Tag Archive for: defence diplomacy

Indonesia steps up defence relationships, but stays non-aligned

Indonesia has recognised that security affairs in its region are no longer business as usual, though it hasn’t completely given up its commitment to strategic autonomy.

Its biggest step was a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed with Australia in August 2024. The agreement acts as a de facto status-of-forces agreement, providing for the presence of foreign forces in Indonesian territory, traditionally an uncomfortable idea for the country.

Jakarta has also stepped up specific defence cooperation with other countries over the past five years, notably with Australia. The United States has also become a closer partner.

While China’s strengthening presence in Southeast Asia is an obvious factor in Indonesia’s diversification of defence relationships, Jakarta declares no policy of trying to counterbalance Beijing. Moreover, it is still far from tying itself down in close and permanent security relationships. Instead, Indonesia adopts a more nuanced approach.

Indonesia lacks a formal strategy to navigate great power competition. However, its impartial stance—rooted in what it calls its ‘free and active’ foreign policy—has resulted in a hedging strategy, balancing economic ties with China and strong political relations with the US and its allies. Meanwhile, Indonesia is expanding its global engagement through active participation in regional and international organisations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations, and through south-south cooperation.

Following its cautious foreign policy, Indonesia avoids alliances with great powers. This approach has allowed it to maintain neutrality and stay ‘defensively active’ for decades. Yet, Indonesia has begun to break from this tradition.

Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence aims to increase the defence budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP. In recent years, Indonesia has signed several arms acquisition deals. These include buying 42 Dassault Rafale fighters from France for $8.1 billion, 12 drones from Turkey worth $300 million and 24 Sikorsky S-70M Black Hawk helicopters from the US.

In the past five years, Indonesia has deepened various bilateral defence relationships. Australia has become a prominent partner, engaging in 48 defence diplomacy activities. These activities saw steady growth throughout the past five years, with the 2024 DCA as the pinnacle of their cooperation.

The 2024 DCA between Indonesia and Australia is their greatest commitment yet to enhancing defence collaboration and addressing shared security challenges. For Indonesia, it is historic as it allows military drills and mutual force operations within each other’s territories. For Australia, this agreement offers better operational proximity to potential flashpoints, such as the South China Sea.

Although yet to be a status-of-forces agreement, the DCA reinforces previous arrangements. It establishes a legal framework to enhance military cooperation and joint activities between the two countries. The agreement also includes provisions for enhanced educational exchanges and closer maritime operations.

However, this agreement does not signal Indonesia’s alignment with any bloc. The country continues to balance its relationships with major powers, staying true to its principle of strategic autonomy.

In 2023, Indonesia elevated bilateral ties with the US to a comprehensive strategic partnership, expanding defence cooperation, including joint exercises such as Garuda Shield. Simultaneously, Indonesia reinforced diplomatic ties with China and the two countries issued a joint statement in 2024 claiming ‘common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims’ in the South China Sea. This sparked controversy among maritime law and international relations experts. It appeared to contradict Indonesia’s long-standing policy of strategic denial regarding China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Additionally, Indonesia has sought to diversify its defence partnerships by engaging with other Global South middle powers, including Turkey, India and Brazil. Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS is also motivated by its willingness to enhance cooperation and collaboration with other developing countries.

The depth of the Indonesia-Australia DCA reveals several key aspects of Indonesia’s approach. First, as great power competition increases, Indonesia is moving beyond its ‘defensive-active’ strategy. Indonesia is now integrating bilateral strategies alongside multilateral approaches to better navigate the evolving security landscape.

Second, Indonesia’s deepening ties with Australia through the DCA serve as a regional safety net in its hedging behaviour. Consequently, Indonesia must reassure other countries that the DCA with Australia aims to enhance cooperation and doesn’t signal alignment with the West.

Finally, while it has shown adaptability in recent years, defence capacity remains crucial for Indonesia to maintain its independence and increase its bargaining position in the geopolitical landscape.

The DCA, alongside global engagement and enhancing defence capacity, indicates Indonesia’s shifting strategy to face the increasingly competitive environment while maintaining its strategic autonomy.

The lost meaning of strategy

Professor Sir Hew Strachan, presenting on 'Strategy in Theory and Practice: Lessons for Army from the Last 15 years’ at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Strategy has long been a contested concept. Yet despite all of the debate surrounding the term, strategy ultimately concerns the relationship between military means and political ends. As the British strategist and military historian Basil Liddell Hart famously observed, strategy is ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy’.

Against this backdrop, there’s been some loose language thrown around on the pages of The Strategist over the last few days. Peter Jennings started us down this slippery slope when he asked ‘why DFAT doesn’t do strategy’ and implored the Government to task DFAT to develop ‘a strategic policy framework of the type associated with White Papers’.

Rob Ayson takes issue with Peter, contending that DFAT is already doing strategy. Read more

PNG appoints a new military chief

Outgoing Commander PNGDF, Brigadier General Francis Agwi, with then Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Patrick Walsh, at Murray Barracks in June 2011 during a visit to Port Moresby by former US Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt CampbellSmart, measured and energetic, Colonel Gilbert Toropo seems a good choice to be Papua New Guinea’s next Defence Force Commander. He’ll need to be. Even the circumstances surrounding the announcement of his selection highlight difficulties likely to confront him in this demanding role. It’s worth knowing a bit more about recent developments concerning Papua New Guinea’s defence forces (PNGDF) and its new commander as security ties form a pillar of the Australia–PNG relationship.

Toropo will take over at a time of some hope about the PNGDF as well as daunting challenges. These positive signs owe much to outgoing commander, Brigadier Francis Agwi. As the PNGDF’s ninth Commander, Agwi was able to begin modest capability-rebuilding, as scars from a necessary but very painful 2000–06 retrenchment exercise (initiated by PNG and funded by Australia to stabilise the unruly post-Bougainville/Sandline Crisis-era force) started to heal. Relations with key defence partners, especially Australia, recovered under Agwi. The force also sent its first few UN peacekeepers overseas to Sudan. And in December, troops from a revitalised special force unit rappelled out of a leased PNGDF helicopter—Agwi had begun re-establishing a safe and effective air transport capability—to hand-deliver PNG’s first ever national security policy (PDF), and its first defence white paper since 1999, to Prime Minister O’Neill for release.

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