschewing heavy-handed censorship for more surreptitious forms. At the same time, it appears that foreign embassies on Weibo are pulling their punches and accepting ‘the sliding slope of red lines and self-censorship inside the Chinese system’ that Parello-Plesner warned about.20 The combination results in the suppression of ideas that are different from the CCP’s ‘correct line’.

Websites FreeWeibo and Weiboscope have been extremely useful for uncovering examples of blatant censorship, including deletions of posts and keyword blocking. However, less obvious forms of censorship are more difficult to detect. Some of those methods include disabling the comments section under posts and switching off their sharing functionality.

The disabling of comments has been one of many levers that Sina Weibo’s censors have been able to pull from as early as 2012, when, rather heavy-handedly, all comments on all posts were switched off after rumours of a coup spread on the platform.21

Similar forms of surreptitious censorship include ‘shadow-banning’, in which users are under the impression that their posts are being seen when in fact they’re being hidden from other users. The practice is known to be used, if only anecdotally, on Sina Weibo, but has been proven to be in use on China’s dominant chat application, WeChat. 22

These stealthier forms of censorship are less noticeable to the user and therefore less likely to provoke any unwanted backlash.23 As Lawrence Lessig observed in 1999, it’s the underlying code that determines ‘whether access to information is general or whether information is zoned’.24 Or to rework the old aphorism, ‘If a message is posted on social media, but the algorithm doesn’t prioritise it, does it really make a sound?’

How censorship on Weibo works

An analysis of three months’ worth of Weibo posts between November 2017 and January 2018 from the top 10 foreign embassies in China (measured by follower numbers) found 51 instances of censored posts, mostly on the US Embassy account (Figure 7).25

Figure 7: Three months of Weibo posts from November 2017 to January 2018 resulted in 51 instances of censorship.

The US Embassy account had 28 instances of censorship in total, and a variety of methods were used to reduce or erase the impact of its posts. Those methods ranged from the blunt to the subtle:

  • Six posts were deleted—some immediately, some weeks after the fact.
  • Fifteen posts had their comments sections disabled immediately.
  • Three posts had comments sections disabled immediately and then re-enabled weeks later.
  • Two posts had their comments sections allowed, then disabled and hidden at some later stage.
  • In two posts, Weibo notified users that comments were being accepted but asked that they wait patiently for a ‘server synchronisation’. The user comments never made it through.

A range of censorship methods were used on US Embassy posts, ranging from the blunt to the subtle (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Censorship methods used on the US Embassy Weibo account

In a blatant act of censorship, a post sent out by the US Embassy on 7 November 2017 showing the first leg of President Trump’s Asian tour, in Japan, was immediately deleted. The deleted post—captured and archived by FreeWeibo.com 26—was also tweeted from the US Embassy Twitter account,27 helping to make its absence on Weibo more noticeable (Figure 9).

Figure 9: The US Embassy tweet, the Weibo equivalent of which was deleted by Chinese censors.

TranslationPresident Trump and First Lady Melania Trump were welcomed by the Emperor and Queen of Japan on the second day of their Japan visit. They also met with the families of North Korean abductees. President Trump held bilateral talks with Abe, and met with Japanese and American business leaders, while the First Lady had a joyous meeting with some Japanese primary school students. #POTUSinAsia

Two days later, on 9 November 2017—the second day of President Trump’s first state visit to the PRC—a post sent out by the US Embassy linking to a transcript of a press briefing by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (Figure 10)28 had its comments section immediately disabled.

The post contained a statement from Secretary Tillerson that presented President Trump and President Xi as being on a joint ticket in regard to denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and quickly became that week’s most shared post from the embassy, with 523 shares and 441 ‘Likes’.

Figure 10: The tweet about Rex Tillerson, the Weibo equivalent of which was deleted by Chinese censors.

Translation: President Trump and President Xi confirmed their determination in realising the complete, verifiable and ever lasting denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. President Trump and President Xi won’t accept a North Korea that is armed with nuclear weapons. We thank China’s cooperation. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at Beijing Press Conference. Read the brief.

On 17 November, another post quoted a different part of Secretary Tillerson’s earlier press briefing:

The key topic of discussion was our continued joint effort to increase pressure on North Korea, to convince them to abandon their nuclear and missile program. President Trump and President Xi affirmed their commitment to achieve a complete, verifiable, and permanent denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump and President Xi will not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea.

On 24 November, another post quoted President Trump from his joint press conference with President Xi two weeks earlier: 29

All responsible nations must join together to stop arming and financing, and even trading with the murderous North Korean regime. Together we have in our power to finally liberate this region and the world from this very serious nuclear menace. But it will require collective action, collective strength, and collective devotion to winning the peace.

And on 30 November 2017, a US Embassy Weibo post announced a call between President Trump and President Xi after Pyongyang tested a missile reportedly capable of reaching the US mainland (Figure 11).30 A copy of the post remains on the US mission’s Twitter account.31

Figure 11: The tweet about Trump’s phone call with Xi, the Weibo equivalent of which was deleted by Chinese censors on Weibo.

Translation: President Trump spoke with President Xi to discuss North Korea’s latest missile test. President Trump stressed America’s determination to defend itself and its allies from the growing threat posed by the North Korean regime. November 29, 2017, the White House President Trump and President Xi call briefing.

Six months after these four posts were published, they no longer exist. It’s unclear when exactly the censors deleted them. This method of delayed censorship avoids detection on FreeWeibo.com, where there are no records of the posts being censored. With the North Korea nuclear crisis still a live issue, the deletions suggest that Beijing is trying to regain control of the narrative inside its own information space.

On 27 December 2017, the US Embassy was censored again after it sent out a post linking to a US– German embassy joint statement about the sentencing of activist Wu Gan and his lawyer, Xie Yang:

We see lawyers and defenders of rights as aiding the strengthening of the Chinese society via developing governance by law. Click the link here to view the recent cases.

The post was captured on FreeWeibo.com after being censored on Weibo.32

Aside from these six instances of deleted posts, all other instances of censorship captured in this report involved the disabling of the comments section under posts. This softer, less noticeable form of censorship is what’s more generally applied to posts from foreign embassies, resulting in suspiciously low levels of reported engagement from users. Engagement levels are artificially deflated when comments are disabled.

In a response to a list of questions asked by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC), three governments—the US, Australian and Japanese—confirmed that their embassies in Beijing never disable the comment sections under their Weibo posts.33

‘We don’t delete our own posts,’ a US Embassy spokesperson told ASPI ICPC via email. ‘The US Embassy faces regular and routine blocking of social media posts in China.’ 34

‘We don’t disable the comments section ourselves,’ a Japanese Embassy spokesperson told an ASPI ICPC researcher over the phone. ‘When comments are closed for posts it’s always done by Sina. They will always disable comments for posts mentioning the names of Chinese political leaders, for example.’

In fact, in the data covered in this report, 75% of the time censorship appears to have been meted out because a top Chinese official (living or dead) was mentioned by name or was in a photo in the post.

The sensitivity around senior Chinese officials isn’t surprising. In his 2013 book, Blocked on Weibo, Jason Q Ng found that the largest share of blocked words he discovered through his research were names of people, mostly CCP members.

‘[P]rotection from criticism on Weibo seems to be a perk for rising up the ranks—while dissidents and people caught up in scandals or crimes make up the rest of the names,’ Ng wrote.35

A post by the Cuban Embassy on 25 January 2018 mentions Song Tao (宋涛) , the head of the CCP’s International Department. The post described Song as ‘Secretary Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy’, which was probably the reason for the censorship that followed (Figure 12).

Figure 12: A Cuban Embassy post runs into trouble

Translation of error message: Sorry, you cannot proceed with your attempt as the content contains information that has violated relevant laws and regulations or Weibo community guidelines.

Even when posts mentioning Xi Jinping are positive, they still attract the attention of censors. In October 2017, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd posted a photo of himself ‘studying’ Xi’s report to the 19th CPC National Congress (Figure 13). ‘China has entered a new age,’ he wrote. According to Rudd, comments under the post were disabled by Weibo. 36

Figure 13: Comments were disabled after Kevin Rudd posted on Weibo

A Sina spokesperson confirmed to ASPI’s ICPC that government-affiliated Weibo accounts with a blue verified badge have the ability to disable the comment sections on their own posts.37 However, in the dataset collected for this report, only one instance of a foreign embassy disabling its own comments was found, on the South Korean embassy’s Weibo account (Figure 14).

Figure 14: The error message reads ‘Due to this user’s settings, you’re unable to comment.’ The South Korean embassy did not respond to ASPI ICPC’s enquiries.

Occasionally, there are exceptions to the censorship rules. An uncensored post from Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sent on 6 December 2017 included Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s name in the text, as well as Li’s image in a photo.38 

The outsized success of a selfie taken by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and posted to Weibo in July 2015 is another exception to the rule (Figure 15). 39 The virality of the post was due not only to the rare inclusion of a top Chinese leader, but also due to the content, in which Modi wishes Li a happy birthday. Premier Li’s exact birthday hadn’t been publicly disclosed before.40

Figure 15: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang post a selfie

In a rare case during the 2017 G20 summit in Germany, any mention of Russian President Vladimir Putin was blocked on Weibo, according to the Financial Times.41

The move was interpreted by the paper as ‘giving Russia’s president an immunity from public criticism usually reserved for China’s Communist Party elite.’ In that instance, any mention of Putin on the accounts of Weibo users with more than 1,000 followers triggered the message: ‘This post does not allow commenting.’

Out of 51 instances of suspected censorship over the three-month study period, only 13 were posts that didn’t mention any top Chinese leaders.

One particularly notable instance of censorship was of a 13 November 2017 post from the US Embassy Weibo account, which included a video of President Donald Trump emphasising the US as a country whose ‘home’ is ‘on the Pacific’ (Figure 16).

Figure 16: Comments are disabled on US Embassy’s post of President Trump speaking about the US and the Pacific.

Translation of error message: Sorry, you cannot proceed with your attempt as the content contains information that has violated relevant laws and regulations or Weibo community guidelines.

Other, more personal, attempts at cross-cultural communication were also hamstrung by the censors. On the final day of President Trump’s state visit to the PRC, a video of Trump’s 6-year-old granddaughter Arabella Kushner that Trump had personally shown President Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan was published on the US Embassy account and immediately had the comments section on it disabled (Figure 17).

Figure 17: Screenshot of the US embassy’s post of Arabella Kushner singing in Chinese. Comments on the post were immediately disabled.

On the same day, a Weibo post written in the first person by President Trump at the end of his state visit to the PRC appeared:

I’m now leaving China for Vietnam for the APEC meeting #APEC2017#. First Lady Melania will stay here to visit the zoo, and of course, the Great Wall of China. Then she will go to Alaska to greet our amazing troops.

The post prompted some users to ask in comments whether Trump had taken over control of the US Embassy account.

After 39 comments were made, any subsequent attempt to comment resulted in an error message reading: ‘Posted successfully. Please be patient about 1–2 minutes delay due to server synchronization, thank you’ (Figure 18).

Figure 18: The Trump post at the end of his China visit.

Translation of error message: Posted successfully. Please be patient about 1–2 minutes delay due to server synchronization, thank you.

Two other posts by the US Embassy probably drew the ire of Weibo’s censors by providing an opportunity for Chinese netizens to draw comparisons between conditions in the US and China.

One such post answered a question posed to the US Embassy Weibo account about whether American officials were provided with special food supplies (Figure 19).42 Chinese news reports in 2011 revealed that Chinese Government officials have exclusive suppliers of organic food.43 Given that the post didn’t include any sensitive words that might cross a censorship fault line, it managed to garner at least 88 comments before commenting was disabled by the censors.

Figure 19: One of only 13 censored posts that didn’t refer to a senior Chinese leader, this post seemed to invite a comparison of US officials to Chinese officials, and comments were disabled.

Weibo accounts run by the US Government have been suspended and even completely deleted in the past. The US Shanghai consulate’s Weibo account was shut down on 14 July 2012, while the US Embassy account was suspended briefly on 5 May 2016, according to China Digital Times, which is a website following social and political developments in China and run by the University of California.44

At times, it’s less clear why a decision to disable comments was made. When the US Embassy posted that it wouldn’t be able to continue posting to Weibo and WeChat during a government shutdown on 22 January 2018, the post went viral (Figure 20).45 It was the second most shared of all posts gathered during the three-month reporting period for this report.

Figure 20: A post by the US Embassy, explaining that it wouldn’t be posting during a government shutdown, was picked up by the Chinese media.

Translation: Due to an unresolved issue with funding, the US embassy’s social media account will cease its regular updates. While the funding issue remains unresolved, all regular and emergency consular, citizen and immigration services will continue as usual. Those seeking visa or citizen services who have secured an appointment in advance should attend as scheduled. In the exception of emergency security and safety information, the embassy website will not continue its regular updates before full resumption of operations.

However, after the post garnered 1,893 comments, further comments were disabled, despite the Global Times’ gleeful reporting on the incident.46

For China’s overzealous censors, even posts that could be used to show the apparent weaknesses of liberal democracies, such as the US Embassy’s government shutdown post, need to be censored—presumably for fear that discussion of the US Government will prompt users to draw comparisons to their own government. Clearly, the censors, of which Sina Weibo employs an estimated 13,000,47 are highly sensitive to any content that falls outside the boundaries of acceptable CCP-approved discourse.

It follows that a country such as Australia, which claims to be ‘a determined advocate of liberal institutions, universal values and human rights’,48 should expect such advocacy to attract the attention of China’s censors. If it didn’t, something would be odd. However, the Australian Embassy Weibo account doesn’t appear to be attracting much CCP censorship. In the three months of data collected for this report, the embassy’s Weibo account was censored only three times, all for mentioning Xi Jinping. Whether this lack of censorship reflects savvy account management, the CCP’s disinterest in the embassy Weibo account or self-censorship by the Australian Government is the important question.

Rising nationalism

Rising Chinese nationalism online has been allowed to foment amid recent social media campaigns against companies such as South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group, German carmaker Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz brand and Marriott International. The campaigns have received support from both state-run media and the Chinese Government.49

On 17 November 2017, an innocuous post by the German Embassy explaining the meaning of the German word Lückenbüßer (stopgap)50, became a place for nationalists to congregate and protest after pro-Tibetan independence flags were sighted at a soccer match in Germany involving Chinese players (Figure 21).

Figure 21: The German Embassy Weibo post and angry responses from nationalists.

Translation: Luther invented the word Lückenbüßer while translating the Old Testament. The word is about holes and cracks needing to be mended in the Holy Wall in Jerusalem. This is the origin of the word. Today, it refers to a person who acts as a replacement for the one missing from the original plan, although the plan does
not work out in the end. No one wants to be a measure of expediency, but we often cannot do without one. During a period of transition when changes are about to happen, or when a final choice has yet to be made, it usually connects the world together.

Translation of comments:

  • You want freedom of speech? Sure! Next time you Germans want to come to China for any games, we will bombard with swastika flags and photos of Hitler, and salute and chant the name of Hilter throughout, and belt out Nazi songs! Then you’d be happy, be content! A nation that cannot retain its roots is really pathetic, of course, they will treat the territorial integrity of other nations as bullshit!
  • You deserve terrorist attacks in Europe, it’s all your own making!
  • Can we perform Nazi rituals and bear Nazi flags when the German team comes to China?
  • Since some people purposely provoked aggression with flags for Tibetan independence during a China–Germany soccer match, while you brushed it aside with the excuse of freedom of speech, I think it would not be an issue to paste around your embassy all with flags of east Germany!
  • What is freedom of speech? If the separation of China can be counted as freedom of speech, then we sincerely hope that you would again divide Germany into two countries.

The prevalence of such deep nationalism, both real and manufactured, has prompted some, like Adelaide University scholar Ying Jiang, in her pioneering research into ‘Weiplomacy’ efforts, to suggest that the power of Weibo to further the goals of public diplomacy might have been overestimated.51 It’s easy to see how that could be the case. While liberal voices face extra scrutiny from the censors, nationalist voices are allowed to flourish. Even foreigners on Weibo have been tapping into Chinese nationalism as a fast track to viral fame on the platform.

David Gulasi, a China-based Australian English teacher, attracted attention on the platform with funny videos, but saw it skyrocket when he started aping nationalistic views. State media outlet Xinhua has noted that videos uploaded by Gulasi include one in which he ‘professed his love for China and denounced foreigners who did not share his passion for the country’.52

In 2016, when thousands of China-based trolls attacked Australian Olympic swimmer Mack Horton and his supporters after Horton called his Chinese rival Sun Yang a ‘drug cheat’, Gulasi joined in on Weibo (Figure 22).53

Figure 22: Joining a Chinese nationalist pile-on on Australian Olympian Mack Horton helped David Gulasi achieve viral fame on Weibo.

In another video, Gulasi complains about the slow pace of life in Australia and tells his audience he has come to China to pursue his ‘Chinese Dream’ 54 —a populist slogan introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013. Astoundingly, Gulasi was chosen by the Australian Embassy to feature in its 45 Years, 45 Stories campaign to commemorate the 45th anniversary of Australia–China diplomatic relations.55

Foreign embassies and even national leaders such as India’s Narendra Modi have had their Weibo accounts deluged with angry nationalistic messages.56 But in an increasingly censored and controlled online media environment, foreign embassy accounts can also be a channel for netizens to protest about their own government.

In early February 2018, the comments section on posts sent out by multiple foreign embassies, including the US, Japanese and UK embassies, as well as the United Nations, spontaneously became a space for Weibo users to protest the China Securities Regulatory Commission and its head, Liu Shiyu (Figure 23).57

Figure 23: A screenshot of the US embassy Weibo account from 9 February 2018. The screenshot was censored on Weibo but retrieved by FreeWeibo.com, a censorship monitoring site. Source: 科学自然 ‘科学自然:激动的中国股民涌到美国驻…’, FreeWeibo.com, 10 February 2018, online

Translation:

  • Since the China Securities Regulatory Commission Weibo has banned hundreds of millions of investors from protesting, all we can do is voice our fury here and strongly demand Liu Shiyu to step down.
  • Please have your American reporters go to the CSRC to interview Liu Shiyu, [and ask him] why is the Chinese stock market so unable to take a hit?
  • As our official platform has been censored, I just want to borrow this space to call for Liu Shiyu to step down. The stock market has crashed five times in two years, slaughtering hundreds of millions of investors
  • ‘641’ (a homonym for Liu Shiyu) must step down immediately, you’ve already seriously hurt hundreds of millions of families.

In April 2018, Weibo reversed a ban on content ‘related to’ homosexuality after an unusually fierce backlash from internet users.58

Both incidents reveal the diversity of views and ideological groupings that continue to exist online in China despite the party-state’s efforts to promote nationalism. Research by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) demonstrates how those widely differing views coexist on Chinese social media, even after extensive efforts by the CCP to repress liberal voices on the platform.59

Its research shows that ,while party-state propaganda plays a dominant role, a number of other distinct ideological clusters exist on Chinese social media sites such as Sina Weibo. Among the groupings they identify are ‘Market Lovers’, ‘Democratizers’, ‘Humanists’ and ‘US Lovers’.

Furthermore, a survey conducted by MERICS for the report shows that Chinese nationalism isn’t necessarily anti-Western. While 62% of respondents in the online survey said China should be more assertive internationally, 75% also supported the ‘spread of Western values’. As the paper points out, ‘the CCP’s strategy of denouncing so-called Western values has repeatedly backfired when netizens pointed out the lack of better Chinese alternatives.’ Western embassies’ public diplomacy efforts seem to have some fertile ground, despite the censorship.

Israel, the Weibo stand-out

The ICPC’s analysis of three months of posts from the top 10 foreign embassies on Weibo shows that a failure to cut through can’t be blamed only on censorship. Many foreign embassies simply aren’t putting enough resources into ensuring that their content is engaging enough to succeed in a highly competitive online media environment, or creative enough to not be easily spotted by censors.

The Israeli Embassy is a stand-out exception: it has a highly successful content strategy that has proved highly popular on the platform.
In her own research into ‘Weiplomacy’ efforts, Adelaide University scholar Ying Jiang captured 2015 data from the top 10 embassies on Weibo, and Israel didn’t make the list. Just a year later, research by Manya Koetse, editor-in-chief of the Chinese social trend tracking website What’s on Weibo, showed that the Israeli Embassy had come out of nowhere to take the top spot (Table 1).

Table 1: The top 10 foreign embassies on Weibo, 2015 to 2017

(Table-1)

Sources:
a) Ying Jiang, ‘Weibo as a public diplomacy platform’, Social Media and e-Diplomacy in China, 10 August 2017, online.
b) Manya Koetse, ‘Digital diplomacy: these foreign embassies are most (un)popular on Weibo’, What’s On Weibo, 20 December 2016, online.
c) Data collected by Fergus Ryan, December 2017.

Of course, a successful digital public diplomacy effort on Weibo should not only be judged by how many posts are censored; it should also be pragmatic. Above all, any digital diplomacy, or ‘e-diplomacy’, effort is fundamentally about the use of the internet and new information and communications technologies to help achieve diplomatic objectives.60

Drawing on data from late 2017, this report has Israel maintaining its lead at number 1 (despite losing followers), while the US and Canada continue to vie for second and third place. The UK has recovered from its loss of two places to regain the number 6 slot, while Australia has managed to re-enter the top 10.

However, follower counts can be a somewhat crude metric, as they can be easily gamed.

A 2014 investigation by The Globe and Mail found that large chunks of those followers were fake. According to the online tool used by the paper, 45.8% of the US Embassy’s followers, 39.9% of the UK’s and 51.2% of Japan’s were real. Only 12.9% of the Canadian Embassy’s 1.1 million followers were determined to be real.61

Another more meaningful metric is to examine the number of shares, likes and comments that each post gets on average to arrive at an idea of how ‘influential’ each embassy is (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Top 10 foreign embassies, by shares and likes per post

Using these engagement metrics, the Japanese, UK, US, Israeli and Canadian embassies are the top 5 leading the pack. 

Central to the success of the top 5 accounts is a tendency to not just promote the image of their own countries, but to engage with and leverage Chinese culture, particularly pop culture. Weibo’s audience skews young (88% of Weibo users are under 33 years of age) and, after its most vocal liberal voices were purged, is now largely dominated by entertainment.62

If the aim of foreign embassies on Weibo is to enhance soft power and to shift public opinion around to supporting their foreign policy positions, the Israeli Embassy Weibo account is exemplary. Shimi Azar, who worked as social media manager at the embassy from late 2014 to early 2016, says the country received a lot of exposure through state visits by Israel’s leaders to China.

‘The first visit of Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu to China in 2013 and the visit of the late president Shimon Peres in 2014 created a big buzz in the media,’ Azar told the Global Times.

‘So the embassy took advantage of this buzz and created a Sina Weibo account for Shimon Peres, which was very successful and soon attracted half a million followers.’63

But the outsized success of the Israeli Embassy Weibo account also occurred in the context of a number of deadly terrorist attacks by jihadist-inspired separatist groups in Xinjiang Province.64 As Peter Cai noted in 2014, the majority of comments under an Israeli Embassy Weibo post that likened Hamas to the Islamic State terrorist group were supportive of Israeli attacks on Hamas.

‘Israel, you must control the population in Gaza, otherwise it’s impossible for you to win. You should ditch your humanitarian principles and the only hope for you is to fight evil with evil,’ read one representative comment under the post.

Chinese netizen support for Israeli foreign policy, which goes against the official Beijing position, is still ongoing. Nine sentences sent out by the Israeli Embassy following US President Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was the most shared piece of embassy content (the item was shared 2,298 times) in the three-month period covered in this report (Figure 25).65

Figure 25: The most shared piece of embassy content—on the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital

The post, which outlines the official Israeli view of the history of Jerusalem, was positively received by Weibo users. ‘The world will rest assured and the people will be satisfied when Jerusalem is given to you,’ reads the most liked comment underneath the post.

‘Put the boot into the cancer of humanity’, the second most liked comment reads—a sentiment typical of a growing anti-Muslim sentiment online that has gone unchecked by Beijing’s censors. Islamophobia has been given a wide berth online in China as authorities continue to crack down in its restive region of Xinjiang. Frequent anti-Muslim comments under many Israeli embassy posts suggest that there’s a perception in their audience that the Israeli Embassy Weibo account is itself anti-Muslim.

A lack of coordination and transparency

But the efficacy of even the most well-resourced and strategic use of Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo is ultimately limited by the party-state. On his second official visit to China in December 2017, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sought to parlay his image as a ‘Weibo addict’ into a public diplomacy coup when he made his first stop a visit to Sina Weibo headquarters in Beijing.

Promotional material released before Trudeau’s visit to Weibo claimed the Q&A with the Canadian Prime Minister would be broadcast live, via video stream onto Weibo (Figure 16). But instead of seeing a live-stream of the proceedings, Weibo users at first saw only a delayed 36-second clip of the PM. It was only hours later that more of his appearance was made available.66 As the Canadian Government intended the event to be live-streamed, a reasonable conclusion is that the abrupt cancellation was due to Weibo censors.

Figure 26: A Sina Weibo poster advertising Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s video live-stream from Sina Weibo HQ. The poster refers to Trudeau as a ‘Weibo addict’.

Chinese officials, when questioned about the practice of censoring the comments section on foreign embassy Weibo accounts, pass the buck back to Sina Weibo. An exchange between a foreign journalist and an official at a recent Foreign Ministry press conference provides an illustrative example:

Q: Some Chinese investors were angry about the decline in the domestic stock market last week, and they used the US Embassy’s Weibo account to vent, posting comments to that account. On Saturday, we saw these comments have been blocked. Can you tell us your understanding as to what happened there? Does China see that the US is doing anything incorrect in this matter?

A: You might as well ask the US Embassy in China, whose staff is responsible for the maintenance of their own account.

Follow-up: It appears from our report that they did not take actions to block anything. That may have been the Weibo that blocked them.

A: I have not heard about what you mentioned. As I understand, you need to ask them if there are problems with their Weibo account. If the problem cannot be solved, they may contact relevant competent authorities. 67

Conclusion and policy recommendations

It’s estimated that Beijing spends US$10 billion a year on external propaganda, an order of magnitude higher than the US, which spent US$666 million on public diplomacy in 2014.68 Content from Chinese state media has featured in major Western outlets such as The Sydney Morning Herald, The Washington Post, the UK’s Daily Telegraph and Le Figaro as well as on the social media platforms Twitter and Facebook.

The reverse would be unthinkable in the PRC’s tightly controlled media environment. This is despite the fact that the PRC backed a landmark resolution in July 2012 at the UN Human Rights Council, which affirmed that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice.’69

Insisting that the PRC uphold the rights of its citizens to engage freely with the legitimate online public diplomacy efforts of foreign embassies isn’t a boutique concern. It’s a parallel issue to seeking reciprocity from the Chinese state for numerous other things, such as intellectual property regimes and market access. The PRC’s online censorship regime cloisters its netizens in an information environment that’s cut off from the rest of the world and primed with a nationalistic ideology. The more the Chinese party-state controls the media to promote its own narrative, the more it limits its own options for how it can resolve international conflicts.70

While CCP statements at the UN are reassuring, the trendlines for censorship in China are moving in the opposite direction. Under Xi’s rule, China has increasingly tightened its grip on the internet, concerned about the erosion of its ideology and policy by a vibrant online culture and the spectre of so-called ‘hostile foreign forces’. As this paper shows, Beijing’s censors aim to use almost imperceptible amounts of censorship to throttle discussion on Weibo that they deem falls outside the frame of discourse acceptable to the CCP party-state. For foreign governments, the temptation to self-censor is increasing.

Foreign governments should demand that Beijing refrain from censoring their legitimate and overt digital diplomacy efforts. Short of that, and probably more powerful for the netizen community, like-minded governments, in coordination with each other, should commit to publishing transparency reports, both to reveal the level of censorship that they’re receiving on Weibo and to demonstrate their commitment to presenting Western political norms and values to Chinese civil society. This can be very influential public diplomacy. It’s important that embassy Weibo accounts speak to China’s diverse netizen groups. Publishing a transparency report about CCP censorship will also inform those groups of their own government’s actions.

The continued meaningful presence of foreign embassy accounts—which occasionally speak outside the bounds of the CCP’s frame of acceptable discourse—will demonstrate those countries’ commitment to presenting Western political norms and values to Chinese civil society.

These accounts can also help reduce misunderstandings between foreign governments and the population of one of the world’s most powerful countries.
Changes need to be made to the way governments engage online in China. Those changes need to include preventive measures to stop governments falling into a cycle of self-censorship. This paper makes the following recommendations:

  1. Governments need to become more assertive and more creative in their messaging on Chinese social media platforms. Of course, some content should be tailored for local audiences. But foreign governments must ensure that they’re communicating the same policy and political messages to the Chinese public as they are to other publics around the world. They are likely to be censored for this.
  2. Foreign governments should use uncensored social media platforms such as Twitter—which, despite being blocked in China, still has an estimated 10 million active users in the country 71 — to cross-post all of their content. That way, incidences of censorship will be transparent and available to global audiences. Cross-posting content elsewhere also gives Chinese netizens an alternative avenue to access and engage with uncensored content. The US Embassy’s Twitter account—which as 738,000 followers—provides other countries with a good model.72
  3. When governments have their official content censored on Chinese online platforms, they should raise this censorship directly with their Chinese Government counterparts. Those countries 73 which allow the Chinese Communist Party an open media and cyber environment to communicate all of its official messages should request reciprocity.
  4. The Australian Government needs more avenues to engage the Chinese public and to put different messages forward. Dedicated official accounts for the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister should be established immediately.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Amber Ziye Wang for her help researching this paper. He’d also like to thank Richard McGregor, Peter Cai and Alex Joske for their comments, which greatly improved the final product. He’s also immensely grateful to my colleagues at ASPI, Danielle Cave, Fergus Hanson and Michael Shoebridge, for their crucial assistance.


ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

The ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre’s mission is to shape debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues, informed by original research and close consultation with government, business and civil society.

It seeks to improve debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues by:

  1. conducting applied, original empirical research
  2. linking government, business and civil society
  3. leading debates and influencing policy in Australia and the Asia–Pacific.

We thank all of those who contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the subject matter. The work of the ICPC would be impossible without the financial support of our various sponsors.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2018

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.

  1. Mareike Ohlberg, Boosting the party voice: China’s quest for global ideological dominance, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2016, online. ↩︎
  2. Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017, online. ↩︎
  3. Jon Russell, ‘Twitter estimates that it has 10 million users in China’, TechCrunch, 5 July 2016, online. ↩︎
  4. US Embassy, Weibo post, 7 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  5. Jiayun Feng, ‘US Embassy bashes Chinese “political correctness” on Weibo, sending the Chinese internet into a frenzy’, SupChina, 7 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  6. Hu Xijin (胡锡进), Weibo post, 7 May 2018. ↩︎
  7. Jiayun Feng, ‘US Embassy bashes Chinese “political correctness” on Weibo, sending the Chinese internet into a frenzy’. ↩︎
  8. Sidney Leng, Jane Li, ‘US, China in fresh row as Beijing tells foreign airlines they will be punished for failing to respect territorial claims, report says’ South China Morning Post, 7 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  9. Ying Jiang, ‘Weibo as a public diplomacy platform’, Social Media and e-Diplomacy in China, 10 August 2017, online. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: Digital Diplomacy

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