Tag Archive for: defence projects

Finally, a truckload of common sense

Much of the argument for building warships and submarines in Australia ultimately rests on the rather dubious logic that we’re on an island surrounded by water. But Australia is also surrounded by air, yet nobody is suggesting that we need to build fighter planes and other military aircraft here. And Australia also is full of a lot of sand and dirt, but nobody until recently has suggested that we should be building tanks and armoured vehicles here.

Because we don’t feel the need to design or build aircraft here, the Royal Australian Air Force is in the happy position of being probably the closest thing to a fifth-generation air force in the region and possibly the world. However, because we do feel the need to build ships and submarines here, our navy isn’t going to get a new frigate until the late 2020s or a new submarine until the early to mid-2030s (noting that scheduling details for those projects are more than a little hazy).

The Australian Army’s vehicle projects have fallen somewhere in between, and essentially chart the trajectory of recent defence industry policy. The Department of Defence used to buy vehicles off production lines overseas (ASLAV and Abrams tanks), except when a local company had made something good in a particular niche (the Bushmaster*).

That pattern has continued with Defence’s current truck projects, whose neat banner heading of Project Overlander (LAND 121) hides a reality of a huge complex of interrelated project phases. While one might think, ‘It’s just trucks, so how hard can it be?’, LAND 121 has had one of the most convoluted histories of recent Defence projects, as is well documented by the Australian National Audit Office. It’s been a tortuous journey, with false starts and missteps as Defence sought to balance its aspirations for vehicle numbers, performance and protection against its budget.

Finally, after many twists and turns, in December 2011 the previous government approved the acquisition of over 2,000 Mercedes-Benz G-Wagens at a cost of around $1 billion to replace the army’s ageing Land Rover fleet. Then in July 2013 it approved a further $3.4 billion for around 2,500 Rheinmetall MAN medium and large trucks to replace the army’s very old Mack and Unimog trucks. Both project phases acquired existing vehicles off existing European production lines. Australian industry, however, was responsible for building the thousands of specialised trailers and modules that would ‘Australianise’ the capability.

Since those government approvals, things have gone well. According to the ANAO’s latest major projects report, the G-Wagens were delivered on budget and achieved final operating capability only a few months behind schedule.† The bigger trucks are still being delivered but are on budget and predicted to achieve both initial and final operating capability ahead of schedule. It is a salutary lesson about the value of adhering to basic principles of competitive advantage and buying off-the-shelf equipment when possible.

Since those decisions, we’ve seen a complete remake of defence industry policy under the current government (see the 2016 policy statement and 2018 capability plan). The new strategy strongly favours local builds and has resulted in the $5 billion first portion of LAND 400 for Rheinmetall’s Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRVs) being assembled on a specially established Australian production line, despite the existence already of three European production lines.

It’s not clear what premium Defence is having to pay for assembling around 186 CRVs in Australia (an initial 25 are being bought from an established production line to get at least some capability into service soon, which does seem to reinforce the arguments for buying off the shelf), or what impact that’s having on the capability outcome or its broader investment program. But it does appear that Defence is paying more than it budgeted for to get fewer vehicles than it planned on.

Plus, the decision has created a future valley-of-death problem for the CRV workforce when the small production run ends. Enter, stage left, the next phase of LAND 400: infantry fighting vehicles with a price tag of $10–15 billion all up. But there may not be much point in auditioning for that role if you’re not Rheinmetall …

So it’s a relief to see that the current defence industry policy didn’t result in the latest (and last) phase of Overlander having to establish a local production line for the final 1,000 medium and heavy trucks. That would inevitably have introduced more cost and consequently delivered less capability for the same investment. Defence Industry Minister Christopher Pyne announced last week that the additional vehicles would be made on an Austrian production line. Whether the government was swayed in this case by data that quantified the premium and consequent opportunity costs is not clear. Nevertheless, it appears there’s still some room for common sense in its application of defence industry policy.

However, it does make one wonder what the original decisions to purchase the G-Wagens and medium and heavy vehicles from factories overseas would look like if they were made today. Given the recent decision to assemble 186 CRVs here, the temptation to announce the assembly of 4,500 vehicles locally would be hard to resist, particularly in the face of state governments clamouring for a piece of Defence’s capital budget. But would that have given the army the outcome it needed on time and on budget?

 

* My colleague Brendan Nicholson is writing an account of the Bushmaster story as part of ASPI’s series of case studies in defence projects.

† Why does the ANAO’s major projects report still cover a project that has delivered its full scope on time and on budget when it doesn’t cover the future submarine and future frigate projects?

Land 400—too much of a good thing?

The government will soon announce the successful bidder to replace the Army’s ASLAV armoured cavalry vehicles under project Land 400 Phase 2 Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs). My new ASPI Strategic Insights paper can be found here. The two contenders are BAE Systems Australia’s Armoured Modular Vehicle (AMV) and Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s Boxer vehicle. They resemble one another and, to an extent, the ASLAV vehicle they’ll replace. All three are eight-wheeled armoured vehicles, originally designed to carry infantry, with two-person turrets armed with a high-velocity automatic cannon. The CRV’s prescribed role is unchanged from the ASLAV’s: reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance and constraining enemy freedom of manoeuvre with firepower.

But there are significant differences behind those similarities. Most obviously, the two future contenders are much bigger and heavier than the ASLAV. And not just a little—they’re two to three times heavier. The AMV weighs around 30 tonnes and the Boxer around 38 tonnes, depending on the mission configuration.

That increase in size and weight has pros and cons. On the pro side, the contenders are much better protected against the latest weapons systems, including roadside bombs (or improvised explosive devices—IEDs), cannon fire and artillery fragments than is the ASLAV. The danger and ubiquity of IEDs weren’t appreciated when the ASLAV’s forbears were designed in the 1970s. And force protection has become a significant, indeed overbearing, design consideration for contemporary Western defence organisations and the governments they serve. The two contenders also have better weapons, sensors and battle management systems than the ASLAV, and those extra systems add up to extra weight and size.

The downside is that extra vehicle weight detracts from strategic deployability, tactical mobility (particularly if roads are of poor quality and bridges are limited), and is logistically difficult to sustain. To give a practical example from recent history, in the early, tense days of the INTERFET mission to East Timor, the ADF was able to airlift ASLAVs and M113 armoured personnel carriers to East Timor using C‑130 Hercules transport aircraft. Neither the AMV nor Boxer vehicles can be carried by a C‑130. Even the heavy-lift C‑17 can only carry one Boxer or, at a stretch, two AMVs.

On the ground, the mobility of the AMV and Boxer is understood to be as good or better than the ASLAV’s when run through Defence’s testing grounds. But the poor quality roads and limited bridges in regional Australia or in countries in our neighbourhood would be a more demanding test if the CRV ever has to operate in a real mission where the locals don’t like seeing their transport infrastructure ruined.

A focus on logistics, to paraphrase the truism, is what distinguishes military professionals from amateurs. Large and heavy CRVs, compared to a more diminutive vehicle, are more capable in a firefight (definitely worth having), but might be a drag on the campaign. They come with a larger logistic footprint, which might be difficult to sustain where infrastructure isn’t well developed—as is typical of northern Australia and the region. Logistics problems are sometimes narrowly perceived as merely annoying and costly administrative burdens, but they can easily affect the prospect for success of the mission and campaign.

Pity the members of the Defence department’s Defence Investment Committee and the National Security Committee of Cabinet (and their staffs) as they try to compare these apples and oranges—better protection and more systems versus difficulty in getting forces to the theatre, constrained movement within the theatre, and a more challenging logistics struggle. Clearly, some prudent balancing of risks is required.

It would help the process if the strategic guidance for force design were as clear and as specific as possible (allowing for future uncertainties). Unfortunately for the decision-makers, the recent 2016 Defence White Paper—should they choose to adhere to it—says that Australia’s force design process must give equal priority to defending Australia, contributing to the security of our neighbourhood and contributing to coalition operations to support a rules-based global order.

That’s like trying to have your cake and eat it too. A coalition operation in the Middle East or Eastern Europe would probably put a premium on close combat protection and firepower. But stabilisation operations in our neighbourhood would favour logistic sustainability and strategic deployability. Looking at the shortlist, it seems that the Land 400 criteria are weighted towards protection and firepower over logistics and deployability.

It’s an understandable temptation for governments to try to have strategic guidance cover all bases, but in reality that means that decision-making risk is transferred down the line to force designers. Left to its own devices, the military will generally opt for more protection and firepower—even if that means that the equipment is less suitable for some likely missions. Somewhere the contradictions need to be balanced, and a judgement made about how much of a good thing is too much.

Underwater warfare: can we trust the eyes and ears of autonomous vehicles?

Graeme Dunk’s recent post described challenges to Australia’s submarines in correctly classifying and discriminating between friendly and potential adversary submarines of similar design, such as the Kilo-class submarines operated by Russia, China, Indonesia, India and Vietnam.

A key question, which I can’t answer, is: what amount of risk is acceptable in deploying our multibillion-dollar submarines into potentially hostile waters? This post explores some existing and emerging technologies that could mitigate mission risks for our upgraded Collins and Shortfin Barracuda submarines.

In my opinion, autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) and autonomous surface vehicles (ASVs)—whose cost is microscopic compared with the cost of a submarine—must be considered. The Mark 48 Mod 7 torpedo size is the only option if AUVs are to be launched through our future submarines’ torpedo tubes. That gives eyes and ears in advance of the submarine to check for mines and to identify other submarines and potentially hostile AUVs.

Minimising traffic over the datalink between the AUV and the submarine preserves stealth. If the AUV is fitted with a sonar transmitter only, any return ping will be heard by our submarine’s sonar receiver. If the AUV has a sonar receiver as well, extra data sent back will help the target’s triangulation, but could compromise our submarine’s location.

The downsides of using AUVs launched like a torpedo are that only a small number can be carried and in time they have to self-destruct to avoid capture. One option to increase numbers is to use a large ASV like an unmanned rigid-hull inflatable boat, launched well away, to tow AUVs to a release point where they can dive under the surface.

Enter the small glider ASV. By continuously harvesting energy from the environment, autonomous gliders are able to travel long distances, hold station, and monitor vast areas without ever needing to refuel. That makes them ideal for monitoring an underwater environment for months at a time, including warning of other submarines or adversary AUVs heading towards our submarine or warship.

The glider’s two-part architecture and wing system directly convert wave motion into thrust, and solar panels provide electricity for sensor payloads. The glider is equipped with GPS and sophisticated computers for navigation and payload control, with satellite communications systems, and with sensors to monitor beneath and ahead of them. Comprising a float about the size of a really thick surfboard on the surface, sporting solar panels and an aerial, the actual winged glider with sensors and other smarts is tethered around 7 metres below the surface.

Gliders can be released by almost any navy ship, well out of harm’s way. They can even travel to a distant area, collect data, and return for maintenance without ever requiring a ship to leave port. In 2012, two Wave Gliders completed a world-record 9,350-nautical-mile crossing of the Pacific Ocean, from San Francisco to Hervey Bay in Queensland, providing proof of the reliability and endurance of this new technology.

The RAN recently acquired several REMUS 100 AUVs and six Liquid Robotics Wave Gliders, one of which is used by the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) for research.

In July, the minister for defence industry, Christopher Pyne, announced that Defence’s Innovation Hub had granted Ron Allum Deepsea Services, based in Sydney, a $3.17-million contract to develop a novel high-performance autonomous glider for long-endurance undersea surveillance.

DSTG research on autonomous systems led to a further July announcement by the minister on a new Cooperative Research Centre (CRC). The press release says:

The first Defence CRC will focus on Trusted Autonomous Systems to deliver game-changing unmanned platforms that ensure reliable and effective cooperation between people and machines during dynamic military operations.

‘To be effective, Defence needs autonomous systems to be highly trusted, robust and resilient and this initiative will bring together the best researchers from industry and universities to develop the intelligent military platforms of the future,’ Minister Pyne said.

The CRC will receive an annual funding of $8 million with a maximum of $50 million over a seven year period.

Those attending the PACIFIC 2017 Conference in Sydney in October will be able to join in six and a half hours of expert presentations and subsequent discussion on AUVs and ASVs.

In October 2016, the Royal Navy (RN) hosted the two-week Unmanned Warrior exercise in the waters off Scotland’s Western Isles. It featured 25 AUVs, ASVs and UAVs, plus some other products, supplied by 40 organisations from many countries, and a few manned RN vessels; by the end they had successfully laid and hunted 50 mines, all coordinated through one command and control system.

In November 2018, the RAN and DSTG will host the Autonomous Warrior exercise in Jervis Bay. Two years in preparation, it will feature a strong local and international presence from navies, the defence industry and academia.

These Australian trusted autonomous system initiatives deserve the support of our whole defence community. They will definitely help protect crew lives and the massive investment in our future submarines.

Graph of the week: the high cost of high costs

Just before Christmas, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) put out an interesting report Process over platforms: a paradigm shift in acquisition through advanced manufacturing (PDF) by Aaron Martin and (expat Australian) Ben FitzGerald. It looks at the potential impact on the acquisition of military capability of new and emerging technologies such as 3D printing (additive manufacturing) and robotics.

The authors recommend a move towards systems that are more mission specific (less multi-role) and which have a shorter overall lifetime, to allow for more rapid technological refresh of fielded capabilities. In this they echo the views in one of my favourite papers on defence acquisition (PDF) which argues for more R2D2 type systems and fewer Death Stars:

After watching the climactic battle scene in Return of the Jedi for the first time, my 8-year-old daughter said, ‘They shouldn’t build those Death Stars anymore. They keep getting blown up’. She may be a little short for a stormtrooper, but the kid’s got a point.

Yes, the Empire should stop building Death Stars. It turns out the DoD shouldn’t build them either, metaphorically speaking. What sort of system fits into this category? I’ll resist the urge to give specific examples and instead will simply point out that any enormous project that is brain-meltingly complex, ravenously consumes resources, and aims to deliver an Undefeatable Ultimate Weapon is well on its way to becoming a Death Star, and that’s not a good thing.

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