Tag Archive for: Darwin

House of cards: northern Australia’s liquid fuel resilience

Northern Australia’s liquid fuel infrastructure is the backbone of defence capability, national resilience, and economic prosperity. Yet, it faces mounting pressure from increasing demand, supply chain vulnerabilities and logistical fragilities.

Fuel security is not just about stockpiling: it hinges on accessibility when and where it’s needed, diversity in suppliers and supply routes, and adaptability to changing circumstances to maintain a stable supply, even in times of crisis.

Australia should consider activating dormant fuel reserves, developing a domestic fuel refinery, hardening logistics chains and preparing contingency measures.

At first glance, northern Australia’s fuel security appears robust, with key Defence bases (HMAS Coonawarra, RAAF Darwin and RAAF Tindal) providing guaranteed demand. Meanwhile, regional economic activity is sustained by reserves at Melville Bay, Nhulunbuy and Darwin’s East Arm Precinct, which includes both Vopak’s commercial and Crowley’s eventual Defence reserves.

Crowley’s East Arm facility will, when complete, be the linchpin of the region’s fuel security, holding 300 million litres of jet fuel, 90 percent allocated to defence operations. By comparison, RAAF Darwin’s 12 million litres and RAAF Tindal’s 14 million litres are fully committed to military use, while HMAS Coonawarra contributes 6 million litres of diesel for naval readiness. Civilian infrastructure supports industry and local communities, including reserves such as Vopak’s 174 million litres, Melville Bay’s 30 million litres of commercial diesel and Nhulunbuy’s estimated 20 million litres.

This dual-purpose system attempts to balance military preparedness with economic necessity, yet these figures tell only part of the story. The apparent stability of northern Australia’s fuel network is an illusion: the system works well only without supply disruptions or rapid demand increases.

90 percent of all liquid fuel is imported and northern Australia remains highly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Seasonal flooding can sever road links between Darwin, Tindal and the air force’s bare bases (RAAF Curtin, Learmonth and Scherger). This shows up a fragile logistics network that adversaries could exploit, or natural disasters could disrupt.

Australia’s national fuel security has been steadily eroding for years, with national stockpiles consistently falling short of the International Energy Agency’s 90-day benchmark. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war highlighted these vulnerabilities. As global supply chains tightened, Australia’s limited reserves became more apparent. While additional storage alone couldn’t eliminate supply shocks, in a crisis it would provide an important time buffer.

The risks are particularly acute in the Top End. Disruptions in Asian refineries, blockages in key shipping lanes such, as those through the South China Sea, or a severe cyclone hitting Darwin’s port could cripple fuel supplies, leaving aircraft grounded, naval operations stalled, and communities isolated. The region’s dependence on limited road transport further amplifies the challenge, particularly when considering fuel delivery to the air force’s northern bare bases.

To address these vulnerabilities, Australia should activate Melville Island’s dormant fuel reserves; develop a domestic fuel refinery in the Northern Territory; harden the logistics backbone; and integrate Vopak and Nhulunbuy into a contingency network.

Just 80 kilometres from Darwin, Melville Island’s port and 30 million litres of existing fuel storage could be a valuable defence asset. With infrastructure upgrades, including new pipelines, tanker berths and integrated defence agreements, Melville could evolve into a dual-purpose hub, reinforcing Australian Defence Force operations and supporting regional economic activity. Increasing redundancy in supply locations enhances operational flexibility and minimises the risks posed by bottlenecks in a single storage site.

Australia’s dependence on imported aviation fuel is a glaring strategic risk, so it should consider a domestic fuel refinery in the Northern Territory. Even a modest refinery capable of processing 10,000 barrels (1.6 million litres) per day could meet at least half of RAAF Tindal’s requirements. While refining capability is not a silver bullet, it would strengthen Australia’s self-sufficiency, ensure a baseline level of operational continuity in a prolonged crisis and reduce Australia’s fuel vulnerabilities.

The Northern Territory’s logistics backbone should be hardened, as it is highly vulnerable to seasonal disruptions: the 320 kilometre highway connecting Darwin and Tindal is a single, flood-prone artery. The government should consider paying for all-weather road upgrades, developing redundant transport routes and exploring alternative logistics solutions, such as a dedicated rail spur. Prepositioned fuel caches near the RAAF’s bare bases could provide a buffer in times of crisis, ensuring operational continuity when primary supply lines are compromised.

Finally, integrating Vopak and Nhulunbuy into a contingency network would establish a reliable fallback system. Nhulunbuy’s fuel capacity of 20 million litres presents a potential strategic reserve but is geographically isolated. Infrastructure improvements, combined with an ADF contingency agreement to access Vopak’s 174 million litres, could ensure continued fuel availability if Darwin’s primary storage and distribution networks were disrupted. A dispersed and resilient fuel network minimises single points of failure, reinforcing Australia’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.

Fuel security demands long-term commitment, but it would reinforce Australia’s defence capabilities. Without assured fuel supply, even the most advanced military platforms become useless.

Without further investment in supply chain resilience, infrastructure modernisation and domestic production, fuel shortages will continue to undermine Australia’s capacity to project force and sustain operations. It is time to double down on what works and strengthen what does not.

Darwin is well-placed for an uncrewed systems hub

Australia often relies on overseas facilities for uncrewed systems’ maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), exposing the country to operational delays, escalating costs and potential security risks. To address this vulnerability, it should establish an MRO facility for uncrewed systems in Darwin.

Uncrewed systems, including drones, uncrewed aerial vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles, are transforming Australia’s defence, security and commercial sectors. They have a range of applications in defence operations, border security, environmental monitoring and industrial applications such as extraction of natural resources, including natural gas.

Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and proximity to major defence and commercial partners mean it is the ideal hub for maintaining these vital assets.

The city’s strategic significance, long recognised by Australia’s defence planners, makes it the natural location for a dedicated MRO facility. As the gateway to the Indo-Pacific, Darwin’s proximity to regional and global markets, particularly Asia, provides an unparalleled advantage for servicing domestic and international clients.

This places Darwin at the crossroads of Australia’s defence and commercial interests in the region, with clear benefits for its role as a logistics and maintenance hub for uncrewed systems. Furthermore, the city’s established infrastructure, including air and sea ports, rail connections and utilities, already supports large-scale defence operations and the growing defence footprint in the region, making it primed for expansion into a world-class MRO hub for uncrewed systems.

Australian uncrewed systems are largely serviced overseas, leaving them vulnerable to extended downtimes, longer repair times and increased risk in transportation. This reliance on foreign facilities compromises Australia’s operational readiness. It hampers the efficiency of industries, such as resource extraction, that rely heavily on uncrewed technology for monitoring, inspections and surveillance.

As the Australian Defence Force and commercial sectors increasingly deploy uncrewed systems, it is essential to ensure they can be maintained and repaired promptly to avoid delays in operations, whether they involve national security, disaster response or remote infrastructure management.

As uncrewed systems are central to the future of defence operations, creating an MRO facility in Darwin would strengthen Australia’s position as a key partner in the region, with the ability to service not only its own uncrewed systems but also those of allied nations. This strategic advantage would provide a competitive edge in defence readiness and international collaborations.

Moreover, Darwin’s potential MRO facility could support other government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force. They all use uncrewed systems for surveillance, border protection and law enforcement.

The ability to rapidly repair and maintain these systems would improve agencies’ responsiveness and availability of capabilities, ensuring that they are always equipped to respond to emerging threats. Darwin could thus play a greater role in Australia’s broader security architecture, providing reliable, homegrown support to key domestic and international partners.

From a commercial perspective, establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would be commercially viable and a boon for local businesses.

With the growing demand for uncrewed systems in industries such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), telecommunications and mining, establishing a local MRO facility would significantly reduce the reliance on overseas service providers. This would cut transport costs and ensure faster turnaround of repairs, improving the operational efficiency of these industries.

It would also create a thriving commercial ecosystem around uncrewed systems in the Northern Territory. Local businesses would be able to engage with the growing global market for uncrewed systems, contributing to job creation and the region’s economic growth.

For this MRO facility to be commercially successful, it should be designed as a multi-use facility, capable of supporting not only defence and government sectors but also commercial enterprises. This approach would ensure financial sustainability through a diversified revenue stream.

Partnerships with commercial operators in the LNG, mining, and telecommunications sectors could provide steady demand for services.

Moreover, collaborations with international partners—such as the United States, Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations—could provide further opportunities for industry growth, turning Darwin into a regional centre for uncrewed system innovation and service.

Such collaborations could include joint research and development projects, knowledge sharing and training programs, further enhancing the facility’s global relevance.

Establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would have significant strategic, economic and operational benefits. It would enhance Australia’s defence readiness, reduce its reliance on overseas maintenance services and foster closer collaboration with key regional partners. A local MRO facility would strengthen Australia’s ability to respond to threats, contribute to the security of the Indo-Pacific region and support industries that rely on uncrewed systems.

By capitalising on Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and growing importance in regional security, Australia can establish a world-class facility that meets its future needs and reinforces its role as a key player in the Indo-Pacific.

Lessons from Cyclone Tracy: preparing for a future of cascading disasters

On Christmas morning in 1974, Cyclone Tracy unleashed catastrophic destruction on Darwin, forever altering the city and Australia’s approach to disaster resilience. As the intensity of climate-driven catastrophes grows, the main lesson of Cyclone Tracy is clear: we must do more to prepare, and we must do it now.

With wind speeds surpassing 217 km/h, the Category 4 cyclone killed 66 people and injured hundreds. It obliterated more than 70 percent of Darwin’s buildings, displacing most of its population. Fifty years on, the lessons from Cyclone Tracy remain as urgent and relevant as ever, as Australia confronts a new era of escalating climate change and increasingly frequent extreme weather events.

ASPI’s new report commemorating Cyclone Tracy’s anniversary highlights the need for proactive, comprehensive disaster resilience in the face of rising climate risks. The aftermath of Tracy revealed deep vulnerabilities in Australia’s preparedness, from inadequate building codes to insufficient community awareness. This reshaped our approach to disaster management, laying the foundations for national disaster-response frameworks that continue to guide Australia.

The immediate aftermath of Cyclone Tracy brought Australia together in a way that was unprecedented in peacetime. The Australian Defence Force led a coordinated relief effort, showcasing the power of military, government and civilian agencies working in unison. The cyclone also prompted establishment of the Darwin Reconstruction Authority, a centralised body that drove the city’s rebuilding efforts and set a benchmark for future disaster recovery initiatives. These responses proved that a structured, collaborative approach to recovery can lead to resilience.

The reconstruction of Darwin not only transformed the city into a modern urban centre; it caused a shift in how Australia views the intersection of disaster response and urban planning. The introduction of stricter building codes, designed to withstand Category 5 cyclones, became a cornerstone of our disaster preparedness. The recovery also highlighted the importance of local leadership, community involvement and a whole-of-nation response to disasters.

While we’ve made progress since Cyclone Tracy, the growing threat of climate change means that disaster resilience today requires an even more multifaceted approach. Our report explores the need to look beyond building codes and infrastructure and include advancements in predictive technologies such as satellite monitoring and early warning systems. Equally important is empowering local communities, particularly those in vulnerable regions like northern Australia, to take proactive measures and adapt to changing conditions. We cannot afford to be reactive. We must be anticipatory in our approach to future disasters.

In this context, Cyclone Tracy offers not only a historical lesson but a clear call to action. The resilience of Darwin in the face of overwhelming destruction was impressive, but future threats demand that we take a more proactive, strategic approach. Australia’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework is a step in the right direction, but it must evolve to meet the demands of an increasingly volatile climate. The growing frequency of cascading disasters—whether bushfires, floods, or cyclones—requires even greater collaboration and resource-sharing between government, industry and the private sector.

The 50th anniversary of Cyclone Tracy must not only be a moment of reflection but a reminder that disaster resilience is a dynamic, ongoing process. Northern Australia is particularly vulnerable to cyclones, heatwaves and flooding, and it cannot afford complacency.

As climate risks continue to escalate, we need to invest in smarter, more resilient infrastructure, better systems of disaster response, and more informed, empowered communities. Traditional knowledge, particularly from Indigenous communities in northern Australia, must also be integrated into disaster planning, offering invaluable lessons on sustainable living and resource management.

The legacy of Cyclone Tracy is clear: resilience is not just about recovery, but about preparation. As Australia faces the challenges of climate change, we must build on the lessons of the past to ensure a safer, more resilient future. This anniversary is an opportunity to strengthen our commitment to disaster preparedness, ensuring that Australia remains a global leader in disaster resilience and recovery.

By taking Cyclone Tracy’s lessons and adapting them to today’s climate risks, Australia can create a more resilient future for all its communities, ensuring that no one faces disaster alone.

Darwin is key for undersea data links. We must promote their resilience there

Australia needs further investment into Darwin’s digital infrastructure to leverage the city’s proximity to Asia and support the resilience of international data flow through subsea cables.

Actions should include establishing an office to coordinate industry and government agencies, and it should build a substantial capability in Darwin to repair cables.

The importance of acting is underscored by Google’s November statement that it would lay a data cable from Darwin to Singapore via Christmas Island and by ongoing joint efforts by Australia, the United States and Japan to increase connectivity in the Pacific.

As subsea links, such as the existing Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable, become Australia’s digital lifelines, their security and resilience become paramount. Disruption to them would have profound consequences for both Australia’s economy and national security.

Darwin’s role in the Indo-Pacific digital ecosystem is growing ever faster, making the city increasingly central to global data flows. Vulnerabilities come with dependence on such infrastructure. Incapacitation of these cables—whether through physical damage or cyber threats—would severely affect Australia’s economy, security, and geopolitical standing.

The government’s current approach to managing subsea cable security lacks the coordination needed to address the growing challenges in this space. With multiple agencies involved, from the Department of Infrastructure to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australia needs a more unified and proactive approach to safeguarding these assets.

Given the national security stakes, Australia must establish a dedicated domestic subsea cable coordination unit to oversee construction, maintenance and security. This unit should serve as a clearinghouse, working closely with key government stakeholders, telecommunications regulators and private sector players—including major tech firms, such as Google and Meta. By integrating their expertise, the unit could ensure that subsea cables were shielded from physical and cyber threats, coordinating national security efforts and fostering a unified response to emerging risks.

As Darwin continues to evolve as a data hub, Australia’s capacity to swiftly repair damage to its subsea cables is becoming increasingly critical. To maintain resilience, the government must establish a local repair hub. This includes building up domestic repair capabilities, which could be achieved through partnerships with international cable operators or by developing local expertise within the Northern Territory. A dedicated repair ship, staffed with a rapid-response team based in Darwin, would be invaluable, ensuring that cable damage was addressed quickly to minimise disruption. This approach would further strengthen Australia’s position as a reliable player in the global digital infrastructure arena.

To support this growing digital infrastructure, Darwin’s physical and digital capabilities must also be scaled up. This requires robust terrestrial backhaul connections and investment by large cloud-service providers in world-class AI data centres.  We also need a regulatory framework that supports the increasing volume of data while addressing potential physical and cyber threats.

The Northern Territory offers geological stability and an advantageous position for connections to Singapore, itself an important node in the global submarine cable network. These advantages make it an ideal place for increasing Australia’s overall telecommunications and subsea cable resilience by diversifying submarine cable landings from clogged areas like Sydney and existing areas like Perth.

As the volume of data flowing through the region rises, so too must the capacity to handle it securely and efficiently. Strong, resilient infrastructure will not only bolster Australia’s own security but position the country as a reliable alternative to higher-risk regions. It will also attract investment and foster deeper international partnerships, particularly with allies such as the United States and Japan, who are already deeply engaged in securing subsea cable infrastructure.

Australia must also step up its role in the global dialogue surrounding subsea cable security. Given the interconnectedness of these cables and their importance to international trade and security, it cannot afford to act in isolation. Active participation in global initiatives is essential. For example, in September, Australia endorsed the New York Statement on Undersea Cables, which calls for international cooperation to safeguard the links.

By engaging in these discussions, Australia can share insights on emerging threats, establish best practices for protection and help shape global responses to subsea cable disruptions. This leadership would further cement Australia’s position as a key partner in global digital infrastructure security.

The time for action is now. Australia’s government must move decisively to secure the subsea cable infrastructure of the Northern Territory, ensuring long-term resilience and reliability.

With its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, Darwin is poised to be a cornerstone of global digital connectivity, not only serving as a gateway for Australia but also reinforcing regional security and economic stability. By securing subsea cable infrastructure, Australia will pave the way for a secure, resilient and interconnected future, reinforcing both its national interests and its partnerships with key allies.

ASPI’s Darwin Dialogue will seek a way forward for critical minerals

Critical minerals including rare earth elements, lithium, and cobalt, play a crucial role in industries, from electronics and renewable energy to defence.

Nearly a year has passed since ASPI hosted the inaugural critical minerals focused Darwin Dialogue, a multi-day track 1.5 initiative with support from the Northern Territory Government.

Progress has been made since, including the signing of the Australian-US critical minerals compact in May 2023, but results have not been achieved at the pace desired by governments or industry.

Immediate challenges and structural concerns persist for Australia’s critical mineral sector in 2024. Tackling these issues whilst achieving greater policy results at speed will be a crucial objective throughout the year.

Perhaps the most pressing of these challenges is the global crash in lithium value. Prices of lithium—Australia’s second largest commodity in committed capital expenditure through to 2030, surpassing even iron ore—collapsed in the last 12 months.

Consequently, Core Lithium suspended its Finniss mine operations in January. Other closures could follow if market conditions don’t improve. Operational mines and Australian lithium projects are in jeopardy.

In response, Minister for Resources Madeleine King and WA Mines Minister David Michael held crisis talks with Australian nickel and lithium producers.

The talks highlight the importance of critical minerals and the time-sensitive nature of secure supply chains. They are also a shining example of closer collaboration and communication between government and industry in the sector. Maintaining this communication, and trust, is critical to aligning policy and industry objectives, and efficiently working together to achieve Australia’s national objectives.

Similar crises are likely without sustained progress towards structural reforms.

Global critical minerals markets and supply chains remain overly concentrated on China as a singular destination and source affording Chinese companies overwhelming influence over the sector across multiple extraction and processing stages and giving the Chinese government undue leverage on its neighbours and strategic competitors.

Overly concentrated geographic clustering of the market, by itself, creates market level risks.

This risk is especially pronounced if the market participant wields its leverage coercively—which China has a demonstrated willingness to do.

In December last year, Beijing banned the export of rare earth extraction and separation technologies. Chinese companies also routinely adjust their domestic production quotas and subsidise rare earth element (REE) prices to strategically flood the market, drive out competitors, and deter new market entrants.

Policies enacted under President Xi Jinping underwrite China’s undue influence and continue to blur the lines between the private sector and the government in China. It is a political risk compounding the economic issue of overreliance on a single market.

Far from a hypothetical, Beijing has already used its near-monopolistic global supply-chain control of REEs to strategic advantage against the US and Japan.

We should expect it to do so again.

The interplay of immediate challenges and structural issues is present in the collapse of lithium and nickel commodity prices in the last year. While seen by many as a market correction in response to a combination of factors affecting the global market, a focus on market manipulation is due.

For lithium, a surge in production capacity has certainly outpaced the growth in demand, leading to oversupply. This oversaturation is partly due to the substantial investments in lithium extraction projects in response to the anticipated boom in electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies.

Slower-than-expected adoption of electric vehicles and the development of alternative battery technologies has contributed to the drop in lithium prices.

But it also has a lot to do with increased Chinese lithium mining.

China is increasing use of lepidolite-derived lithium. Lepidolite is a poor-quality lithium source, expensive to extract lithium from, and environmentally unsound, with low yield and high energy costs. Chinese authorities in Yichuan have already shuttered lepidolite plants due to environmental concerns.

Persistent, state-backed investment in lepidolite-lithium would be driven by nationalist desire for a domestic lithium supply, not market fundamentals.

In Australia, an influx of low-quality lithium and continued low prices could be an industry killer. And if Australian spodumene ore derived lithium mines prove unsustainable then supply may recenter on China.

Similarly, several factors have led to the decline in nickel commodity prices, including increased nickel pig iron production in Indonesia and the push for nickel sulphate for electric vehicle batteries.

The nickel pig iron output surge has led to an oversupply, driving down prices. It is again a potential industry killer for Australian producers. And again, there are significant environmental, social and governance (ESG) concerns surrounding Indonesian nickel.

Indonesian nickel has high pollution levels and produces difficult to dispose of tailings and other ecological concerns. Indonesian nickel is largely processed in domestic coal-fired rotary kilns. There are plans to expand its nickel production using electric kilns but potential pollution levels are expected to remain high.

Further, the Indonesian government placed a prohibitive ban on nickel exports in 2020 to reduce international competition and drive domestic investment. While the EU successfully challenged this ban as breach of Indonesia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, with the panel recommending policy reform in November 2022, it remains in effect. Indonesia has appealed the WTO panel’s decision, suspending its impact until after the appeal is heard.

As highlighted by Indonesia, the geopolitical landscape of critical minerals is evolving. Nations are strategically positioning themselves to be important suppliers of critical minerals, as well as ensuring stable and secure supply of these essential elements for their economic and technological advancement.

This increased awareness has led to the development of several unilateral critical mineral supply chain policy measures.

Over the last 12 months, Australia has introduced a new critical minerals strategy and new critical minerals and strategic materials lists.

Countries like the US, Japan, Korea, and Australia increasingly recognise that the markets alone cannot provide stable critical mineral supply chains, and the problem is too big for any country to resolve.

Australia, like-minded governments and the private sector must collaborate to ensure competitive, secure, resilient REE and critical minerals supply and value chains. But this is a complicated problem, requiring a nuanced and collaborative policy approach. International collaborations and alliances are forming to establish more resilient supply chains and share mineral exploration and extraction expertise. A collective approach reflects a shared commitment to addressing the challenges posed by the concentration of critical mineral production and enhancing the security of these vital resources for various industries, including electronics, renewable energy, and defence.

In April, ASPI will convene the second Darwin Dialogue to bring together leaders and key players from Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States to discuss critical mineral production, supply chain resilience and economic security.

In the lead-up to this event, ASPI will produce a second series of Strategist pieces exploring the opportunities for developing Australian critical mineral supply chains and mini-lateral cooperation.

Planning for the ADF in the Northern Territory

Last year, while standing on the foreshore at Nightcliff in Darwin at low tide, I watched an ascending Bell MV-22 Osprey transforming from helicopter to airplane mode.

Looking down just after it passed, I saw a piece of corroded aluminium protruding from the mud. It turned out to be wreckage from a hostile Mitsubishi A6M fighter destroyed by Darwin’s air-defence systems in 1942 or 1943.

Darwin has been a strategic military base since 1911, when the navy established a ‘naval reserve subdistrict’ in Darwin staffed by one lieutenant, a chief petty officer and a boatman.

By 1932 the ‘Darwin Detachment’ comprising five officers and 42 men became the first Australian unit to be permanently stationed in Darwin. ‘The Garrison did not change Darwin’s ways. It became part of them,’ historian Alan Powel writes in The shadow’s edge: Australia’s northern war.

As part of Britain’s ‘Singapore strategy’, Darwin became the site for a strategic reserve of bunker fuel for allied naval forces. The first four storage tanks were built between 1924 and 1928, adjacent to the civilian wharf and close to the city’s administrative centre.

When plans for the oil tanks in Darwin were being finalised, their susceptibility to attack by enemy aircraft was inconceivable.

On 9 February 1942, the Japanese First and Second Carrier Divisions under Vice Admiral Chuicki Nagumo, fresh from Pearl Harbor, attacked and destroyed the oil tanks, allied shipping and other military and civilian infrastructure around Darwin Harbour. Fifteen civilians were killed in the first raid.

The perceived threat of imminent invasion prompted a massive build-up of defence forces and infrastructure. The construction of army camps close to the town permanently shaped the development of Darwin as a post-war city. After demobilisation, the abandoned military camps were occupied by civilians. These camps became the foundation for Darwin’s suburbs of Stuart Park, Parap, Nightcliff and Winnellie. By 1952, Darwin’s civilian population was 8,214, an increase of 240% from 1947.

Of the thousands of service personnel posted to bases in the Northern Territory during World War II, ‘the majority did not like it’. The negative impression of both the area and the capability of the local population became an indelible part of Australian Defence Force culture, and NT bases are still considered by many to be ‘hardship postings’.

Earlier this year in Darwin, the Minister for Defence Industry, Pat Conroy stated: ‘We are facing the biggest arms race in our region since 1945.’

The 2023 defence strategic review identifies the imperative to ‘comprehensively remediate’ northern bases including Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin and RAAF Base Tindal near Katherine. Both the current and previous Australian governments have talked about investing $8 billion to do so. The scope of those projects touches every conceivable defence activity.

A topical example is the $200-plus million to expand Tindal’s capacity to accommodate Northrop Grumman’s MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft. Much of the work on base is going to NT-based businesses, but it’s notable that the ADF has left the company, and others, to work out how to house their employees who will maintain the Tritons.

Katherine is a small community and it makes no sense to operate so independently, when success genuinely relies on collaboration.

NT government officials attempting to obtain a coherent picture from ADF colleagues about the scope of the proposed defence build-up have been met with limited information. Collaboration is essential if we are to ensure that we don’t repeat past mistakes based on unrealistic expectations about the capacity of infrastructure and local housing and labour markets to meet anticipated demand.

There are several critical issues that should be forefront in the strategic thinking of ADF officers charged with delivering the objectives of the defence strategic review in the NT.

First, in no other capital city in Australia are the citizens more conscious of the reality and implications of the military presence, exemplified by the response to the deaths of the three US marines when their MV-22B Osprey crashed and caught fire at Melville Island: it was ‘a loss felt across the entire community’.

Second, so much of what the ADF does in the Top End is dependent on shared civilian infrastructure. This includes the hospitals, airport, the wharf and associated fuel stores and of course, roads.

Finally, planning decisions cast long shadows. When decisions are made remotely without engagement with the local situation, opportunities are lost—which in turn generates negative risks.

In common with the ADF, the NT Planning Commission works on strategic planning horizons and would welcome a collaborative approach.  Ultimately, we are all in this together, and to succeed we must work together.

Bolstering defence innovation in Australia’s north

The story of Darwin really begins with the necessity to establish a support route for the Overland Telegraph to the southern states of Australia. In November 1871, the 1,100-mile submarine cable between Darwin and Banjoewangie in Java was laid. This in turn was connected through Singapore to Europe and London.

It was one of the greatest Australian engineering achievements you’ve probably never heard of. The cable connected Australia to the rest of the world, with the first official international telegraph dispatched from Darwin on 22 August 1872. But it didn’t come easily.

The harsh environment and Darwin’s geographic isolation required an innovative approach that accounted for local conditions and utilised the expertise and wisdom of the area’s First Nations people. The final route chosen for the overland cable was a traditional trade route that Indigenous people had used for thousands of years.

Yet the Northern Territory is probably not the first place that people would think of when it comes to technology development and innovation, especially in the high-tech world of defence. Other Australian states have long been working to establish themselves as leaders in defence innovation—and succeeding. While each jurisdiction has its own unique priorities and strengths, the federal government’s focus for these initiatives has primarily been ‘south of 26 degrees south’ and funding has reflected that.

The South Australian government has been actively promoting the state as a hub for defence innovation, with a particular focus on advanced manufacturing and high-tech industries.

Victoria has established a Defence Science Institute to support collaboration between universities and industry partners in defence innovation, with a focus on areas such as cybersecurity and autonomous systems.

New South Wales has focused on developing advanced manufacturing capabilities and supporting research and development, and similar initiatives have been undertaken in Queensland and Western Australia.

But what about the Northern Territory?

Most in the defence organisation tend to think of the NT only as a stopover for Australian Defence Force deployments into the region—which it is, as a forward operating base—and a place to conduct training and exercising in the dry season. Few would consider it a natural home for innovative defence technology development.

But the NT government—a small jurisdiction both population- and budget-wise—has been working to change that perception over the past few years and has self-funded and supported some truly innovative projects.

Unfortunately, this work has been done on a shoestring budget and with limited support from the federal government or industry. Two examples are Australia’s only defence and aerospace Industry 4.0 TestLab at Charles Darwin University and the ‘virtual twin’ project for Darwin harbour and surrounds.

The TestLab is a partnership between CDU and RMIT University, with funding from the federal Department of Education and the NT government. It was launched in 2022 and has developed the new diploma of advanced manufacturing to assist territory manufacturers in transitioning to ‘Industry 4.0’.

Industry 4.0 is the full integration of cyber and physical production systems and has been heralded as the fourth industrial revolution. Cyber integration lowers costs and wastage while improving the competitiveness of businesses.

CDU is now running courses in which students learn how to manage Industry 4.0 projects, set up the internet of things on production lines, test cybersecurity technologies, and integrate 3D printing and robotics into manufacturing. These skills will all be critical for Australia’s future defence workforce.

The NT government’s virtual twin project is the first of its kind in Australia and incorporates data on geography, infrastructure, services and marine patterns to support and enable the ADF and allied forces to plan the construction of defence infrastructure supply chains across the territory. The virtual twin can also be used to simulate defence scenarios and to optimise planning, logistics, training and asset management programs.

The project was developed through a strategic partnership between the NT government, Secora, Dassault Systèmes and AMC Search. Delivered in just six weeks for only $2 million from the NT government—an industry first—the virtual twin will provide significant savings in both time and money for civil and military infrastructure projects.

The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral John C. Aquilino, was briefed on the project and given a hands-on demonstration during a visit to Darwin in 2022. He was engaged and impressed and directed his planning staff to better understand how the US could use this capability, though nothing has come out of this yet.

The TestLab and virtual twin initiatives show that valuable defence innovation is possible in the Northern Territory.

The defence strategic review delivered plenty of funding to develop and strengthen critical infrastructure in the NT. It also contained plenty of rhetoric about the importance of the Top End.

Assistant Minister for Defence Matt Thistlethwaite said in a statement: ‘Defence bases and infrastructure in the north are essential enablers for Australia’s capability and major drivers of economic activity.’ Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has made similar statements, as have ministers of past governments.

Base development and hardening are essential. Increasing exercise tempo in the north is important. But Defence should not overlook the importance of an innovative industry base and workforce across the north to achieving its goals.

This will deepen Defence’s efforts and support Australia’s allies and partners who frequent the territory. It will also help to achieve the review’s goal for defence to be treated as a true whole-of-nation effort, which it notes will be sorely needed in coming decades.

Strategic review must move to secure Australia’s northern defence infrastructure

The Russo-Ukrainian war has burst the bubble of those who had assumed that future wars would be fast and furious affairs. While we have many lessons to learn from the first six months of this war, it seems clear that logistics and infrastructure matter as much in major conflict today as they did in World War II. This lesson isn’t good news for Australia’s defence organisation, which is too comfortable with relying on ‘plugging in’ to US infrastructure. The three decades of relative peace Australia has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War has degraded our prioritisation of and investment in future-ready defence and multi-use strategic infrastructure.

The strategic uncertainty we now face requires a paradigm shift in our way of thinking about this infrastructure, especially in Australia’s north. The recently announced defence strategic review provides the perfect opportunity to get that process started.

The government needs to take a longer term perspective on defence and multi-user infrastructure that considers a range of future contingencies. The upgrades to the airfield in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands under Defence Project 8219 to support the operation of the Royal Australian Air Force’s P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft show our siloed, short-term thinking in action. This critical investment will ensure the airfield is long and wide enough to support P-8s. However, Defence hasn’t synchronised the project with other requirements, which means a lost opportunity. Nor is this investment focused on ensuring that defence infrastructure on Cocos (Keeling) Islands is future-ready; instead, it will just be good enough for now.

Defence needs to revisit its assumptions about infrastructure. An example of this issue is Defence’s bare bases: RAAF Base Scherger near Weipa in Queensland, RAAF Base Curtin near Derby in Western Australia and RAAF Base Learmonth near Exmouth, also in WA. These bases, built in the 1980s and 1990s, were constructed to enhance the air force’s ability to mount operations in defence of Australia. Today, these facilities are more important than ever. But their full utility can’t yet be realised because they’re plagued by challenges, including poorly maintained roads and untested supply-chain assumptions.

Defence needs to reacquaint itself with the forgotten multi-user infrastructure in northern Australia. Across the region, many pieces of infrastructure have national-security significance. Some of these sites have slipped from strategists’ calculus, like the fuel storage on Melville Island near Darwin. Planners also take many pieces of infrastructure, like some of the smaller jetties and piers in northern Queensland, for granted. Defence needs to take on a greater role in ensuring these facilities continue to operate.

There are also cases where potentially strategically important facilities and infrastructure are no longer commercially viable, so they risk falling into disrepair. In Gove in the Northern Territory, the Nhulunbuy Rio Tinto mine will close within a decade. And with it will go a potentially important fuel storage facility.

In northern WA, the Mungalalu Truscott Airbase is a sealed, all-weather runway that’s 1,800 metres long and 30 metres wide and provides significant efficiencies for aviation operations in the Kimberley region and the Timor Sea. It played a critical role in the defence of Australia during the Second World War. The airfield runs the risk of being shut down as WA government policies focused on making Broome (more than 600 kilometres to the southwest) a hub airport for the mining industry diminish Mungalalu Truscott’s commercial viability.

Ownership of our infrastructure is also an issue that the government ought to consider in more detail for multi-user infrastructure. Much has been written about the lease of Darwin Port to Chinese-owned company Landbridge. The public debate on the lease often doesn’t consider Landbridge’s control over the port’s future development. Especially where the future development interests of the lessee and the Australian government might be divergent.

Finally, Australia’s strategic circumstances are rapidly evolving. The recent signing of the security pact between Solomon Islands and China is a case in point. Darwin has long been considered a forward operating base in a time of crisis. Our approach to infrastructure in Darwin is focused on achieving a higher degree of readiness than in Townsville or Cairns, which have long been garrison towns—places where capabilities are raised, trained and sustained. The Solomon Islands security pact may indeed change this strategic calculation. We must consider whether Cairns and Townsville should also be potential forward operating bases in light of this development. If so, much will need to be done in these cities to support target hardening, supply-chain resilience, and defence and multi-user infrastructure.

This sort of readiness won’t just happen and can’t be left to market forces. But neither can it be left to Defence to start a multi-year analysis of the problem, which would delay real action even further. The government must include these considerations in its defence strategic review. Thankfully, that review is set to report back early next year and, if done right, its findings could set the ball rolling on positive developments for northern Australia and the defence of the continent more broadly.

Handling of Darwin port lease a fiasco on both sides of politics

Unexpectedly, the loudest exchange in the pre-election debate between Prime Minister Scott Morrison and opposition leader Anthony Albanese on Sunday night was over the Port of Darwin.

The 99-year lease of the port to a Chinese company in 2015 is a prime example of policy stupidity and bureaucratic myopia.

Seven years on, Morrison and Albanese could choose to end the lease and bring the Port of Darwin back into Australian control. Both failed to say they will, but the case to resume ownership is growing stronger.

China’s advance into Australia’s near region is becoming faster and more blatant. We desperately need to resist this strategic undermining.

How can Australia believably tell our Pacific island neighbours they should reject Chinese offers of port and airport development when, just a few years ago, there was hardly any piece of critical infrastructure we wouldn’t sell to Beijing?

The prime minister was correct to say in the debate that a now-closed loophole in Australia’s foreign investment laws meant, in 2015, Canberra did not have the power to prevent the Northern Territory from leasing the port to a foreign company.

The opposition leader was equally correct to retort that the real failure was that no one in the federal government or bureaucracy had the wit to see the lease as a strategic problem. With a bit of energy and imagination, Canberra could have talked Darwin out of leasing the port to a Chinese company.

Why that opportunity was missed is astonishing. Consider that, in 2015, Beijing was well advanced in annexing the South China Sea, turning a bunch of rocks and shoals into well-fortified air and naval bases.

The Chinese Communist Party was engaged in full-on cyber intellectual property theft and espionage in Australia, which our national security establishment was acutely aware of. It was also increasingly obvious that our political parties were being compromised by donations from so-called Chinese mystery businessmen.

Yet with all that happening, no one was troubled by the idea of leasing the only significant port in the northern half of Australia to a Chinese company intimately connected to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative? This was the same port the Japanese saw as a key strategic target in 1942 and was central to our East Timor stabilisation mission in 1999.

What was inexplicable in 2015 is utterly indefensible now, but note that in the debate neither leader was promising to fix the Port of Darwin debacle. It was like watching two scarred and wary tom cats circling each other: lots of yowling but no interest in landing a killer blow.

Albanese could have said the Port of Darwin debacle happened because of the short-sighted behaviour of an NT Country Liberal Party government and a federal Coalition failure to identify and prevent a threat to national security. ‘Only a Labor government will step in to reverse this stupidity,’ Albanese might have said, offering some proof of his party’s apparent commitment to national security.

Labor lacks the courage of its defence convictions. Its claim to bipartisanship is designed more to suppress a conversation than it is to show what it would do to get ahead of Beijing’s strategy.

For his part, Morrison had an opportunity given to him by Defence Minister Peter Dutton late last year when the government asked the Department of Defence to review its position on the Port of Darwin. That created a moment for Morrison to correct a profound strategic mistake, bring the port back into Australian ownership and rethink Australia’s northern defence needs.

It was an opportunity not taken. When asked about the port in February, Morrison said: ‘I’ve always said that if we receive advice from our defence and intelligence agencies that that is what is necessary to do to protect Australia’s national interest, I will not hesitate. I would not hesitate to do that. But that is not something that has been advised.’

Morrison has never hesitated to overturn Defence’s advice when it has suited him to do so—consider the French submarine contract or reversing the Australian Defence Force chief’s decision to remove a meritorious unit citation from the Afghanistan Special Operations Task Group following the Brereton report into alleged war crimes.

On the Port of Darwin, it is regret­table, indeed wilfully negligent given our strategic circumstances, that Defence cannot bring itself to correct its 2015 performance. But the government has an obligation to lead—not just to hide behind flawed bureaucratic advice.

One can only speculate about why the Morrison government decided not to take a decision on bringing the port back into Australian control. It may have hoped that, faced with an offer from the private sector, Chinese company Landbridge would sell a commercial proposition that has not produced a compliant belt and road partner.

There has been no successful move on that front, nor will there be if the CCP judges that hanging on to the port obstructs Australian and allied military thinking about the north. Beijing is calling Morrison’s bluff. Our officials undoubtedly would have advised that moving to resume ownership of the port would have been greeted with fresh howls of outrage from Beijing.

The Treasury view is that such a move could worry potential investors, giving rise to a concern of a sovereign risk to their assets. I doubt that, because the investors we should attract to Australia come from countries that respect the rule of law and don’t use economic linkages to force political concessions.

One lesson from the past decade is that Chinese foreign investment into Australian critical infrastructure carries risks to investments different from, say, Canadian or Japanese companies. This cuts across Treasury’s ideological disposition to imagine that China acts just like any other country in its economic behaviour. Not so!

Few, if any, democratic leaders have taken more steps than former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull and Morrison to resist Beijing’s determined undermining of others’ sovereignty, but Morrison’s instinct is reactive. There is precious little strategy to get ahead of the problem.

For example, we have known for years and in quite precise ways that Beijing wants to establish a military footprint in Pacific island countries. That could have been countered with a more forward-leaning use of the ADF to significantly strengthen our own presence first. Instead, we got cautious incrementalism.

Retaking control of the Port of Darwin this year would have been an enormous help in setting the foundations for what will become, in quite short order, a larger US and ADF presence in the north—forced on us by harsh strategic realities changing our region. Regrettably, neither side of politics is yet prepared to grasp the nettle.

Plotting Darwin Harbour’s future course

Darwin Harbour and the port facilities along its eastern arm have a long history of disregard, disrepair and haphazard investment and control by successive governments dating back to the close of World War II. There has arguably never been anything like a coherent national security or economic strategy for Australia’s most northern and strategically important deepwater port.

This remains the case today, despite it being critical infrastructure for the current and future economic and social prosperity of the Northern Territory.

Until 2015, the NT government faced a dual problem: funding the port’s operations and investing for its future maintenance and development. Despite repeated efforts, the government was unable to find assistance to resolve either problem. Following a global trend, a long-term lease of part of the port seemed to make good economic sense. The lease was won by a Chinese-owned company, Landbridge Infrastructure Australia. At that time, most in Canberra were working under the assumption that a red line separated economic and national security policies.

The distinct change in the global strategic environment since then has made the lease a concern from a national security perspective.

The key question that any future strategy for Darwin Harbour must now address is how can our most northern deepwater port best be used in an environment in which the Chinese party-state and military are aggressively pursuing interests vastly different from our own? The answer lies in understanding what role Darwin can play as Australia works with allies and partners to evoke positive contributions to regional security and credible deterrence of conflict.

National security doves continue to protest that China isn’t an expansionist power. However, even the most strident acknowledge that the global security context continues to experience more significant uncertainty and unpredictability. In comments made to the Chinese state-owned news agency Xinhua, Landbridge’s owner, Ye Cheng, said of the port, ‘This is our involvement in One Belt, One Road.’ Ye Cheng’s admission suggests that there’s a connection between Landbridge’s port lease and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Meanwhile, as the gateway for maritime trade to Asia, Darwin Port’s renewed significance since Covid-19 has shown that national supply-chain resilience and sovereignty have an all-new level of policy importance.

Today, everyone has a plan for the port—the NT government, the Department of Defence, the US government, the Japanese oil company Inpex, Landbridge and the broader private sector. Better still, many of those plans have very real budgets. For example, the US is planning to spend more than $80 million on liquid-fuel storage. But too little has been done to align those often ambitious visions, and uncertainty about the future of the port lease adds further confusion.

Our new ASPI report, Lead me to the harbour! Plotting Darwin Harbour’s future course, launched today, aims to move beyond binary options playing out in public policy discourse. Instead, we offer an analysis of the benefits provided by both the port and the harbour, exploring the harbour’s history, the nature of its strategic importance to Australia and our allies, and opportunities for its future development. We explore four options for the future development of the port and harbour. Rather than examining the policy behind the current leasing arrangements, this work focuses on promoting policy discourse on a unifying vision for the harbour’s future.

A key insight is that this is an opportunity for the federal government to work with the NT government to harness the existing plans for the port, or at least those proposed by Defence, the US government and the NT government, and embed those plans within the broader strategic vision for Australia. While each of those worthy projects will undoubtedly have merit, the question is whether, by carefully harnessing them together, they could produce a greater economic and national security whole.

Australia’s economic and political relationships and opportunities with neighbours in Asia, the increased aggression of the Chinese Communist Party, and the US force posture pivot to the Indo-Pacific, all put northern Australia at the centre of the region rather than the edge of Australia.

The four opportunities we explore for the future of the port each has its strengths and weaknesses. The two things they all share are a need to mitigate the security implications of the current lease arrangement in the era of great-power competition and a need to invest considerable money into any of the proposed solutions for the chosen option to be successful beyond the short term.

Other key reference points for decision-making include the policy directions we can see being taken by our major security partners: the US, Japan and now India as a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Darwin’s future port must be a national strategic and economic asset, invested in to enable greatly increased Australian, ally and partner military operations and supporting Australia’s economic and trade relations with Southeast, West and North Asia. A partnership between the federal and NT governments that uses Defence as an anchor tenant in developing the port as a primary naval asset for Australia and our strategic partners is the essential starting point. That will also enable new corporate investment and activity—but only if the two governments work together with a strategic and economic focus on the port and its future.

This time around, big thinking and a long-term view are required. Getting Darwin Harbour right will take real vision, leadership, collaboration and investment, and all in spades.

Our recommendation is that it’s now time for a national discussion on the port’s role in the long-term strategic future of Australia. That national discussion must result in the production of a national security and economic strategy for the port and harbour with appropriate funding attached.