Tag Archive for: Cybercrime

State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Governmental practices in protecting IP-intensive industries

Introduction

This report looks at measures that governments in various parts of the world have taken to defend their economic ‘crown jewels’ and other critical knowledge-intensive industries from cyber threats. It should serve as inspiration for other governments, including from those economies studied in State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to defend against cyber-enabled IP theft. Despite accounting for the bulk of GDP growth, innovation and future employment, such intellectual property (IP)-intensive industries aren’t held to the same levels of protection and security scrutiny as government agencies or providers of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Various layers of cybersecurity protection regimes

Source: Developed by the authors.

Since 2022, an increasing number of governments have introduced new policies, legislation, regulations and standards to deal with the threat to their economies from cyber-enabled IP theft. Most prominently, in October 2023, the heads of the major security and intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US (also known as the ‘Five Eyes’) appeared together in public for the first time, in front of a Silicon Valley audience, and called out China as an ‘unprecedented threat’ to innovation across the world.1 That was followed up in October 2024 with a public campaign called ‘Secure Innovation’.

There is, however, variation in how governments frame their responses. Countries such as the UK and Australia take a national-security approach with policy instruments that seek to monitor the flow of knowledge and innovation to and from specific countries (primarily China). Other countries, such as Malaysia and Finland, take a due-diligence risk approach with a focus on awareness building and providing incentives to organisations to do their due-diligence checks before engaging with foreign entities. Countries such as Japan and Singapore, by contrast, take an economic-security approach in which they focus on engaging and empowering at-risk industries proactively.

This report is the third in a compendium of three. The first report, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, published in 2022, looked at the scale, scope and impact of state-sponsored cyber-espionage campaigns aimed at extracting trade secrets and sensitive business information. The second report, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to respond to cyber-enabled IP theft, looks at the extent to which agreed norms effectively constrain states from conducting economic cyber-espionage and also examines the varying levels of vulnerability experienced by selected major emerging economies.

This third report complements those diagnoses by offering policymakers an action perspective based on good practices observed across the world. Various practices and examples have been selected, drawing from a multi-year capacity-building effort that included engagements in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Latin America and consultations with authorities in developed economies such as the US, Australia, Japan, Singapore and the Netherlands. Many of the practices covered in this report were presented at the Track 1 Dialogue on Good Governmental Practices that ASPI hosted during Singapore International Cyber Week 2023.

International guardrails

The issue of economic cyber-espionage2 is inherently international. It’s an issue caused by malicious or negligent behaviour of other states. Accordingly, international law and norms are as critical as domestic responses in countering the threat posed. This section offers a review of the most relevant international initiatives that touch on the governance of cyberspace and the protection of IP.

Through the UN First Committee process, states have introduced a set of voluntary and non-binding norms (Figure 2). That has included the following provisions:

  • States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts; that is, activities that constitute (serious) breaches of international obligations, inflict serious harm on another state or jeopardise international peace and security.
  • States should not conduct or support cyber activities that damage critical infrastructure or impair the operation of critical infrastructure that provides services to the public.
  • States should offer assistance upon request and respond to requests to mitigate ongoing cyber incidents if those incidents affect the functioning of critical infrastructure.

Figure 2: UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace


The G20 norm complements the work of the UN First Committee, providing that:

  • States should not engage in cyber-espionage activities for the purpose of providing domestic industry with illegitimately obtained commercially valuable information.

The extent to which states accept that economic cyber-espionage without commercial intent is an acceptable tool of statecraft remains a live debate. In 2017, the authors of the Tallin Manual 2.0 asserted that although ‘peacetime cyber espionage by States does not per se violate international law, the method by which it is carried out might do so’.3 Other states, however, such as the members of MERCOSUR (the trade bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela [currently suspended]) and China hold the view that ‘[n]o State shall engage in ICT-enabled espionage or damages against other States’.4 Austria recently (2024) added to this debate, arguing that ‘cyber espionage activities, including industrial cyber espionage against corporations, within a state’s territory may also violate that state’s sovereignty.’5

The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and the new UN Cybercrime Convention don’t address the theft of IP or offer mechanisms to deal with state-sponsored cyber activities.6 Both frameworks merely offer mechanisms for the harmonisation of legal regimes to enable states to collaborate on investigations and prosecutions of cyber-related crimes.

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO), sets minimum standards for IP protection. Article 39 provides perpetual trade-secret protection, provided that the secret is not ‘generally known or readily accessible’ to the general public, has ‘commercial value because it is a secret’, and the owner has taken reasonable precautions to protect the secret.77 However, TRIPS doesn’t take into account any cyber-related threats to IP protection; nor does it provide dispute-settlement mechanisms to address state-sponsored or state-supported acts of theft.

Finally, there are international agreements that regulate certain technology transfers. For instance, the Wassenaar Arrangement—a voluntary export-control regime established to promote responsible transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technologies and goods—offers a list of technologies that are considered sensitive and ought to be subject of additional layers of review before being approved for export. While it doesn’t address cyber-enabled IP theft, it does regulate the trade in technologies that could facilitate such theft, such as intrusion software and surveillance tools.

However, despite the serious impact of IP theft, there’s a clear gap in current international law and norms that would otherwise offer national governments guardrails for introducing measures that would help states to prevent, deter, detect and recover from economic cyber-espionage. Therefore, the onus for protection presently lies on national governments taking ownership and responsibility within their own borders.

References

  1. Zeba Siddiqui, ‘Five Eyes intelligence chiefs warn on China’s “theft” of intellectual property’, Reuters, 19 October 2023, online.
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  2. ‘Economic cyber-espionage’ is the unauthorised collection of commercially valuable assets, through compromises of digital systems and communication channels, by one state against another or by one state against a private entity. ‘Industrial or commercial cyber-espionage’ is the unauthorised collection of commercially valuable assets, through compromises of digital systems and communication channels, by one private entity against another private entity. ↩︎
  3. Michael N Schmitt, Tallinn manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
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  4. On China, see “China’s views on the application of the principle of sovereignty in cyberspace,” United Nations, online; on Mercosur, see “Decision rejecting the acts of espionage conducted by the United States in the countries of the region,” United Nations, 22 July 2013, online.
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  5. Przemysław Roguski, “Austria’s Progressive Stance on Cyber Operations and International Law,” Just Security, 25 June 2024, online.
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  6. See, for instance, Brenda I Rowe, ‘Transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage: a legal quagmire’, Security Journal, 13 September 2019, 33:63–82.
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  7. ‘Article 39 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’, World Trade Organization, online.
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State-Sponsored Economic Cyber-Espionage for Commercial Purposes

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has launched the world’s first capacity-building initiative dedicated to raising awareness about the threat of economic cyber-espionage in key emerging economies across the Indo-Pacific and Latin America.

Through a series of research reports, case studies, and learning materials, this initiative highlights how economic cyber-espionage is not just a concern for advanced economies—it is a growing risk for emerging economies like India, Brazil, and Indonesia, which are rapidly digitizing their industries.

What is Economic Cyber-Espionage?

Economic cyber-espionage refers to the state-sponsored theft of intellectual property (IP) via cyber means for commercial gain. As nations undergo digital transformation, securing knowledge-based industries is critical for economic security. However, many countries—especially those with lower cybersecurity maturity—are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-enabled IP theft.

In the modern economy, local businesses that trade internationally, critical national industries, and start-ups as well as universities, research and development organisations and public services rely on secure data, digital communications and ICT-enabled systems and applications.

But trust and confidence in the digital economy is threatened by the practice of some states that deploy offensive cyber capabilities against industries, organisations and individuals in other states. Those who operate in environments with lower levels of cybersecurity maturity are particularly vulnerable to fall victim to cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.

Project Activities and Findings

This project has included a series of workshops and engagements in India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, bringing together officials and experts to discuss cyber threats that endanger national economies and innovation sectors.

For this project, ASPI has also published three reports, which can be downloaded on the right.

  1. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity (2022): Highlights how state-sponsored cyber-espionage has intensified, with more targeted industries and universities now based in emerging economies
  2. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to respond to cyber-enabled IP theft: Evaluates the readiness of 11 emerging economies—including Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—to counteract cyber-enabled IP theft.
  3. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Governmental practices in protecting IP-Intensive industries: Reviews how governments around the world are responding to the threat of economic cyber-espionage and considers how states are employing, among others, legislative, defensive, and reactive measures.

On 15 November 2022, ASPI also issued a Briefing Note recommending that the G20 members recognise that state-sponsored ICT-enabled theft of IP remains a key concern for international cooperation and encouraging them to reaffirm their commitment made in 2015 to refrain from economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes.

Videos and Podcasts

Explore the videos and podcasts we have produced to help you make sense of economic cyber-espionage.

Project Team

This team is led by CTS Deputy Director Bart Hogeveen and CTS senior analyst Dr. Gatra Priyandita. We thank the support and contributions of other serving and former ASPI staff, including Urmika Deb, Dr. Ben Stevens, Dr. Teesta Prakash, and Shivangi Seth. This project involved input from researchers from across the world, including those in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. We thank them for their contributions.

State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity

As part of a multi-year capacity building project supporting governments in the Indo-Pacific with defending their economic against the risk of cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, ASPI analysed public records to determine the effects, the actual scale, severity and spread of current incidents of cyberespionage affecting and targeting commercial entities.

In 2015, the leaders agreed that ‘no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.’

Our analyses suggests that the threat of state-sponsored economic cyberespionage is more significant than ever, with countries industrialising their cyberespionage efforts to target commercial firms and universities at a grander scale; and more of these targeted industries and universities are based in emerging economies.

“Strategic competition has spilled into the economic and technological domains and states have become more comfortable and capable using offensive cyber capabilities. Our analysis shows that the state practice of economic cyber-espionage appears to have resurged to pre-2015 levels and tripled in raw numbers.”

In this light, we issued a Briefing Note on 15 November 2022 recommending that the G20 members recognise that state-sponsored ICT-enabled theft of IP remains a key concern for international cooperation and encouraging them to reaffirm their commitment made in 2015 to refrain from economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes. 

This latest Policy Brief, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, further suggests that governments should raise awareness by better assessing and sharing information about the impact of IP theft on their nations’ economies in terms of financial costs, jobs and competitiveness. Cybersecurity and intelligence authorities should invest in better understanding the extent of state sponsored economic cyber-espionage on their territories.

On the international front, the G20 and relevant UN committees should continue addressing the issue and emphasising countries’ responsibilities not to allow the attacks to be launched from their territories. 

The G20 should encourage members to reaffirm their 2015 commitments and consider establishing a cross-sectoral working group to develop concrete guidance for the operationalisation and implementation of the 2015 agreement while assessing the scale and impact of cyber-enabled IP theft.

Exfiltrate, encrypt, extort

The global rise of ransomware and Australia’s policy options

What’s the problem?

As the Covid-19 pandemic has swept across the world, another less visible epidemic has occurred concurrently—a tsunami of cybercrime producing global losses totalling more than US$1 trillion.1

While cybercrime is huge in scale and diverse in form, there’s one type that presents a unique threat to businesses and governments the world over: ransomware.

Some of the most spectacular ransomware attacks have occurred offshore, but Australia hasn’t been immune. Over the past 18 months, major logistics company Toll Holdings Ltd has been hit twice; Nine Entertainment was brought to its knees by an attack that left the company struggling to televise news bulletins and produce newspapers; multiple health and aged-care providers across the country have been hit; and global meat supplies were affected after the Australian and international operations of the world’s largest meat producer, JBS Foods, were brought to a standstill. It’s likely that other organisations have also been hit but have kept it out of the public spotlight.

A current policy vacuum makes Australia an attractive market for these attacks, and ransomware is a problem that will only get worse unless a concerted and strategic domestic effort to thwart the attacks is developed. Developing a strategy now is essential. Not only are Australian organisations viewed as lucrative targets due to their often low cybersecurity posture, but they’re also seen as soft targets. The number of attacks will continue to grow unless urgent action is taken to reduce the incentives to target Australian companies and other entities.

What’s the solution?

All governments, civil society groups and businesses—large and small—need to know how to manage and mitigate the risk of ransomware, but organisations can’t deal with the attacks on their own. Given the significant—and increasing—threat ransomware presents to Australia, new policy measures are fundamental to dealing with this challenge. While there’s no doubt ransomware is difficult to tackle using traditional law enforcement methods because the criminal actors involved are usually located offshore, there are domestic policy levers that can be pulled, for example, to support cybersecurity uplift measures across the economy. Such action is essential because the grim reality is that, when it comes to ransomware, prevention is the best response.

This policy report addresses key areas in Australia where new policies and strategies and improved guidance are needed and also where better support for cybersecurity uplift can be achieved.

Our recommendations include arguments for greater clarity about the legality of ransomware payments, increased transparency when attacks do occur, the adoption of a mandatory reporting regime, expanding the official alert system of the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), focused education programs to improve the public’s and the business community’s understanding and, finally, incentivising cybersecurity uplift measures through tax, procurement and subsidy measures. We also recommend the establishment of a dedicated cross-departmental ransomware taskforce, which would include state and territory representatives, that would share threat intelligence and develop federal-level policy proposals to tackle ransomware nationally.

Introduction: What’s ransomware?

Ransomware is a form of malware designed and deployed by state and non-state cybercriminals who seek out vulnerabilities in the computer systems of organisations, both large and small, locking up, encrypting and extracting data, and rendering computers and their files unusable.2 Attacks are accompanied by a demand for ransom to be paid in return for decrypting and unlocking systems.

Increasingly, ransomware attacks include an extortion element that usually involves threats to leak stolen data publicly or on the dark web if payment isn’t made (known as ‘hack and leak’) to exert pressure on the victim to pay the ransom.

Furthermore, payments can be difficult to trace because they’re generally made using cryptocurrency.3

This also makes it hard—but not impossible (as we saw with the Colonial Pipeline attack)—to investigate and prosecute the criminals responsible for ransomware attacks. Generally, those criminals operate with impunity in extraterritorial jurisdictions (most notably Russian threat actors) where governments protect or tolerate them or don’t have the legal systems, frameworks or capabilities in place to prosecute them.4

Ransomware is a form of cybercrime that’s both scalable and able to be commoditised. It can be bought as a service, generally on the dark web, where ransomware criminals essentially act as ‘guns for hire’. In 2020, a US analysis found buying malware online was ‘incredibly easy’, and that advanced malware tools sell for as little as US$50.5 The analysis also found that ‘almost all premium malware sellers provide buyers with in-depth tutorials and ideas about using their products for technically unskilled buyers.’6

The most common way ransomware is deployed into a system is via email phishing campaigns, remote access vulnerabilities and software vulnerabilities.7 In the case of phishing, a criminal sends an email containing a malicious file or link that deploys malware when it’s clicked. Phishing campaigns continue to evolve and are becoming increasingly sophisticated and targeted. Remote access vulnerabilities, such as weak username and password combinations, allow criminals access to and control of the computer remotely. Cybercriminals exploit such vulnerabilities via sustained attacks or by obtaining user credentials, which are often purchased on the dark web, enabling the deployment of malware onto a system.8 Finally, cybercriminals leverage security weaknesses in popular software programs to gain control of systems and deploy ransomware.9

It’s important to note that ransomware attacks are entirely foreseeable and almost always defendable.

In the physical world, organisations pay for security alarms, high fences and sensors to protect their property. And the digital world should be no different. Ransomware is simply another crime type and the threat should be viewed as another organisational risk because, behind every ransomware attack, are cybercriminals who have watched their victim’s network, laying the ground for encryption and data theft to hold the victim to ransom.

The domestic landscape

In 2019–20, the ACSC reported an increase in the number of ransomware attacks on Australian organisations, although specific metrics weren’t released.10 According to the ACSC, the top five sectors to report ransomware incidents during that period were health; state and territory governments; education and research; and transport and retail.11 It’s worth noting that the health sector was disproportionately affected, in line with global trends,12 reflecting its attractiveness as a target due to the value of the troves of personal health data stored and, most importantly, the criticality of the services provided. Put simply, a ransom is more likely to be paid if human life is endangered.

It should be noted that transnational cyberattacks are a serious concern for Australians. The recently published results of the 2021 Lowy Institute Poll reported that 98% of the poll’s nationally representative sample viewed ‘cyber attacks from other countries’ as a critical (62%) or important (36%) threat to Australia over the next decade.13 That makes transnational cyberattacks the highest of the 12 threats to Australia’s vital interests that the Lowy Institute asked people about, rating higher than climate change, Covid-19 and other potential epidemics, international terrorism, a severe downturn in the global economy and Australia–China relations.

Figure 1: Threats to Australia’s vital interests

Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2021, online.

Do Australians understand what ransomware is?

In a bid to better gauge the public’s understanding of what ransomware is, what it does and what to do in the event of an attack, the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre conducted a nationally representative online survey of 1,000 Australian adults in April 2021 on ‘Understanding ransomware’. The results—though not unexpected—painted an alarming picture of just how little the Australian public understands ransomware.

Twenty-five per cent of respondents said ransomware was the most significant cybersecurity threat to Australian businesses, coming in behind hacking (48%). Seventy-seven per cent said they wouldn’t know what to do if they fell victim to a ransomware attack but, when given a set of options, 56% said they would contact the ACSC. Of the respondents, 42% said they understood how a ransomware attack occurred, and 44% indicated that they knew what happened in a ransomware attack. Respondents believed financial gain was the key aim of an attack (71%), followed by data theft (14%).

While this survey wasn’t exhaustive, it clearly shows that the community, generally, has little understanding of ransomware, illustrating that a more concerted effort to educate Australians about it is required. That effort should be teamed with effective tools and policies to mitigate the risk of falling victim to a ransomware attack.

Major reported ransomware attacks in Australia in 2020 and 2021

Major attacks on Australian targets in 2020 and so far in 2021 included the following:

  • February and May 2020: Toll Holdings
    Employee and commercially sensitive data was stolen in two separate ransomware attacks on Toll Holdings, which is an Australian logistics giant.14 Some of the stolen data was leaked on the dark web.15 It’s understood that Toll didn’t pay either ransom.16 As a result of the attack, the company has undertaken substantial remediation and cybersecurity uplift programs.17
  • May 2020: BlueScope Steel
    A ransomware attack on a US-based system of BlueScope Steel had global ramifications, affecting production at the organisation’s Port Kembla facility in Australia.18 Details of the attack, including whether payment was made, were undisclosed.
  • June 2020 (two attacks): Lion Dairy and Drinks
    Dairy processor and drink manufacturer Lion was forced to shut down production as a result of two separate ransomware attacks, which had significant impacts on its vast domestic supply chain.19 Sensitive data was stolen in the attacks, and the criminals responsible threatened to publish it on the dark web.20 It’s unknown whether a ransom was paid.
  • December 2020: Law in Order
    Law in Order provides document-management services to the legal profession and purports to have ‘iron-clad security’.21 The criminals who attacked it threatened to publish stolen data on the dark web.22 It’s unknown whether a ransom payment was made.
  • March 2021: Nine Entertainment
    In late March, Nine Entertainment’s news and newspaper production were severely damaged by a ransomware attack.23 As a result, news teams were forced to work remotely, and most production had to be done out of Nine’s Melbourne office, which was the least affected. It took weeks for production to return to normal.24 It’s unknown whether the ransom was paid.
  • March 2021: Eastern Health
    Eastern Health, which operates several hospitals in Melbourne, was brought to a halt by a ransomware attack that resulted in multiple surgery cancellations and prevented access to patient medical records, internal emails and IT systems.25 Systems were reportedly damaged for weeks. It’s unknown whether a ransom was paid.
  • April 2021: Uniting Care Qld
    Uniting Care Qld, which operates several hospitals and disability and aged-care facilities across the state, had its access to internal IT systems and patient records severely compromised in a ransomware attack attributed to the REvil group.26 It’s unknown whether a ransom was paid.
  • June 2021: JBS Foods
    JBS Foods, the world’s largest meat supplier, had its global production brought to a standstill by a ransomware attack affecting 47 facilities in Australia.27 The company confirmed that it paid US$11 million to the attackers.28

Ransomware payments and regulating cryptocurrency

Cryptocurrencies are the preferred channel of payment for ransomware attacks because of the assumed untraceability of those payments. However, successful steps are being taken to crack down on cryptocurrency providers via law enforcement and recovery action. In the US, steps have been taken to regulate the use of cryptocurrencies more tightly and to recoup stolen funds; for example, US$2.3 million was recovered after the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack.29

The US Treasury announced in May 2021 that, under a proposed reporting regime, cryptocurrency transfers of more than $10,000 would have to be reported to the Internal Revenue Service—a step that could help to improve the effectiveness of cryptocurrency tracking.30 There’s also a move in the US towards KYC (‘know your customer’) and AML (anti-money-laundering) cryptocurrency regulation. KYC policies govern the types of information banks must collect, and retain, about their customers; AML regulations require financial institutions to monitor the use of funds by their customers.31

In 2018, new laws came into force in Australia making it compulsory for digital currency exchange providers operating in Australia to register with AUSTRAC and comply with reporting obligations under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006.32 Under those laws, exchanges are required to collect information to establish a customer’s identity, monitor transaction activity and report transactions or activity that’s suspicious or involves amounts of cash over $10,000.33

The legality of ransomware payment in Australia

When a ransomware attack occurs, any payment made has legal implications, but in Australia the legality of such a payment is murky at best. This is an issue that needs to be addressed with haste, without the burden of bureaucratic process and a regulatory quagmire. Importantly, criminalising ransomware payment isn’t the solution. Mandatory reporting of ransomware attacks, however, should be considered.

The ACSC’s advice on payment is clear: don’t pay.34 At first blush, that appears to be straightforward, but any organisation faced with a ransomware attack (in which often every minute matters) grapples with the legal consequences of paying or not paying. This is a highly nuanced issue and one that other nations are also grappling with.

While the payment of a ransom should always be a last resort, criminalisation wouldn’t incapacitate the real offenders; nor would it bring restitution to victims. In fact, it would have the effect of further victimising the victim. There are also ethical considerations that need to be taken into account, the central one being the notion that criminalisation could punish organisations for taking proportionate action to protect stakeholders and the community more broadly. This is especially relevant in relation to critical infrastructure entities.

In the Australian context, the Criminal Code Act’s ‘instrument of crime’ provisions are broad. It’s an offence to ‘deal with’ money or other property if there’s a risk that the money or property will become an instrument of crime or if the payer is ‘reckless’ or ‘negligent’ about the fact that the money or property will become an instrument of crime.35 The Criminal Code also includes terrorism funding offences, which make it illegal to intentionally ‘make funds available to a [terrorist] organisation’ if the funder either knows that the organisation is a terrorist organisation or is reckless about whether the organisation is a terrorist organisation.36

Australia is also bound by UN sanctions laws and, under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (which implements UN Security Council sanctions), it’s an offence to transfer assets to sanctioned people and entities or to contravene UN sanctions enforcement laws.37 Currently, no ransomware actors are explicitly listed on the UN’s sanctions list; however, sanctions laws could apply in relation to sanctioned states or to groups acting on behalf of sanctioned entities.38

The most commonly cited potential defence against a charge of making an ‘illegal’ ransomware payment is duress. A duress defence can be used if a person ‘reasonably believes’ that a threat made will be carried out unless an offence of ransom payment is committed, there’s no reasonable way the threat can be rendered ineffective, and the conduct or payment is a reasonable response to the threat.39 Such a defence would depend on the particular circumstances facing an organisation and its payment of a ransom.

In the US, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported 2,474 ransomware incidents in 2020, ransom payment isn’t illegal.40 However, a ransomware advisory published by the US Treasury Department in October 2020 highlighted the possibility of sanction breaches that could be associated with ransomware payments to malicious cyber actors.41 The advisory contains a list of malicious cyber actors sanctioned by the department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, signalling that ransom payments to such actors could be met with civil penalties. Of note, however, is the recognition that ‘a company’s self-initiated, timely, and complete report of a ransomware attack to law enforcement [will be] a significant mitigating factor in determining an appropriate enforcement outcome if the situation is later determined to have a sanctions nexus’.42 On this point, a 2019 FBI ransomware alert highlighted the need for ransomware attacks to be reported, regardless of whether money is exchanged.43 Interestingly, the alert highlights the challenges that affected organisations face—and a possible reticence to prosecute for payment—by stating ‘the FBI understands that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers’.44

Given that the measures outlined in the Treasury advisory have, to date, not been applied, and the clear focus on reporting and transparency, it could be reasonably concluded in the US that there’s little appetite for penalising organisations for paying ransoms. Such a model could be employed in Australia, fostering an information-sharing culture without fear of legal consequences for organisations that pay ransoms. There’s also merit in the US approach of publishing a list of known malicious ransomware actors. While that wouldn’t remediate the problem, it would serve to better inform organisations about cyber threat actors.

A mandatory reporting regime could take the form of a legal obligation for an organisation to report the nature and root cause of a ransomware attack to the ACSC within a prescribed time frame (for example, within 21 days). That would be in addition to real-time reporting of a cyber incident.

Furthermore, this should occur regardless of whether payment is made and ensure the confidentiality of victims. It wouldn’t be about naming and shaming. Rather, by compelling victimised organisations to report under law, the ACSC would have improved access to vital and timely intelligence, assisting root-cause analysis and the identification of other attack vectors. Ultimately, when published, this would help better inform other stakeholders on how to reduce vulnerabilities. It would also enhance the operation of the federal government’s proposed changes to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018.45

It’s worth noting recent steps that the European Commission has taken ‘to tackle the rising number of serious cyber incidents’, announcing on 23 June that it will build a ‘Joint Cyber Unit’.46 The aim of the unit is to provide a coordinated response to ‘large-scale’ cyber incidents and assist in recovery, operating at both the operational and technical levels.47 It will involve key stakeholders from law enforcement, security, defence and diplomacy.48 Its functions will be enhanced by a new US–EU working group, which has been established specifically to address the ransomware threat.49

The joint EU and US approach demonstrates that, while Australia can take significant steps to address ransomware domestically by clarifying our law, there’s a vital need to work closely with allies and like-minded nations to tackle the threat globally. Longer term, sustained intelligence sharing and the adoption of responsibilities flowing from the agreed UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace will help achieve international consensus on tackling ransomware.50 In April, to that end, the Five Eyes nations committed to tackling the growing threat of ransomware, specifically addressing the issue in the Five Country Ministerial Statement Regarding the Threat of Ransomware.51

What about cyber insurance?

While still relatively immature, Australia’s cyber insurance market has expanded. Cyber insurance policies can be expensive, given the nature of the threat, and broad in scope, covering recovery, replacement and regulatory costs associated with a ransomware attack. Of concern, however, are policies that cover ransom costs, which could serve to encourage attacks targeted at insured entities.52 There are also concerns that ransomware criminals might access systems in search of insurance certificates and then demand ransom payment of the specific amount covered by an insurer.53 While there is a role for cyber insurance to play as part of an organisation’s holistic cyber security strategy, it is not a silver bullet, and it can have unintended consequences. As noted above, a key risk is the targeting of insured organisations by threat actors. There is also the potential for organisations with cyber insurance to be lax in their approach to managing cyber security. As noted in the Harvard Business Review: “Insurance is important, but it’s likely to take a back seat to the broader cyber security discussion…Insurance helps you recover from a situation, filling in the gaps when problems occur that you can’t prevent, but attempts to prevent problems are still crucial”.

Where do we go from here?

To better protect Australians and their businesses against ransomware, we believe that the three key words are transparency, education and incentivisation.

Increased transparency is vital

As it stands, there’s a dearth of official public data relating to ransomware attacks in Australia. For example, and as noted above, in the 2019–20 financial year the ACSC reported an increase in the number of domestic ransomware attacks, but no specific metrics were released.54 This is in stark contrast to the US, which has a much more transparent reporting system. The FBI publicly reported that it recorded 2,474 ransomware incidents in 2020, amounting to US$29.1 million in economic loss55 (and that’s likely to be a significant understatement of the overall incidence of ransomware attacks because reporting is voluntary).

While it’s understandable that the specifics of attacks and victims aren’t released into the public domain, if more insight were provided into the prevalence and root causes of ransomware crimes in Australia there would be greater onus on organisations to harden their systems against attack (especially known vulnerabilities). Furthermore, by building a public narrative on the threat landscape and threat actors, policymakers, organisations and the community more broadly would be better informed about the scale of the attacks. This would have a two-pronged effect—encouraging cybersecurity uplift across the economy and enhancing trust in government, especially in the light of the heightened reporting obligations touted for critical infrastructure entities.56

In April this year, the US Department of Justice established a dedicated ransomware taskforce.

A memo from Acting Deputy Attorney General John Carlin stated that 2020 had been ‘the worst year’ in history for ransomware and cyber extortion. He signalled that steps would be taken to deal with the root causes of ransomware, which could include actions ranging from ‘takedowns of servers used to spread ransomware to seizures of these criminal enterprises’ ill-gotten gains’.57

The US Government’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also provides regular ransomware alerts and tips to the public,58 which go into significant detail regarding the latest ransomware attacks, the systemic weaknesses that were exploited to gain access for malware to be deployed and steps organisations can take to mitigate those risks. The CISA played a pivotal role in disseminating real-time information about the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021,59 which brought the major provider of fuel to the US east coast to a grinding halt.60

The CISA kept the community and critical infrastructure entities informed during what was arguably the most serious ransomware attack the US has seen, ultimately assisting other organisations to be on guard.61

The US approach illustrates how comprehensive and more transparent official reporting of ransom ware attacks could be used to enhance preparedness for an attack and people’s understanding of the threat environment. While the ACSC does provide high-level threat intelligence to organisations, there’s a requirement for those organisations to register and be accepted into the ACSC Partnership Program. In addition, the alerts and advice are quite technical, which could make them inaccessible to some organisations, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Hence, there’s a need to build on the existing regime, with a view to enhancing transparency across the entire economy and community via public alerts and advice when ransomware attacks occur.

Education is necessary to improve knowledge and mitigate risk

While increased transparency is vital, it’s of little use if organisations don’t understand what ransomware is, what needs to be done to mitigate risk and haven’t implemented appropriate cybersecurity controls. Many ransomware attacks would be avoidable if effective organisational cybersecurity controls were in place and good cyber hygiene was practised. Ransomware is different from most other tools used by criminals in that it can have far-reaching consequences. The threat it poses through its ability to cripple critical infrastructure makes it all the more serious. Hence, there needs to be greater focus on the basics—a concerted education campaign that explains what ransomware is, what it does and how organisations can bolster their defences.

Top of the list must be patching. Patch management is essential for effective cybersecurity and ensures that the security features of software on computers and devices are up to date. All software is prone to technical vulnerabilities and, when a vulnerability is exposed and shared, cybercriminals have a metaphorical front-door key. A 2019 report by the Ponemon Institute on vulnerability responses found that, of the 48% of organisations that had experienced data breaches in the preceding year, 60% reported that the breaches resulted from failure to patch.62

And that brings us to people. Amid the barrage of policies and technical guidance, it’s often forgotten that the route to a cyber breach is surprisingly simple. In most cases, it comes down to a number: 1. That’s the number of people a cybercriminal needs to trick to gain access to a system.

Phishing emails containing malicious links are common lures used to deploy ransomware. The FBI reported 241,342 phishing complaints in 2020 and estimated that phishing cost more than US$54 million.63 Therefore, training employees to be better prepared to identify suspicious emails— and not to click on them—is essential. For large, well-resourced organisations, investing in threat hunting is the key.64 In many cases, the attacker has been inside the victim’s network for a significant period, watching and preparing the environment for an attack. An investment in threat hunting means that network anomalies can be more easily recognised and more swiftly contained. It could prove critical in detecting whether a cybercriminal is planning and plotting within a network.

It’s the responsibility of all executives, business leaders and boards to be aware of and effectively manage cybersecurity risks, to ensure that appropriate measures are in place and to foster a culture in which cybersecurity really does matter. If cybersecurity matters to a chair and board, that will trickle down and become a priority for the whole organisation. To that end, it’s also timely to note that Australian directors increasingly bear personal exposure to cyber risk liability, which may be heightened under the proposed changes to the critical infrastructure regime.

Incentivisation is needed to achieve real cybersecurity uplift

Good cyber hygiene is central to mitigating a ransomware attack, but cybersecurity uplift costs money—a cost that’s borne without immediately ‘tangible’ results for organisations. This is especially pertinent for SMEs, which generally don’t have the same level of resourcing to prioritise cybersecurity. Hence, incentivisation has a key role to play if cyber resilience is to be applied across all levels of the economy.

A clear example of where existing mechanisms could be used to incentivise cyber uplift is via full expensing, previously known as instant asset write-offs. The temporary full expensing scheme, which was extended in the 2021–22 federal Budget, allows organisations with an annual turnover of less than $5 billion to immediately write off the business portion of the cost of eligible new assets they first use or install by 30 June 2023, with no cap on the value of new assets that can be claimed (but there may be certain cost limits on particular assets).65 Put simply, this means organisations can make full or significant deductions for eligible purchases up front, rather than over a period of several years via depreciation. While this doesn’t remove the need for initial outlays, the scheme does offer significant taxation benefits. There’s clear scope for the federal government to provide clear information via the Australian Taxation Office about what cybersecurity asset purchases are covered under the scheme.

As it stands, cybersecurity assets aren’t clearly defined, and only bespoke in-house software is covered.66 If the scheme were broadened to include off-the-shelf products and subscription services (such as cloud services), it would support scalable and more rapid uplift. This relatively simple incentivisation solution, which should be promoted, would have a two-pronged effect, simultaneously easing financial imposts on organisations while also hardening cybersecurity resilience across a greater cross-section of the economy.

Another option is to leverage the power of federal government procurement to drive organisational cybersecurity uplift by mandating minimum cybersecurity standards for organisations feeding into the government supply chain. This has the potential to be transformative, given the government’s huge procurement spend (81,174 contracts with a combined value of $53.9 billion were published on AusTender in 2019–20).67 Despite that massive spend, cybersecurity is mentioned only once in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, 68 which recommend that cybersecurity risk be considered along with other risks and be evaluated in accordance with the government’s Protective Security Policy Framework.69 Cybersecurity needs to play a more prominent role in government procurement practices, not be viewed as an afterthought or secondary consideration. The important role government procurement could play in cyber uplift was highlighted by Rajiv Shah in his 2020 report Working smarter, not harder.70 Shah observed that the government:

… has an opportunity to leverage its market power to provide for broader benefits to the Australian economy and society … Setting security standards expected from its suppliers may help to lift standards across the board. Companies will be incentivised to lift their standards in order to qualify to do business with the government, and it will often be easier for them to apply those standards across their whole enterprises rather than just for their government contracts.71

A cybersecurity uplift grant or subsidy scheme could be considered, in the vein of a program such as the Skilling Australia’s Defence Industry Grants Program.72 That program provides grants to SMEs with fewer than 200 employees over three years, assisting the development of defence sector skills and human resources practices and training plans. The program provides SMEs that service, or intend to service, the defence industry with the capacity and skills required to operate in that supply chain.

A similar program could be introduced for organisations that feed into the whole-of-government supply chain to uplift cybersecurity resilience via both training and physical upgrades.

Another option could be to expand and extend the remit of the Cyber Security Business Connect and Protect Program beyond assistance and advice to also include financial aid to lift SME cybersecurity.

As it stands, the program (which is currently closed), provides funding to ‘trusted organisations’ to raise awareness of cybersecurity risks to SMEs, promote action to address those risks and support and lift the cyber capability of SMEs. However, the scheme doesn’t provide funding to assist SMEs in the physical implementation of cybersecurity uplift.

Policy recommendations

We make eight policy recommendations under the following themes.

Legal clarity

  1. The Australian Government shouldn’t criminalise the payment of ransoms. Instead, a mandatory reporting regime should be adopted, fostering an information-sharing culture without fear of legal repercussions.
  2. A dedicated cross-departmental ransomware taskforce, including state and territory representatives, should be established to share threat intelligence and develop federal-level policy proposals to tackle ransomware nationally.

Greater transparency

  1. The ACSC’s existing official alert system should be expanded to include the real-time distribution of publicly available alerts and clear, actionable advice when ransomware attacks are reported. The alerts and advice should be updated as required.
  2. The non-punitive mandatory reporting regime should require organisations to report ransomware incidents and known root causes to the ACSC within 21 days. The information would then be de-identified and distributed publicly.
  3. The ACSC should publish a list of ransomware threat actors and aliases, giving details of their modus operandi and key target sectors, along with suggested mitigation methods.

Low-hanging fruit: incentivisation and education

  1. The federal government should implement practical incentivisation measures to drive cybersecurity uplift across the economy via temporary full expensing and changes to procurement practices and grant or subsidy programs.
  2. The government should deliver a concerted nationwide public ransomware education campaign, led by the ACSC, across all media. The campaign should highlight the key causes of ransomware vulnerability and how organisations can bolster their security, and it should draw in external expertise where necessary.
  3. A business-focussed multi-media public education campaign, led by the ACSC, should be launched to educate organisations of all sizes and their people about basic cybersecurity and cyber hygiene. It should focus on the key areas of patching, multifactor authentication, legacy technology and human error.

Conclusion

Ransomware isn’t an abstract possibility. In Australia, the threat’s right here, right now and isn’t going away. Unless a concerted effort is made to mitigate the risk, the problem could continue to get worse.

There’s a key role for the Australian Government to play in leading the way, but tackling ransomware is a shared responsibility. While there’s no doubt that organisations must take responsibility for ensuring that their cybersecurity posture is up to scratch, there are practical and easily implementable steps the government can take to provide clarity, guidance and support.

The ongoing ransomware attacks that continue to strike unabated around the world must act as a red flag. And, because we’ve been warned, we need a plan.


Acknowledgements

Thank you to Danielle Cave for all of her work on this project. Thank you also to all of those who peer reviewed this work and provided valuable feedback including Michael Sentonas, Dr Natasha Molt, Fergus Hanson, Michael Shoebridge, Bart Hoogeveen, Jocelinn Kang and Tom Uren. ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre receives funding from a variety of sources including sponsorship, research and project support from across governments, industry and civil society. The Cyber Security CRC is a bronze sponsor of the centre. No specific funding was received, from any organisation, to fund the production of this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our annual report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. 

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, issues related to information and foreign interference and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.

The ICPC informs public debate in the Indo-Pacific region and supports public policy development by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. The ICPC enriches regional debates by collaborating with research institutes from around the world and by bringing leading global experts to Australia, including through fellowships. To develop capability in Australia and across the Indo-Pacific region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale exercises for the public and private sectors.

We would like to thank all of those who support and contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the topics we work on. If you would like to support the work of the centre please contact: icpc@aspi.org.au

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021

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ISSN 2209-9689 (online), ISSN 2209-9670 (print).

Funding Statement: No specific sponsorship was received to fund production of this report.

  1. ‘New McAfee report estimates global cybercrime losses to exceed $1 trillion’, news release, McAfee, 7 December 2020, online. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: Cybercrime

Malicious AI arrives on the dark web

The development of artificial intelligence has progressed at an unprecedented pace over the past few months. While governments, industry, civil society and multilateral bodies alike deliberate how best to regulate it, nefarious non-state actors are already harnessing AI to scale up their malicious activities.

Since the launch of OpenAI’s ChatGPT in November last year, forums on the dark web have been buzzing about ways to harness the technology. Just as people around the world have shared tips on using ChatGPT and other AI tools to enhance efficiency or outsource tasks, dark web users have been sharing tips on how to jailbreak the technology to get around safety and ethical guardrails or use it for more sophisticated malicious activity. Now, just as legitimate users have moved on from exploring ChatGPT to building similar tools, the same has happened in the shadowy world of cybercrime.

In recent weeks the dark web has become a breeding ground for a new generation of standalone AI-powered tools and applications designed to cater to a cybercriminal’s every illicit need.

The first of these tools, WormGPT, appeared on the dark web on 13 July. Marketed as a ‘blackhat’ alternative to ChatGPT with no ethical boundaries, WormGPT is based on the open-source GPT-J large-language model developed in 2021. Available in monthly (€100) or yearly (€550) subscriptions, WormGPT, according to its anonymous seller, has a range of features such as unlimited character inputs, memory retention and coding capabilities. Allegedly trained on malware data, its primary uses are generating sophisticated phishing and business email attacks and writing malicious code. The tool is constantly being updated with new features, which are advertised on a dedicated Telegram channel.

Hot on WormGPT’s heels, FraudGPT appeared for sale on the dark web on 22 July. The tool—based on GPT-3 technology—is marketed as the an advanced bot for offensive purposes. Its uses include writing malicious code, creating undetectable malware and hacking tools, writing phishing pages and scam content, and finding security vulnerabilities. Subscriptions start at US$200 a month through to US$1,700 for an annual licence. According to the security firm that discovered it, FraudGPT is likely focused on generating quick, high-volume phishing attacks, while WormGPT is more focused on generating sophisticated malware and ransomware capabilities.

It’s early days, so it’s too soon to know how effective WormGPT and FraudGPT actually are. The specific datasets and algorithms they are trained on are unknown. The GPT-J and GPT-3 models they are based on were released in 2021, which is relatively old technology compared with more advanced models like OpenAI’s GPT-4. And just as in the legitimate world, these AI tools could be overhyped. As anyone who has played around with ChatGPT, Google’s Bard or one of the other AI tools on the market knows, AI might promise the world, but it is still limited in what it can actually do. It’s also entirely possible that the malicious AI bots for sale are scams in themselves, designed to defraud other cybercriminals. Cybercriminals are, after all, criminals.

Yet it’s safe to say that these tools are just the beginning of a new wave of AI-powered cybercrime.

Despite its limitations, AI offers enormous opportunities for nefarious actors to enhance their malicious activity and expand their operations. For example, AI can craft convincing phishing emails by mimicking authentic language and communication patterns, deceiving even savvy users and leading to more people unwittingly clicking on malicious links. AI can quickly scrape the internet for personal details about a target to develop a tailored scam or carry out identity theft. AI can also assist in rapidly developing and deploying malware, including pinpointing vulnerabilities in software before they can be patched. It can be used to generate or refine malicious code, lowering the technical barriers for cybercriminals.

AI technology is also getting smarter—fast.

There are already two new malicious AI tools in the works that represent a giant leap beyond WormGPT’s and FraudGPT’s capabilities. The creator of FraudGPT is apparently developing DarkBART—a dark web version of Google’s Bard AI—and DarkBERT, a bot trained on data from the dark web. Both tools will have internet access and be integrated with Google Lens. Interestingly, DarkBERT was originally developed by researchers to help fight cybercrime.

The widespread adoption of AI by nefarious actors and the technology’s rapid advancement will only continue to elevate the scale and sophistication of malicious cyber threats. AI-powered cybercrime will demand an even more proactive approach to cybersecurity to counter the dynamic and evolving tactics employed by malicious actors. Fortunately, AI also offers opportunities to enhance cybersecurity—and the principles of good cyber hygiene and awareness training remain relevant as the first line of defence against cybercriminals. But individuals, organisations and the government will still need to get ready for an explosion of AI-powered cybercrime.

As cybercrime evolves, organisational resilience demands a mindset shift

Facing the threat of state-sponsored cyberattack groups, the financial motivations of organised cybercrime gangs and the reckless ambitions of loosely knit hacktivist collectives, Australian organisations are fighting a cybersecurity battle on multiple fronts.

While an attacker’s goals can be amorphous and hard to define, the tools, tactics and procedures deployed against private and public organisations are constantly evolving.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in malicious emails. A tell-tale giveaway used to be poorly written and grammatically incorrect correspondence urging the user to click a link or open an attachment. With the advent and large-scale adoption of generative artificial intelligence platforms such as ChatGPT and Bard, the malicious is getting harder to distinguish from the mundane.

As AI-enhanced attackers continue to target Australian organisations, is it possible to be completely secure?

No, it’s not.

Short of taking your operations entirely offline, no silver bullet, no enchanted widget, no magic bean will stop all cyberattacks.

Although it’s impossible to completely inoculate your organisation from cyberattacks, it’s entirely possible to limit the impact of the inevitable breach.

With attackers honing their craft to inflict maximum damage, businesses need to build resilience to ensure that an attack is a relatively minor inconvenience rather than a catastrophic incident.

It’s clear the stakes are high. A recent ransomware attack took an Australian financial services firm offline for five weeks. The cost of this downtime and remediation has been forecast to reach $95 million to $105 million.

While threats range from compromising business email and man-in-the-middle interventions to distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and zero-day exploits, attackers appear to favour ransomware—the Swiss army knife of attacks. Not only can denying an organisation its data further political, financial or activist aims, but ransomware-as-a-service operations significantly lower the barriers to entry for cybercriminals.

In its purest form, a ransomware attack seeks to make critical data unavailable to the victim. This is traditionally achieved by encrypting the data and demanding a ransom be paid to receive a decryption key. Unfortunately, even paying the demand is no guarantee. Recent Rubik research found that only 14% of Australian organisations that paid the ransom were able to recover all their data.

Governments and law enforcement agencies around the world are increasingly urging organisations not to pay ransom, and organisations have improved their use of backup data to recover business operations.

But attackers have adapted. We’ve seen an evolution in how they try to force their victims to negotiate. They first seek to destroy or corrupt backup data before the ransom demand is made.

Of the Australian organisations that experienced a cyberattack last year, 98% saw the malicious actors attempt to compromise their backup data. In 87% of cases, they were at least partially successful.

This tactic is designed to hamper recovery efforts, since up-to-date backup data enables a victim to rapidly restart operations from the latest ‘save point’ prior to the infection.

Data backups are so fundamental to cyber resilience that it’s the only measure in the Australian Signals Directorate’s essential eight to address recovery. While the other seven measures are all important, they relate to prevention before the fact, rather than recovery after an attack.

At maturity level one, the essential eight guidance recommends:

  • performing regular backups of important data, software and configuration settings with a frequency and retention timeframe in accordance with business continuity requirements
  • retaining backups of important data, software and configuration settings in a secure and resilient manner
  • preventing unprivileged accounts from modifying and deleting backups.

Organisations subject to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act that use the essential eight model as the framework for their critical-infrastructure risk-management program must meet these minimum requirements. Realistically, they should exceed them and aim for maturity level three, which calls for immutable backups that cannot be deleted, modified or accessed, even by users with privileged accounts.

These measures help to ensure that if a ransomware attack denies an organisation access to its data, shutting down its operations, it can recover rapidly by restoring from backups.

With resilient copies of critical data, services can be restored within a matter of hours rather than organisations facing the prospect of days, weeks or even months offline.

As cyber resilience increases, attackers have adopted different strategies—attacking backups, and data exfiltration.

Rather than encrypt data, malicious actors seek to steal high-value material like financial details, medical records, personally identifiable information and other sensitive information.

A ransom is then demanded on the threat of that data being published or sold to other attackers. This has played out recently with high-profile attacks against major organisations, including a law firm that reportedly had 4 terabytes of data stolen. Just under half of the data was reportedly published on the dark web in a bid to force the victim to negotiate.

These devastating attacks succeed for two reasons.

First, one of the greatest challenges organisations face today is data sprawl. Employees can work from anywhere and more applications and digital platforms to help them do so are implemented every day.

As workers disperse and platforms proliferate, sensitive data is scattered and duplicated across an immense digital footprint. How can you protect sensitive data if you don’t know what or where it is?

Second, too much faith has been placed in organisations’ ability to keep attackers out. A ‘digital fortress’ mentality has been pursued in an attempt to thwart 100% of cyberattacks and the convincing marketing of cybersecurity vendors has lulled many into a false sense of security.

That 100% safety target cannot be achieved.

If organisations shift their focus away from risk minimisation and heavy investment in trying to stop every attack and towards cyber resilience to limit the impact of an inevitable breach, these intrusions will continue but their impact can be much less severe than has been witnessed in recent years.

The most sensitive data is typically highly formatted. Passports, drivers’ licences, credit card numbers and the like all follow conventions. AI and machine-learning models can be trained to scour an organisation’s digital footprint, locating all sensitive data so that appropriate protection and access protocols are in place before a breach occurs.

With such a strategy in place, if exfiltration occurs the data taken can be minimised to what you might find in the Yellow Pages rather than banking details, medical history and personal identifiable information.

As cyberattackers hone their tradecraft, Australian organisations need a shift in mindset. It is indeed true that it’s a matter of when not if a cyberattack will occur. Once that has been accepted, the way sensitive data is protected changes drastically. With investments in cyber resilience and armed with a well-defined and well-rehearsed recovery strategy, the impact of a ransom attack can be reduced from catastrophic to merely inconvenient.

Going back to the future to fight cybercrime

Over the past decade, Australia’s law enforcement community has increasingly taken the driver’s seat in developing new thinking for policing. While that’s likely to be challenged by officials from Dubai to London, Australia’s law enforcement agencies have invested heavily in research and futures thinking. While doing so, they’ve committed to a strict focus on leveraging new technology to protect and serve communities.

These agencies have been thinking about the future and technology to ensure they anticipate and prepare for emerging challenges. This investment is delivering new capabilities and increasingly qualified law enforcement officers. But does the digital age require a reimagining of policing itself, rather than a focus on simply integrating new technology?

In London in 1829, Robert Peel established the first police force. He instructed the Metropolitan Police of the day that ‘the principal object to be obtained is the prevention of crime’. Policing has, of course, changed a lot since those early days.

In autocratic states, police are, for the most part, primarily focused on protecting the state. In contrast, most police forces in democratic states are, at least in theory, focused on protecting the community.

The indicators to measure police performance tell a somewhat different story. For most Western law enforcement agencies, there’s a focus on seizures of illicit goods, arrests and prosecutions. For those law enforcement agencies with a direct community policing role, reported crime statistics trends are also important.

In practice, then, whether a police officer is dealing with an armed robbery or an importation of an illicit substance, the investigative process is relatively similar. Find or receive evidence of a crime within a specific, legally defined jurisdiction. Then collect evidence to prove the guilt of an offender that meets the burden of proof required by the relevant court: in Australia, that is beyond reasonable doubt.

Many law enforcement agencies have been innovative in finding new ways to follow this process. For example, the Australian Federal Police works offshore with its international partners to disrupt criminal networks, primarily through activities like intelligence-sharing, joint operations and capacity development. Police and law enforcement agencies also often undertake additional work to prevent crime, but that is a lower priority activity.

Digital policing presents a challenge to this paradigm.

A range of new and emerging technologies are making digital policing more difficult. From encryption and anonymisation to virtual reality and artificial intelligence, there are continuous and evolving challenges to law enforcement’s ability to collect information in an evidentiary form.

When cybercrime is detected or reported, it’s often a challenge to ascertain which jurisdiction the crime occurred in. In many cases, the location of the crime is not in the same jurisdiction as the victim and offender. This makes collecting admissible evidence increasingly more legally complex and resource intensive.

These are not altogether new challenges. However, investigations for even minor digital offences are increasingly complex and require the kind of international cooperation necessary for more serious offences.

Of course, criminals understand these challenges and identify them as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

A simple vignette illustrates the practical problems. If, in the real world, a person in a Canberra suburb witnesses someone walking up to their mailbox and stealing their mail, they can ring the Australian Capital Territory police. Subject to the availability of resources, officers will attend the house and take a witness statement. The victim will, if possible, provide a description of the alleged offender. The officers will collect evidence to identify an offender and then charge them or perhaps provide a warning.

In contrast, it’s often difficult for an individual to identify that they have even been a victim of a cybercrime. The victim usually has few details of the offender. Local police often can’t collect digital evidence and will require access to specialist investigative capabilities. These capabilities are finite, so the investigation is unlikely to proceed if the crime isn’t serious. In many cases, if the offender can be located, they don’t reside in Australia. Because of the costs associated with undertaking international police-to-police cooperation with a foreign jurisdiction, further investigation may be deemed not in the public interest.

While a simplified example, it does illustrate the scale of the issue. An obvious problem emerges when this is laid against the rapidly increasing rate of cybercrime. The problem is more than a question of resources. Increasing the number of successful prosecutions will mean more offenders face consequences for their actions. But will it prevent crime and make for a safer community?

I would argue that digital policing requires a focus on preventing cybercrime. And that the principal metric for measuring success ought to be crime statistics. In digital policing, agencies must look to achieve a bigger outcome than arrests; they must seek risk reduction and need to consider all new methods to pursue it. More broadly, governments and law enforcement agencies must look to redefine how they frame policing success in the digital age.

Of course, prosecutions should still be a tool for digital policing. Because of the cooperation required, police diplomacy and mutual legal assistance will also be necessary. However, the more significant focus should be on collecting victim-sourced information and intelligence that enhances our understanding of cybercrime and cyber vulnerabilities.

The central focus of a new digital policing paradigm should be on preventing crime through risk-, intelligence- and data-informed education and training. Police could then use investigative and disruptive techniques to achieve strategic effects rather than arrests. This more strategic digital policing model could be used to deliberately affect crime trends, such as by removing key facilitators in order to stop or delay the exploitation of specific vulnerabilities.

This new paradigm will be troubling for many victims of crime. But it should be no less upsetting than empty promises of retributive justice. However, it does suggest that communities will have to be heavily engaged in any paradigm shift in thinking.

For criminals, the message isn’t that cybercrime won’t be investigated or pursued. Instead, our digital police are taking a more holistic approach to cybercrime. Criminals should understand that a knock on the door from the police is still possible.

There’s no argument here that other parts of government should subsume digital policing roles. Instead, digital police should focus more on preventing and disrupting cybercrime than investigating and prosecuting offenders. Ironically, returning to an 1829 paradigm might be the key to digital policing.

Chinese state-backed hacking: time to level the playing field and breach the Great Firewall

More than 30 countries across Europe, North America and Asia yesterday joined in revealing and condemning the Chinese government’s Ministry of State Security’s work with Chinese cyber hackers and cybercriminals to hack companies, governments and other organisations globally, stealing valuable intellectual property and even conducting ransomware attacks.

The grouping included Japan, the United States and, through NATO, 28 European nations, as well as New Zealand, Australia and Canada.

Far from being an issue involving only Beijing and Washington as part of strategic competition between two great powers, this behaviour from the Chinese state shows that China poses a systemic challenge to all open societies. So it’s not a surprise that this large and growing group of governments is working more closely together to face it. They’re the same grouping we saw coming together on China at the G7-plus meetings in Cornwall last month.

Chinese state actions and the government’s cooperation with China’s criminal hacker ‘ecosystem’ are damaging and flagrant. That’s not new news. So, what do we do?

We need to start by realising that this is not just a case of Chinese authorities tolerating cybercriminals operating out of China. The Chinese government is working with and through its criminal cyber community to advance its own interests and damage others—corporations and governments alike. That damage is to every one of the countries that spoke out yesterday and to companies operating in their economies.

There are four big messages out of this for governments and companies.

The first is to really take in the implications of this deeply malign, damaging behaviour of the Chinese state, which professes peaceful intent and an abhorrence of interfering in other jurisdictions, and think through the specific risks and damage that can result. This is a board- and CEO-level issue for every Australian company, for example.

The second is for governments and companies to actively tighten their cybersecurity by implementing the detailed set of mitigating measures the US and partner cybersecurity agencies set out in support of yesterday’s statement. Three big things to do are getting software patches up to date to remove vulnerabilities Chinese hackers can use; increasing the internal system monitoring that your organisation does to spot malicious and suspicious activity inside your network; and using anti-virus software along with a domain reputation service (to spot activity coming from malicious or suspicious sources before it compromises your company’s or agency’s systems).

These steps will make it harder for the Chinese government’s Ministry of State Security and the cybercriminal outfits they work with to successfully penetrate and compromise company and government systems internationally.

The last two messages are arguably much more challenging and more important.

These global attacks were about China hacking into foreign digital technology—in this case Microsoft Exchange systems used in much of the advanced world—with the Chinese attackers looking for valuable information and also vulnerabilities in how companies’ and governments’ critical digital systems work. That’s a bad problem to have.

But consider the enormous additional vulnerabilities that any government, critical infrastructure operator or government agency faces by using Chinese-sourced digital technology. The Ministry of State Security doesn’t need a hacker network to get into these systems. As ASPI’s series of reports on the expansion of China’s tech giants shows, it can go straight through the front door, accessing and using data produced by the normal business operations of Chinese digital systems and, when it needs to, compelling the secret cooperation of Chinese vendors and operators.

That gives company and government decisions about digital technology and software adoption a very sobering risk to factor in along with the usual business-case elements of cost, performance and ease of implementation.

National 5G and digitisation initiatives, along with specific critical and digital infrastructure decisions—whether on transport, communications, public health or e-commerce—must now take account of not just the risk of hacking, but the risk of inherent compromise of digital supplier and operating organisations.

The last big message from this wholesale Chinese hacking enterprise is that it’s time to stop accepting that our open economies and societies are somehow uniquely vulnerable and that all we can do is make ourselves harder targets, soak up these Chinese (and Russian—remember Solar Winds) attacks and express concern.

More targeted indictments and asset freezes on Chinese officials—like leaders and operatives in the Ministry of State Security—and charges against Chinese cybercriminals will help. Magnitsky-style laws in more countries, including Australia, must be part of the answer here. But that just won’t be a big enough deterrent by itself.

From here, given the systemic challenge that China under Xi Jinping is for many of us, it’s time to give Beijing some home games and homework to do.

China’s own digital ecosystem is messy, patchy and vulnerable. It requires legions of humans to keep spotting gaps and fixing seams, as well to operate and police. And we know how vulnerable the ruling Chinese Communist Party regime feels to anything but well-chewed, censored information reaching the 1.3 billion Chinese citizens who are not party members.

Listening to Xi’s CCP centenary speech reminded anyone who had forgotten that a central thought he and the other CCP leaders have every day is the need to continue to struggle to stay in power within China. So, ensuring only the ‘correct line’ is provided in China’s information space is a continuing huge priority for Xi.

The same is true, strikingly, for Vladimir Putin in Russia, whose recently released national security strategy sees the ‘home front’ as the most dangerous and critical one for him to control to stay in power, given the threat of foreign ideas and information that challenge his narratives. While commentary has been about Russia’s use of cyber and disinformation power against others, the vulnerabilities in Russia’s own cyber and information space worry Putin more than most other threats. Xi seems to suffer the same anxieties, as did his predecessors.

The governments that are routinely targeted by Beijing can work together and independently to stand up China-focused outfits with missions like Radio Free Europe, creating and using capable digital-era approaches to routinely breach the Chinese government’s ‘Great Firewall’. This can provide sources of external information and commentary, and also provide footage of Chinese security thugs beating up Hongkongers and operating arbitrary interrogation centres, of the People’s Liberation Army massacring Chinese students in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and of eyewitness testimony about the graphic mass abuses Chinese officials are committing against Chinese Uyghurs every day.

Some healthy doses of China’s own history, including the mass deaths Mao Zedong inflicted in Chinese people through his Great Leap Forward, will contest the propaganda-driven, aggressive nationalism Xi and his leadership colleagues stoke every day.

This will provide a partial antidote for the historically ridiculous notions that all China’s troubles have been inflicted by evil foreigners, and that the party is Chinese people’s benevolent protector. The contrast with the stage-managed happy, dancing Uyghurs and the silence and denials of other abuses committed by the CCP will be confronting and jarring to Chinese citizens and amplify the power of this external information.

We know there’s an appetite for this kind of information—and for discussion within mainland China and with people in places like Taiwan and elsewhere—from the example of the short-lived Clubhouse app, where exactly this kind of conversation happened before Chinese censors banned it earlier this year.

And lastly, while we’re thinking through how to demonstrate to the Chinese government its own vulnerabilities as part of stronger deterrence, it’d be useful to ensure that Beijing understands it has myriad of its own critical infrastructure and digital vulnerabilities.

Having Beijing know the practical reality of this, and be anxious about vulnerabilities that it doesn’t know about but which other capable governments might, could be the kind of tangible constraint Xi and his colleagues best understand. This is a future for cyber deterrence.

This coordinated response from the democracies hopefully ends the approach whereby governments, including in Canberra, would say nothing publicly about extensive Chinese state cyber intrusions while pretending that wider relations with Beijing could progress as normal.

There can be no return to a trusting ‘win–win’ relationship with Beijing at the same time as we are being spied on and robbed blind by its hackers.

So, the nasty implications of this most recent exposure of Chinese state and criminal cooperation are much wider than just providing more work for cybersecurity professionals and concerned foreign affairs departments. It’s a further step along the path of growing international cooperation to deal with the systemic challenge of China. And it’s time to show that the digital playing field isn’t all tilted in Beijing’s favour.

ASEAN needs to enhance cross-border cooperation on cybercrime

ASEAN member states are prime targets for cybercrime given their position among the fastest-growing digital economies in the world. As described in a 2020 Interpol report, the impact of cybercrime will only increase as cybercriminals become more sophisticated, taking advantage of the inefficiencies in regional law enforcement structures.

In recent years, ASEAN has made significant progress on enhancing regional cybersecurity through capacity-building programs, the creation of new multilateral institutions, and its endorsement of international norms developed through the United Nations. As it moves forward with proposing new solutions and mechanisms to tackle cyber threats, ASEAN would benefit from establishing a shared cybercrime framework to fill some of the gaps created by inefficiencies in regional law enforcement structures, including the harmonisation of cybercrime laws and standards.

Most ASEAN member states have adopted cybercrime legislation in key areas, such as fraud and forgery, child pornography, and offenses against confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems. However, capabilities and national priorities vary across member states, creating a marked disparity in cybercrime legislation and enforcement. In particular, there are important differences in how members define criminal conduct in cyberspace and how they go about collecting electronic evidence for cybercrime investigations, making cross-border cooperation lengthy and complex.

The most effective way of obtaining e-evidence is through mutual legal assistance treaties—agreements between two or more countries to facilitate collection and sharing of evidence for investigations or proceedings related to criminal offences involving computer systems and data. Though often considered too complex and lengthy, a mutual assistance agreement is the only mechanism that ties together the laws of receiving and requesting countries.

In 2004, ASEAN member states agreed on a regional Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. However, its application to cybercrime remains limited as it lacks provisions for addressing the transnational nature of cyberthreats, such as retention of and access to e-evidence. Such provisions are important because e-evidence is stored online by service providers that are often based in a different country than the requesting one.

Today, the only legally binding multilateral instrument dealing with cybercrime matters is the 2004 Budapest Convention. Drafted by the Council of Europe, it seeks to address internet and computer crime by harmonising national laws, improving investigative techniques and increasing international cooperation—including mutual legal assistance.

But the Budapest Convention has failed to reach universal consensus and has been dismissed by major global players, such as China, Russia, India and Brazil. Among ASEAN members, the Philippines has been the only one to ratify it. The main points of contention have been the convention’s perceived violations of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Still, there are several steps ASEAN could take to harmonise cybercrime laws and standards across its members.

In the short run, ASEAN should aim to streamline the mutual legal assistance process wherever possible to ensure effective coordination. This could be done by drawing on existing models for making a request for mutual assistance and by adopting a common taxonomy of cybercrime terminology. ASEAN should also consider amending the 2004 mutual assistance treaty to include cybercrime-related provisions.

In comparison with the Budapest Convention, the ASEAN treaty lacks the following provisions to deal effectively with cybercrime: expedited preservation of stored computer data; expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data; mutual assistance regarding accessing stored computer data; transborder access to stored computer data with consent or where publicly available; and mutual assistance in the real-time collection of traffic data.

In the long run, ASEAN could consider drafting a regional cybercrime convention that establishes common cybercrime policies and institutions to foster cross-border cooperation in line with its own values. This would be no easy task, as the ASEAN decision-making process is based on reaching consensus through informal—and often slow—procedures. Its decisions are often political and non-binding.

Although this practice often produces good decisions, it’s a slow-moving process that exacts a high cost in the fast-changing environment that is cyberspace. In the absence of consensus, member states that want to move forward more quickly could do so through the ‘ASEAN minus X’ (A-X) voting formula, which allows some members to move ahead on the basis that the others will follow at a later stage.

Historically, A-X has mostly been employed to deal with economic matters. However, in cybersecurity, economics and security are two sides of the same coin. A-X has also already been used to pass legally binding conventions to counter different cross-border security threats, such as the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and the 2015 ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.

Harmonisation of cybercrime laws and standards would allow ASEAN to fill some of the gaps created by the inefficiencies in existing law enforcement structures. Nonetheless, there’s no silver bullet for tackling cybercrime effectively. These measures would need to be part of a broader set of initiatives that include the development of capabilities to prevent, detect and investigate cybercrimes across the region.

Cybercriminals in the backyard

There’s a popular perception that cybercrime is an anonymous activity. With seemingly faceless attackers and ‘darknet’ sites, a picture emerges of a threat unlike anything we’ve seen before. But cybercrime shouldn’t generate this kind of paradigm shift. As Peter Grabosky astutely argued almost 20 years ago, it’s ‘old wine in new bottles’. The crime types—fraud, extortion, theft—remain the same; only the tools have changed.

In my ASPI report, Cybercrime in Southeast Asia, released today, I argue that cybercrime is actually rooted in the conventional world. In many cases, there’s a strong offline dimension to it, along with a local one. All cyberattacks have at least one person behind them. Some of those offenders know each other. All are physically based somewhere and are the product of local socioeconomic conditions. As a result, we see different ‘flavours’ of cybercrime coming out of different parts of the world.

It’s worth quickly sketching some of the most famous cybercrime hubs around the globe. Perhaps the best known of all is parts of the former Soviet Union. That region produces the most technically capable offenders, who are often responsible for developing top-level malware and other tools that are used throughout the industry. An excellent education system produces an oversupply of able technologists who then struggle to find opportunities in a weak technology industry.

Another reputed hub is Nigeria, which is known for far less technical forms of cybercrime. Nigerian cybercriminals have traditionally carried out ‘advance fee fraud’—the email scams familiar to most of us. In more recent years, West African offenders have evolved. One growing threat is business email compromise, in which a scammer impersonates a CEO or other person to instruct an employee in the victim company to transfer funds into an account controlled by the criminals.

But there are cybercrime hotspots emerging elsewhere, including in Australia’s strategic backyard. Southeast Asia provides an interesting cybercrime case study, as it includes populations of both local and foreign offenders. While offenders are spread across the region, certain countries contain a larger cybercriminal threat than others. Vietnam, for example, hosts a local community of ‘black hat’ hackers. While some cybercriminals strike at home, Vietnam itself is not a target-rich environment and major attacks there are not widely reported. One rare example was the Vietcombank case of 2016, in which 500 million dong (A$33,000) was extracted from a customer’s account.

For those Vietnamese attacking targets overseas, credit card fraud has been a popular endeavour. The conventional business model has been to target ecommerce sites and steal their databases of credit card details. The cybercriminals can then sell the card data in virtual marketplaces or buy products online themselves and arrange for them to be shipped back to Vietnam. Vietnamese cybercriminals have also engaged in personal data theft, compromising email and other account credentials, and a number of other schemes.

If the example of Vietnam is about local offenders striking internationally, the case of Malaysia is about foreign cybercriminals using that country as a base of operations. There is a community of local Malaysian cybercriminals, but the more pressing issue is the large presence of Nigerian fraudsters who have established themselves there.

While Nigerian email scams are well known, many assume that the offenders are based in West Africa. And while there are indeed a number of offenders operating out of Nigeria, there are also Nigerian cybercriminals spread out across Africa and the world, including in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, India, the Philippines and Australia. Their presence in such countries can be for computing training, coordinating money-mule and other support operations, or running their own autonomous scam operations from those countries.

Curiously, for some time Malaysia has hosted one of the largest concentrations of Nigerian fraudsters. It isn’t yet clear why this is such a fertile location, but it’s of growing concern, as perhaps many thousands of such offenders are running hugely profitable enterprises there.

Australia’s approach to fighting cybercrime needs to be augmented to account more seriously for this local dimension, particularly in Southeast Asia, and our fight against cybercrime should be more targeted, enduring and forward-looking.

While it makes sense to continue supporting international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime, those efforts need to be targeted to specific hotspots where the problem is the most acute and Australia’s contributions can provide the greatest value for money. This involves the identification of current or future cybercriminal hotspots in Australia’s near region.

Australia’s law enforcement capacity-building programs should be matched specifically to those countries producing the biggest cybercrime threat. Deeper relationships should also be developed between investigators in Australia and in those countries through expanded use of cyber liaison posts and exchange programs.

Finally, Australia should adopt prevention programs that seek to block offenders’ pathways into cybercrime and promote those programs in cybercrime hotspots in the region.

The terror–cyber–crime nexus and terrorists’ innovation

Despite herculean efforts, countering terrorist financing has proven to be hard.

The reasons for that include the complexity of the international financial system, some states’ reluctance to enforce existing measures, and terrorist groups’ ability to innovate and diversify to obtain new sources of funds and hide what they have.

While the terror–crime connection is very old (from Russian anarchists in the 19th century to the US Weathermen in the 1970s), new technologies mean that we now face a terror–cyber–crime nexus.

Islamic State promoted what Magnus Ranstorp has called ‘microfinancing’ of the caliphate and encouraged ‘gangster jihad’, enabling it to amass nearly US$6 billion in 2015 (including about $500 million from oil and gas, $360 million from ‘taxes’ and extortion, and $500 million from looting bank vaults in Mosul).

The cash allowed it to invest in its ‘Committee for Military Manufacturing and Development’, which distributed weapons and ammunition across the caliphate and constructed new weapons, such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, on an industrial scale. Well-armed and well-funded, IS proved very effective in multi-domain military operations.

Despite its diminished territorial footprint (it now controls less than 1% of the area it did in 2017), the group’s ability to make money remains largely unaffected. International commitment to sanctioning IS-associated money launderers and financial facilitators has been limited.

IS has a network that operates across the globe, raising funds from multiple sources, ranging from individuals’ donations to illicit oil deals, including with the Assad regime (absurdly, for years the regime and IS have been trading illicit oil through Muhammad al-Qatirji and his Qatirji Company).

Anecdotal evidence indicates that IS and other jihadist groups are now deepening their exploitation of the cybersphere. For example, they’re very interested in cryptocurrencies; at least one Islamic scholar has declared bitcoin permissible under sharia law, and the person-to-person bitcoin exchange LocalBitcoins lists three bitcoin sellers in Syria.

In 2014, IS supporter Ali Shukri Amin argued that Salafi-jihadis should use bitcoin rather than the currencies of the infidels. He noted that the financial system prevents individuals from supporting the mujahidin, as bank transfers are recorded.

Junaid Hussain—who rose to become the number 3 leader of IS and was on the US government’s most-wanted list before a Hellfire missile took him out in 2015—combined a unique form of hacktivism with terror while he led the CyberCaliphate hacker group. He worked with Ardit Ferizi, a Kosovar hacker, who was arrested in Malaysia, extradited to the US and sentenced to 20 years for providing material support to America’s enemies. Ferizi had hacked the personal data of more than 1,300 American military and government personnel on an online retailer’s fileserver and given the data to IS, which then disseminated a ‘kill list’. Notably, Ferizi had demanded a payment of two bitcoins (worth at the time around $500) in exchange for leaving the server alone and explaining how he’d hacked it.

In December 2017, a woman was arrested in New York for obtaining $62,000 in bitcoin to send to IS. She had initially tried to travel to Syria, but, when that failed, she used false information to acquire loans and multiple credit cards, which she turned into bitcoin and other digital currencies before sending it via Pakistan, China and Turkey to fund IS.

In 2017, the Jeddah-based Islamic Research and Training Institute, a research wing of the Islamic Development Bank, signed an agreement with Belgium-based SettleMint and Ateon to look at the feasibility of an Islamic blockchain. The institute was seeking to ensure that the technology is compliant with sharia law, which prohibits riba (interest, usury) and requires all financial transactions to have ‘material finality’.

In 2018, Mufti Muhammad Abu Bakar, a sharia adviser and compliance officer at Blossom Finance in Jakarta, drafted a paper arguing that bitcoin is permissible under Islam because in places such as Germany it’s recognised as legal currency. Earlier this year, at the annual sharia conference of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, time was allocated to discuss bitcoin to determine whether it is riba, which is prohibited, or ribawi (items that are exchanged in equal measures once ownership is transferred).

In other words, Islamic scholars are recognising the possibility of using cryptocurrencies more extensively.

And Salafi-jihadis aren’t the only ones seeking to exploit the cryptocurrency revolution. Neo-Nazi groups are also seeking to use it to raise funds. In 2017, the Daily Stormer website attracted around US$60,000 in bitcoin and cryptocurrency donations. The far-right neo-Nazi activist Weev, who runs the site, has collected around US$1.8 million that way.

If we’re to properly address the potential that cryptocurrencies offer to non-state actors, we must recognise that a Westphalian concept of sovereignty in the regulatory system gives our adversaries an advantage, as jihadist and far-right groups either reject that concept or exploit it.

Time to admit we’re failing on cybercrime

The first step in solving a problem is recognising that there is one. When it comes to tackling cybercrime, it’s time to admit our approach isn’t working.

Our failure is staring us in the face. In his address to the National Press Club last year, then-Cybersecurity Minister Dan Tehan said that in the past year the Australian Cyber Security Centre had ‘identified 47,000 cyber incidents, a 15% increase on last year. Over half of these incidents were online scams or fraud, which saw an increase of over 22%.’ That’s five incidents every hour in Australia. As the minister put it, ‘business for cybercriminals is booming’.

With this volume of crime, you might think plenty of people are being arrested. In fact, no. Asked by Nick Evans of the West Australian how many prosecutions there’d been, the minister said, ‘Prosecutions are incredibly difficult because a lot of what is occurring is occurring offshore … So it’s not one where I can stand here and readily say to you that we’ve had success in targeting this organisation or that organisation and we’ve put them behind bars.’

There are multiple ways Australians are being fleeced through cybercrime. In one example reported by government, a cybercriminal stole money by posing as two senior executives at one company. First, the criminal, pretending to be the CEO, sent an email requesting a large payment from the financial controller. In a second email, the criminal, this time pretending to be the chief operating officer, authorised the ‘CEO’s’ request. Believing that these fraudulent requests were genuine, the business made payments worth $500,000 to the criminal’s offshore bank accounts. It’s a scam repeated across the country, with estimates that compromised business email cost Australian companies $20 million last year, a 130% increase from the previous year.

This isn’t to single out Australia. The problem is universal. The UK Office for National Statistics released a national crime survey in 2017 that ‘estimated that there were 3.3 million incidents of fraud in the survey year ending June 2017, with over half of these (57%; 1.9 million incidents) being cyber-related’. In the United States, the director of the National Security Agency, Admiral Mike Rogers, has likened the cyber domain to the ‘Wild West‘. Statistics from the US Internet Crime Complaint Center show that the financial loss from cybercrime in the US exceeded US$1.3 billion in 2016, a rise of 24%. Because this was only based on reported cases, it’s likely a large underestimate.

As the Wild West moniker suggests, there’s very little risk of being caught if you’re a cybercriminal. There are several reasons for this. As the statistics suggest, the volume of crime is so high that it has overwhelmed our capacity to respond. Traditional crime fighters are also unequipped to deal with this crime type. If you have $20,000 worth of valuables stolen from your home, your local police station will likely be on the case immediately. If you have $20,000 stolen in an online scam, going to your local police station will produce a very different experience. Online crime is likely to be both transnational and veiled in anonymity. Law enforcement activity is likely to require significant technical expertise and cooperation from foreign counterparts, both of which make successful attribution and enforcement difficult.

These factors make cybercrime highly attractive. And if this wasn’t bad enough, we’ve more recently witnessed the rise of crime-as-a-service, allowing non-experts to essentially buy and apply ready-to-use kit. This opens cybercrime to even more actors.

While the challenge is formidable, part of the problem has been our approach. We essentially have three responses to cybercrime.

First, and most important, is improving our cybersecurity. This is so critical that there’s now a Minister for Cybersecurity. Hardening defences against attackers makes eminent sense. The problem is that it’s not enough. Even as Australia and other Western states have been hardening our cyber defences, the volume of reported cyber incidents has increased.

Second, we can use our offensive cyber capabilities to make life harder for cybercriminals. On 30 June 2017, Australia made the rare, candid admission that its cyber offensive capabilities would be directed at ‘organised offshore cybercriminals’. While this increases the cost of carrying out cybercrime, it isn’t a complete solution. This high-end capability can’t deal with the overwhelming volume of cybercrime, and its effects are often not enduring—it can’t put cybercriminals behind bars, and even if their equipment is destroyed, the criminals can easily buy more.

Finally, we can use law enforcement to deter cybercriminals. But with the current score card essentially 47,000 to 0, we can anticipate the average cybercriminal today doesn’t feel much heat.

What this all boils down to is the reality that national level efforts aren’t enough. And for as long as we continue to fail, the attractiveness of cybercrime will increase owing to its low risk and high rewards, drawing in and supporting more and more nefarious actors, including organised crime groups and terrorist organisations.

To address this problem, the cost of engaging in cybercrime has to increase, as does the risk of being caught. Ongoing improvements in cybersecurity and the limited use of offensive cyber capability are part of the solution, but we need to reconsider our law enforcement response.

Acting alone, we’re unlikely to succeed. One thousand new AFP officers won’t stop cybercrime. But a broader approach, working in concert with other states, might bear fruit. The world is still too divided on this topic for a large multilateral forum like the UN to be able to move the needle on this issue. But a more narrowly focused ‘coalition of the willing’ or mini-lateral response has potential.

There’s a dawning realisation in like-minded countries that national-level efforts are failing to address the challenge of cybercrime, opening the door to more cooperative approaches. Australia should consider leading efforts to string together a small coalition of states with the interest and will to stump up the resources needed to shift the cost/risk profile of cybercrime. There’s no single right answer on what needs to be done, but the basic parameters are clear.

The group should agree on a narrow set of coordinated actions they’ll take to increase the cost and risk of cybercrime, as well as how these efforts will be coordinated at an international level. This would likely involve an initial focus on non-state actors that can be targeted by law enforcement (as opposed to criminal states involved in cybercrime such as North Korea). It might involve throwing considerably more resources into tracking where stolen funds end up, working together to bring law enforcement and diplomatic pressure to bear on destination states, and providing everyday citizens with a feedback loop so they know that when they report cybercrime, something will be done about it.

The current situation is unsustainable. It’s time concerned states revisit their approach.