Tag Archive for: cyber security

Cyber maturity 2016: digital growth in our neighbourhood

The Asia–Pacific’s rapid online growth has contributed to its rise as the world’s new economic centre of gravity. With the majority of the world’s internet users now living in the Asia–Pacific, the region abounds with both digital opportunities and vulnerabilities. Asian governments are increasingly looking to cyberspace to facilitate better governance and critical national infrastructure delivery, and citizens are using it to connect with each other and new digital business opportunities. As individuals, businesses and governments in the Asia–Pacific become more reliant on the benefits of cyberspace, cybersecurity will become an essential ingredient for regional and international stability. As such, developing behavioural norms and confidence building measures for cyberspace, while also improving awareness of the regional threat landscape, must be a high priority for all parties concerned.

ASPI’s third annual cyber maturity report emphasises that countries in the Asia–Pacific are adopting markedly different approaches to cyber security, stability, crime and digital growth, and with varying levels of maturity in their comprehension of risks and opportunities.

The countries of the Asia–Pacific are unevenly developed, with many within their populations remaining illiterate and poor. There’s significant scope for new technologies to advance the rate at which the least-developed countries attain significant goals in the growth of their economy, the education of their people, and their ability to earn. However, many regional governments view the unimpeded flow of information across borders as a threat to their power and seek to constrain it in order to ensure a monopoly on information. Beyond the detrimental effect that has to freedom of expression, those regulations are also inhibiting the emergence of local digital economies, which harms the ability of many to work their way out of poverty.

For some countries, legacy fixed-line telecommunications infrastructure doesn’t have the footprint required to enable widespread internet access, however mobile connectivity brings cyberspace to more people each year. For example, in Cambodia, only 0.5% of people have a fixed broadband connection while 42% have a mobile broadband connection. The emergence of cheap handsets and new apps in local languages is assisting otherwise disconnected individuals to engage with cyberspace: a small step towards closing the digital divide. As access to cyberspace grows, first-time users will be exposed to the potential dangers that cyberspace poses to the uninformed or uneducated, and more work will be required to support the security of new internet users.

Unfortunately, the cost of connectivity remains prohibitive for many in the region and programs to enable cheaper access, such as Facebook’s Free Basics program, have been praised by some but opposed by others for violating principles of net neutrality. For example, the Solomon Islands’ size and remote location makes a submarine cable connection uneconomical for commercial operators. In its absence, expensive satellite connections remain the only option. In other countries, such as Bangladesh, substandard infrastructure is inhibiting digital growth, with unstable power supply leaving connections unreliable.

At the other end of the spectrum, the region offers up some of the world’s most cyber-savvy and network-dependant countries. Japan and South Korea are among the most connected in the world, with over 100 mobile broadband connections per 100 people in both countries. The ubiquity of cyberspace and its importance to their citizens, government and economy, and the vulnerability of their geo-strategic situation means that those countries lead the region in the importance placed on attaining cybersecurity. Similarly, Singapore sits near the top of the rank table. The island nation’s mature cyber policies are informed not only by its understanding of online risks and opportunities, but also by a strategic culture of economic reliance on technology and strong defence posture that highlights the strategic benefits of cyberspace.

Cyberspace, with the potential it offers to enhance development and open new opportunities, will be a key enabler of a secure, stable and prosperous Asia–Pacific. Preserving regional cybersecurity will require coordinated efforts by capable like-minded countries to support emerging norms of behaviour and confidence building mechanisms for cyberspace. Capacity building in the form of providing policy, legislative and technical support to rapidly developing countries is also an essential endeavour for international partners. Creating a region that engages in cyberspace in a mature way is a daunting task, but one that’s increasingly critical to global security and must be led by the major economies of the region.

Cyber wrap

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Following the high profile infiltration of the DNC’s email servers earlier in this year, the FBI’s now working to allay concerns that vote counting machines could be next on the hit-list of would-be saboteurs. FBI Director James Comey was quick to point out that a breach of these systems is pretty tough, pointing out the disjointed and ‘clunky as heck’ nature of the voting systems as the main barrier to malicious actors. ‘A lot of people have found that challenging over the years, but the beauty of that is it’s not exactly a swift part of the internet of things, and so it is hard for an actor to reach our voting process.’

Last week the White House announced that retired Air Force Brigadier General Gregory J. Touhill will become the US’s first federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The creation of the post was foreshadowed by President Obama more than eight months ago via the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP). Touhill will make the shift from the Department of Homeland Security, where he currently serves as the deputy assistant secretary for cybersecurity and communications. According to the White House, the federal CISO will be responsible for ‘driving cybersecurity policy, planning, and implementation across the Federal Government’. In essence his role will largely be concerned with protecting government networks and the US’s critical infrastructure.

On the home front, Australia’s new Minister Assisting the PM for Cyber Security Dan Tehan has weighed in on the ‘information as a weapon’ discussion kicked off by the DNC hack. Tehan called the incident a ‘wake-up call’ and stressed that Australia must have ‘the proper protections in place’ to prevent similar incidents of what he terms ‘cyber influencing’ occurring here.

Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency (CSA) head David Koh has given a one-on-one interview with GovInsider, outlining the city-state’s approach to managing cyber threats, innovation, public outreach and promoting security by design. Koh, who’s led the CSA since it was formally established in April 2015, is currently overseeing the creation of a ‘competency skills framework’ developed with the private sector. Once complete, the framework should lay out specific career pathways available to IT experts in both technical and management streams. Koh also highlighted the importance of trust and assurance of data privacy to Singapore’s ‘Smart Nation’ vision, arguing that without a foundation of confidence there will be a reluctance amongst the population to share the data that gives the ambitious program its life.

Japan’s Financial Services Agency is set to host the country’s first cyber security exercise exclusively for financial institutions. The drill—scheduled to take place in October—will see 80 financial institutions come together to test their wares against fictitious malicious cyber actors. The exercise came about following the increase online attacks targeting financial institutions in the country. Participants will include local and major regional banks, with the drill seeking to expand and build upon on numerous existing info-sharing and collaborative agreements between several Japanese financial institutions.

Japan’s NEC Corporation has won a contract to roll-out a new 5,300 kilometre submarine cable in South East Asia. The Indonesia Global Gateway Cable System will connect the islands of Sumatra, Batam, Jawa, Bali, Kalimantan and Sulawesi with Singapore. It’ll also link Indonesia with two other major international cables, boosting connectivity, resilience and internet speeds across the country.

Cyber wrap

Following costly compromises in Bangladesh, Vietnam and Ecuador, Gottfried Leibbrandt, CEO of international bank settlement company Swift has told a conference in Brussels that cyber threats are his main source of anxiety. In his speech Leibbrandt outlined the organisation’s response to the cyber security breaches that have seen millions of dollars stolen. According to Leibbrandt, Swift plans to harden its security requirements, require certification for third party providers, assist members to identify suspicious behaviour, and develop security audit frameworks to ensure new security controls are properly implemented.

Swift has also criticised some members for being slow to report cyber security incidents affecting the network. Internationally, data breach notification requirements are inconsistent and there is disagreement about whether mandatory breach reporting has value. In The Wall Street Journal, Denise Zheng from CSIS and Andrea Castillo from George Mason University have discussed the case for and against mandatory data breach notifications. Zheng says that requiring companies to disclose breaches improves collective cyber security responses, but Castillo believes that regulating breach disclosure could weaken the ability of companies to properly investigate and respond to cyber threats. In Australia, the Privacy Amendment (Notifications of Serious Data Breaches) Bill is expected to be introduced into Parliament later this year. The Bill includes mandatory data breach disclosures and notifications for customers whose data is lost in cyber security incidents.

James Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence, told Congress back in 2015 that Russia had surpassed China as the US’s principal cyber threat, even though Russian hackers have been notoriously hard to detect. This week Switzerland’s CERT.ch has revealed that one of the country’s top defence, aerospace and technology firms, Ruag, had been compromised for at least two years by an APT, most likely linked to the Russian Turla APT. CERT.ch was apparently monitoring the breach for some time to gather evidence about the APT’s tactics and techniques, but this was cut short after a media leak earlier this month. CERT.ch characterised the actor responsible as extremely patient and deliberate, moving carefully through the company’s network and identifying individuals so that they could specifically target only those with valuable information. System logs revealed at least five occasions last year when significant amounts of Ruag’s data was exfiltrated using proxy servers.

Not to be outdone, a Chinese APT dubbed ‘Ke3chang’ by FireEye has reappeared two and a half years after it was first detected targeting European foreign ministries just before the G20 summit. Palo Alto’s Unit42 has found evidence that Ke3chang has reengineered a remote access tool into a new tool called TidePool in order to target 30 Indian embassies around the world. Ke3chang distributes TidePool by spoofing emails from other embassy employees to induce their targets to open infected attachments. The vulnerability used (CVE-2015-2545) has also recently been used by another hacker group against anti-China protesters in Hong Kong.

Moving across the ditch, Andrew Hampton, the new head of New Zealand’s signals intelligence organisation GCSB, has told stuff.co.nz that one of the ‘more disturbing revelations’ of his first month at the helm was the scale of the cyber threat that his agency deals with. Hampton revealed that GCSB detects an average of seven serious cyber incidents per month, in addition to about 12 reports from other agencies of less serious incidents. He characterised the actors responsible as ‘foreign sourced, complex and persistent’. Hampton is a career public servant, but unusually for his role has no previous experience in intelligence or security.

And finally, the status of the US Cyber Command is again under examination, as Congress debates a measure in the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) that would elevate Cyber Command to the status of Unified Combatant Command, equivalent to Pacific Command or Central Command. The measure was passed by the House, but is absent from the Senate’s version of the Bill, and the White House has opposed its inclusion in the NDAA. Cyber Command is currently a Sub-unified Command of Strategic Command, while its commander Admiral Mike Rogers is dual-hatted as Director of the NSA. Rogers has lobbied for Cyber Command to be taken out of Strategic Command as it would allow more control over its strategic priorities and budget measures which he believes  will allow it to better respond to cyber threats.

Pushing a new model for public–private cyber partnerships

At the heart of the new Australian Cyber Security Strategy is a new paradigm for public–private engagement on cyber security. Business has been elevated from ‘partner’ to ‘co-leader’ in the new ‘National Cyber Partnership’ to jointly drive implementation of the Strategy. The Strategy quite rightly appreciates the criticality of engaging the combined skills, expertise and capabilities of the public and private sectors to manage cyber threats and reap the economic rewards of connectivity.

In the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy, the Government claimed leadership of national cyber security, noting that it was best placed to ‘identify the strategic threats and emerging challenges of Australia’s cyber security’. The 2016 Strategy has retreated from this hubristic statement and introduced new language that invites business to co-lead and co-design initiatives such as new voluntary standards, jointly operate new cyber threat sharing centres, and undertake combined cyber incident exercises. It reflects a more sophisticated approach to engaging the owners and operators of the majority of Australia’s cyber infrastructure.

The Government has already taken steps to enable digital growth, digital innovation and expansion of the national cyber security industry through initiatives such as the previously announced Cyber Security Growth Centres. This Strategy links with the National Innovation and Science Agenda by engaging the private and research sectors to design courses that produce work-ready graduates and attract more people to cyber security and related careers.

It’s been unclear to many on the outside looking in exactly who in Government they should be talking to, and when, about cyber security. The Strategy has sought to address this with the creation of two new leadership positions, the Minister Assisting the PM and the Special Advisor to the PM on Cyber Security. These positions will be critical for leading the successful implementation of the Strategy, and their ability and willingness to meaningfully engage with the private sector will be significant factor in its eventual success or failure. The additional funding to the tune of $21.5 million over five years for CERT Australia is also a welcome boost to the important work CERT Australia does in engaging Australian business and critical infrastructure operators.

When the creation of the ACSC was announced in 2013, it was heralded as an opportunity to engage the private sector in government’s cyber security operations, however its location in ASIO’s secure building was less than inspired. The announcement of the transfer of the ACSC to a new facility in Canberra promises to unlock its unmet potential for greater private sector interaction. The new cyber threat sharing centres in capital cities and the online cyber threat sharing portal should also assist in integrating public and private sector information. To be truly successful they will require government to provide meaningful, actionable information in a timely manner, and the private sector to also engage in a constructive exchange of information.

Other initiatives announced in the Strategy will also better enable the private sector to manage cyber threats and embrace opportunities for digital economic growth. Voluntary Cyber Security Governance ‘health checks’ for ASX 100 companies will seek to provide constructive organisational change and make cyber security a board-level issue. While small businesses received less focus than the top-end of town, they’ve received a small boost with promised funding for pen testing. That will not only encourage small businesses to be more resilient to cyber threats, but also help further develop the Australian cyber security industry. This industry offers significant export opportunities for Australia and the Strategy supports its growth in several ways—including the growth of a skilled workforce.

While the initiatives announced in the Strategy promise a new era of public–private partnership on cyber security in Australia, there are some old hurdles that must be overcome. Business has often lost interest in engaging with government, as the cost often appears to outweigh the benefits. Without clear articulation of government’s policy goals it’s hard for business to stay engaged in the often laborious processes that government imposes on itself (PDF). The success of the new Strategy and its promised new partnership with the private sector will rely on government clearly stating its policy intent and purpose, and sustaining engagement with the private sector now that the review process has concluded.  

Embracing the private sector to share in decisions that shape the national approach to cyber security will create better overall outcomes for both sectors, and should also provide for better co-investment in cyber initiatives. The Strategy has opened the door to a new model for the public–private partnership to enhance Australia’s cyber security to reap the economic benefits that lay in wait in cyberspace. It’s now up to cross-sectoral leadership to deliver the goods.

Apple versus the State: the end of the beginning

Image courtesy of Flickr user Eric Fidler

With a war of words akin to the build-up to a heavyweight boxing match, the highly anticipated courtroom battle between Apple and the FBI was called off, leaving fight fans without a clear cut understanding of who had won or lost. Just hours before the court case was to commence, the US Department of Justice announced that they postponed due to a ‘third party’ demonstrating a viable technique for accessing the iPhone that belonged to one of the San Bernardino shooters.

Despite some headlines stating that the ‘encryption battle’ was now over, the opposite is true. We’re only at the beginning of what is shaping up to be a second crypto war. The fall out of this incident will be drawn out and messy, with clear cut winners hard to identify.

The first and most obvious outcome is that relations between the US law enforcement community and the US tech industry are going to be fragile at best, insurmountably riven at worst. Post-Snowden, it’s taken a great deal of effort to re-establish trust and rebuild productive relationships. Clearly relationships between the private sector and US government have been tarnished by the case. With so many companies strongly supporting Apple’s stance, it’s difficult to imagine that they will be less wary of future US government requests for assistance.

What did Apple’s relationship with the State look like before the court case? While Apple haven’t highlighted their previous cooperation with the FBI and the White House, they have at times enjoyed strong collaboration, especially—and ironically—when working together to persuade China against adopting strong new anti-encryption policies. The FBI has agents assigned to work with Apple. Tim Cook had contributed money to both of Obama’s presidential campaigns, and has met with White House officials at least 14 times since 2010. It’s hard to envisage such a degree of cooperation returning for some time.

Second, it’s likely that the quality and standard of encryption will be raised by the tech industry. The public’s increased awareness of what encryption is and its benefits for their privacy will further complicate the government’s access to encrypted data. Having found a way into the iPhone, the FBI have shown that they can circumvent Apple’s much-lauded security. You can guarantee that Apple’s finest minds are attempting to decipher how the FBI hacked the phone in order to ‘plug’ that hole quickly. And now that we know that a security vulnerability exists, it’s certain that the world’s white and black hat hacker communities and private sector entities are also focused on finding it.

While FBI officials have outlined their thinking on when they decide to disclose a flaw, they are clearly in no hurry to share their discovery with Apple, demonstrated by the fact that they have already offered to unlock another iPhone belonging to two teenagers accused of murder.

All of this points towards a competition between the private sector and the FBI in relation to encryption, which surely can’t be a healthy platform from which to reach any sort of consensus and cooperation in the future.

Third, the second crypto war is now coming squarely to the attention of the US Congress who are now taking their first steps towards providing a legal framework around the issue. Since December 2015, Senators have been drafting an encryption bill that would apparently authorise federal judges to order tech companies to provide encrypted data to law enforcement. But with the way that encryption is heading, there are questions around whether compliance will even be possible. Other efforts in the House of Representatives have been made to study the intricacies of encryption in order to understand the unintended consequences of legislative responses. That of all points towards an energised political debate and a Congress that’s looking to act.

As Obama so sagely advised in a recent talk, now’s the time to be thinking about appropriate legislative changes. He rightly stated that in the wake of major terrorist attacks or major acts of crime, the public’s positon sways in favour of strong law enforcement agencies and could result in ‘sloppy’ and poorly crafted legislation on encryption being pushed through the political cycle. We can be absolutely certain that this is unlikely to be the last time a law enforcement agency tries to compel a tech company to help bypass security measures.

So what’s happening in Australia in relation to this issue? Both of Australia’s major political parties explicitly rejected a Senate motion calling on the Government to support public use of strong encryption technologies, in a move that coincided with the Apple case in March. The Attorney-General George Brandis also spoke on the issue, stating that he would ‘expect that all order of courts should be obeyed by any party which is the subject of a lawful order by a court.’ Yet he acknowledged that encryption’s ability to make certain evidence inaccessible is a serious problem for law enforcement. We know that Prime Minister Turnbull himself is a fan of encrypted communications, however he’s also fully cognisant of the challenges that face the national security community. So it’s hard to know exactly where he might fall on the issue.

What’s certain is that we need to have a focused debate on what will be a key security issue over the coming years, between public and private sectors: a conversation that ASPI’s ICPC will support and facilitate.

Cyber wrap

Bangkok Ultraviolet Project

Last week, the US Senate approved the CISA or Cyber Security Information Sharing Act. Among the bill’s main provisions is a proposal to expand liability protections to companies that voluntarily share threat information with the government. The bill managed to evade a series of last minute privacy amendments, passing with strong bipartisan support in a 74–21 vote. Congress will now have to work to reconcile the differences between CISA and a similar, earlier version of the bill, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act, which passed the House in April. Once the two have been merged, the White House is expected to rubber stamp the finished product.

The New York Times has published an interesting piece on the issue of export controls on surveillance technology. Last month two men were fined by the US Department of Commerce for illegally exporting surveillance technology to Syria via an elaborate Middle East distribution network. The US has enacted specific bans on the export of American surveillance technology to both Syria and Iran, where it’s feared they can be deployed to crackdown on dissidents and opposition parties. But moves to introduce a wider licencing arrangement for the export of surveillance technology have been met with stiff resistance by the US tech sector. Other countries including Germany and Switzerland successfully passed mandatory licensing laws on the export of surveillance technology earlier this year, and in September the European Parliament agreed to a non-binding resolution calling for similar tech safeguards.

Japan’s Minister in charge of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games recently met with the head of the London Olympics organising committee, Sebastian Coe. The get-together aimed to share insights into the types of cyber-attacks tackled during the 2012 games and to communicate lessons learnt with the Tokyo 2020 organising committee. The meet follows the announcement that the Tokyo Metropolitan government will establish its own computer security incident response team (CSIRT) to assist in the protection of critical infrastructure in the lead-up to and during the games.

Chinese hackers behind the breach were motivated by a desire to understand how the US delivers health care, say insiders close to the investigation of the Anthem health insurance hack. The Chinese government has vowed to provide universal access to healthcare by 2020 but there’s widespread frustration domestically as to the quality, availability and cost of care. While Chinese intelligence agencies might have been interested in US government employee information, it’s believed that the theft of intellectual property and trade secrets was the main target for the infiltration. A US government official told the Financial Times, ‘Knowledge is power. How is it set up? What are they insuring? Why is this procedure covered but not that one? All of that is useful information.’

Last week Thai military chiefs publically called for the creation of a whole-of-government body to help ensure ‘cyber readiness’ at the national level. Special adviser to the permanent secretary for the Defence Ministry General Bunjerd Tientongdee warned that Thailand only maintained preparedness within the military and the Information and Communications Technology Ministry. Deputy chief of the Air Forces’ Cyber Warfare Division called for the creation of a ‘one-stop service’ to handle national cybersecurity issues. Earlier in the week Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha moved to distance Thailand’s military cyber set-up from the controversial ‘single gateway’ proposal after new questions were raised by the public surrounding the militaries involvement in domestic surveillance.

Cyber wrap

iOS apps

Following up on last week’s cliffhanger, the Safe Harbour agreement was deemed invalid by the European Court of Justice. For the last 15 years, this agreement has allowed the transfer of EU data across the Atlantic by US businesses, based on corporate self-regulation. EU concerns over the US approach to data privacy were exacerbated by the Snowden saga, and undoubtedly contributed to the recent decision. This verdict has potentially significant implications for the more than 3,000 businesses in Europe and the US that depended on the agreement.

In the wake of last month’s historic agreement on cyber security between the US and China, the Washington Post reported this week that China has arrested several suspected hackers at the request of the US. The US identified the culprits as guilty of stealing US commercial secrets and they were arrested by the Chinese two weeks before Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington DC. This move is a far cry from the normal denials; however it’s unclear whether the arrests demonstrate a lasting policy change or simply a short-term strategy to avoid Obama’s threatened sanctions.

In a Clinton-esque move, new PM Malcolm Turnbull has come under fire for sending official emails from a private server, separate to Parliamentary systems. Greens Senator Scott Ludlum has called for an audit of the server, and criticised the PM for making the role of Government cyber security experts more difficult. Commentators have drawn parallels between this scandal and Hillary Clinton’s use of a private server to handle classified information during her time as Secretary of State. Keenly aware of cyber security threats, Turnbull has denied his communication involved restricted information. The Parliamentary network has in the past been the subject of numerous attempts by hackers to extract sensitive data from members and ministers.

The Internet of Things promises to change the way people interact with cyberspace. Harbor Research has produced a handy infographic which illustrates the potential impact of the growing ubiquity of digital sensors in everyday items.

Cisco researchers have successfully disrupted a group of cyber criminals operating the infamous Angler Exploit Kit. One of the most advanced ransomware on the market, Angler EK restricts a user’s access to their system, often through encryption, demanding payment in exchange for data restoration. The investigators at the company’s Talos Security Unit noticed that the majority of Angler victims were connected to a Limestone Networks server and after a process of server examination with the cooperation of Limestone it was discovered that the operation was exploiting up to 90,000 users every day. The exposed operation was responsible for up to half of all Angler Exploit Kit activity and is estimated to have been generating up to US$30 million of revenue every year.

The recent spotlight on automotive cybersecurity hasn’t gone unnoticed in Canada. The Canadian Government is making moves to secure its cars by offering a contract for the fortification of the electronic control units (ECUs) of government and military vehicles against cyber threats. A Tender Notice titled ‘Cybersecurity of Automotive Systems’ was released last week, emphasising the ‘need to study the security of automotive vehicles, including understanding their vulnerabilities and assessing the potential mitigation measures’. Defence Research and Development Canada is offering up to US$825,000 for the job.

The Great Firewall seems to still be up and running, with Apple News being blocked in China. The new app, officially launched in the US and under testing in the UK and Australia, can be accessed around the world by travelling iPhone users, even in Hong Kong. However, when connecting from within mainland China, the app presents the message: ‘Story Unavailable: News isn’t supported in your current region’. The source of the block is unclear, however it’s being suggested that Apple is self-censoring in order to comply with China’s restrictive media laws. China is Apple’s second largest consumer and made sales of over US$13 billion in the third quarter.

It’s been an interesting week for smartphone cyber hygiene. Apple has cleaned out its iOS App store of several programs that were capable of disrupting the encrypted connections between servers and users. The nefarious apps install root certificates in smartphones, enabling the monitoring of personal data. Apple has urged its users to delete these apps in order to protect their privacy, however has neglected to disclose the apps’ names, making this advice difficult to follow. In Washington, the White House has decided not to pursue legislation that would force tech companies to install ‘backdoors’ in their encryption software. The overruling of this law is seen as a victory for privacy advocates; however this fight between law enforcement imperatives and customer privacy has been going on since the mid-90s and is far from over.

Cyber wrap

News that Malcolm Turnbull became Australia’s 29th Prime Minister this week was met with excitement from Australia’s ICT industry. Turnbull, who was an early investor in Australian ISP OzEmail and several other internet businesses has spoken of the need to develop a ‘culture of innovation’ based on ‘clear and detailed education, innovation and technology policies that are funded adequately.’ Turnbull’s knowledge of technology issues certainly eclipses that of any previous PM and is an exciting proposition for the development of Australia’s whole of government cyber policy.

Republican Presidential candidate Jeb Bush has become the first major candidate to release a cybersecurity plan. While Bush’s five-point plan is fairly light on details, mainly sticking to broad themes and statements, there are a couple of interesting points of note. In the plan Bush calls for the US to maintain ‘oversight’ of ICANN, the body charged with managing the Internet’s domain name system and wider IANA functions. But Bush may have already missed the boat. November’s US election date falls after the Department of Commerce’s revised privatisation date of September 2016. Bush also backs the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, currently stalled in the Senate and calls on President Obama to help clear the deadlock. According to both Republican and Democratic staffers, Bush may have missed this boat too, with both parties rumoured to be keen to put the measure to a vote in early- to mid-October.

The Foreign and Defence Ministers of Australia and South Korea pledged to deepen cyber cooperation during their recent 2+2 meeting. A joint statement from the dialogue pinpoints CERT to CERT and policing cooperation as avenues ripe for deepened bilateral cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum and APCERT for multi-lateral collaboration. The Minsters recommitted to holding an annual defence and foreign bilateral meeting; given that both countries are regional ICT leaders, cyber security should continue to feature in discussions.

Programmer and creator of the McAfee anti-virus program, John McAfee has announced he is running for the US Presidency. McAfee, who has created his own ‘Cyber Party’ is running on a privacy protection platform. You can check out his YouTube launch video, complete with green screen here.

The US and China concluded their much anticipated four day cyber dialogue over the weekend. Chinese media reported that that countries ‘reached an important consensus on combatting cybercrime’ while the US remained slightly more demur about the meeting. According to the White House, US national security adviser Susan Rice had a ‘frank and open exchange about cyber issues’ with Meng Jianzhu, Secretary of China’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, which oversees law enforcement agencies. The Chinese delegation also visited the State, Justice and Treasury departments plus the FBI and Homeland Security.

But it seems the largest takeaway from the weekend meetings is that the White House will put a hold on the roll out of planned sanctions against Chinese companies and individuals tied to US intellectual property theft. The sanctions, which are the manifestation of ongoing US frustration over what it sees as illegitimate targeting of industry, were reportedly going to be rolled out this week, directly before President Xi’s landmark visit to the US next week. According to an administration source, assurances made by the Chinese delegation to curb economic espionage during an all-night meeting on Friday were enough for the US to postpone the sanctions, at least until after Xi’s visit.

Cyber wrap

Night View with Tokyo Tower Special Lightup <Invitation for 2020 Olympic Games>

The Japanese Government formally adopted its new Cybersecurity Strategy last Friday. The Strategy outlines the directions of Japanese cybersecurity policy as the country approaches the 2020 Olympics and Paralympics in Tokyo, and faces the challenges of a rising China. The Strategy’s ultimate objective is to ensure a free, fair and secure cyberspace—balancing the need for security with freedom of access and expression.

The cyber threats posed to the Tokyo Olympics are at the forefront of the Strategy, which notes that extensive public, private and academic cooperation will be required to develop secure networks from the ground up, particularly as the interface between cyberspace and physical objects grows with the ‘Internet of Things’. This includes the recommendation that corporations position their Chief Information Security Officers at suitably senior levels to adequately make the changes necessary for more secure networks. Public-private partnerships are also noted as critical for the security of Japan’s critical information infrastructure (CII), as is better information sharing between government agencies and CII operators. The Strategy was released for comment in May this year, and was originally due for release in June, but was delayed to incorporate the lessons learned from the Japan Pension Service hack.

Meanwhile, the Australian cyber community will be waiting until late October for the Australian Cyber Security Review to be released, according to a Prime Minister & Cabinet spokesperson. The launch of the Strategy will reportedly follow closely after the fourth annual Cyber Security Challenge Australia on 30 September. The Challenge is a public-private event for Australian tertiary students to test their cyber security skills and engage with key government and private sector cyber security leaders.

Competitors in the Cyber Security Challenge may one day be press-ganged into national cyber service if Australian Information Security Association executive James Turner’s proposal to nationalise the Australian cyber security industry is adopted. Turner’s proposal would see the role of the Australian Cyber Security Centre expand, and the pooling of cyber security expertise to provide a critical mass to support government and private sector cyber security. While suggestions like this seem extreme, governments around the world may start to consider similar measures to tackle this increasingly expensive problem. The US is reportedly planning to spend US$14 billion on government cybersecurity in the 2015-2016 financial year, while corporate entities will spend US$31.5 billion in the same timeframe, but the vulnerability of both sectors  to hackers is unlikely to decrease any time soon.

Australia and India’s bilateral cyber policy and security engagement took another forward step last month as the first Australia–India Cyber Policy Dialogue concluded successfully in New Delhi. Announced as part of the Framework for Security Cooperation agreed by Prime Ministers Modi and Abbott last November, the Dialogue reportedly discussed the ‘full range’ of cyber issues including threat perceptions and government cyber security arrangements, and international cyber security policy, governance and cybercrime cooperation. Notably, the two national CERT teams signed a framework to enhance their operational collaboration for information sharing and incident response. The Modi government’s Digital India programme was also discussed at the Dialogue—an initiative that seeks to increase internet penetration to enable the delivery of core government services through high speed internet connections. However, India is facing the same cyber skills shortages as many other nations, requiring an estimated 1 million cyber security professionals by 2025 to meet its goals, from its current base of 62,000.

When states strike back—national responses to cyber incidents

Keyboard & Mouse

As states become less inhibited about utilising cyber as a component of state power, policymakers will be increasingly challenged to develop proportionate responses to disruptive or destructive attacks. Already, there’s been significant pressure to ‘do something’ in light of the allegedly state-sponsored attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment, the Sands Casino in Las Vegas and Saudi Aramco. But finding a timely, proportionate, legal and discriminatory response is complicated by the difficulty in assessing the damage to national interests and the frequent use of proxies. Perpetrators have plausible deniability, frustrating efforts to assign responsibility. Past experience suggests that most policy responses have been ad hoc.

In determining the appropriate response to a state-sponsored cyber incident, policymakers will need to consider three variables: the intelligence community’s confidence in its attribution of responsibility, the impact of the incident and the levers of national power at a state’s disposal. While these variables will help guide responses to a disruptive or destructive cyberattack, policymakers will also need to take two steps before an incident occurs. First, they will need to work with the private sector to determine the effect of an incident on their operations. Second, governments need to develop a menu of pre-planned response options and assess the potential impact of any response on political, economic, intelligence and military interests.

Even as the number of highly disruptive and destructive cyberattacks grows, governments remain unprepared to respond adequately. In other national security areas, policy responses to state-sponsored activity are well established. For example, a country can expel diplomats in response to a spying scandal, issue a demarche if a country considers its sovereignty to have been violated, and use force in response to an armed attack. Clear and established policy responses such as these don’t yet exist for cyberattacks for two reasons. First, assessing the damage caused by a cyber incident is difficult. It can take weeks, if not months, for computer forensics experts to accurately and conclusively ascertain the extent of the damage done to an organisation’s computer networks. For example, it took roughly two weeks for Saudi authorities to understand the extent of the damage of the Shamoon incident, which erased data on 30,000 of Saudi Aramco’s computers. Although this may be quick by computer forensics standards, a military can conduct a damage assessment from a non-cyber incident in as little as a few hours.

Second, attributing cyber incidents to their sponsor remains a significant challenge. Masking the true origins of a cyber incident is easy—states often use proxies or compromised computers in other jurisdictions to hide their tracks. For example, a group calling itself the Cyber Caliphate claimed responsibility for taking French television station TV5 Monde off the air with a cyberattack in April 2015, and used the television station’s social media accounts to post content in support of the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Two months later French media reported that Russian state-sponsored actors, not pro–Islamic State groups, were likely behind the incident. Even when attribution is possible, it isn’t guaranteed that domestic or foreign audiences will believe the claim unless officials reveal potentially classified methods used to determine the identity of the perpetrator, damaging intelligence assets in the process. Under pressure, responses are likely to be made quickly with incomplete evidence and to attract a high degree of public skepticism. This creates clear risks for policymakers. Quick damage assessments could lead to an overestimation of the impact of an incident, causing a state to respond disproportionately. Misattributing an incident could cause a response to be directed at the wrong target, creating a diplomatic crisis.

Policymakers should consider three variables before developing a response. First, they should understand the level of confidence that their intelligence agencies have in attributing the incident. Although there have been great strides in the ability of intelligence agencies to attribute malicious activity, digital forensics aren’t perfect. The degree of attributional certainty will have a direct impact on the action taken. For example, if the level of attribution is low, policymakers will be limited in their choice of response even if the severity of the attack is high. They may choose a less valuable retaliatory target to limit the odds of escalation and international criticism. There may also be instances where there’s such little evidence for the source of the attack that the victim may choose not to respond.

Second, policymakers should assess the cyber incident’s effects on physical infrastructure, society, the economy and national interests. Questions include: What was the physical damage caused by the affected systems, and was there any impact to critical infrastructure? What type of essential services are affected? Has the incident caused a significant loss of confidence in the economy? What was the incident’s impact on national security and the country’s reputation?

Third, policymakers should consider the range of diplomatic, economic and military responses at their disposal, from a quiet diplomatic rebuke to a military strike. Responses need not be limited to cyberspace—nothing bars a state from using other channels, though each carries its own risks.

Cyber responses can be taken in addition to diplomatic, economic and military activity. However, they would most often be delivered covertly and could be difficult to develop quickly unless a government had prepared capability against a specific target, likely involving prior cyber espionage, an unparalleled understanding of a target’s vulnerabilities and a custom exploit kit at its disposal. As an example, Stuxnet reportedly took years to develop and deploy. An overt cyber response can be unappealing as states may lose the ability to launch similar responses against other targets. Although states may outsource their responses to a proxy, doing so could limit their control over the response and lead to escalatory activity. Therefore, policymakers are likely to concentrate on other levers of power, alongside whatever they may do covertly.

Given the pressure governments will feel to respond to significant cyberattacks, policymakers need to develop a response framework before a disruptive or destructive cyber incident occurs. Although each response will be case specific, a framework will enable policymakers to quickly consider their options. I suggest such a framework for response in a publication released today with the Council for Foreign Relations.